Ketubot 48b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

She always remains in the father’s domain, until she enters the husband’s domain

for marriage.

That is, until she enters the bridal chamber for the purpose of marriage.

And as long as she has not entered the husband’s domain, if she is betrothed to a kohen, she does not eat teruma, and likewise the father retains all rights over her, like every right of a father over his daughter.

The father handed over

his daughter

to the agents

of the husband

who came to take her for the purpose of marriage—

she is

already considered

in the husband’s domain.

The father went

with his daughter

with the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents went with the husband’s agents—

then

that

she

still

remains in the father’s domain.

The father handed her over to his agents so that they would bring her to her husband, and the father’s agents met the husband’s agents on the way, and

the father’s agents handed over

the daughter

to the husband’s agents—

she is in the husband’s domain.

Gemara:

What is this that it teaches:

“She always

remains in the father’s domain”?

And we explain:

To exclude from

the words of

the First Mishna

below [57b] .

For it is taught

there: If the husband demanded that she prepare herself for marriage, and

the end arrived

of the

period

that they give her to prepare herself—that is, twelve months, which they give a virgin, or thirty days, which they give a widow to prepare herself—

and they had not yet married

her, for example, because the groom delayed, or because some circumstance beyond his control occurred to him,

they eat from his, and

the Israelite women betrothed to a kohen

eat teruma.

It teaches us

the tanna of our Mishna by teaching:

“She always

remains in the father’s domain,” for even in such a case she still remains in the father’s domain .

We learned in our Mishna:

“The father handed her over to the husband’s agents; she is in the husband’s domain, and so on.”

Rav said: Her handing over

to the husband’s agents is considered handing her over to the bridal chamber

for every

matter—that is, for inheriting her, for becoming impure for her, for the work of her hands, and for every matter of a man with his wife.

Except for

the matter of eating

teruma.

For if her husband is a kohen, she does not eat teruma until she enters the bridal chamber.

And the reason is that Rav holds that the reason a betrothed woman does not eat teruma is simpon. That is, we are concerned that perhaps the husband will find a defect in her, and her betrothal will have been a mistaken betrothal. And this reason applies even now, when she has been handed over to the husband’s agents, until she enters the bridal chamber, at which time her husband will examine her.

And Rav Asi said: Even for

the matter of eating

teruma,

the handing over to the husband’s agents is considered handing her over to the bridal chamber.

And this is because he holds that the reason a betrothed woman does not eat teruma is that we are concerned that perhaps they will mix for her a cup of teruma in her father’s house, and she will give her brothers and sisters to drink from that cup. Therefore, now that she has been handed over to the husband’s agents, when her brothers and sisters are not with her, she is permitted to eat teruma .

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rav Asi, and some say Hiyya bar Rav [raised an objection] to Rav Asi—

from our Mishna:

“She always remains in the father’s domain until she enters the bridal chamber,”

and yet we said that the innovation of our Mishna is that even with regard to teruma she remains in the father’s domain until she enters the bridal chamber, although she has already been handed over to the husband’s agents!

Rav said to them

to Rav Huna and to his son Hiyya:

“Did I not say to you: Do not follow the reversed [interpretation]?”

That is, did I not tell you not to respond in the beit-midrash from a Mishna that can be reversed in two directions, so that the one answering can explain its meaning according to his own words?

For

Rav Asi

can

give you this answer,

that what we learned in the Mishna, “until she enters the bridal chamber,” refers to handing over to the husband’s agents.

Her handing over

to the husband’s agents

is her entering the bridal chamber.

And Shmuel said: For

the matter of

her inheritance,

handing her over to the husband’s agents is effective. That is, if she dies on the way, the husband inherits her dowry. And although below we say that a man does not inherit his betrothed wife, nevertheless here, since she has already been handed over to the husband’s agents, the father relinquished her dowry because of the closeness of the marriage.

But with regard to other matters, handing her over to the husband’s agents is not effective .

Reish Lakish said: For

the matter of

her marriage settlement

her handing over is effective.

And we examine this: What is meant by what Reish Lakish said, that with regard to

her marriage settlement

her handing over is effective—

what is it?

If the intention is

that if she dies, he inherits her [

that he inherits her dowry],

that is

what

that

Shmuel

said!

Ravina said:

“For her marriage settlement,” which Reish Lakish said, means

to say

that if the husband dies after she has been handed over to his agents, the daughter is considered a widow from marriage, and

her marriage settlement from

a

different

man whom she will marry—its amount is

one hundred zuz,

as the law of a widow, and not two hundred zuz, as the law of a virgin.

Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Hanina both said:

Her handing over to the husband’s agents is considered as though she entered his domain

for every

matter,

even for

the matter of

teruma,

so that if he is a kohen, she already eats teruma.

It was objected:

If

the father went

with his daughter

with the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents went

with his daughter

with the husband’s agents, or she had a courtyard on the way and entered it with him,

with her husband,

to spend the night

there like any ordinary overnight stay, and not for the purpose of marriage,

even though her marriage settlement

that is, the movable property that her father designated for her dowry, is already

in her husband’s house,

if

she dies—

her father inherits her,

and not her husband.

But if

the father handed over

his daughter

to the husband’s agents, or the father’s agents handed over

the daughter

to the husband’s agents, or he had a courtyard on the way and she entered it with him

for the purpose of

marriage,

then

even though her marriage settlement

is still

in her father’s house,

if

she dies—

her husband inherits her.

When are these words said—

with regard to

the matter of

her inheritance. But with regard to

the matter of

teruma, a woman does not eat teruma—

until she enters the bridal chamber.

A refutation of all of them

the amoraim who disagreed with Shmuel and held that her handing over applies to everything, even to teruma!

And we conclude:

A refutation.

And we ask:

But

the beraita

itself is difficult!

You said

at the beginning of the beraita:

“She entered with him to spend the night.”

It implies:

the reason is that

she entered specifically

to spend the night,

an overnight stay like other overnight stays;

but

if she entered with him

without specification—

we say that

they entered for the purpose of marriage,

and this is her entering the bridal chamber, and even though he did not have intercourse with her, it is marriage.

Come to the latter clause: “She entered with him for the purpose of marriage.”

It implies that only if she entered specifically for the purpose of marriage,

but

if she entered with him

without specification—

this is entry

to spend the night,

and not for the purpose of marriage!

Rav Ashi said:

The entire beraita

teaches unspecified [cases].

That is, both what we learned at the beginning of the beraita, “she entered with him to spend the night,” and what we learned at the end, “she entered with him for the purpose of marriage,” do not refer to a case in which she explicitly stated that she was entering with him for the purpose of spending the night or for the purpose of marriage; rather, it refers to a case in which she entered without specification.

And the tanna explains that if they entered her courtyard,

an unspecified

entry into the courtyard

of hers—

to spend the night

is an ordinary overnight stay, and not for the purpose of marriage.

But when they entered his courtyard,

an unspecified

entry into the

courtyard of his—

for

the purpose of

marriage

it is.

The tanna taught: The father handed over

his daughter

to the husband’s agents—

and she committed adultery

when she was in their domain,

then

the judgment of

this one is strangulation,

like a married woman, and not stoning like a betrothed woman.

From where are these matters?

Rav Ami bar Hama said,

for

the verse says

concerning a betrothed young woman who committed adultery:

“To commit adultery in her father’s house.”

And from this verse we expound:

excluding when the father handed over

his daughter

to the husband’s agents,

and she committed adultery in their domain, in which case her judgment is not stoning like a betrothed woman, but strangulation, like a married woman.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps

we should expound from the verse:

excluding

one who committed adultery after

she entered the bridal chamber—

and

still

did not

have intercourse,

in which case her judgment is strangulation like a married woman [and the verse teaches us that even though she is still a virgin, nevertheless, since she has already entered the bridal chamber, her judgment is strangulation].

But if she was merely handed over to the husband’s agents, and did not yet enter the bridal chamber, let us say that her judgment is still like that of a betrothed woman, since she is still called “her father’s house”!

Rava said: My mother said to me,

the exclusion of a virgin who entered the

bridal chamber

but did not have intercourse

is explicitly written

in the Torah.

As it is stated in that same context:

“When there will be a young woman, a virgin, betrothed to a man,”

and we expound:

“young woman”

specifically to be stoned—

and not a mature woman.

“Virgin”

specifically—

and not one who has had intercourse.

“Betrothed”

specifically—

and not married.

And now,

what

is the exclusion of “betrothed—and not

married”?

If you say

that they exclude

a truly married woman,

that is, one who entered the bridal chamber and had intercourse, surely this cannot be said, for

that is

the exclusion of

“virgin—

and not one who has had intercourse,”

since a truly married woman has had intercourse!

Rather, it must be that

the exclusion speaks of a woman

who entered the bridal chamber—

but did not have intercourse!

And if so, it necessarily follows that from the verse “to commit adultery in her father’s house” they exclude a young woman who was handed over to the husband’s agents and committed adultery.

And we examine this: From what we learned in our Mishna, “she is in the husband’s domain,” it follows that even if she ultimately returned to her father’s house, she had already left the father’s domain.