Ketubot 31b — the Talmud in English

that he is

exempt

, since his initial lifting was performed for the purpose of placing the object down—is that not so!?

But if so,

rather than teaching

in the latter clause of the beraita—a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

if he was dragging it out

without having lifted it,

and was dragging it out, he is exempt.

Let the tanna

of the beraita

differentiate

within that very case, with regard to one who lifted the object himself. For even in his case, according to Rabbi Avin, one finds that he is exempt from payment for the theft. And let it teach as follows:

When are these matters stated—

that he is liable to pay for the initial lifting—

when he stands

afterward

to rest

in the private domain, since the initial act of lifting was thereby nullified.

But

when he stood

to adjust the load—

when the initial act of lifting was not nullified—he is

exempt

because, according to Rabbi Avin, the initial lifting was performed for the purpose of placing the object down!?

Rather,

because of this difficulty, the Gemara resolves in another way the difficulty raised from the beraita against Rabbi Avin:

Whose opinion is this

beraita?

It is the opinion of Ben Azzai, who says: “One who walks

, with each step in which he places his foot on the ground,

is considered as though he were standing.”

It follows that the initial lifting and initial displacement in the private domain are not what make him liable, since he continued walking in the private domain. And since one who walks is considered as though he were standing, it is as though he placed the object down in the private domain. His liability is only for the displacement of his body at the boundary of the private domain. It follows that at the time of the initial lifting, when he stole the object, the act of carrying it out had not yet begun. Therefore, he is not exempt from the monetary liability that he incurred earlier, at the time of the lifting.

The Gemara still challenges Rabbi Avin:

But

if he lifted the purse and was

throwing

it into the public domain,

what

is the law? Will he really be

exempt

because his initial displacement was performed for the purpose of placing the object down!?

But if so, this difficulty arises:

Let the tanna

of the beraita

differentiate and teach the distinction within that very case,

in the same manner as the first clause, which deals with lifting the purse, and let it teach as follows:

When are these matters stated,

that if he lifted the purse and the liability for the theft preceded the liability for stoning, he is not exempt under the principle that when one becomes liable for a more severe punishment he is exempt from monetary liability—

when walking

with the stolen object in his hand, since by walking he nullified the displacement caused by his lifting it.

But

if he is

throwing

the purse, then even though the liability for the theft preceded his liability for carrying it out, he is

exempt,

since the initial displacement was performed for the purpose of placing the object down.

And the Gemara answers:

It was necessary for him to teach the case of dragging it out.

That is to say: It was preferable for the tanna to teach incidentally a novel legal ruling concerning “dragging it out,” rather than to teach another way in which one is exempt after lifting the object.

For in the law of “dragging it out” there is a novel ruling, because

it might enter your mind to say that this is not the normal manner of carrying an object out,

and therefore he should not be liable to a death penalty at all for carrying it out—

the tanna teaches us

in the beraita that he is liable to a death penalty even when he takes the purse out by dragging it!

The Gemara explains:

And with regard to what,

what type of purse is there a novelty in saying that carrying it out by dragging is considered carrying it out, so that one is liable for it?

If it is

large

purses,

if they are large purses filled with a heavy load and difficult to lift—

This cannot be the explanation, because

that is its normal manner

and it is normal to take such a purse out by dragging it; there is no novelty here.

And

if it is

small

purses,

if the purses he dragged were small—

This too cannot be the explanation, because in fact

that is not its normal manner,

and he should not be liable, since he did not carry it out in the manner in which people normally carry objects out.

Rather,

the Mishna deals

with

medium-sized

purses,

purses that are neither large nor small, and which are sometimes carried out by dragging.

The Gemara further explains the latter clause of the Mishna, which states, “if he was dragging it out”:

And where did he take it out,

where did he take the purse, that you say that the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft take effect simultaneously?

If he took it out

from the owner’s private domain

into the public domain

and placed it there—

This cannot be the explanation, because

the prohibition of Shabbat

indeed

exists,

since he carried it from a private domain into the public domain, but

the prohibition of theft

indeed

does not exist,

since taking it into the public domain does not constitute an act of acquisition by which he acquires the stolen object and becomes liable for accidental damage to it and for its payments.

And

if he took it into the private domain

of the thief, thereby acquiring it through acquisition by means of his courtyard—

This too cannot be the explanation, because

the prohibition of theft

indeed

exists,

since he brought it into his courtyard, but

the prohibition

of Shabbat

indeed

does not exist, since he carried it only from one private domain into another private domain.

;

No, it is necessary:

Our Mishna deals with a case

in which he took it

from the private domain

to the sides of

the edge of

the public domain.

They would place obstacles along the public domain at a certain distance from the houses, so that wagons would not travel close to the houses and rub against them. The area between the obstacles and the houses was called “the sides of the public domain.”

And

we ask:

According to whom,

according to whose view does our Mishna hold in the dispute among the tannaim concerning the status of “the sides of the public domain”—whether they have the status of the public domain with regard to Shabbat?

If it is according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says: “The sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain.”

This cannot be, because

the prohibition of Shabbat

indeed

exists

when he carries the purse into the sides of the public domain, but

the prohibition

of theft

indeed

does not exist,

since, according to him, it has the status of the public domain, and taking an object into the public domain does not create liability for theft.

And

if it is according to the Rabbis, who say: “The sides of the public domain are not considered like the public domain.”

This too cannot be, because

the prohibition of theft

indeed

exists, since according to them the status of “the sides of the public domain” is like that of an alleyway with regard to pulling: one who pulls an object into it acquires it,

but the

prohibition of Shabbat

indeed

does not exist, since according to them this is not the public domain!?

since according to them this is not a public domain?!

And the Gemara answers:

Actually, it is according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who said that with regard to Shabbat the sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain, and therefore one is liable for Shabbat when he takes the purse there.

And

however,

when Rabbi Eliezer said, “The sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain,” that applies only with regard to liability for Shabbat,

since

at times the public is pressed for space and enters there,

as sometimes the public is forced into the sides of the public domain.

But with regard to acquisition, one acquires there,

but it is possible to acquire an object by pulling it even in the sides of the public domain.

What is the reason?

Because the public is not commonly found there,

the public is not usually present in the sides of the public domain. Therefore, its status is like that of an alleyway, in which the Sages instituted acquisition by pulling an object into it.

Rav Ashi said

to explain the latter clause, “if he was dragging it out,” so that the question of where he took it out does not arise:

For example, he placed

his

hand below three

handbreadths from the ground of the public domain,

and received it

into his hand by dragging it from the owner’s domain into his hand.

And his hand acquires the object for him, making him liable for the theft,

in accordance with Rava’s ruling!

As Rava said,

with regard to Shabbat:

A person’s hand is considered for him like an area of four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths.

Therefore, when a person places an object into a hand that is situated in the public domain, placing it there is considered like placing it on an area measuring four by four handbreadths, which is the minimum area required for placing an object.

And just as the hand is considered significant with regard to an area of four by four handbreadths, so too it is considered significant with regard to acquisition of a stolen object.

That is, the case is one in which he dragged the purse into his hand, which was standing in the public domain, and acquired it through the act of placing it into his hand. This act was also the carrying of the purse into the public domain, since his hand was situated in the public domain.

However, we must say that his hand was not three handbreadths above the ground. For if his hand had been three handbreadths above the ground of the public domain, his hand would have been three handbreadths above the private domain [which is at the same height as the public domain]. If so, he would have had to lift the purse three handbreadths in order to place it into his hand, and he would then have become liable for the theft when he lifted it three handbreadths, before placing it into his hand, and would have incurred the prohibition of Shabbat.

Furthermore, we must bring a source that a person’s hand acquires an object for him. The source for this law is Rava’s statement with regard to Shabbat that a person’s hand is considered for him like an area of four by four handbreadths.

Rav Aḥa

holds that it is indeed impossible to acquire a stolen object by pulling it into the public domain. Therefore,

he teaches it this way:

he explains the beraita like Rav Ashi, who established it as a case in which he placed his hand below three handbreadths from the ground and received the object into it.

But

Ravina teaches

a different explanation of the beraita:

Actually, it is a case in which he took it into the public domain.

He took the purse into the public domain.

And

as for the difficulty that the prohibition of Shabbat indeed exists, whereas the prohibition of theft does not exist, this is not difficult, because

in the public domain also he acquires it

through acquisition by pulling, and he becomes liable to pay for the theft.

And both of them—

Rav Aḥa and Ravina, who disagree over whether one acquires an object by pulling it in the public domain for purposes of theft—

are disagreeing over the precise reading of this Mishna

in tractate Bava Kamma [79b],

and this is the matter over which they disagree!

As we learned in the Mishna: If he was pulling

a stolen ox

and was taking it out

from the owner’s domain toward the public domain,

and it died

while it was still

in the owner’s domain—

the thief is exempt

from paying its value, because he had not yet acquired the stolen object.

But if he

lifted it

in the owner’s domain,

or took it out of the owner’s domain

into the public domain,

and it died

afterward, he is

liable

to pay its value.

Ravina,

who holds that one acquires an object even by pulling it into the public domain,

inferred this from the first clause,

and derived his ruling from the precise wording of the first clause:

For we learned in the first clause:

“If he was pulling it out, and it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt.”

And this implies:

The reason is that it died in the owner’s domain

before he took it out of that domain, and therefore he is exempt;

but if he took it out of the owner’s domain

into any place that is not the owner’s domain, even into the public domain,

and it died,

then he is

liable.

And this proves that pulling an object acquires it even in the public domain.

Whereas

Rav Aḥa,

who holds that pulling an object into the public domain does not acquire it,

inferred

his position

from the latter clause,

as we learned there:

“If he lifted it or took it out”

of the owner’s domain, and it died, he is liable!

And it follows:

Removal is analogous to lifting.

Just as lifting

is discussed where

it comes into his domain,

that the stolen item comes into the domain of the thief, inside his hands,

so too, removal

is discussed in a case where

it comes into his domain

of the thief, and not into the public domain.

And the Gemara adds and explains:

For Rav Aḥa, the first clause is difficult,

for it implies that pulling into the public domain effects acquisition!?

For Ravina, the final clause is difficult,

for it implies that pulling into the public domain does not effect acquisition!?

The first clause—

which implies that anything they removed from the domain of the owners, even into the public domain, is acquired—

for Rav Aḥa,

who holds that pulling into the public domain does not effect acquisition,

is not difficult.

For:

As long as

it has not come into his domain [before he has pulled the stolen item into his domain], it is

considered to be in the

called “the domain of the owners.”

For what they said, “the domain of the owners,” does not mean their actual domain, but rather that it remains in their possession as long as the thief has not performed a complete act of acquisition with it.

The final clause,

which implies that “they removed it” is analogous to “they lifted it,” meaning that the stolen item came into his domain—

for Ravina,

who holds that pulling effects acquisition in the case of theft into the public domain,

is not difficult,

for:

We do not say, “removal is analogous to lifting,”

according to Ravina.

We learned in the Mishna: These are the young women for whom there is a fine:

one who has intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister,

or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife, or with a menstruant woman:

a. The Torah said [Deuteronomy 25:1–3]: “When there is a dispute between people, and they come to judgment, and they judge them, and they vindicate the righteous and condemn the wicked. And it shall be, if the wicked is deserving of being beaten [who transgressed a prohibition and became liable for lashes], that the judge shall cause him to lie down and strike him before him according to his wickedness, by number. Forty he shall strike him; he shall not add, lest he add to strike him beyond these with a great blow, and your brother be degraded before your eyes.”

b. From what the Torah said, “He shall not add, lest he add,” we learn a prohibition against one who injures and strikes his fellow. However, he does not receive lashes for this prohibition except in a situation where he does not pay for his injury, such as where the value of the damage was not worth a peruta, for otherwise he would not be “receiving lashes and paying,” as will be explained.

c. From what the Torah said, “according to his wickedness,” the Sages learned [below, 37a]: “For one wickedness you make him liable, but you do not make him liable for two wickednesses,” and the verse comes to teach that a person does not receive lashes and pay.

d. The Torah did not explain whether one who becomes liable for lashes and money receives lashes and does not pay, or perhaps pays and does not receive lashes. The amoraim discussed this matter in our sugya.

e. In two places the Torah explained, concerning one who became liable for lashes and money, that he pays the money, and consequently we know that he does not receive lashes, since one does not receive lashes and pay. These are they:

The first: one who injures his fellow, for if he injured him by an amount worth a peruta, he pays for five matters [damage, pain, medical expenses, loss of work, and humiliation], and does not receive lashes for having transgressed the prohibition of “he shall not add to strike him”; and later in the sugya the source for this is explained.

The second: conspiring witnesses, for if they plotted to cause a person to lose money worth a peruta, they pay the money, “as he plotted to do to his brother,” and they do not receive lashes for having transgressed “You shall not bear false witness against your fellow”; and later in the sugya the source for this is explained.

f. The Gemara raises a doubt: Is the punishment of lashes more severe than the punishment of money, or perhaps the punishment of money is more severe than the punishment of lashes?

g. In our sugya [and below, 34b, which is also a continuation of the sugya], a dispute of amoraim is explained according to the view that “he receives lashes and does not pay”: whether those liable for unintentional lashes are also exempt from payments, like those liable for unintentional death penalties, or not.

And we raise a contradiction from what we learned in the Mishna in tractate Makkot [13a]:

These are those who receive lashes: one who has intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with

his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife, or with a menstruant woman,

these very “those liable for prohibitions” whom we learned in our Mishna to have a fine are liable for lashes.

Those same people designated in our Mishna as “those liable for prohibitions punishable by lashes,” for whom there is a fine, are liable to receive lashes.