Ketubot 53b (נג:) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to them: Go and tell him:

Your favor is taken—

and cast upon thorns.

Meaning, do you think that we will be grateful to you for the report you conveyed? Your favor is removed—and cast upon thorns! For

Rav Hoshaya already interpreted his teaching in Babylonia,

and already stated this matter!

We learned in our Mishna:

the daughters who will be born to you

from me, etc. [

they shall live in my house and be sustained from my property until they are taken by men].

Rav taught

in the Mishna:

“until they are taken by men,”

as it is written in our Mishna.

And Levi taught: “until they reach maturity.”

And we raise a difficulty: Does

according to

the view of

Rav—

even though she reaches maturity [

that she has reached maturity]—she will still be sustained from his property? Maturity removes her from her father’s authority!

And

according to the view of

Levi—

even though she has married

she will be sustained?!

And we explain:

Rather, if she reaches maturity but has not married,

or

if she marries but has not reached maturity, everyone agrees

that she is certainly not sustained.

They disagree—

with regard to a betrothed woman who has not

yet reached maturity. Rav holds that even a betrothed woman is included in “until they are taken by men,” and therefore she is not sustained.

Levi holds that only if she reaches maturity or marries, thereby leaving her father’s authority completely, as she does upon reaching maturity, is she not sustained. But a betrothed woman is sustained.

And Levi likewise taught in his collection of Mishnayot [

which he arranged the six orders in the manner of Rabbi Hiyya and Rabbi Oshaya]:

“until they reach maturity, and the time arrives for them to marry [

and the time arrives for them to marry. That is, twelve months for a virgin from the time her husband-to-be demanded that she marry] .”

And we raise a difficulty: Is it necessary that specifically

both

things occur—that they reach maturity and that the time arrives for them to marry? And we explain:

Rather, either they reach maturity, or the time arrives for them to marry.

In any event, it is apparent from here that it is specifically when she marries that she loses her sustenance, but a betrothed woman is entitled to sustenance.

And we say: This question—whether a betrothed woman whose husband died is entitled to sustenance—

is

a dispute among

the tannaim

:

As it is taught:

Until when is a daughter sustained—

until she is betrothed.

They said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: Until she reaches maturity.

Rav Yosef taught: “Until they are

taken by men.”

They raised a dilemma before them:

Is the reference to

the state of being betrothed, or

perhaps to

the state of being married?

And we conclude:

Teyku.

Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Yosef: Have you heard from Rav Yehuda

whether an orphaned

betrothed daughter is entitled to sustenance

from the brothers,

or

perhaps

is she not entitled to sustenance?

He said to him: It is apparent—

I have not heard

from Rav Yehuda.

Rather, based on reasoning—

she is not entitled

to sustenance.

For the reason that the Sages instituted that she should be sustained from the brothers is so that she would not have to go around soliciting from door to door. But here,

since he betrothed her,

the betrothed husband—certainly

does not want her to be disgraced,

and he will go and sustain her from his own resources, although the obligation is not imposed upon him.

He said to him,

Rav Ḥisda:

If it is apparent that you have not heard

explicitly from Rav Yehuda, on the contrary,

based on reasoning, she is entitled

to sustenance from the brothers! For

since he does not know her

the betrothed husband

from within [

as he is not familiar with her], and perhaps when he marries her he will find a blemish in her—

he will not throw money away for nothing [

he will not waste his money needlessly to sustain her when there is uncertainty].

Some say

the reverse:

At first

Rav Yosef said to him:

Rav Ḥisda,

it is apparent that I have not heard,

but

based on reasoning, she is entitled, since he does not know her—

he will not throw money away for nothing.

And

Rav Ḥisda said to him:

If it is apparent that you have not heard, based on reasoning she is not entitled, since he betrothed her—

he does not want her to be disgraced. [

Mnemonic: Men’s fish-bag, Zaraf, Maana, and a second yevama, a betrothed woman, and one who was violated ]

They asked Rav Sheshet: A girl who refuses,

that is, a minor orphan whom her brothers married off, and who refused her husband and returned to them—

is she entitled to sustenance

until she reaches maturity,

or is she not entitled to sustenance?

The sides of the dilemma are: Did her refusal uproot the marriage entirely from its outset, so that it is as though she was never married at all, or perhaps, ultimately she was married and thereby left her father’s authority?

Rav Sheshet said to them: You have learned it: A widow

from betrothal [for one widowed after marriage, she certainly is not entitled to sustenance] , who is

in her father’s house, and a divorcee

from betrothal

in her father’s house, and a yevama awaiting levirate marriage

from betrothal

in her father’s house—

is entitled to sustenance.

Rabbi Yehuda says: When she is

still

in her father’s house—

she is entitled to sustenance.

If she is not in her father’s house—

she is not entitled to sustenance.

And it is difficult:

Rabbi Yehuda—

is identical to the first tanna!

In what way does he disagree with him?

Rather, is it not—

the case of a girl who refuses is the difference between them. The first tanna holds: She is entitled to

sustenance, since she is like a widow from betrothal and the like, as she too is considered as though she had never been married, because she uprooted the marriage through her refusal.

And

there came

Rabbi Yehuda

and

held

that only when she is still in her father’s house, having never left it through marriage at all, is she entitled to sustenance. But if she left through marriage, even though she ultimately refused,

she is not entitled

to sustenance.

Reish Lakish raised a dilemma: A daughter of a

yevama,

that is, one who took his yevama in levirate marriage, and his yevama bore him a daughter, and he died—does she have sustenance from the brothers, from her father’s property,

or is she not entitled to sustenance?

The sides of the dilemma are: Shall we say that

since the master said

that the

ketubba

of a yevama is

against the property of her first husband,

the obligations of the conditions of the ketubba are also not imposed upon the second husband, and therefore

she is not entitled

to sustenance,

or perhaps, since if she has no

ketubba

from

the

first

husband, for example, if he has no property,

the Sages instituted for her

a ketubba

from the second

husband, so that she would not be insignificant in his eyes and he would divorce her,

she is entitled

to the conditions of the ketubba from him as well, meaning that her daughter is sustained from his property?

And we conclude:

Teyku.

Rabbi Elazar raised a dilemma: A daughter of a second-degree forbidden woman,

that is, one who married a woman from among the second-degree relatives, who are forbidden by rabbinic decree [and are listed in tractate Yevamot 21a], whose law is that she has neither a ketubba nor sustenance, and she bore him a daughter, and he died—does she

have sustenance

from his property,

or

perhaps

is she not entitled to sustenance?