Ketubot 45a — the Talmud in English

The first measure: if

witnesses came against her in the house of her father-in-law

after she had married,

that she had committed adultery

when she was betrothed

in her father's house—

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they stone her at the entrance of her father's house. That is: “See the growth that you raised!”

So that everyone should know that from her father's house this disgrace came forth, for while she was in his house she committed adultery, and not in the house of her father-in-law!

For Scripture speaks of such a case, where the husband says: “I approached her, but I did not find signs of virginity,” meaning that she had already married. And concerning this Scripture said: “They shall bring the young woman out to the entrance of her father's house.”

The second measure: if

witnesses came against her in her father's house,

before she married, and they testify

that she committed adultery in her father's house —

—

they stone her at the entrance of the city gate.

For so it is written: “If there be a young woman who is a virgin betrothed, you shall bring both of them out to that city's gate, and stone them with stones.”

The third measure,

she sinned [זינתה]

[committed adultery]

and in the end she became an adult—

—

she is judged by strangulation.

Just as, had she committed adultery now, after becoming an adult, her judgment would not be stoning but strangulation [since the liability for stoning was stated only with regard to a betrothed young woman and not an adult woman, as it is written: “If there be a young woman who is a virgin”], so too, when she sinned and in the end became an adult, her judgment is strangulation.

Since her body changed [for she became an adult] between the time of the sin and the time she was brought to judgment, the law of her death likewise changed, to what it is now.

And we object:

does this mean,

it follows from the words of the beraita taught by Sheila,

that wherever the body changes [שנשתנה הגוף] [the body changes]—

[meaning, the body has changed],

the execution changes [משתנה גם דין המיתה, בהתאם] [the law of death changes accordingly].

[so that the law of execution changes accordingly]?

And we raise a contradiction

to this from that which was taught [below, 46a]:

a betrothed young woman who committed adultery, and after she became an adult

her husband took her in marriage, and

spread an evil report about her,

claiming in court that he had not found signs of virginity in her, and he lied in his words—

he does not receive lashes, and he does not give one hundred sela.

And the reason is that these liabilities were stated specifically with regard to a husband who spreads an evil report about a young woman, when she is a young woman. Here, however, since he took her in marriage when she was an adult, and then accused her of having committed adultery with another during the time of betrothal, he does not become liable for the special punishments that the Torah imposed upon one who spreads an evil report about a betrothed virgin young woman. For what makes him liable for lashes and payment of the fine is his deed performed through the twisting of his lips, by which he accused her of not having signs of virginity; and here he made this accusation when she was already an adult. Therefore, these liabilities do not apply to him.

And if the matter were true, that signs of virginity were not found in her because she had committed adultery with another during the time of her betrothal,

she and her conspiring witnesses [אם נמצאו העדים שהביא הבעל זוממין, ששיקרו בעדותם] [if the witnesses brought by the husband were found to be conspiring witnesses who had lied in their testimony]—

[if the witnesses whom the husband brought were found to be conspiring witnesses who had lied in their testimony] —

hasten to the house of stoning [כלומר ישכימו בבוקר לבית הסקילה, כי אין להם נס והמלטה מן המיתה הזאת. רש"י] [that is, they rise early to go to the house of stoning, for they have no escape or deliverance from this death. Rashi].

[that is, they should go early in the morning to the place of stoning, for they have no escape from this execution. Rashi].

And the Gemara explains the beraita: Is it conceivable that

she and her conspiring witnesses

together

could occur to your mind as being stoned? How can it be possible that both she and they are stoned? For if they lied, only they are liable for stoning; and if the matter is true, only she is stoned!

to be stoned? How could it be that both she and they are stoned? If they lied, only they are liable to stoning; and if the matter is true, only she is stoned!

Rather,

necessarily, this is the meaning of the beraita:

either she or her conspiring witnesses—

hasten to the house of stoning! That is, if the matter was true as the husband said, she is stoned; and if not, the conspiring witnesses are stoned.

That is, if the matter was true as the husband said, she is stoned; and if not, those who schemed against her are stoned.

And it follows from here that although her body changed, because she became an adult, and had she committed adultery now her judgment would be strangulation, nevertheless we do not say that the law of her death changed; rather, she is subject to stoning!

Rava said:

But is it

the case of one who spreads an evil report that you are stating as an objection to the beraita taught by Sheila, that if she sinned and in the end became an adult, her law changes when she becomes an adult [and it is speaking of a case where the witnesses came while she was in her father's house], and you seek to prove from the case of one who spreads an evil report, where the witnesses came after she became an adult, and her husband took her in marriage, and she was in the house of her father-in-law, that we do not say “the body changed, the execution changed,” but rather she or her conspiring witnesses are stoned?!

as a challenge to the beraita taught by Sheila, which says that if she committed the offense and ultimately reached majority, her law changes when she reaches majority? That case concerns witnesses who came while she was in her father's house. Yet you seek to prove from the case of one who disseminates a defamatory report, where the witnesses came after she reached majority, her husband had taken her as his wife, and she was in her father-in-law's house, that we do not say that when the body changes the form of execution changes, but rather that either she or those who schemed against her are stoned?!

But

different is the law of

the

one who spreads an evil report—

—

for it is an innovation,

such that with regard to it we do not say: since the body changed, the execution changed!

And the proof that with regard to one who spreads an evil report we do not say, since the body changed the execution changed, is from another law stated with regard to one who spreads an evil report:

For behold,

a young woman who

entered beneath the wedding canopy but had not had intercourse

yet,

and committed adultery,

her law changed from the law of a betrothed young woman, and from now on her law is

strangulation

and not stoning [as was taught below, page 48b].

But

the law of

one who spreads an evil report,

is always stated only after she entered beneath the wedding canopy, when he accuses her, after taking her as a wife, of having committed adultery during the time of her betrothal; and although he accuses her after her law changed from stoning to strangulation, if it is indeed found to be as he said, that she committed adultery during the time of her betrothal, her law now is

stoning,

despite the fact that now her law changed from stoning to strangulation!

And it follows that it was introduced as an innovation concerning the spreading of an evil report that we do not say: because her law changed, and had she committed adultery now her law would be strangulation, the law of her death resulting from the adultery that occurred previously should also change. Therefore, even when she became an adult and married, and he spread an evil report about her, we do not say that because her law has now changed to strangulation, the law of her death should change from the original law, according to which she is subject to stoning.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said to Rava: Perhaps, when the Torah introduced the innovation [שמא מה שחידשה תורה שלא אומרים מדאישתני דינא אישתני קטלא במוציא שם רע] [perhaps that which the Torah introduced, that with regard to one who spreads an evil report we do not say that since the law changed the execution changed]—it did so only

[perhaps the Torah's innovation that in the case of one who disseminates a defamatory report we do not say that when the law changes, the form of execution changes] — it applies only

where the body did not change,

for only her legal status changed from betrothed to married, but no change occurred in her body.

But where the body changed,

for she became an adult—

the Torah did not introduce the innovation [לא חידשה התורה שאם יוציא עליה שם רע בהיותה בוגרת על כך שזינתה בהיותה נערה, שלא ישתנה דינה] [the Torah did not introduce that if he spreads an evil report about her when she is an adult concerning her having committed adultery when she was a young woman, her law should not change]!

That is, the proof from an ordinary case of one who spreads an evil report to this matter is no proof, because there her body did not change ,

but only her law changed: had she committed adultery now, her law would be strangulation, and specifically in such a case the Torah introduced the innovation concerning one who spreads an evil report, that she is subject to stoning despite the fact that her law changed to strangulation.

But when her body changed, it is possible to say that the Torah did not introduce an innovation. Therefore, in the case where she became an adult, in which her body changed, if you say that when she sinned and in the end became an adult, and the witnesses came while she was in her father's house, her law should be strangulation, then also with regard to one who spreads an evil report, after she became an adult, the tanna should have said that her law is strangulation!

Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

This matter—the beraita taught by Sheila, which says that if the witnesses came when she was an adult she is judged by strangulation, because we say that since her body changed—

changed

the execution, whereas in another beraita we found that her law is stoning,

and

although she became an adult and her body changed, nevertheless

the execution did not change,

the matter is a dispute

among the tannaim.

For we learned:

A prince and a high priest who sinned inadvertently and became liable for a sin-offering, such as when they ate forbidden fat, have a sin-offering different from the sin-offering of an ordinary person. For an ordinary person brings a female sheep or a female goat as a sin-offering, whereas the prince brings a male goat, and the high priest brings a bull.

If they

sinned

when they were ordinary persons,

before they were appointed, and then they were appointed,

afterward, although “their bodies changed” at the time of their appointments,

they are like ordinary persons ,

and they bring a female sheep or a female goat, and not the offerings designated for a prince and a high priest.

Rabbi Shimon says: If it became known to them

that they had eaten the forbidden fat

before they were appointed,

so that the sin and its knowledge were in the same body—

they are liable

for a sin-offering.

But if they sinned before they were appointed, and it became known to them only

after they were appointed—

—

they are exempt

entirely from the offering, because the sin was before the change, and the knowledge was after the change, and their liability then is for a different offering, for which they did not become liable at the time they sinned; therefore, they bring no offering at all.

And it follows that Rabbi Shimon holds that because the body changed, from an ordinary person to a prince or from an ordinary priest to a high priest, the offering changed! Whereas the tanna in the beraita concerning one who spreads an evil report disputes him, and holds that a change in the body does not change the law of liability for death.