Ketubot 44a — the Talmud in English

Here too, this is the reason that she does not collect

two hundred from the earlier date and one hundred from the later date,

since he did not write to her: “I have added one hundred to your two hundred,”

certainly

she waived

простил]

the first lien.

And therefore, if she comes to collect her ketuba of three hundred, she cannot collect two hundred from the earlier date and one hundred from the later date; rather, she collects the entire three hundred from the later date. But if he added to her ketuba, by this she does not waive the earlier lien, and she can collect the first obligation from the date of its writing.

The Master said: If she wishes, she collects by this one; if she wishes, she collects by that one.

And we raised an objection against it:

Let us say that this disagrees with Rav Naḥman.

For Rav Naḥman said: Two documents

of sale or gift of a field

that emerge one after the other,

that is, Reuven wrote a document to Shimon in Nisan, and another document in Sivan—

the second

document

canceled the first!

And if the seller wrote in the document a guarantee to the buyer, that if his creditors were to collect the field for their debt he would compensate him for this with another field, and the creditor came and seized the field from him, the buyer does not collect the guarantee from the other purchasers, but only from the date of the second document.

And if so, let us say here too that the second document canceled the first, and she waived the first lien!

And we reject this:

Was it not stated concerning it,

was it not said concerning Rav Naḥman’s statement,

Rav Pappa said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that if he added to it

in the second document

a palm tree —

пальму, —

for

цели

the addition he wrote it,

the second document, and he did not cancel the first; and he intended that if the buyer wishes to receive the principal and the addition, he collects from the date of the second document, and if he wishes to collect from the earlier date, he collects only the principal.

Here too,

with regard to a ketuba,

did he add anything to her

in the second document, for he wrote to her three hundred.

And therefore, she may collect whichever of them she wishes.

The essential matter: Rav Naḥman said: Two documents that emerge one after the other—

the second canceled the first.

Rav Pappa said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that if he added to it a palm tree—

for the addition he wrote it.

And we say: This is

obvious,

for if the document was the

first for a sale, and

the document was the

second for a gift—

it is reasonable that he did not intend to cancel the first document, but only

to strengthen his position is why he wrote it for him, because of the law of the adjoining field. “

The law of the adjoining field” is the right of priority that neighbors have in purchasing immovable property over other people. “

An adjoining-field owner” is the neighbor whose field boundaries abut the field that its owner is offering for sale, and the neighbor has priority in purchasing the field over the other buyers by virtue of “you shall do what is upright and good,” since it is preferable for a person that his property be concentrated in one place. And only the neighbor has this preference.

The right of priority of an adjoining-field owner applies only when the owner of the field sells his field, but not when he gives it as a gift, for he may give it to whomever he wishes, and he need not give it as a gift to his neighbor.

And therefore he wrote for him a gift document, in addition to the sale document, so that the neighbors could not come against him with the claim of an adjoining-field owner.

And all the more so

if the document was the

first a gift, and

the document was the

second a sale,

for certainly the second document did not cancel the first document,

for we say: It was because of the law of a creditor that he wrote this.

That is, in the sale document he accepted responsibility, so that if a creditor came and seized the field from him, he could return to the seller to collect his money. This is not so with a gift, which has no guarantee.

Rather, if both of them,

the two documents,

were sales,

or if

both of them were gifts—

the second canceled the first; what is the reason

that he canceled it?!

Rafram said: Perhaps the holder of the document admitted

that the first document was forged, and the seller or giver agreed to let him collect by the second document, from the later date.

Rav Aḥa said: Perhaps,

through the writing of the second document—

he waived

the buyer or recipient of the gift

its lien,

that of the first document.

What is the difference between them,

what practical difference is there between Rafram’s reason and Rav Aḥa’s reason?

There is a difference between them

in these matters:

a.

Undermining the witnesses.

According to Rafram, there is a defect in the witnesses who signed the first document, since he admitted that that document was forged. But according to Rav Aḥa’s view, they are fit.

b.

And to pay for produce

that the buyer ate between the date of the first document and the date of the second document. According to Rafram, he must pay it to the seller, since it became clear that the first document was forged; but according to Rav Aḥa, he need not pay it.

c.

And concerning

the matter of

the taska.

The king’s tax imposed upon the land. According to Rafram, the seller must pay the taska from between the date of the first document and the date of the second document. And according to Rav Aḥa, this debt is imposed upon the buyer.

What has become of the matter of the ketuba?

From when does she collect it when there are two ketubot?

Come and hear, for Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel

in the name of Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Shimon: The one hundred and two hundred

she collects

from the betrothal, and the addition

to the ketuba she collects

from the marriage.

And the Sages say: Both this one and that one—

from the marriage.

And the halakha

is according to the Sages, that

both this one and that one—

from the marriage.

Mishna:

Every married woman who commits adultery while under her husband is liable for death by strangulation. However, a betrothed virgin girl is excluded from this rule: if she committed adultery during her betrothal, her judgment is stoning at “the entrance of her father’s house.”

Likewise, a special passage was stated in the Torah concerning a betrothed virgin girl: if her husband brought an evil name upon her, claiming that she committed adultery during her betrothal, he is flogged and pays one hundred silver pieces.

These two innovations concerning a betrothed virgin girl were stated only with regard to an Israelite woman, and not with regard to a female convert, as will be explained in the Gemara.

A female convert whose daughter converted with her,

and committed adultery

the daughter, when she was betrothed to a man, [while she was still a girl], is not stoned at the entrance of her father’s house as is the law of an Israelite betrothed virgin girl.

And even if she converted when she was younger than three years and one day, so that she converted with the presumption of virginity—

behold,

the death of

this one is by strangulation,

as is the law of a married woman who committed adultery, and not as the law of a betrothed virgin girl who committed adultery, whose judgment is stoning.

And the reason is that the law of stoning stated concerning the betrothed virgin girl was stated only with regard to the seed of Israel. And as the verse says [in the passage concerning one who brings an evil name upon a virgin girl who committed adultery during her betrothal]: “For she has done a disgraceful deed in Israel.”

And likewise,

she does not have

the execution at

the entrance of the father’s house ,

stated concerning an Israelite betrothed girl.

And not

the law of

one hundred sela

if her husband brought an evil name upon her, claiming that she committed adultery during her betrothal, and the husband was found to be a liar, and the witnesses he brought were conspiring false witnesses.

And the reason is that the passage concerning one who brings an evil name was stated with regard to Israel.

But if

her conception was

the pregnancy of this girl

not in holiness,

for her mother conceived when she was a gentile,

and her birth was in holiness,

for she was born after her mother converted—

behold, this one is subject to stoning.

And the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

And

still

she does not have either

an execution at

the entrance of the father’s house, nor

payment of

one hundred sela

from her husband who brought an evil name upon her.

But if

both

also

her conception and

also

her birth were in holiness,

for her father and mother converted first, and only afterward her mother conceived from her father—

behold, she is like an Israelite girl in every respect.

And she also has the law of the entrance of the father’s house and the law of one hundred sela.

An Israelite girl who

has a father but does not have the entrance of her father’s house,

for example, where her father has no house.

And likewise if she

has the entrance of her father’s house but has no father—

behold, this one is subject to stoning

not at the entrance of her father’s house.

For

it was not stated

the law of

the entrance of the father’s house—

was

except as a mitzva.

But this does not prevent the execution.