Ketubot 42a — the Talmud in English

The work of her hands

of the maiden, which she did during her father’s lifetime,

and her found property

[objects she found],

even though she did not collect

them until

the father died,

for example, she had not yet received the wages for her work when he died [and the Gemara will explain the meaning of “collection” with regard to a found object] –

they belong to the brothers.

Gemara:

And we raise a difficulty:

what does it come to teach us

our Mishna? After all, we have already

learned,

we learned in the Mishna above [39b] that

the enticer gives three things, and the violator

gives

four

things.

The enticer gives humiliation, defect, and a fine,

and

adds to him

the

violator

another payment,

who gives

also

the

money of

the pain!

And since we have already learned in that Mishna that the enticer gives three things and the violator four, what does the tanna in our Mishna add to teach us?!

And we answer: the law that if the enticed woman or the violated woman was a “maiden,” he gives the payments

to her father

of the maiden –

it was necessary for him

for the tanna of our Mishna to teach us, since we did not learn this law in the Mishna above.

And we object: that he gives them

to her father is also obvious

!

For

since we say that he

gives

that the

enticer

pays these payments.

For from the very fact of his obligation to pay, we know with certainty that he must pay them to her father and not to her.

For if

these payments are

herself,

it is difficult:

why does the enticer pay?

Why does he need to pay them at all? After all,

with her consent,

with the maiden’s agreement,

he acted,

he performed his act, since she was enticed and agreed to him, and thereby waived her claim against him for the money of her humiliation, defect, and fine!

Therefore the Gemara offers another answer:

Rather, this distinction that we learned in our Mishna, between whether she

stood in court

before the father died and whether she stood after the father died,

was necessary for him

for the tanna to teach us, and it is

the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis

in our Mishna.

In two places the Torah innovated that a person can sue his fellow and administer an oath to him concerning it, even against his will; and if his fellow denies the claim concerning which he administered the oath, the one who denies is obligated to bring a sacrifice for it.

The “administering of an oath” that the Torah allowed in these two cases—to administer an oath to the defendant against his will—is the imposition of the severity of the oath by the claimant upon the defendant, so that if the defendant falsely denies the claim, he becomes obligated to bring a special sacrifice for it.

The first place is the “oath of testimony,” in which any person can demand that his fellow come and testify for his benefit the testimony that he knows, and he can even administer an oath to him concerning this against his will. And if his fellow denies it, lies, and says that he does not know testimony for him, he becomes obligated in the “sacrifice for the oath of testimony.” This obligation, as stated, applies even though the witness did not himself swear, but only denied his fellow’s demand that he come and testify, which was expressed in the form of an “administering of an oath,” for example, when the claimant said, “I administer an oath to you that you know testimony for me.”

The second place is the “oath of a deposit.” If a person claims from his fellow money that he deposited with him, or money that he owes him, the claimant has the power to present his claim in the form of an “administering of an oath”: he addresses his fellow and says to him, “I administer an oath to you that you owe me money.” Then, if the defendant denies it and claims that he does not owe him money, he becomes obligated in the sacrifice of an “asham for robbery,” even though he did not swear, but only denied the claim presented through the claimant’s “administering of an oath.”

In both places, the sacrifice comes as a special obligation for denying the oath administered that the Torah innovated in these two places, and it is not an ordinary sacrifice brought for an ordinary false oath.

We learned there

[in tractate Shevuot 36b]: One who says to his fellow,

“You violated and enticed

[or enticed]

my daughter!” And he,

his fellow,

says: ‘I did not violate and did not entice!’

And the father of the daughter said to him:

“I administer an oath to you”

concerning my claim that you violated and enticed my daughter!

And

his fellow

said: “Amen!”

Indeed, I accept your administering of the oath, but I maintain my denial of your claim, for I did not violate and did not entice your daughter!

And afterward he admitted

that he had indeed violated or enticed his daughter –

he is liable

to pay him the principal and a fifth, and to bring an asham sacrifice, and this is the sacrifice of an asham for robbery.

Rabbi Shimon exempts

him from the fifth and from the sacrifice. Because

since

he

does not pay a fine on the basis of

his own

admission ,

but only through the testimony of witnesses, and since if he had admitted to him when he sued him he would have been exempt, now too, when he denied the claim, this is not considered a denial of property.

They said to him

the Sages to Rabbi Shimon: Apart from the fine, the violator and the enticer also pay humiliation and defect. Therefore,

even though he does not pay a fine on the basis of his own admission, but

he

does pay humiliation and defect on the basis of his own admission,

since the payments of humiliation and defect are not payments of a fine but monetary payments, it follows that he denied to him, through an administered oath, a monetary claim.

[And the Gemara below explains the reasoning of the Rabbis: since ordinarily one who claims, “You violated my daughter,” claims from him the humiliation and defect, and does not claim the fine, therefore this person did not swear concerning a denial of a fine.]

Abaye asked Rabbah: One who says to his fellow, “You violated and enticed my daughter, and I brought you

to court

for this, and you became obligated to me in money!”

And he,

the defendant,

says: “I did not violate and did not entice, and you did not bring me to court” ,

and consequently

“I did not become obligated to you in money!”

And he swore

to him concerning his denial.

And

in the end

he admitted

that he had indeed violated or enticed her, and had stood in court and become obligated in money.

For Rabbi Shimon, what is the law

what will be the law in this case?

Shall we say:

since he stood

already

in court

concerning this, and now, if he admits to his claim, he will be obligated to pay, since the court has already obligated him, then this oath—this denial of

money it was, and he is liable for an oath sacrifice on its account!

Or perhaps, even though he stood in court

and became obligated to pay money, since the essence of this obligation

was a fine,

the Torah did not obligate him to bring an oath sacrifice?

He said to him

Rabba:

It is property, and he is liable concerning it for a guilt-offering for a false oath .

Abaye raised an objection to

Rava from what we learned in tractate Shevuot:

Rabbi Shimon says: It could be that one who says to his fellow: “You raped and seduced my daughter,” and he says: “I did not rape and I did not seduce.”

Or he said to him:

“Your ox killed my slave,”

and you must pay me and give me the thirty shekels stipulated in the Torah for one whose ox killed his fellow’s slave.

And he says: “It did not kill”

my slave.

Or his slave said to him: “You knocked out my tooth, and blinded

or blinded

my eye,”

and you must send me out to freedom!

And he,

the master,

says: “I did not knock out

your tooth,

and I did not blind

your eye,

and he swore

the master concerning his denial of his claim,

and

in the end

admitted

that he had indeed knocked out his tooth or blinded his eye.

Could he be liable

for a guilt-offering for misappropriation, like anyone who denied under oath concerning a deposit?

The verse states: “And he denies to his fellow concerning a deposit, or concerning a deposit placed in his hand, or concerning robbery, or he oppresses his fellow, or he finds a lost item and denies it, and he swears falsely.”

And they learn the following from this verse:

Just as these,

the matters mentioned in the verse,

are distinguished

by this,

that they

are payments of

property, even

in

every

place, the liability for a guilt-offering for misappropriation for a false oath concerning a deposit applies specifically when he denies under oath matters

that are property.

These,

all the cases above,

are

their payments

a fine,

and their denial does not make one liable for an offering for a false oath concerning a deposit.