Ketubot 42a (מב.) — the Talmud in English

The work of her hands

that the maiden performed during her father's lifetime,

and her found objects

that she found,

even though she did not collect them

until

the father died,

for example, she had not yet received the wages for her labor when he died [and the Gemara will explain the meaning of “collection” with regard to a found object]—

they belong to the brothers.

Gemara:

We are astonished:

What does it come to teach us

in our Mishna? We have already

learned,

in the Mishna above [39b], that

the seducer pays three things, and the rapist

pays

four

things.

The seducer pays humiliation, degradation, and the fine,

and

adds to him

the

rapist

another payment,

which he pays

also

the

payment for

pain!

Since we have already learned in that Mishna that the seducer pays three things and the rapist four, what additional point does the tanna teach us in our Mishna?!

And we answer: The law that if the seduced or raped woman was a “maiden,” he pays the payments

to her father,

the maiden's father—

it was necessary for him

for the tanna of our Mishna to teach us, since we did not learn this law in the Mishna above.

And we object: The fact that he gives them

to her father is also obvious

!

For

we say that he

gives

the payments, that the

seducer

pays these payments.

For from the very fact that he is obligated to pay, we certainly know that he must pay them to her father and not to her.

For if

these payments belong

to her herself,

it would be difficult:

why does the seducer pay?

Why should he have to pay them at all? After all,

with her consent,

with the maiden's agreement,

he acted,

he performed his act, since she was seduced and consented to him, and thereby waived her claim against him for the payments of her humiliation, degradation, and the fine!

Therefore, the Gemara offers another answer:

Rather, the fact that we learned in our Mishna that there is a distinction between whether she

appeared in court

before the father died or appeared after he died—

it was necessary

for the tanna to teach us this, and it is

the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis

in our Mishna.

In two places the Torah innovated that a person can demand that another come and testify for him and can administer an oath to him concerning this, even against his will; and if the other person denies the claim concerning which he was adjured, the one who denies it becomes obligated to bring an offering.

The “administering of an oath” that the Torah allowed in these two cases—by which the claimant may impose the severity of the oath upon the defendant against his will—means that if the defendant falsely denies the claim, he becomes obligated to bring a special offering.

One place is the “oath of testimony.” Anyone may require another person to come and give testimony on his behalf concerning testimony that the other knows, and he may even administer an oath to him against his will. If the other person denies it, lies, and says that he knows no testimony on his behalf, he becomes liable for the “offering for an oath of testimony.” This liability applies even though the witness did not swear himself, but merely denied the other person's demand that he come and testify, which was expressed in the form of an oath—for example, the claimant said, “I administer an oath to you that you know testimony on my behalf.”

The second is the “oath concerning a deposit.” If a person claims from another money that he deposited with him, or money that the other owes him, the claimant has the power to present his claim in the form of an oath: he addresses the other and says, “I administer an oath to you that you owe me money.” Then, if the defendant denies it and claims that he owes him no money, he becomes liable for the offering of an asham for robbery, even though he did not swear, but merely denied the claim presented through the claimant's administering of an oath.

In both cases, the offering comes as a special obligation for denying the oath that the Torah introduced in these two instances; it is not an ordinary offering brought for an ordinary false oath.

We learned there

in tractate Shevuot 36b: If one says to another,

“You raped and seduced

[or seduced]

my daughter!” And he

the other person

says: “I did not rape or seduce her!”

And the girl's father says to him:

“I administer an oath to you

concerning my claim that you raped and seduced my daughter!”

And

the other person

says: “Amen!”

Indeed, I accept your administration of the oath, but I maintain my denial of your claim, for I did not rape or seduce your daughter!

And afterward he admitted

that he had indeed raped or seduced his daughter—

he is liable

to pay the principal and an added fifth, and to bring an asham offering; this is the offering of an asham for robbery.

Rabbi Shimon exempts

him from the added fifth and the offering, because

he

he

does not pay the fine on the basis of his own

admission, but only through the testimony of witnesses. Since if he had admitted to him when the latter brought the claim, he would have been exempt, now too, when he denied the claim, this is not considered a denial of a monetary claim.

himself ,

but only through the testimony of witnesses. Since if he had admitted to him when the latter brought the claim, he would have been exempt, now too, when he denied the claim, this is not considered a denial of a monetary claim.

The Sages said to him

to Rabbi Shimon: In addition to the fine, the rapist and seducer also pay for humiliation and degradation. Therefore,

although he does not pay the fine on the basis of his own admission, nevertheless

he

does pay for humiliation and degradation on the basis of his own admission,

since the payments for humiliation and degradation are not fines but monetary payments, and he has therefore denied a monetary claim through the administered oath.

[And the Gemara below explains the reasoning of the Rabbis: ordinarily, one who says, “You raped my daughter,” is claiming payment for humiliation and degradation, and is not claiming the fine; therefore, the defendant did not swear concerning a denial of the fine.]

Abaye asked Rabba: If one says to another,

“You raped and seduced my daughter, and I brought you”

to court concerning this, and you were found liable to me for money!

And he,

the defendant,

says: “I did not rape or seduce her, and you did not bring me to court ,

and consequently

I did not become liable to you for money!”

And he swore

to him concerning his denial.

And

eventually he

admitted

that he had indeed raped or seduced her, that he had appeared in court, and that he had become liable for money.

According to Rabbi Shimon, what

would be the law in this case?

Should we say:

Since he appeared

already

in court

concerning this, and now, if he admits to the claim, he will be liable to pay, since the court had already obligated him, then this oath was a denial of

property, and he is liable for an oath offering!

Or perhaps, although he appeared in court

and became obligated to pay money, since the essence of this obligation

is a fine,

the Torah did not make him liable for an oath offering?

He said to him,

Rabba:

It is a monetary obligation, and he is liable to bring a sacrifice for a false oath .

Abaye challenged Rava

from what we learned in tractate Shevuot:

Rabbi Shimon says: It is possible that one who says to another: “You raped and seduced my daughter,” while the latter says: “I neither raped nor seduced her”;

Or if he said to him:

“Your ox killed my slave,”

and you are required to pay me the thirty shekels prescribed by the Torah for one whose ox killed another person’s slave.

And he says: “It did not kill”

my slave.

Or if his slave said to him: “You knocked out my tooth and blinded [

or blinded ]

my eye,”

and you are required to set me free!

And he,

the master,

says: “I did not knock out

your tooth,

and I did not blind

your eye,”

And

the master swore concerning his denial of the claim,

and

ultimately

admitted

that he had indeed knocked out his tooth or blinded his eye.

Could he be liable

to bring an asham sacrifice for misappropriation of property, like anyone who denied under oath a claim concerning a deposit?

The verse states: “And he denies his fellow with regard to a deposit, or a loan, or robbery, or he oppresses his fellow, or he finds a lost item and denies it, and he swears falsely.”

And the following is learned from this verse:

Just as these,

the matters mentioned in the verse,

are distinguished

by the fact

that they

are payments of

money,

in

every

case, liability to bring an asham sacrifice for misappropriation of property due to an oath concerning a deposit applies specifically when he denies under oath matters

that are monetary.

These are excluded,

all the cases mentioned above,

since

their payments

are a fine,

and denial of them does not make one liable for the sacrifice brought for a false oath concerning a deposit.