Ketubot 48b (מח:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

She always remains in the father’s domain until she enters the husband’s domain

for marriage.

That is, until she enters the ḥuppa for the purpose of marriage.

As long as she has not entered the husband’s domain, if she is betrothed to a kohen, she may not eat teruma; and the father retains all the rights over her that a father has over his daughter.

If the father hands over

his daughter

to the agents

of the husband

who came to take her for the purpose of marriage,

she is

already considered

to be in the husband’s domain.

If the father

and his daughter

travel with the husband’s agents, or if the father’s agents travel with the husband’s agents,

then

she

is

still

in the father’s domain.

If the father handed her over to his agents so that they would bring her to her husband, and the father’s agents encountered the husband’s agents on the way, and

the father’s agents handed over

the daughter

to the husband’s agents,

she is in the husband’s domain.

Gemara:

What is the purpose of the phrase

“she always

remains in the father’s domain”

? We explain:

It serves to exclude

the view of

the first Mishna

below [57b].

As it is taught

there: If the husband demanded that she prepare herself for marriage, and

the end

of the

period

given to her for preparing herself had arrived—that is, twelve months given to a virgin, or thirty days given to a widow—and

they had not yet married,

for example, because the groom delayed, or because he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control,

they eat from his resources, and

the Israelite women betrothed to a kohen

eat teruma.

It teaches us

that the tanna of our Mishna, by teaching:

“She always

remains in the father’s domain,” means that even in such a case she is still in the father’s domain .

We learned in our Mishna:

“If the father handed her over to the husband’s agents, she is in the husband’s domain, etc.”

Rav said: Her transfer

to the husband’s agents is considered a transfer to the ḥuppa

for every

matter—that is, with regard to inheriting from her, becoming impure for her, her handiwork, and every matter that applies between a man and his wife.

Except with

regard to eating

teruma.

If her husband is a kohen, she may not eat teruma until she enters the ḥuppa.

The reason is that Rav maintains that the reason a betrothed woman may not eat teruma is the concern of simfon: The husband may discover a physical defect in her, in which case the betrothal was a mistaken betrothal. This reason applies even now, when she has been handed over to the husband’s agents, until she enters the ḥuppa, at which point her husband will examine her.

And Rav Asi said: Even with

regard to eating

teruma,

the transfer to the husband’s agents is considered a transfer to the ḥuppa.

This is because he maintains that the reason a betrothed woman may not eat teruma is that we are concerned that a cup of teruma wine might be mixed for her in her father’s house, and that she might give some of that cup to her brothers and sisters. Therefore, now that she has been handed over to the husband’s agents, when her brothers and sisters are not with her, she may eat teruma .

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi, and some say that Ḥiyya bar Rav raised it to Rav Asi

from our Mishna:

“She always remains in the father’s domain until she enters the ḥuppa,”

yet we said that the novel element of our Mishna is that even with regard to teruma she remains in the father’s domain until she enters the ḥuppa, although she has already been handed over to the husband’s agents!

Rav said to them

—to Rav Huna and his son Ḥiyya:

“Did I not tell you: Do not follow the inverted interpretation?”

That is, did I not tell you not to respond in the beit-midrash from a Mishna that can be inverted in two directions, enabling the respondent to reinterpret its meaning in accordance with his own position?

For

Rav Asi

can

answer you

that what we learned in the Mishna, “until she enters the ḥuppa,” refers to being handed over to the husband’s agents; for

her transfer

to the husband’s agents

is her entry into the ḥuppa.

And Shmuel said: With

regard to

her inheritance,

the transfer to the husband’s agents is effective. That is, if she dies on the way, the husband inherits her dowry. Although it is stated below that a man does not inherit his betrothed wife, nevertheless, here, since she has already been handed over to the husband’s agents, the father relinquishes his rights to her dowry because the marriage is near.

But with regard to other matters, her transfer to the husband’s agents is not effective .

Reish Lakish said: With

regard to

her marriage settlement,

the transfer is effective.

We inquire concerning this: When Reish Lakish said that her transfer is effective with regard to

her marriage settlement,

what

does this mean?

If the intention is

that if she dies, he inherits her

—that he inherits her dowry—

this is

what

Shmuel

said

!

Ravina said: When Reish Lakish said “with regard to her marriage settlement,” he

meant

that if the husband dies after she was handed over to his agents, the daughter is considered a widow from marriage, and

her marriage settlement from

a

different

man whom she marries is

one hundred dinars,

the amount due to a widow, rather than two hundred zuz, the amount due to a virgin.

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Ḥanina both said:

Her transfer to the husband’s agents is considered as though she had entered his domain

in every

matter,

even with

regard to

teruma,

so that if he is a kohen, she may already eat teruma.

Meytivi:

If

the father travels

with his daughter

with the husband’s agents, or if the father’s agents

and his daughter travel

with the husband’s agents, or if she had a courtyard on the way and entered it with him,

with her husband,

to spend the night

there as one spends an ordinary night, and not for the purpose of marriage,

even though her marriage settlement

—that is, the movable property her father designated for her dowry—was already

in her husband’s house,

if she

dies,

her father inherits her,

not her husband.

But if

the father handed over

his daughter

to the husband’s agents, or if the father’s agents handed over

the daughter

to the husband’s agents, or if he had a courtyard on the way and entered it with her

for

the purpose of marriage,

then

even though her marriage settlement

is still

in her father’s house,

if she

dies,

her husband inherits her.

When are these matters stated?

With

regard to

her inheritance. But with

regard to

teruma, a woman may not eat teruma

until she enters the ḥuppa.

A refutation of all of them

—the amoraim who disagreed with Shmuel and maintained that her transfer is effective for everything, including teruma!

And we conclude:

Teyku.

And we raise a difficulty:

But the

beraita

itself is difficult!

You said

at the beginning of the beraita:

“She entered with him to spend the night.”

This implies that

the reason is that she

entered specifically

to spend the night,

an ordinary overnight stay;

but

if she entered with him

without specification,

we say that they entered

for the purpose of marriage,

and this is her entry into the ḥuppa, so that it constitutes marriage even though he did not yet have intercourse with her.

Come and hear the latter clause: She entered with him for the purpose of marriage.

This implies that only if she entered specifically for the purpose of marriage;

but

if she entered with him

without specification,

this is entry

to spend the night,

and not for the purpose of marriage!

Rav Ashi said:

The entire beraita

is taught with unspecified cases.

That is, both the first clause of the beraita, “she entered with him to spend the night,” and the latter clause, “she entered with him for the purpose of marriage,” do not refer to a case in which she specified that she was entering with him to spend the night or for the purpose of marriage. Rather, they refer to a case in which she entered without specification.

The tanna explains that if they entered her courtyard,

an unspecified

entry into the courtyard

belonging to her

is to spend the night,

an ordinary overnight stay and not for the purpose of marriage.

But when they entered his courtyard,

an unspecified

entry into the

courtyard belonging to him

is for

the purpose of

marriage.

That is its presumed purpose.

The tanna teaches: If the father handed over

his daughter

to the husband’s agents,

and she engaged in licentious intercourse

while she was in their domain,

then

the judgment of

this woman is strangulation,

as that of a married woman, and not stoning, as that of a betrothed woman.

From where are these matters derived?

Rav Ami bar Ḥama said:

As

the verse says

concerning a betrothed young woman who engaged in licentious intercourse:

“To commit adultery in her father’s house.”

And we derive from this verse:

excluding one whose father handed over

his daughter

to the husband’s agents,

and she engaged in licentious intercourse while in their domain; in that case, her judgment is not stoning, as that of a betrothed woman, but strangulation, as that of a married woman.

And we object:

Perhaps

we should derive from the verse:

excluding

one who engaged in licentious intercourse after

entering the ḥuppa

but

still

had not

had intercourse,

in which case her judgment is strangulation, as that of a married woman [and the verse teaches us the novel point that although she is still a virgin, nevertheless, since she has already entered the ḥuppa, her judgment is strangulation].

But if she was merely handed over to the husband’s agents and had not yet entered the ḥuppa, perhaps her status is still that of a betrothed woman, since she is still called “in her father’s house”

Rava said: My mother said to me:

The exclusion of a virgin who entered the

ḥuppa

but did not have intercourse

is explicitly written

in the Torah.

As it is stated in that context:

“When there is a young woman, a virgin betrothed to a man,”

and we derive:

“Young woman”

specifically receives the penalty of stoning—

and not a mature woman.

“Virgin”

specifically—

and not one who has had intercourse.

“Betrothed”

specifically—

and not married.

Now,

what

is the exclusion indicated by “betrothed—and not

married”?

If you say

that the verse excludes

a truly married woman,

that is, one who entered the ḥuppa and had intercourse, this certainly cannot be the meaning, since

that is the exclusion of

“virgin

—and not one who has had intercourse,”

“virgin”

for a truly married woman has had intercourse!

Rather,

it must be said that the exclusion refers to a woman

who entered the ḥuppa

but did not have intercourse!

If so, it necessarily follows that the verse “to commit adultery in her father’s house” excludes a young woman who was handed over to the husband’s agents and engaged in licentious intercourse.

We inquire concerning this: From what we learned in our Mishna, “she is in the husband’s domain,” it follows that even if she ultimately returned to her father’s house, she had already left the father’s domain.