Ketubot 45a (מה.) — the Talmud in English

The first measure is: if

witnesses came against her in her father-in-law’s house,

after she had married,

that she had committed adultery

while she was betrothed,

in her father’s house

they stone her at the entrance to her father’s house. That is to say: See the produce that you raised!

This is so that everyone will know that this disgraceful act emerged from her father’s house, for she committed adultery while she was in his house, and not in her father-in-law’s house!

For the verse speaks of such a case, in which the husband says: “I came near to her, but I did not find signs of virginity,” meaning that she had already married. And concerning this the verse says: “They shall take the young woman out to the entrance of her father’s house.”

The second measure is: if

witnesses came against her in her father’s house,

before she had married, and testified

that she had committed adultery in her father’s house

—

they stone her at the entrance of the city gate.

For so it is written: “If there is a young woman who is a virgin betrothed to a man, you shall take both of them out to the gate of that city and stone them with stones.”

The third measure:

if she acted corruptly

[committed adultery]

and ultimately reached maturity

—

she is judged by strangulation.

Just as if she were committing adultery now, after reaching maturity, her punishment would not be stoning but strangulation—for the obligation of stoning is stated only with regard to a betrothed young woman and not an adult woman, as it is written: “If there is a young woman who is a virgin”—so too, when she acted corruptly and ultimately reached maturity, her punishment is strangulation.

Since her body changed [for she reached maturity] between the time of the transgression and the time she was brought to judgment, the law of her execution also changed, becoming the law applicable to her now.

And we raise an objection:

Does this mean

that the beraita taught by Sheila implies

that wherever the body changes

[that is, the body has changed]—

the form of execution changes

[the law of execution also changes accordingly]?

And we pose a contradiction

to this from that which was taught in a beraita [below, 46a]:

A betrothed young woman who committed adultery, and after she reached maturity

her husband married her, and

he spread an evil report about her,

claiming in court that he had not found signs of virginity, although he was lying—

he is neither flogged nor required to give one hundred sela.

The reason is that these obligations were stated specifically with regard to a husband who spreads an evil report about a young woman while she is still a young woman. Here, since he married her when she was already an adult woman, and only then accused her of having committed adultery during their betrothal, he does not incur the special punishments that the Torah imposed upon one who spreads an evil report about a betrothed virgin. The acts that make him liable for lashes and payment of the fine are those he performed through his utterance, namely, falsely claiming that he had not found signs of virginity. Here, however, he made this accusation when she was already an adult woman, and therefore these obligations do not apply to him.

And if the matter were true—that signs of virginity were not found because she had committed adultery with her husband during the period of their betrothal—

she and her conspiring witnesses

[if the witnesses brought by the husband were found to be conspiring witnesses who had lied in their testimony]—

hasten to the place of stoning [that is, they should rise early and go to the place of stoning, for they have no possibility of escape from this execution. Rashi].

[that is, they should go early in the morning to the place of stoning, for they have no escape from this execution. Rashi].

The Gemara explains the beraita: Is it conceivable that

she and her conspiring witnesses

together

would come to mind

[that they are both stoned]? How could it be possible that both she and they would be stoned? If they lied, only they are liable to stoning; and if the matter is true, only she is stoned!

Rather,

necessarily, this is what the beraita means:

Either she or her conspiring witnesses

hasten to the place of stoning!

That is, if the matter was true as the husband stated, she is stoned; and if not, her conspiring witnesses are stoned.

It is therefore proven from here that although her body changed because she reached maturity—and if she had committed adultery now her punishment would have been strangulation—we nevertheless do not say that the law of her execution changed; rather, she is executed by stoning!

Rava said:

But are

you speaking of one who spreads an evil report

as an objection to the beraita taught by Sheila, which says that if she acted corruptly and ultimately reached maturity, her law changes when she reaches maturity [and the case is one in which the witnesses came while she was in her father’s house]? You are attempting to prove this from the case of one who spreads an evil report, in which the witnesses came after she reached maturity, her husband married her, and she was in her father-in-law’s house, where we do not say that the body changed and therefore the form of execution changed; rather, she or her conspiring witnesses are stoned?!

But

different

is the law of

one who spreads an evil report

—

it is an exceptional innovation,

for in that case we do not say that since the body changed, the form of execution changed!

The proof that in the case of one who spreads an evil report we do not say that since the body changed, the form of execution changed, is based on another law stated concerning one who spreads an evil report:

For

a young woman who

entered the wedding canopy but had not yet had intercourse

and

committed adultery,

has her law changed from that of a betrothed young woman, and from that point her punishment is

strangulation

and not stoning [as it is taught below, on 48b].

But

the law of

one who spreads an evil report

always applies only after she has entered the wedding canopy: He accuses her after marrying her, claiming that she committed adultery during their betrothal. And despite the fact that he accuses her after her law has changed from stoning to strangulation, if his claim is indeed proven true, namely, that she committed adultery during their betrothal, her present punishment is

stoning,

despite the fact that her law has now changed from stoning to strangulation!

It is therefore proven that in the matter of spreading an evil report, an innovation was introduced: We do not say that because her law changed—and if she were to commit adultery now her punishment would be strangulation—the law of her execution for the earlier adultery should also change. Therefore, even when she reaches maturity and marries, and he spreads an evil report about her, we do not say that since her present law has changed to strangulation, the law of execution for her original act should change; rather, her punishment is stoning.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rava: Perhaps when the Merciful One introduced the innovation

[perhaps the Torah’s innovation—that in the case of one who spreads an evil report, we do not say that since the law changed, the form of execution changed]—it applies only

where the body did not change,

but only her status changed from betrothed to married. Her body itself did not change.

But where the body changed,

as when she became an adult woman—

the Merciful One did not introduce the innovation

[the Torah did not introduce the rule that if he spreads an evil report about her when she is an adult woman concerning adultery committed when she was a young woman, her law does not change]!

That is, the proof from an ordinary case of one who spreads an evil report is no proof. In that case her body did not change ; only her legal status changed: If she were to commit adultery now, her punishment would be strangulation. Specifically in such a case the Torah introduced the rule concerning one who spreads an evil report that she is stoned, despite the fact that her legal status had changed to one carrying strangulation.

But where her body changed, it is possible to say that the Torah did not introduce such an innovation. Therefore, in the case of a woman who reached maturity, whose body changed, if you say that when she acted corruptly and ultimately reached maturity, and the witnesses came while she was in her father’s house, her punishment is strangulation, then in the case of one who spreads an evil report as well, once she reached maturity, the tanna should have said that her punishment is strangulation!

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The matter in question—the beraita taught by Sheila, which says that if the witnesses came when she was an adult woman she is judged by strangulation, because we say that since the body changed,

the form of execution changed

—while in another beraita we find that her punishment is stoning,

and

even though she reached maturity and her body changed, nevertheless

the form of execution did not change

—is a dispute

between tannaim.

As we learned:

A nasi and a High Priest who sinned inadvertently and became liable to bring a sin-offering—for example, they ate forbidden fat—have sin-offerings different from that of an ordinary person. An ordinary person brings a female sheep or a female goat as a sin-offering, whereas a nasi brings a male goat, and the High Priest brings a bull.

If they

sinned

while they were ordinary people,

before they were appointed, and they were appointed

afterward, even though “their bodies changed” at the time of their appointments,

they retain the status of ordinary people ,

and bring a female sheep or a female goat, rather than the offerings specific to a nasi and a High Priest.

Rabbi Shimon says: If they became aware

that they had eaten the forbidden fat

before they were appointed,

when the sin and awareness of it occurred in the same body—

they are liable

to bring a sin-offering.

But if they sinned before they were appointed and became aware of it only

after they were appointed

—

they are exempt

from the offering altogether, because the sin occurred before the change, whereas awareness occurred after the change, and at that point their liability would be for a different offering, for which they did not become liable at the time of the sin; therefore, they bring no offering at all.

It is proven that Rabbi Shimon holds that because the body changed—from an ordinary person to a nasi, or from an ordinary priest to a High Priest—the offering changes! But the tanna of the beraita concerning one who spreads an evil report disagrees with him and holds that a change in the body does not change the law governing liability for execution.