Ketubot 22a — the Talmud in English

Behold,

are they not two witnesses against two witnesses?

And we should have disqualified him because of the doubt? And

if

it is speaking of a case where there emerged against him

a challenge concerning family blemish,

such as when they said, “He is a slave,” why are they not trustworthy once they have signed? Is this not merely

the disclosure of a fact,

that he is not a slave, and this is a matter whose disclosure is destined to occur, and with regard to a matter whose disclosure is destined to occur, people do not lie.

And if you say: in any event, since they have an interest in their testimony, they should be disqualified, even though there is no concern that they are lying—for even Moses and Aaron are disqualified from testimony because of the disqualification of kinship, and if so, even an interested party should be disqualified from testimony because he is related to himself, even when there is no concern that he is lying?

It may be said: here, since only the disclosure of a fact concerning his lineage is required, the laws of giving testimony are not required, and therefore they are trustworthy. Rashi, and according to the Tosafot of Rabbi Isaac ben Samuel.

And we answer:

I can always say to you

that there emerged against him

a challenge concerning robbery, and

nevertheless this is not two witnesses against two witnesses, because

these say:

“We know about him that he repented!”

And therefore they do not contradict the testimony of the first witnesses, and they are trustworthy.

Rav Zeira said: This matter

which he says below,

I heard from Rabbi Abba, and if not

for

Rabbi Abba from Akko

reminding me of it

after some time, I would have forgotten it.

If three sat to ratify a document, and

after they had testified before them, and before they signed the confirmation,

one of them died, they must write

in the confirmation:

“We were in a session of three, and one is no longer here.”

Since the ratification of documents is with three, while only two are signed on this document, the one who sees it may say that this document was ratified with two; therefore they write in the document that at the time of the ratification there were three here.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: And if he wrote in it—

“This document came before us, the court of law,”

this document came before the court of law,

he no longer needs

to write in it, “and one is no longer here,” since a court of law cannot consist of fewer than three.

And we object:

Perhaps

the one who sees it will think that

it is an impudent court of law

that ratified it through two judges,

and in accordance

with the opinion of

Shmuel, for Shmuel said: “If two judged, their judgment is a judgment, but they are called an impudent court of law,”

and if so, it is still necessary to write in the document, “and one is no longer here,” to say that here they did not rely on Shmuel’s ruling?

And we answer:

that

it is speaking when

it was written in it: “This document came before

this document came before

the court of our master Rav Ashi,”

who was an important court of law, and certainly he would not judge with two.

And

we object:

Perhaps

the one who sees it will still think that

the scholars of the academy of Rav Ashi, according

to

Shmuel’s opinion, held,

and they judged with two?

And we answer:

that

it is speaking when

it was written in it: “And our master Rav Ashi instructed us,”

and since it was done by the command of Rav Ashi, certainly it was not done with fewer than three.

Mishna:

A woman who said: “I was a married woman, and I am divorced.”

She is trustworthy.

Since

the mouth that prohibited

her, when she said, “I was a married woman,”

is the mouth that permitted

her, when she said, “I am divorced”.

And if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says—

“I am divorced,” she is not trustworthy.

Since now there is no “mouth that prohibited,” for she was prohibited through the witnesses.

She said—

“I was captured

among the gentiles,

and I am pure,

for I was not violated by them,” and there are no witnesses that she was captured,

she is trustworthy.

Because

the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.

And if there are witnesses that she was captured, and she says—

“I am pure,” she is not trustworthy.

And if, after she married, witnesses came,

then

this woman does not go out.

And the Gemara will explain concerning what this law was stated.

Gemara:

Rav Asi said: From where

did we learn the law of

“the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” from the Torah?

As it is stated

in the section of “the one who brings out an evil name”:

“I gave my daughter to this man as a wife.”

And we expound: when he said, “I gave my daughter

to a man,”

behold, he

prohibited her

to the entire world, since we do not know to which man he gave her, and because of the doubt she is prohibited to the entire world.

And when he added and said

“this,”

behold, he

permitted her

to her husband, and it is proven that he is trustworthy to permit her, since “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted”.

And we object:

Why do I need a verse,

when

it is logical

that he is trustworthy to permit her, since

he prohibited her, and he permits her?

Rather,

indeed, it is not necessary to have a verse to say that the father is trustworthy to permit his daughter, but

when the verse was necessary, it was for that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: From where is it derived that a father is trustworthy to prohibit his daughter from the Torah?

As it is stated—

“I gave my daughter to a man,”

and it is proven that the giving of the daughter is dependent on the father, and he is trustworthy to say that he married her off, and to prohibit her to the entire world.

And we object: still, what is the purpose of the verse’s addition of the word

“this”?

The fact that he is trustworthy to permit her to her husband is logical, as above.

And we answer:

It is needed for that which Rabbi Yona taught.

For Rabbi Yona taught:

It is stated in the section of the one who brings out an evil name:

“I gave my daughter to this man,”

and we expound: “to

this man”

specifically,

but not to a levir.

That is, the husband is liable for lashes and one hundred silver coins, as the law of one who brings out an evil name, only when he is the man to whom the woman was given. But if the first husband died without children, and his brother performed levirate marriage with her, and afterward brought out an evil name concerning his first brother’s marriage, he is not liable on account of one who brings out an evil name.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

A woman who said—

“I am a married woman,” and afterward said

even after some time—

“I am unmarried,”—

she is trustworthy.

And we object: why is she trustworthy?

“For she rendered herself a piece of the prohibition”?

And we answer:

Rava bar Rav Huna said:

This teaching, which says that she is trustworthy, is speaking

for example, when she gave an explanation

a reason

for her words,

to explain why she retracted. As will be explained further on in the Gemara.

It was also taught likewise,

that she is trustworthy to retract through an explanation: the woman who

said—

“I am a married woman,” and retracted

after some time

and said—

“I am unmarried,” she is not trustworthy. But if she gave an explanation for her words, she is trustworthy.

And there was also an incident involving one distinguished woman

important,

who

in addition

was

also

distinguished in beauty, and people rushed upon her to betroth her, and she said to them—

“I am betrothed.”

After some days, she arose and betrothed herself.

The Sages said to her: What did you see that made you do this,

when you had rendered yourself a piece of the prohibition by saying, “I am betrothed”? How did you go and betroth yourself?

She said to them: At first, when improper men came upon me, I said—

“I am betrothed.”

Now, when proper men came upon me, I arose and betrothed myself.

And from here there is an additional proof that she is trustworthy to retract through an explanation.

And this is a ruling:

a woman who retracted through an explanation came before us, and

Rav Aḥa, the minister of the capital, brought

this case

before the Sages in Usha, and they said:

that

if she gave an explanation for her words, she is trustworthy.

The Gemara discusses further the laws of an explanation:

Shmuel asked Rav: the woman who

said

“I am impure, and afterward said, ‘I am pure,’”

and gave an explanation for her words,

what is the law?

Is she trustworthy to permit herself through an explanation?

He said to him,

Rav to Shmuel:

Even in this case, if she gave an explanation for her words, she is trustworthy .