Ketubot 31a — the Talmud in English

and tore his fellow’s silk garments

when he swallowed the teruma, and payment for the silk garments is the matter over which Abaye and Rava differ.

The essential statement: Rav Ḥisda said: Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana concedes that one who steals his fellow’s forbidden fat and eats it is

liable

for payment of the theft. Since

he had already become liable for

payment of the

theft before he came to commit

the

prohibition

of eating

forbidden fat.

And we discussed it:

let us say

that

it differs

this statement of Rav Hisda from that

which

said

Rabbi Avin?

Is it necessarily implied by Rav Hisda’s words that he disagrees with Rabbi Avin’s words, as follows?

a. One who transfers an object on Shabbat from one place to another in the public domain, over a distance of four cubits—for example, he initially uprooted it from the public domain and ultimately placed it in another place in the public domain, after transferring it four cubits in the public domain —he is liable for death for the labor of “carrying out” on Shabbat, which includes within it [by a tradition from Moses at Sinai] also transferring an object from its place in the public domain to another place in the public domain.

b. One who uproots an object from the private domain, carries it out into the public domain, and places it there is liable for death, for he transgressed the labor of carrying out.

c. The measure of lifting in order to acquire an object through acquisition by lifting, according to Rashi, is three handbreadths.

The measure of uprooting an object with regard to carrying out on Shabbat, according to Tosafot in our sugya, is lifting it from the domain to a height of three handbreadths in the air.

For Rabbi Avin said: One who throws an arrow

on Shabbat in the public domain

from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of

four

cubits [which is the measure of transferring in the public domain for which one is liable to court-imposed death because of a labor on Shabbat]—

and tore

the arrow

silk garments,

expensive silk clothing belonging to his fellow,

in its course [

the arrow’s flight].

And it emerges that the person throwing the arrow desecrated Shabbat and damaged his fellow’s property through one action—

the thrower

is exempt

from payment for the damage to the silk garments, since kam lei bid’rabba minei.

But here the liability for death and the monetary liability do not come simultaneously, for he had already become liable for the monetary payment during the arrow’s flight, when the arrow tore the clothing, whereas the liability for death comes upon him only when the labor is completed, when the arrow comes to rest in the public domain at the end of four cubits. Nevertheless, he is exempt from the liability for payment for the damage!

And because

the uprooting

of the arrow

is necessary for the placing.

That is to say: since, in order to place the object at the end of four cubits, it is necessary to uproot it from its place and transfer it from the place where it was, therefore we regard the entire act from the uprooting until the placing as one lengthy labor for which he becomes liable—when it is completed—for court-imposed death.

And since, at the time of performing the labor—which, as stated, begins with the uprooting—he became liable for money, the money is exempted by the law of “kam lei bid’rabba minei.”

And if so,

here too,

in the case of one who lifts fat in order to eat it, since he lifts the object in order to bring it to his mouth and eat it, therefore we should say that the

lifting

of the stolen fat

is necessary for eating.

And it is as though he began eating from the time of the lifting.

And since, during the act necessary for “eating,” he became liable for the liability of theft, namely at the time of the lifting, according to Rabbi Avin’s view we should exempt him from the monetary payment for it, since it is performed at a time when he had already begun the eating that brings him to karet.

Since Rabbi Hisda did not exempt him for the lifting, because it precedes the eating, is it indeed necessary to conclude that Rabbi Hisda disagrees with Rabbi Avin?

The Gemara rejects this:

And since Rav Hisda did not exempt him for the lifting, because it precedes the eating, is it indeed necessary that Rav Hisda disagrees with Rabbi Avin?

The Gemara rejects:

How can you understand it thus!?

In the case there, concerning one who throws an arrow,

placing is impossible

for which he would become liable

without uprooting

and transferring the object in the public domain; therefore, from the time of uprooting it is regarded as the performance of a labor that makes one liable for death.

But

here,

behold,

eating is possible without lifting, for if he wishes—

he bends down [

he stoops]

and eats.

That is to say: it is impossible to regard the lifting—which is above three handbreadths—as part of the act of eating. Only if the act of lifting were necessary for eating the fat would we indeed say that the lifting too is part of the act of the prohibition; and since at that time, when he is occupied with the act of the prohibition that makes him liable for death, he becomes liable for money, he would not be liable to pay it.

But since the act of lifting to a height of three handbreadths is not necessary for eating the fat, because he could have bent down below three handbreadths and eaten it, therefore we do not regard the “lifting” as part of the act of the prohibition of eating.

And it emerges that at the time when he becomes liable for money, namely when he lifted it to a height of three handbreadths, he is not occupied with an action that makes him liable for karet, nor did he in fact become liable for karet at that time [but only when he ate the fat]; therefore, there is nothing here that exempts the money.

Alternatively,

it is possible to distinguish in another manner: Rabbi Avin’s words were stated only with regard to “throwing an arrow,” and only in a case where the silk garments were torn by that same arrow, because:

for

there,

concerning one who throws an arrow,

if he wished to return it [

if he wanted to return the arrow] after it had left his hand,

he could not return it [

he could no longer return it]. It emerges that the essence of his liability both for the labor of Shabbat and for tearing the silk garments is for throwing the arrow, since everything that happens afterward is not dependent upon him; therefore, he is exempt even for tearing the silk garments.

But

here,

with the lifting of the fat, even after he lifted it,

he can return it

and return it and not eat it. If so, his liability for karet is not for the lifting, and therefore the monetary liability that existed at the lifting is not exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

what difference is there

in law

between this wording

the first

and this wording

the latter?

There is a difference between them: one who transfers a knife in the public domain

from the beginning of four to the end of four cubits,

and tore silk garments in its course.

For

according to that wording which you said, placing is impossible without uprooting,

and for this reason he is exempt when throwing an arrow at the silk garments,

here

concerning one who transfers a knife

also,

behold,

placing is impossible without uprooting.

But

according to that wording which you said:

he is exempt only if

he cannot return it—

here

concerning one who transfers a knife, behold,

he can return it.

The body of the matter: Rabbi Avin said: One who throws an arrow

on Shabbat

from the beginning of four to the end of four, and tore silk garments in its course,

he is

exempt

from payment, since

the uprooting is necessary for the placing.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye raised an objection

from that which is taught in a beraita:

one who steals

a purse on Shabbat,

which he lifted, carried out from the owner’s domain, and placed in the public domain, he is

liable

to pay for the theft.

And although he is liable for stoning for carrying the purse out from the private domain into the public domain, we do not say kam lei bid’rabba minei—

since

he had already become liable for the theft,

when he lifted it from its place, in the private domain,

before he came to the prohibition carrying stoning,

which applies only when he carried it out and placed it in the public domain.

If he was dragging

the stolen object

and going out

from the owner’s domain,

dragging

it

and going out—

that is, he did not lift it in the owner’s domain so that he would become liable through the “acquisition” of the theft by lifting; rather, the acquisition of the theft was through carrying it out of the owner’s domain.

He is

exempt

from paying for the theft,

for the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft

the liabilities for the prohibition of Shabbat and the prohibition of theft

come

together

as one,

for he became liable for both of them when he carried it out of the owner’s domain.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Avin’s view from the beginning of the beraita, that he is not exempt for the lifting that he performed in the private domain in order to carry it out into the public domain, by the law of “kam lei bid’rabba minei”:

But why!?

Behold,

here too let us say: the lifting

of the purse

is necessary for carrying out, and he should be exempt from the payments!?

and he should be exempt from payment!?

And we answer:

And we answer:

in what are we dealing here,

it is speaking in the beraita

of a case where he lifted it

in order to put it away

in the private domain,

and

only after he had lifted it

he reconsidered concerning it and carried it out

into the public domain. Since, at the time of the lifting, he did not intend to carry it out from the private domain into the public domain, his initial uprooting does not make him liable for carrying out on Shabbat and cannot exempt the monetary liability. Only when he reconsidered and decided to carry it out was there a second uprooting, and only then did the labor of carrying out begin.

And the Gemara wonders about this interpretation:

and in such a case,

where at the time of uprooting from the private domain he did not intend to carry it out,

is he liable

at all for the labor of carrying out on Shabbat!?

But Rabbi Simon said that Rabbi Ami said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

A person

who clears objects from one corner to another

on Shabbat,

and

while they are in his hand

reconsiders concerning them

that he should not place them in the house,

and carries them out—

he is exempt,

since

there was no uprooting from the outset for this purpose.

And this carrying out is found to be without an uprooting that makes one liable because of carrying out on Shabbat!?

And if so, how did they say in the beraita, “since he had already become liable for the theft before he came to the prohibition carrying stoning,” implying that when the purse comes to rest in the public domain he will become liable because of the prohibition of Shabbat? But there was no uprooting from the outset for this purpose!?

And we answer:

do not say,

do not say, in order to resolve the difficulty, that the case is where he lifted it

in order to ‘put it away’

in the private domain.

Rather,

the beraita truly speaks of a case where from the outset he lifted it

in order ‘to carry it out’ —

And this is how it should be resolved so that no difficulty is raised against Rabbi Avin from this beraita:

here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing,

that it is speaking

when he stopped,

after he had uprooted and lifted the purse in the private domain. His stopping nullifies the first uprooting, since his stopping in the private domain together with the object in his hand is considered the placing of the object there. His liability for the labor of carrying out begins only afterward, when he again becomes uprooted from the place where he stopped. For since he uprooted himself from the place where he was standing, “the uprooting of his body is like the uprooting of the object.” Therefore, he is not exempt for the first uprooting and lifting from the monetary liability for theft.

And the Gemara wonders:

he stopped—

for what purpose?

When he stopped in the private domain after the first uprooting, for what purpose did he stop?

If

you should say that he stopped in order

to adjust the load [

to settle his burden on his shoulder]—this cannot be said. For stopping in order to adjust the load

is its usual manner,

it is normal to stop in order to adjust the load, and if so, the first lifting and uprooting were not nullified; and it would still be difficult: he should be exempt for the liability of theft, for which he became liable through that lifting!?

Rather,

necessarily, the beraita speaks

of one who stopped to rest,

for through this the first uprooting was nullified.

And now the difficulty is:

but

if he stopped

to adjust the load

which is his usual manner—

what

will the law be according to Rabbi Avin?