Ketubot 49a — the Talmud in English

And

since this law—that she leaves the authority of the father when she is delivered to the agents of the husband—is learned from the verse, “to commit harlotry in her father’s house,”

say

that

where she returns to her father’s house [when she returned to her father’s house],

[when she returned to her father's home],

she returns to the original matter,

and if she committed harlotry, her punishment should be stoning!

Rava said: That matter,

that case, where she returned to her father’s house—

was already decided by the tannai of the school of Rabbi Ishmael,

that she does not return to be like one who was not delivered to the agents.

For the tannai of the school of Rabbi Ishmael

wrote:

“And the vow of a widow and a divorced woman—everything that she prohibited to herself shall stand against her.”

And now, what is the verse speaking about?

If it is speaking of a widow and a divorced woman from marriage,

what does it teach?

What is the novelty of this verse?

For is she not removed

from

the category of the father,

since she has already married,

and removed

also

from the category of the husband,

since she is a widow or a divorced woman? If so, certainly everything that she prohibited to herself shall stand against her!

Rather,

you are compelled to say that it is not speaking of a widow and a divorced woman from marriage, but from betrothal. And this is the meaning of the verse:

Suppose that the father delivered

his daughter

to the agents of the husband, or that the agents of the father delivered

the daughter

to the agents of the husband,

and she was widowed on the way, or

that she

was divorced

on the way.

How do I read it,

is she considered

the house of this woman’s father, or the house of this woman’s husband?

Rather, it is to tell you that

that

once she has left

the daughter

the authority of the father for even one moment, he can no longer annul

her vow, and we do not say that authority is restored to the father upon the husband’s death or through divorce, and that she returns to her father’s authority.

But when she is widowed from betrothal before she was delivered to the agents, we learned in Tractate Nedarim [70a] that authority is restored to the father, and he annuls her vow. This law is learned from the verses.

Rav Pappa said: We too have learned

this matter:

For thus we learned in the Mishna:

One who has intercourse with a betrothed maiden is not liable—

until she is a maiden, a virgin, betrothed, and she is in her father’s house.

And now,

granted

that what we learned, that she must be a maiden, means that the obligation of stoning applies specifically to a

maiden—

and not

to a

fully mature woman.

And what we learned, that she must be a virgin, means to tell you that her liability applies specifically when she is a

virgin—

and not

when she is

one who has had intercourse.

And what we learned,

betrothed—

and not married,

to exclude one who entered the wedding canopy but did not have intercourse. [For if she had intercourse already, we excluded one who has had intercourse through “virgin.”]

Rather, what we learned,

“in her father’s house”—

to exclude what? Is it not

[does it not]

to exclude a case where the father delivered her to the agents of the husband,

so that even if she returned to her father’s house, her punishment is strangulation, like that of a married woman—and not stoning, like that of a betrothed woman?!

Rav Naḥman bar Isaac said: We too have learned

this matter in our Mishna:

One who has intercourse with a married woman, once she has entered the authority of the husband for marriage, even though she has not had intercourse, one who has intercourse with her is subject to strangulation.

And from the fact that we learned “she entered the authority of the husband,” and we did not learn that she entered the wedding canopy,

learn from it

that even in such a case, where she returned to her father’s house, one who has intercourse with her is subject to strangulation.

Mishna:

The father is not liable for the sustenance of his daughter during his lifetime.

This is a homiletic exposition expounded by Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah

on the day they appointed him as president,

before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavne [they called the place this because they sat there in rows, like a vineyard]: There are two enactments that the Sages enacted in the conditions of the marriage contract:

[this was the name given to the place because they sat there in rows like a vineyard]: The Sages enacted two provisions as part of the conditions of the marriage contract:

A.

that

the sons shall inherit

the ketubat benei dikhrin [the “sons’ marriage-contract payment”; what it is will be explained below]. For this is what they write in the conditions of the marriage contract: “The male children that you will have from me, they shall inherit the money of your marriage contract beyond their share together with their brothers” [the male children that you will have from me, they shall inherit the money of your marriage contract beyond their share together with their brothers].

B.

And

that

the daughters shall be sustained.

For this is what they write in the conditions of the marriage contract: “The female children that you will have from me, they shall dwell in my house and be sustained from my property until they mature, or until they are taken by men” [the daughters that you will have from me, they shall dwell in my house and be sustained from my property until they mature, or until they marry].

Just as the sons do not inherit

the ketubat benei dikhrin

except after the father’s death,

for this is what is written in their marriage contract: “They shall inherit,” an expression of inheritance, which is after death,

so too the daughters are not sustained—

except after their father’s death.

But during his lifetime, he is not liable for their sustenance.

Gemara:

It follows from our Mishna that

with regard to the sustenance of his daughter—

it is he who is not liable. But with regard to the sustenance of his son—

he is liable.

And it further follows from our Mishna that with regard to

his daughter too, it is an obligation that is absent

to sustain her.

But a mitzva—

there is!

Who is the author of the Mishna?

It is not Rabbi Meir, not Rabbi Judah, and not Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka!

For it was taught in a beraita: It is a mitzva to sustain the daughters,

and

a kal va-chomer applies to the sons,

that it is a mitzva to sustain them,

because

they

engage in Torah study .

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says: It is a mitzva to sustain the sons, and a kal va-chomer applies to the daughters, because

of

disgrace

for them to go around soliciting at the doors.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: It is an obligation to sustain the daughters after their father’s death

as a condition of the marriage contract.

But during their father’s lifetime—

neither these nor those are sustained,

and there is not even a mitzva in this.

And now,

who is the author of the Mishna?

According to which view was our Mishna taught?

If it is Rabbi Meir, he said

that the

sons

are only

a mitzva

to sustain, and not an obligation. Whereas in our Mishna it follows that it is an obligation to sustain them!

If it is Rabbi Judah, he said

that it is a mitzva to sustain the daughters, and the

sons too

are only

a mitzva

to sustain, and not an obligation!

If it is Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

according to his view,

there is not even a mitzva

to sustain, whether the sons or the daughters!

And we answer:

If you wish, say:

Our Mishna is according to the view of

Rabbi Meir

is.

If you wish, say: It is Rabbi Judah,

and

if you wish, say: It is Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

And now the Gemara explains how it is possible to establish the words of our Mishna according to each of the tannaim mentioned above:

If you wish, say: It is Rabbi Meir

—

and this is what

the tannai in our Mishna said:

The father is not liable for the sustenance of his daughter, and the same law applies to his son,

that he is not liable for his sustenance.

But a mitzva—

there is with regard to his daughter,

and

a kal va-chomer applies to the sons

that there is a mitzva to sustain them, since they engage in Torah study.

And the reason that it teaches

in the Mishna that he is not liable for the sustenance of

his daughter,

is not so that we should infer from this that he is liable to sustain his son, but that if the tannai had stated that he is not liable for the sustenance of his son—so that it would follow from this that, in any event, there is a mitzva to sustain him—we would infer that with regard to his daughter there is not even a mitzva to sustain her, since she does not engage in Torah study.