Ketubot 31b (לא:) — the Talmud in English

which is

exempt,

since his initial displacement is for the purpose of the placement—is this so?!

But if so,

why did he teach

in the latter clause of the beraita:

if he was dragging it out,

without lifting it,

he is exempt if he drags it out?

Let the tanna

of the beraita

differentiate within that case itself,

in the case of one who lifted the object himself, since in that case too, according to Rabbi Avin, one finds exemption from payment for the theft. And let him teach as follows:

When is this said—

that he is liable to make payment for the initial lifting—

when he stops

afterward

to rest

in a private domain, since the initial displacement has thereby been nullified.

But

when he stops

to adjust the load,

since the initial displacement has not been nullified,

he is exempt

since, according to Rabbi Avin, the displacement is for the purpose of placement—is this so?!

Rather,

in light of this difficulty, the Gemara resolves in another way the difficulty posed by the beraita against the words of Rabbi Avin:

In accordance with whose opinion is

this beraita?—

it is that of Ben Azzai, who says: “One who walks

with every step in which he places his foot on the ground

is considered to have stopped.”

It follows that neither the lifting nor the initial displacement in the private domain renders him liable, since he continued walking in the private domain; and since “one who walks is considered to have stopped,” it is as though he placed it in the private domain. His liability is only for the displacement of his body at the boundary of the private domain. It follows that at the time of the initial lifting, when he stole the object, the labor of carrying out had not yet begun. Therefore, he is not exempt from the monetary payment for which he had become liable earlier, at the time of the lifting.

The Gemara still challenges Rabbi Avin:

But

if he lifted the purse and was

throwing

it into the public domain—

what will the law be? Will he really be

is the law? Will he really be

exempt

because his initial displacement is for the purpose of placement?!

But if so, the following difficulty arises:

let the tanna

of the beraita

differentiate and teach within that case itself,

in the same manner as the first clause, which discusses lifting the purse, and let him teach as follows:

When is this said,

that if he lifted the purse and liability for the theft preceded liability for stoning, he is not exempt on account of kam lei bid’rabba minei—

when he walks

with the stolen object in his hand, thereby nullifying through his walking the displacement caused by his lifting it.

But

if

he throws

the purse, then even though liability for the theft preceded his liability for carrying it out, he is

exempt,

since the displacement is for the purpose of placement.

The Gemara answers:

He needed to teach the case of dragging it out.

That is: It was preferable for the tanna to incidentally teach a novel law concerning “dragging it out” than to teach another manner of exemption in the case of lifting.

For in the law concerning “dragging it out,” there is a novel point, because

it might have entered your mind to say that this is not the normal manner of carrying out,

and he would not be liable to death at all for carrying it out—

the tanna teaches us

in the beraita that he is liable to death even when he carries the purse out by dragging it!

The Gemara explains:

And with regard to what,

that is, with regard to what type of purse is there a novel point that carrying it out by dragging is considered carrying out, rendering one liable for it?

If it is

large

If it is large purses,

if they are large purses filled with a load and difficult to lift—

this cannot be the explanation, for

that is its normal manner,

as it is normally carried out by dragging, and there is no novel point here.

And

if it is

small

And if it is small purses,

if they are small purses that he dragged—

this too cannot be the explanation, for in truth

that is not its normal manner,

and he should not be held liable, since he did not carry it out in the manner in which people carry things out.

Rather,

this Mishna deals

with

medium-sized

with medium-sized purses,

purses that are neither large nor small, and which are sometimes carried by dragging!

The Gemara further explains the latter clause of the Mishna, “if he was dragging it out”:

And where did he carry it out,

that is, where did he carry out the purse, such that you can say that the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft take effect simultaneously?

If he carried it out

[he carried the purse out] from the domain of the owner from whom it was stolen

into the public domain,

and placed it there—

this cannot be the explanation, for

the prohibition of Shabbat

indeed

applies,

since he carried it from a private domain into the public domain, but

the prohibition of theft

however

does not apply,

since by carrying it into the public domain there is no act of acquisition by which he “acquires” the stolen property and becomes liable for accidents involving it and for its payments.

And

And if he carried it into the private domain

of the thief, thereby “acquiring” it through acquisition by one’s courtyard—

this too cannot be the explanation, for

the prohibition of theft

indeed

applies,

since he brought it into his courtyard, but

the prohibition of

Shabbat

however

does not apply,

since he carried it only from one private domain into another private domain.

No, it is necessary:

our Mishna deals with a case

in which he carried it out

from the private domain

to the sides of

the margins of

the public domain.

”They would place obstacles along the public domain at a certain distance from the houses, so that carts would not pass close to the houses and scrape against them; the area between the obstacles and the houses was called “the sides of the public domain.”

And

And we ask:

In accordance with whose opinion,

that is, whose view does our Mishna follow in the dispute between the tannaim concerning the status of “the sides of the public domain”—whether they are considered a public domain with regard to Shabbat?

If it is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer, who says: “The sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain.”

This cannot be so, for

the prohibition of Shabbat

indeed

applies

when he carries the purse out to the sides of the public domain, but

the prohibition of

theft

however

does not apply,

since according to him it is a public domain, and carrying an object into the public domain does not effect acquisition of stolen property.

And

And if it is in accordance with the Rabbis, who say: “The sides of the public domain are not considered like the public domain.”

This too cannot be so, because

the prohibition of theft

indeed

applies,

since according to them, the status of “the sides of the public domain” is like that of a simta with regard to pulling, so that one who pulls an object into it acquires it, but

the prohibition of Shabbat

however

does not apply,

since according to them this is not a public domain?!

The Gemara answers:

Actually, it is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

who said with regard to Shabbat that the sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain; therefore, he is liable for Shabbat when he carries the purse there.

And

And however,

when Rabbi Eliezer said, “The sides of the public domain are considered like the public domain,” this applies only with regard to liability for Shabbat,

since

sometimes the public is crowded and enters there,

as sometimes the public is forced into the sides of the public domain.

But with regard to acquisition, one acquires,

as one can acquire an object by pulling it even in the sides of the public domain.

What is the reason?—

For the public is not commonly found there,

since the public is not usually present in the sides of the public domain; therefore, its status is like that of a simta, in which the Sages instituted acquisition through pulling an object into it.

Rav Ashi said,

to explain the latter clause, “if he was dragging it out,” so that the difficulty of where he carried it out does not arise:

For example, he brought

his

hand to within three

handbreadths of the ground of the public domain,

and received it

into his hand by dragging it from the owner’s domain into his hand.

His hand acquires it for him, rendering him liable for the theft,

as in the statement of Rava!

For Rava said,

with regard to Shabbat:

a person’s hand is considered for him like an area of four

handbreadths

by four

handbreadths.

Therefore, when a person places an object in a hand located in the public domain, the placement is considered placement upon an area of four by four, which is the minimum area required for placement.

And just as the hand is considered significant with regard to an area of four by four, so too is it considered significant with regard to the acquisition of stolen property.

That is, the case is one in which he dragged the purse into his hand, which was located in the public domain, and acquired the stolen property by bringing it into his hand. This act also constitutes carrying it into the public domain, since his hand was located in the public domain.

However, we must say that his hand was not three handbreadths above the ground. For if his hand had been three handbreadths above the ground of the public domain, his hand would have been three handbreadths above the private domain [which is equal in height to the public domain]. If so, he would have had to lift the purse three handbreadths in order to bring it into his hand, and he would then have become liable for the theft when he lifted it three handbreadths, before placing it into his hand, and he would have become liable for the prohibition of Shabbat.

Furthermore, we must establish a source for the principle that a person’s hand acquires for him; the source of this law is Rava’s statement with regard to Shabbat that a person’s hand is considered for him like an area of four by four.

Rav Aḥa

holds that it is indeed impossible to acquire stolen property by pulling it into the public domain. Therefore,

he teaches as follows,

explaining the beraita in accordance with Rav Ashi, who established it as a case in which he brought his hand to within three handbreadths of the ground and received the object.

But

Ravina teaches

the beraita as follows:

Actually, it is a case in which he carried it into the public domain.

He carried the purse into the public domain.

And

And as for your difficulty—that the prohibition of Shabbat indeed applies, but the prohibition of theft does not—this is not difficult, because

in the public domain too he acquires it

through acquisition by pulling, and he becomes liable for payment for the theft.

And both of them—

Rav Aḥa and Ravina, who disagree over whether in the public domain one acquires an object by pulling it with regard to theft—

disagree over the precise wording of this Mishna

in tractate Bava Kamma [79b],

and that is where they disagree!

For we learned in a Mishna: If he was pulling

a stolen ox

and going out

from the owner’s domain toward the public domain,

and the ox died

while it was still

in the owner’s domain—

the thief is exempt

from paying its value, since he had not yet “acquired” the stolen property.

But if

he lifted it

the ox in the owner’s domain,

or carried it out from the owner’s domain

into the public domain,

and it died

afterward, he is

liable

to pay its value.

Ravina,

who holds that even pulling an object into the public domain effects acquisition,

inferred his view from the first clause,

carefully deriving the law from the wording of the first clause of the Mishna:

For we learned in the first clause:

If he was pulling it out, and it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt.

And it implies:

The reason is that it died in the owner’s domain

before he carried it out of their domain, and therefore he is exempt;

but if he carried it out of the owner’s domain

to any place that is not the owner’s domain, even into the public domain,

and it died,

he is

liable.

It is thus proven that pulling an object, even into the public domain, effects acquisition.

Whereas

Rav Aḥa,

who holds that pulling an object into the public domain does not effect acquisition,

inferred

his position

from the latter clause,

as we learned there:

“If he lifted it or carried it out”

from the owner’s domain, and it died, he is liable!

And it follows:

“removing” is analogous to lifting.

Just as lifting

is understood as

bringing it into his domain,

meaning that the stolen item enters the thief’s domain, into his hands,

so too, removing

is understood as occurring when

it enters his domain

of the thief, and not the public domain.

The Gemara adds and explains:

For Rav Aḥa, the first clause is difficult,

as it implies that pulling an item into the public domain effects acquisition!?

For Ravina, the latter clause is difficult,

as it implies that pulling an item into the public domain does not effect acquisition!?

The first clause—

which implies that in every case where he removes the item from the owner’s domain, even into the public domain, he acquires it—

according to Rav Aḥa,

who holds that pulling an item into the public domain does not effect acquisition,

is not difficult.

For:

As long as

it has not entered his domain [that is, before he has pulled the stolen item into his domain], it is

called

“the owner’s domain.”

For when they said “the owner’s domain,” they did not mean that it is literally in the owner’s domain; rather, it remains in his possession as long as the thief has not performed a complete act of acquisition with regard to it.

The latter clause,

which implies that “he removed it” is analogous to “he lifted it,” meaning that the stolen item entered his domain—

according to Ravina,

who holds that pulling an item into the public domain effects acquisition with regard to theft—

is not difficult,

for:

We do not say that “removing is analogous to lifting”

according to Ravina.

We learned in the Mishna: These are the young women for whom there is a fine:

one who has intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister,

or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife, or with a menstruant woman:

a. The Torah states [Deuteronomy 25:1–3]: “When there is a dispute between people, and they come to judgment, and the judges judge them, vindicating the righteous and condemning the wicked. And if the wicked man is liable to lashes, it shall be that when the judge has him lie down, they shall strike him before him according to his wickedness, by number. Forty shall he strike him; he shall not add, lest he add to strike him beyond these with many lashes, and your brother be degraded before your eyes.”

b. From the Torah’s statements, “he shall not add, lest he add,” we learn the prohibition of a negative mitzva against one who wounds and strikes his fellow. However, he is not lashed for this prohibition except in a case where he does not pay for his injury, such as when the damage was not worth a peruta; for otherwise, he would be subject to “lashes and payment,” as will be explained.

c. From the Torah’s statement, “according to his wickedness,” the Sages learned [below 37a]: “For one wickedness you hold him liable, but you do not hold him liable for two wickednesses.” The verse therefore comes to teach that a person is not both lashed and required to pay.

d. The Torah did not explain whether one who becomes liable for both lashes and monetary payment is lashed and does not pay, or perhaps pays and is not lashed. The amoraim discuss this matter in our sugya.

e. In two cases, the Torah explicitly states, with regard to one who became liable for both lashes and monetary payment, that he must pay the money; consequently, we know that he is not lashed, since one is not both lashed and required to pay. These are:

The first: one who wounds his fellow. If he wounds him with damage worth a peruta, he pays for the five forms of liability [damage, pain, medical costs, loss of work, and humiliation], and he is not lashed for violating the prohibition, “he shall not add to strike him.” The source for this is explained later in the sugya.

The second: conspiring witnesses. If they schemed to cause a person a monetary loss worth a peruta, they pay the money, “as he schemed to do to his brother,” and they are not lashed for violating “You shall not bear false witness against your fellow.” The source for this is explained later in the sugya.

f. The Gemara considers whether the punishment of lashes is more severe than the punishment of monetary payment, or perhaps the punishment of monetary payment is more severe than the punishment of lashes.

g. In our sugya [and below, 34b, which is also a continuation of the sugya], a dispute among the amoraim is explained according to the view that one is “lashed and does not pay”: Are those liable for unintentional transgressions punishable by lashes also exempt from payment, like those liable for unintentional capital offenses, or not?

And we raise a contradiction

from what we learned in the Mishna in tractate Makkot [13a]:

These are those who are lashed: One who has intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with

his brother’s wife, or with his father’s brother’s wife, or with a menstruant woman,

Thus, those “liable for negative commandments” whom we learned in our Mishna are subject to a fine are liable to lashes.