Ketubot 54a (נד.) — the Talmud in English

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Is it to be said that

since she does not have

a

כתובה, she does not have

a daughter

sustenance,

as this is a condition of the ketuba,

or perhaps, it was her mother who committed a transgression [

who did something forbidden ]—

the Sages penalized her

by denying her a ketuba, but

she,

the daughter,

who did not commit a transgression, the Sages did not penalize her?

And we conclude:

teiku [the question remains unresolved].

Rava raised a dilemma: The daughter of a betrothed woman,

that is, a man had intercourse with his betrothed, she bore him a daughter, and he died, leaving sons: does she

have the right to sustenance, or does she not have the right to sustenance?

The sides of the uncertainty are: Is it to be said that

since she has

the betrothed woman

a ketuba,

for example, where he wrote her a ketuba at the time of betrothal , or because of the enactment of the Sages that a betrothed woman has a ketuba, even though it is not written until the time of marriage—

she has

the right to sustenance,

or perhaps, since the Sages did not enact

that it be

written until the time of marriage,

even the conditions of the ketuba do not take effect until the time of marriage, and therefore

she does not have it?

And we conclude:

teiku [the question remains unresolved].

Rav Pappa raised a dilemma: The daughter

of a woman who was raped,

that is, a man raped a young woman and subsequently married her, as it is written: “He shall take her to be his wife”; she bore him a daughter, and he died: does she

have the right to sustenance

from the brothers,

or does she not have the right to sustenance?

According to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, you need not raise the dilemma, as he said

that if the husband dies,

she has a ketuba of one hundred dinars

from his property, even though he had already given the young woman’s father one hundred silver coins after raping her. If so, certainly the daughter has the right to sustenance, as all the laws of a ketuba apply to her.

You need raise the dilemma only according to the opinion of the Sages, who say: The money of her fine discharges

his obligation under her ketuba,

and he is no longer obligated to pay her ketuba.

What is the ruling?

Is it to be said that

since she does not have a ketuba,

she also does not have the conditions of a ketuba, and therefore

she does not have

the daughter

sustenance,

or perhaps,

it is specifically the

ketuba

itself that she does not have, as

what is the reason

that they enacted a ketuba for her?

So that she would not be insignificant in his eyes to divorce! But he cannot divorce her

the raped woman, as it is written: “He may not send her away all his days.” Therefore she does not have a ketuba. But she does have the other conditions of a ketuba, which were not enacted for this reason,

and we conclude:

teiku [the question remains unresolved].

We learned in our Mishna:

“You shall reside in my house, etc.”

Rav Yosef taught:

From what is written in the ketuba: “You shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property throughout the period of your widowhood while you remain in my house,” the word “in my house” appears twice. We infer that

“in my house”

is specifically required: If the father had a house, the sons may not say to her, “Go to your father’s house, and we will provide for you there.” Rather, they must provide her with housing appropriate to her honor in the house their father bequeathed.

But

not in my shack —

that is, if their father bequeathed them a shack , a narrow and small house, they may say to her, “Leave us,” since “You shall reside in my house” is written in the ketuba, but not “in my shack.”

But she does have the right to sustenance

in her father’s house, from the father’s property. We do not say that since the provision written in the ketuba, “You shall reside in my house,” is not fulfilled, the provision “and be sustained from my property” is not fulfilled either.

Mar bar Rav Ashi said: She does not even have the right to sustenance.

And the halakha is not in accordance with Mar bar Rav Ashi.

Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said:

A widow who

was asked to marry and agreed—

this is no longer considered “the period of your widowhood,” and

she does not have

any further

right to sustenance.

And we raised a difficulty:

If she did not agree,

even if the reason she delays marrying is not concern for her husband’s honor, but rather that the man who proposed to her is unsuitable for her—

does she have the right to sustenance?

Rav Anan said: For me, it was explained to me by Mar Shmuel himself:

If

she said,

the widow, “I do not want to marry”

because of my particular husband—

she has the right to sustenance.

But if she said that she does not want to marry

because of people who are unsuitable for her—

she does not have the right to sustenance.

Rav Ḥisda said: If she engaged in licentious relations

while she was living as a widow—

she does not have the right to sustenance.

Rav Yosef said: If she applied blue eye makeup and adorned herself—

she does not have the right to sustenance,

as she thereby revealed that she is not delaying marriage out of concern for her husband’s honor.

The one who says

that if she

engaged in licentious relations

she does not have the right to sustenance—

all the more so

in the case of

applying eye makeup and adorning herself,

she does not have the right to sustenance.

But

the one who says

that if she

applied eye makeup and adorned herself

she does not have the right to sustenance,

but if she engaged in licentious relations—

she does have

the right to sustenance.

What is the reason?

Because one may say that the reason she engaged in licentious relations was that

her inclination compelled her,

and not that her husband’s honor was unimportant to her.

And the halakha does not follow any of these teachings ,

but rather follows that which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: A woman who claims

her ketuba in court does not have the right to sustenance.

And we challenged this:

Is that so? But it was taught in a beraita: If she sold her ketuba, pledged her ketuba, or made

the land designated for her

ketuba an apotiki for another [

for one of her creditors ]—

she does not have the right to sustenance.

It follows that

in these cases, yes,

in these cases she indeed does not have the right to sustenance, because this is considered as though she had already collected her ketuba.

But

if she merely

claims

her ketuba in court—

she has not

lost her right to sustenance!

And we explain:

These cases, whether

she did so

in court

or

whether not in court,

she loses her right to sustenance.

But

one who claims

her ketuba, if she claimed it

in court—

yes,

indeed she does not have the right to sustenance. But if she claimed it

not in court—

no,

she does not lose her right to sustenance.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And so was the practice of the people of Jerusalem, etc.”

It was stated: Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the people of Judea. And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the people of Galilee .

Babylonia and all its surrounding towns [

the cities adjacent to it ]

follow Rav.

Nehardea and all its surrounding towns follow Shmuel.

There was a certain woman from Meḥoza [

Meḥoza is one of the surrounding towns of Babylonia ]

who was married to a

son of

Nehardea. They came before Rav Naḥman. He heard her voice [

Rav Naḥman recognized from her voice ]

that she was from Meḥoza. He said to them: Babylonia and all its surrounding towns follow Rav!

They said to him: But she is married to a man from Nehardea [

she is married to a son of Nehardea ]!

He said to them: If so,

then

Nehardea and all its surrounding towns follow Shmuel!

And how far

is an area considered

Nehardea?

As far as the Nehardea kav measure is used.

That is, everywhere grain is measured using the Nehardea kav measure.

It was stated: With regard to a widow, Rav said:

When the court collects her ketuba for her, it

appraises

that which is

upon her,

that is, the clothing she is wearing, as part of payment of her ketuba.

And Shmuel said: They do not appraise that which is upon her.

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said: And the reverse—

that is, they disagree in the opposite manner—

in the case of a hired laborer.

That is, a hired worker who lives in his employer’s house, and whose employer purchased clothing for him: according to Shmuel, the clothing is appraised as part of his wages, while according to Rav, it is not appraised.

Rav Kahana taught: And likewise in the case of a hired laborer.

Rav and Shmuel also disagree in the case of a hired laborer in the same way that they disagree in the case of a widow.

And Rav set down

a

mnemonic

for his statement:

“An orphan” [

a hired laborer ]

and “a widow”—

“Strip off and go” [

remove their garments and leave ].

Rav Naḥman said: Although we learned in the Mishna in accordance with Shmuel,

nevertheless

the halakha is in accordance with Rav.

As we learned: Whether one who consecrates his property, or one who appraises

himself,

and the treasurer comes to take the property, or comes to collect the assessed value of the one who appraised himself,

he has no

property that the treasurer may take

from the clothing of his wife, or from the clothing of his children

of the one who consecrated his property or appraised himself,

nor from clothing that he dyed

for

their sake,

that is, clothing that he dyed for his wife and children, even though they had not yet used it,

nor from new sandals that he purchased for their sake.

It is apparent from here that the clothing she is wearing is not appraised, in accordance with Shmuel!

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: But since we learned in the Mishna in accordance with Shmuel, why is the halakha in accordance with Rav?

He said to him: At first glance—

it runs like Shmuel.

That is, the straightforward meaning of the Mishna is in accordance with Shmuel. But

when you examine it—

the halakha is in accordance with Rav.

What is the reason?

When he gave her

the clothing,

he gave it to her with the intention that she remain before him,

that is, for as long as she remained married to him. But

with the intention that she take it and leave [

that she take the clothing and leave ]—

he did not give it to her.

This is not comparable to the Mishna concerning one who consecrates his property or appraises himself.

The daughter-in-law of the house of bar Elisha was claiming her ketuba from the orphans.

They were bringing her

the orphans

to the court [

the orphans brought her to the court ].

They said

to her:

“It is degrading to us that you should go dressed like this” [

it is not honorable for us that you should go in these garments ].

She went, put them on, and covered herself with all the clothing [

she went and put on all her garments ].

They came before Ravina, and he said to them: The halakha is in accordance with Rav, who said: A widow’s clothing is appraised,

and here too, the clothing she was wearing is appraised as part of payment of her ketuba.

There was a certain man who said to them

in the instructions of a person on his deathbed:

“A dowry for my daughter” [

the daughters’ dowries and jewelry were fixed in amount: so many garments ].

In the end,

the dowry

was reduced in value:

the dowry.

Rav Idi bar Avin said: The profit [

the gain ]

belongs to the orphans,

and we do not say that they must give her the value of the dowry according to the value it had on the day of the instructions.