Ketubot 43b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:

the matter concerns a case such as

where she was wounded in her face,

and through this her value was diminished; and in such a case the payment belongs to the father, because the father has with regard to his daughter the right to sell her as a Hebrew maidservant, and through this injury he suffers a monetary loss, because he will receive less money for her from the buyer who purchases her!

Rav Zeira said that Rav Mattana said that Rav said—and some say that Rabbi Zeira said [

Rashi explained that Rav Zeira is Rabbi Zeira. However, before he went up to the Land of Israel and was ordained, he was called Rav Zeira, and after he went up and was ordained, he was called Rabbi Zeira. Thus, some say that he said this matter before he went up to the Land of Israel, and some say that he said it afterward]

Rav Mattana said that Rav said: A daughter who is supported from the brothers—

her labor belongs to herself.

For it is written

with regard to Canaanite slaves:

“And you shall take them as an inheritance for your sons after you,”

and we expound:

“them for your sons”—

but not your daughters for your sons!

The verse indicates

that

a person does not bequeath the right of his daughter to his son.

Avimi bar Pappi said to him:

This matter

Shakud [

that is Shmuel, and he was called this because the halakha follows him in monetary matters, and he is diligent with his words, saying them in accordance with the halakha ]

said.

And we are astonished:

Shakud—who is he? [

Who is he?] Surely

Shmuel

is he! But

Rav said it,

and not Shmuel!

And we explain:

Say

this instead: Rav said it, and

Shakud also said it.

Mar bar Amemar said to Rav Ashi: This is what they say

in Nehardea: The halakha is in accordance with Rav Sheshet,

who derived from our Mishna that her labor belongs to the brothers.

Rav Ashi said: The halakha is in accordance with Rav,

that her labor belongs to herself.

And we conclude:

And the halakha is in accordance with Rav.

Mishna:

One who betroths his daughter when she is a minor or a maiden—

and her husband divorces her,

and afterward

her father betroths her

again, and these two betrothals were during her minority or maidenhood—

and she is widowed [

she becomes widowed],

her ketuba belongs to him.

That is, payment of both ketubot goes to the father. And our Mishna maintains that payment of a ketuba also goes to the betrothed woman.

But if

her father married her off

—

and her husband divorces her,

and again

her father marries her off

,

and she is widowed—

her ketuba belongs to her.

Both ketubot belong to her, since from the time her father married her off the first time, his authority over her ceased, and the right to the ketuba is determined according to the time of collection and not according to the time of writing; and at the time of collection, after she has already been married, she is in her own authority.

Rabbi Yehuda says: The

ketuba

first

is

the father’s.

And in the Gemara the reason of Rabbi Yehuda will be explained.

The Sages said to them:

The Sages:

From the time he married her off—

her father has no authority over her.

Gemara:

The Gemara proves from the fact that the tanna stated, “she was divorced and widowed,” and did not state, “she was divorced and again divorced,” or “she was widowed twice”—

It follows that

the reason is: she was married off and divorced, married off and widowed.

But

if

she is widowed twice—

she is no longer fit to marry.

Since she has acquired a presumption that her husbands die, she is forbidden to marry again. Therefore, the tanna stated it in this wording, indicating that she is still permitted to marry, and did not state it in the wording of misfortune.

And incidentally,

while the tanna came to teach us the law of her ketuba,

he sets down for us [

he sets down for us]

the tanna in accordance with Rabbi, who says: When it occurs twice [

a matter that recurs twice]

it establishes a presumption.

We learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The ketuba

first belongs to the father.

What is Rabbi Yehuda’s reason?

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Since from the time of the betrothal

when her father betrothed her to her first husband and the husband became liable for the ketuba,

the father acquired them.

Since it was the father who betrothed her.

But with the second betrothal, after she had already been married to the first husband, the father did not acquire it, because from the time she married the first one, his right over her ceased.

Rava raised an objection

from that which was taught:

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The ketuba

first

is

the father’s. And Rabbi Yehuda concedes in the case of one who betroths his daughter when she is a minor, and she reaches maturity—

and afterward she marries, that her father has no authority over her.

And

why? Here too, let us say

that the ketuba should be his,

since from the time of the betrothal the father acquired it!

Rather, if it was stated, this is how it was stated:

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say

that the reason of Rabbi Yehuda is:

since in his authority

of the father

are written

the obligations of one hundred and two hundred [ one hundred is given to a widow, and two hundred to a virgin] in the ketuba, for they write the ketuba before the marriage.

But if she reached maturity before the marriage, then it was not written in his authority, since from the time she reached maturity, she is not in his authority!

And we inquire:

And from when is it collected,

that is, from when were the husband’s properties pledged for the obligation of the ketuba, so that they may be seized from purchasers who bought them after the lien took effect?

Is it already from the time of the betrothal, when the husband became obligated through the enactment of the Sages concerning a ketuba, or only from the time of writing the ketuba, at the time of the marriage, since only from then did the obligation of the ketuba become a loan documented in a deed?

Rav Huna said: The

one hundred

and

two hundred,

which he became liable to her by the enactment of the Sages, were already pledged

from the betrothal.

And

if

the addition

of the ketuba, to which he became liable of his own accord, he would not become pledged to her except

from the marriage,

when a formal acquisition is performed for it and the deed of the ketuba is written.

And Rav Asi said: Both this and that—

from the marriage.

Because he maintains that she relinquished the first lien and consented that the lien should take effect at the time written in the deed, both with regard to the principal of the ketuba and with regard to the addition .

And we are astonished:

Did Rav Huna really say this?

For it was stated: She produced

the woman

against him two ketubot, one for two hundred, and one for three hundred,

and the one for three hundred was later than the first.

And Rav Huna said:

She has only one of the ketubot, and she may collect whichever of them she wishes.

For sometimes she will wish to collect specifically the ketuba for two hundred, for example, if he sold his properties between the time of the first ketuba and the second; if she comes to collect the second ketuba, the deeds of the purchasers take precedence.

Therefore, if she

comes [

comes]

to collect

the first ketuba of

two hundred—

she collects from the first time,

and seizes from the purchasers from the time written in the deed of the ketuba.

And if she comes to collect

three hundred,

for example, when he had properties even at the time of the second ketuba—

she collects from the second time.

And if it is so,

that Rav Huna maintains that she collects the principal of the ketuba from the first time, and the addition from the second time, let us say that

she should collect two hundred,

which are from the enactment of the Sages,

from the first time, and one hundred,

which is the addition to the ketuba—

from the second time!

And we raise an objection:

According to your reasoning, she should collect

the

entire five hundred, two hundred from the first time,

and

three hundred from the second time,

since it should be said that all three hundred are an addition to the ketuba!

Rather, why does she not collect five hundred?

Since he did not write to her

in the second ketuba:

“I desired and added for you three hundred in addition to two hundred” [

I desired and added for you three hundred in addition to two hundred], he certainly did not intend to add to the first ketuba, but

this is what he said to her: If you collect from the first time [

you collect]—

you collect two hundred; if you collect from the second time,

the first ketuba is annulled, and

you collect three hundred!