Ketubot 49a (מט.) — the Talmud in English

And

since this law—that once she was delivered to the husband’s agents, she left her father’s authority—is learned from the verse, “to commit fornication in her father’s house,”

say

that

where she returns to her father’s house [when she returned to her father’s house],

[when she returned to her father's home],

she returns to the original status,

and if she committed fornication, her punishment should be stoning!

Rava said: That case,

the case in which she returned to her father’s house—

was already decided by the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael,

who taught that she does not revert to the status of one who was not delivered to the husband’s agents.

As the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written:

“And the vow of a widow or a divorced woman, everything that she prohibited to herself shall remain in force against her.”

And now, what is the verse discussing?

If it is referring to a widow or divorced woman who had been married,

what is the verse teaching?

What novelty is conveyed by this verse?

She has already left

the

authority of her father,

as she had already married,

and she has also left

the

authority of her husband,

as she is a widow or a divorcee; and if so, it is obvious that everything she prohibited to herself shall remain in force against her!

Rather,

you must say that the verse is not referring to a widow or divorcee who had been married, but to one who had been betrothed. And this is the meaning of the verse:

Suppose the father delivered

his daughter

to the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents delivered

the girl

to the husband’s agents,

and she was widowed on the way, or

she

divorced

on the way.

How do I regard her,

does she belong to

her father’s house or to her husband’s house?

Rather, this is to tell you

that

that once she has left

the daughter

her father’s authority for even a single moment, he can no longer annul

her vows; and we do not say that authority reverts to the father upon the husband’s death or upon divorce, so that she returns to her father’s authority.

But in a case where she was widowed during betrothal, before she was delivered to the husband’s agents, we learned in tractate Nedarim [folio 70a] that authority reverts to the father, and he may annul her vows. This law is derived from the verses.

Rav Pappa said: We too have learned

this matter:

For so we learned in the Mishna:

One who engages in intercourse with a betrothed na'ara is not liable—

until she is a na'ara, a virgin, betrothed, and in her father’s house.

And now,

granted

that what we learned, that she must be a na'ara, means that liability to stoning applies specifically to a

na'ara—

and not

to a

bogeret.

And what we learned, that she must be a virgin, means to tell you that her liability applies specifically when she is a

virgin—

and not

when she is

one who has had intercourse.

And what we learned, that she must be

betrothed—

and not married,

to exclude one who entered the bridal chamber but did not have intercourse. [For if she had intercourse, we have already excluded one who has had intercourse by the word “virgin.”]

Rather, what we learned,

“in her father’s house”—

what does this exclude? Is it not

[does it not]

to exclude one whom the father delivered to the husband’s agents,

so that even if she returned to her father’s house, her status is that of a married woman, and her punishment is strangulation—and not stoning, as in the case of a betrothed woman?!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too have learned

this matter in our Mishna:

With regard to one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, once she has entered the husband’s authority for marriage, even if she has not had intercourse, one who engages in intercourse with her is subject to strangulation.

And from the fact that we learned “entered the husband’s authority,” and did not say “entered the bridal chamber,”

infer from it

that even in such a case, where she returned to her father’s house, one who engages in intercourse with her is subject to strangulation.

Mishna:

The father is not obligated to provide for his daughter during his lifetime.

This was a teaching expounded by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya

on the day that he was appointed Nasi

before the Sages in the vineyard at Yavne [the place was called this because they sat there in rows, like a vineyard]: The Sages enacted two provisions in the conditions of the ketubah:

[this was the name given to the place because they sat there in rows like a vineyard]: The Sages enacted two provisions as part of the conditions of the marriage contract:

a.

that

the sons shall inherit

the ketubat banin dikhrin [the sons’ inheritance of their mother’s ketubah; what this is will be explained below]. For this is what is written in the conditions of the ketubah: “The male children that you will have from me shall inherit the money of your ketubah in addition to their share with their brothers” [the male children that you will have from me shall inherit the money of your ketubah in addition to their share with their brothers].

b.

and

that

the daughters shall be provided for.

For this is what is written in the conditions of the ketubah: “The female children that you will have from me shall remain in my house and be provided for from my property until they mature, or until they marry” [the female children that you will have from me shall remain in my house and be provided for from my property until they mature, or until they marry].

Just as the sons do not inherit

the ketubat banin dikhrin

until after the father’s death,

as it is written in their ketubah: “They shall inherit,” an expression of inheritance, which takes effect after death,

so too, the daughters are not provided for—

except after their father’s death.

But during his lifetime, he is not obligated to provide for them.

Gemara:

It is implied by our Mishna that

with regard to providing for his daughter—

it is that he is not obligated. But with regard to providing for his son—

he is obligated.

It is further implied by our Mishna that with regard to

his daughter as well, it is only an obligation that is absent

to provide for her.

But a mitzva

does exist!

Who is the author of the Mishna?

It is neither Rabbi Meir, nor Rabbi Yehuda, nor Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka!

As it was taught in a beraita: It is a mitzva to provide for one’s daughters,

and

and by means of a kal va-chomer, it is a mitzva to provide for one’s sons,

because they engage in Torah study,

because

they

these are the affairs of Torah study .

This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a mitzva to provide for one’s sons, and by means of a kal va-chomer, it is a mitzva to provide for one’s daughters, because

they

it is degrading

for them to go around soliciting from door to door.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: It is an obligation to provide for one’s daughters after their father’s death

as a condition of the ketubah.

But during their father’s lifetime,

neither these nor those are provided for,

and there is not even a mitzva in this.

And now,

who is the author of the Mishna?

According to which view was our Mishna taught?

If it is Rabbi Meir, he said

that

the sons

are subject only to

a mitzva

to provide for them, and not to an obligation. Yet our Mishna implies that he is obligated to provide for them!

If it is Rabbi Yehuda, he said

that it is a mitzva to provide for the daughters, and that

the sons as well

are subject only to

a mitzva

to provide for them, and not to an obligation!

If it is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka,

according to his view,

there is not even a mitzva

to provide for either the sons or the daughters!

And we answer:

If you wish, say:

Our Mishna is in accordance with the view of

Rabbi Meir

;

if you wish, say: It is Rabbi Yehuda’s

view; and

if you wish, say: It is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka’s.

The Gemara now explains how the words of our Mishna can be established in accordance with each of the tanna’im mentioned above:

If you wish, say that it is Rabbi Meir’s

view,

and this is what

the tanna of our Mishna

said: The father is not obligated to provide for his daughter, and the same law applies to his son,

for he is not obligated to provide for him.

But a mitzva—

does exist with regard to his daughter,

and

by means of a kal va-chomer, with regard to his sons

there is a mitzva to provide for them, since they engage in Torah study.

And the fact that it teaches

in the Mishna that there is no obligation to provide for

his daughter,

is not in order for us to infer from this that he is obligated to provide for his son. Rather, had the tanna stated that there is no obligation to provide for his son, implying that there is nevertheless a mitzva to provide for him, we would have inferred that with regard to his daughter there is not even a mitzva to provide for her, since she does not engage in Torah study.