Ketubot 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

and tore his fellow’s silk garments

when he swallowed the teruma; and the payment for the silk garments is the difference between Abaye and Rava.

The essential statement: Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana concedes that one who steals his fellow’s forbidden fat and eats it is

liable

for payment of the theft. Since

he had already become liable for

payment of the

theft before he came to commit

the

prohibition

of eating

forbidden fat.

We raised a difficulty:

Shall we say

that

it disagrees

with Rav Ḥisda’s statement, with

that

which

Rabbi Avin said?

Must it necessarily be understood from Rav Ḥisda’s words that he disagrees with Rabbi Avin’s statement below?

a. One who carries an object on Shabbat from one place to another in the public domain, over a distance of four cubits—for example, he initially lifted it from one place in the public domain and ultimately placed it in another place in the public domain after carrying it four cubits in the public domain, is liable to death for the labor of “carrying out” on Shabbat, which includes [by a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai] transferring an object from its place in the public domain to another place in the public domain.

b. One who lifts an object from the private domain, carries it out into the public domain, and places it there is liable to death, for he violated the labor of carrying out.

c. According to Rashi, the measure of lifting required to acquire an object through acquisition by lifting is three handbreadths.

According to the Tosafot in our sugya, the measure of lifting an object with regard to carrying out on Shabbat is raising it from the domain to a height of three handbreadths in the air.

For Rabbi Avin said: One who throws an arrow

on Shabbat in the public domain

from the beginning of the four

cubits

to the end

of the four

cubits [which is the measure of carrying in the public domain that makes one liable to execution by a court for performing a labor on Shabbat]—

and tore

the arrow

silk garments,

expensive silk clothing belonging to his fellow,

in its course [

the flight of the arrow].

Thus, the person who threw the arrow violated Shabbat and damaged his fellow’s property through a single act—

the thrower

is exempt

from payment for the damage to the silk garments, because of kim lei be-derabba minei.

Here, however, the liability for death and the monetary liability do not arise simultaneously. He became liable for the monetary payment already during the arrow’s flight, when the arrow tore the garments, whereas he would become liable for death only when the labor was completed, when the arrow came to rest in the public domain at the end of four cubits. Nevertheless, he is exempt from the monetary payment for the damage!

And this is

because the lifting

of the arrow

is necessary for its placement.

That is: Since, in order to place the object at the end of four cubits, it is necessary to lift it from its place and carry it from where it was, we regard the entire act, from lifting until placement, as one extended labor for which he becomes liable—once it is completed—to execution by a court.

Since, at the time he performed the labor—which, as stated, begins with the lifting—he became liable for money, the monetary liability is exempted by the rule of kim lei be-derabba minei.

If so,

here too,

in the case of one who lifts forbidden fat in order to eat it, since he lifts the object in order to bring it to his mouth and eat it, we should say that the

lifting

of the stolen forbidden fat

is necessary for eating.

It is as though he began eating at the moment of lifting.

Since, during the act necessary for “eating,” he became liable for the theft—namely, at the moment of lifting—then according to Rabbi Avin’s view he should be exempt from the monetary payment for it, since the lifting takes place at a time when he has already begun the eating that brings him to karet.

Since Rav Ḥisda did not exempt him for the lifting, because it precedes the eating, must it indeed follow that Rav Ḥisda disagrees with Rabbi Avin?

The Gemara rejects this:

Can this really be compared!?

Is the matter under discussion comparable to the proof?

There,

in the case of the thrower of an arrow,

placement is impossible

for which he would become liable

without lifting

and carrying the object in the public domain. Therefore, the performance of a labor that makes him liable to death is considered to have begun from the moment of lifting.

But

here,

it is

possible to eat without lifting, for if he wishes—

he can bend down [

bend over]

and eat.

That is: We cannot regard the lifting—which is above three handbreadths—as part of the act of eating. Only if the act of lifting were necessary for eating the forbidden fat would we indeed say that the lifting too is part of the prohibited act; and since, at that time, while engaged in the prohibited act that makes him liable to death, he becomes liable for money, he would not be liable to pay it.

But since lifting to a height of three handbreadths is not necessary for eating the forbidden fat—for he could bend down to below three handbreadths and eat it—we do not regard the “lifting” as part of the prohibited act of eating.

It follows that at the time he becomes liable for money, namely, when he raises it to a height of three handbreadths, he is not engaged in an act that makes him liable to karet, nor has he in fact become liable to karet at that time [but only when he eats the forbidden fat]. Therefore, there is nothing here that exempts the monetary liability.

Alternatively,

the matter may be divided differently: Rabbi Avin’s statement was made only with regard to “throwing an arrow,” and only when that same arrow tore the silk garments. This is because:

for

there,

in the case of the thrower of an arrow,

if he wished to bring it back [

if he had wanted to bring the arrow back after it had left his hand],

he could not bring it back [

he could no longer bring it back]. It follows that his primary liability, both for the labor of Shabbat and for tearing the silk garments, is for throwing the arrow, since everything that occurs afterward is beyond his control. Therefore, he is exempt even for tearing the silk garments.

But

here,

in the case of lifting the forbidden fat, even after he has lifted it

he can bring it back,

return it and refrain from eating it. Therefore, his liability to karet does not arise from the lifting, and the monetary liability incurred through the lifting is not exempt.

The Gemara explains:

What practical difference

is there

between this first formulation

and

this latter formulation

?

There is a difference between them in the case of one who carries a knife in the public domain

from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits

and tears silk garments in its course.

For according to

the formulation that you said, that placement is impossible without lifting,

and for this reason one who throws an arrow at the silk garments is exempt,

here too,

in the case of one who carries a knife,

also,

it is

impossible to place it without lifting.

Whereas according to

the formulation that you said,

that he is exempt only if

he cannot bring it back—

here,

in the case of one carrying a knife,

he can bring it back.

The essential statement: Rabbi Avin said: One who throws an arrow

on Shabbat

from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits, and tears silk garments in its course,

is

exempt

from payment, since

the lifting is necessary for the placement.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye raised an objection

from a beraita that teaches:

One who steals

a purse on Shabbat,

lifting it, carrying it out from the owner’s domain, and placing it in the public domain, is

liable

to pay for the stolen item.

Although he is liable to stoning for carrying the purse out from the private domain into the public domain, we do not say kim lei be-derabba minei—

since

he had already become liable for the theft

when he lifted it from its place in the private domain,

before he came to the prohibition carrying stoning,

which applies only when he carried it out and placed it in the public domain.

If he was dragging

the stolen item

and went out

from the owner’s domain,

dragging

it

and going out—

that is, he did not lift it in the owner’s domain so as to become liable for acquiring the stolen item through lifting; rather, the acquisition of the stolen item occurred through removing it from the owner’s domain.

He is

exempt

from paying for the theft,

for the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft,

the liabilities for the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft,

arise

for him

simultaneously,

since he became liable for both when he carried it out of the owner’s domain.

The Gemara challenges Rabbi Avin’s view from the first clause, which does not exempt him for lifting the purse in the private domain in order to carry it out into the public domain by virtue of kim lei be-derabba minei:

But why!?

Yet

here too, let us say: The lifting

of the purse

is necessary for carrying it out,

and he should be exempt from payment!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here?

The beraita is discussing

a case where he lifted it

for the purpose of

putting it away

in the private domain,

and

only after he had lifted it

he reconsidered and carried it out

into the public domain. Since, at the time of the lifting, he did not intend to carry it out from the private domain into the public domain, his initial lifting does not make him liable for carrying out on Shabbat and cannot exempt the monetary liability. Only when he reconsidered and decided to carry it out did a second lifting occur, and only then did the labor of carrying out begin.

The Gemara challenges this interpretation:

But in such a case,

where at the time he lifted it from the private domain he did not intend to carry it out,

is he liable

at all for the labor of carrying out on Shabbat!?

But Rabbi Simon said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

A person

who moves objects from one corner to another

on Shabbat,

and,

while they are in his hands,

reconsiders regarding them

and decides not to put them in the house,

and carries them out—

is exempt,

since

the initial lifting was not performed for that purpose.

This carrying out is therefore without a lifting that creates liability for carrying out on Shabbat!?

If so, how did the beraita say, “since he had already become liable for the theft before he came to the prohibition carrying stoning”? This implies that when the purse comes to rest in the public domain he becomes liable for the prohibition of Shabbat. But the initial lifting was not performed for that purpose!?

And we answer:

Do not say,

do not resolve the difficulty by saying that he lifted it

in order to “put it away”

in the private domain.

Rather,

the beraita is actually speaking of a case where he initially lifted it

in order “to carry it out” —

And this is how the matter should be resolved so that Rabbi Avin is not challenged from this beraita:

Here,

in the beraita,

what are we dealing with?

It is speaking of a case

where he stopped

after initially lifting the purse in the private domain. His stopping cancels the initial lifting, since his stopping in the private domain while holding the object is considered placing the object there. His liability for the labor of carrying out begins only afterward, when he lifts it again from the place where he stopped. For once he lifts it from the place where he stopped, “the lifting of his body is like the lifting of the object.” Therefore, he is not exempt for the initial stopping and lifting from the monetary liability for the theft.

The Gemara asks:

He stopped—

for what purpose?

When he stopped in the private domain after the initial lifting, for what purpose did he stop?

If

you might say that he stopped in order

to adjust his load [

to settle his burden on his shoulder]—this cannot be said. For stopping in order to adjust one’s load

is its normal manner,

it is customary to stop in order to adjust one’s load. If so, the initial lifting and removal were not nullified, and the difficulty remains: he should be exempt for the theft liability incurred through that lifting!?

Rather,

the beraita must be speaking

of one who stopped to rest,

which nullifies the initial lifting.

Now the difficulty arises:

But

if he stopped

to adjust his load

—which is his normal practice—

what

would the law be according to Rabbi Avin?