Ketubot 42b — the Talmud in English

And Abaye infers from here:

What, is it not

speaking

where he had already stood

before

the court,

and they had obligated him to pay money on the basis of witnesses, and now he is suing him for this money? Nevertheless, we learned in the Mishna that he is exempt from a sacrifice for an oath, since its essence is a fine!

Rabba rejected Abaye’s difficulty:

No.

Rather, it is speaking there

where he had not yet stood before the court

.

And Abaye raises an objection:

But from the beginning

of the Mishna, namely, the words of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that one is liable for a sacrifice for an oath even for payments of a fine—it is necessarily speaking

where he had stood before the court,

certainly

the end also,

namely, the words of Rabbi Shimon, with whom they disagree, is speaking

where he had stood before the court!

As it teaches

at the

beginning

of that Mishna:

I have only

that they are liable for the principal, the additional fifth, and a guilt-offering for misappropriation for an oath denying a monetary claim,

but

for

matters for which they pay only the principal

.

Double payment, fourfold and fivefold payment ,

and the one who rapes or seduces, and the one who defames,

for all of these are payments of a fine—

from where

that he should be liable for the principal, the additional fifth, and a guilt-offering for misappropriation for denying them under oath?

The verse says

as it is written in that passage:

“And he acts treacherously”—

it includes

also one who denies these payments, under the law of anyone who denies a deposit under oath.

And now,

what are the circumstances?

If he had not stood

yet

before the court,

double

payment—does it exist?

How can he sue him for it, when it has not yet been established in court that he stole! And furthermore, perhaps he will admit and become exempt!

Rather, it is obvious

that it is speaking

where he had stood before the court!

And since the beginning is where he had stood before the court,

presumably

the end also

is speaking of it

where he had stood before the court!

[And this is what is written in the end: “These, which are fines, are excluded,” meaning that their essence is a fine.]

He said to him

Rabba:

I can resolve it for you

[I can explain it for you], that in the

beginning

it is speaking

where he had stood before the court,

and therefore he is liable for a sacrifice for an oath,

and

if in the

end

it is speaking

where he had not stood before the court,

and therefore they are payments of a fine, for which one is not liable for a sacrifice for an oath.

And

in truth, the Mishna

in its entirety

is the words of

Rabbi Shimon.

And

I am not explaining it to you in this way, because

a forced explanation

—forced explanations—

we do not explain to you,

I am not explaining it to you.

And this explanation is forced,

for if

I explain it to you

thus, you would say to me

: If so, since the entire Mishna is according to Rabbi Shimon, this is how the Mishna should be taught, in one of two possibilities:

Either let it teach

at the

beginning

of the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says

: I have only matters for which one is liable for the principal alone.

Or let it teach

at the

end,

after the conclusion of the tanna’s words:

The words of Rabbi Shimon!

But it is not possible to insert this in the middle of the Mishna, within Rabbi Shimon’s words: “Rabbi Shimon says”!

Rather,

necessarily, the Mishna

in its entirety

is speaking

where he had stood

already

before the court.

And the beginning,

which teaches that he is liable, is the words of

the Rabbis

;

and the end—

the words of

Rabbi Shimon.

And I concede to you concerning a sacrifice for an oath,

that if the rapist or the seducer stood before the court and became obligated to pay them, nevertheless, according to Rabbi Shimon, if the father again sues the rapist or the seducer to pay the money that they had already become obligated to pay him in court, and administers an oath to them concerning it, there will be no liability for a sacrifice for their denial, since

the Merciful One exempted him. F

as it is written:

“And he denies

his fellow concerning a deposit or a loan,” for payments of a fine must be excluded from this verse, since only monetary payments are mentioned in the verse. And Rabbi Shimon excludes from here even money whose essence is a fine.

And when I say,

and when I said that

it is money

according to Rabbi Shimon after standing before the court, this is only with regard

to bequeathing it to his sons.

For if the father brought him before the court and he became obligated to pay him the fine, but he did not manage to collect the money from him before he died, it is money that the father can bequeath to his sons, and for this matter it is not considered a fine, which he does not bequeath to his sons; therefore, it belongs to the brothers and not to her.

Abaye raised an objection to him

Rabba with another difficulty, from our Mishna, in which we learned:

Rabbi Shimon says: If she did not manage to collect it before the father died—

they belong to her herself.

And Abaye infers:

And if you say

that after standing before the court

it is money

according to Rabbi Shimon

to bequeath it to his sons,

then, when she did not manage to collect the money before the father died, why did Rabbi Shimon say that it is

hers herself!? Why?

For it is money

that must belong to the brothers!

Rava said: This matter was difficult for

[they were perplexed by it,]

Rabba and Rav Yosef for twenty-two years,

twenty-two years.

And it was not resolved,

and they found no resolution [explanation] for it

until Rav Yosef sat at the head—

and resolved it.

For those twenty-two years were the days of Rabba’s authority as head of the academy. After Rabba died, Rav Yosef sat at the head. At that time they assisted him from Heaven to resolve this difficulty, so that he would gain renown. For Rabba was sharp, and therefore they called him “uprooter of mountains,” while Rav Yosef was the master of traditions, Mishna, and beraita, and therefore they called him “Sinai.” Rashi.

And thus Rav Yosef explained:

It is different there,

in the matter of seduction,

for the verse says: “And the man who lies with her shall give the father of the young woman fifty silver [shekels].”

And it is implied from this verse that

the Torah did not grant

the fine

to the father—

but only from the time of giving

specifically.

Therefore, if she did not collect the money before the father died, the fine belongs to her herself.

And when Rabba said

that once he had stood before the court

it is money to bequeath it to his sons—

he was speaking of other fines.

He was speaking.

And we are astonished:

But from now on, concerning a slave, for it is written

in it as well in the language of giving:

“He shall give thirty silver shekels to his master,”

is

so too

it to be said

that the Torah granted it to the master only from the time of giving!?

And we answer:

“He shall give” is one matter, and “he gave” is another matter.

Concerning a slave, it is written in the language “he shall give,” which is the language of a command, and the meaning of the verse is that in such a case, where his ox killed a male or female slave, he shall always give his master thirty shekels.

But concerning the seduced woman it is written “and he gave,” whose meaning is something already given. The Torah granted him the money only from the time of giving, and not from the time of standing before the court.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

that one must distinguish between the fine of the rapist and seducer and other fines, for concerning the rapist and seducer, even when he has stood before the court it is not money, because it is written “and he shall give,” the following difficulty arises: Why did Rabba say that according to Rabbi Shimon

the verse says, “And he denies

his fellow concerning a deposit or a loan,” ”

and from here he learned to exempt the rapist and seducer from a guilt-offering for misappropriation even when he had stood before the court?

But this verse teaches, according to Rabbi Shimon, concerning anyone who denies any of the fines that he is exempt, since the obligation of fines is not similar to a loan [namely, a loan, or money given to him to conduct business with on his behalf] written in the Torah, whose essence is money.

Whereas the fine for which the rapist and seducer became liable was innovated in this respect: even after he had stood before the court, it is not money.

And if so,

the verse “and he shall give” is needed

to say this! For the Torah said “and he shall give,” that the Torah did not grant it to him until the time of giving, and therefore this is not considered denial of money!

Rava said: When it was necessary

to learn from

“and he denies”

concerning rape and seduction, as with all fines, and it is impossible to learn this from “and he shall give” stated there, it is

for example, where she stood before the court, came of age, and died .

For according to Rabbi Shimon, the fine belongs to her. For just as he holds in the case where she did not manage to collect it before the father died that the fine belongs to her, so too in the case where she did not manage to collect it before she came of age [and according to the first tanna, they belong to the father], according to Rabbi Shimon it belongs to her herself.

And in such a case, the fine is considered money after she stood before the court, like all other fines after standing before the court. And if she then died, the fine is considered ordinary money with regard to the father,

for there, when her father inherits—

he inherits from her.

And her father inherits from her every right that she had in the money.

And in such a case, it is impossible to exempt one who denies it from a sacrifice for an oath by means of the teaching from “and he shall give,” for this fine is already considered money, since she stood before the court and came of age, and her father inherited from her. Therefore, the exemption must be learned from “and he denies,” and the teaching is that the essence of this money is a fine, as will be explained below.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

that it is speaking where he had already stood before the court, then why did we learn in the Mishna:

“These, whose essence is a fine, are excluded,”

for

it is money!

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

This is the intention of the Mishna:

These, whose essence is a fine, are excluded.

And furthermore,

Abaye raised an objection

to Rabba from what we learned there in the Mishna in tractate Shevuot:

Rabbi Shimon exempts

from a guilt-offering for misappropriation the rapist and seducer who denied under oath the claim “You raped or seduced my daughter,” because

he does not pay a fine on the basis of his own admission,

and if he admitted, he would become exempt.

And Abaye infers:

The reason is that he had not stood

previously

before the court,

for if he admitted, he would become exempt.

But if he had stood

previously

before the court—

for

then, if he admitted that he had stood before the court and become obligated to pay, he would pay

on the basis of

his own

admission,

then now, when he denies it,

he is likewise liable for a sacrifice for an oath!

Rabba said to him:

Rabbi Shimon—

said it to them according to the words of the Rabbis.

And this is what he said to them:

For me,

according to my position,

even though he had stood

previously

before the court,

and become obligated to pay, nevertheless, if he now denied this obligation,

the Merciful One exempted him

from a sacrifice for an oath,

from

the verse

“and he denies

his fellow,” since the verse specified only matters whose essence is money.

But according to you,

according to your position,

at least concede to me that where he had not stood

previously

before the court, when the father now sues

him—

he is suing for a fine

of the rapist and seducer

he is suing,

and he is not liable for a guilt-offering for misappropriation for denying a fine, since he can admit and become exempt, and this is not a monetary obligation.