Ketubot 21a (כא.) — the Talmud in English

And

according to the opinion of the Sages

it is not necessary to have two witnesses for each and every signature, because

they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document,

meaning that they testify that there was a loan, and therefore they combine to say: “We saw the lender and signed our names to it.”

And we challenge this:

Obviously

this is the point of their dispute! What is the Gemara teaching us by stating it?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind that, according to Rabbi,

his reasoning is not that he is certain that they testify concerning their handwriting, but rather

it is uncertain to him—

whether they testify concerning their handwriting, or whether they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document,

and because of this uncertainty he requires two witnesses for each and every signature.

And there is a practical difference

between a case of uncertainty and a case of certainty:

where one

of

them

—of the witnesses—dies. If Rabbi’s reasoning is based on uncertainty,

two

witness

es

from elsewhere

in the marketplace

would be required

to testify concerning him,

and the surviving witness cannot join with another witness and testify concerning the signature of his fellow,

because if so

he would join with another witness; perhaps they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, and then

we would extract three-quarters of the money on the testimony of one witness,

meaning: Since he testifies concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, half of the money is extracted on his testimony without joining him with the other witness, [since according to the one who says, “They testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document,” a person is deemed credible when he says, “This is my handwriting,” even without joining him with another witness], and afterward, when he joins with the other witness in order to testify concerning his fellow’s signature, another quarter of the money is extracted on his testimony. It follows that three-quarters of the money are extracted on the testimony of one witness!

This is impossible, because it is written: “A matter shall be established on the testimony of two witnesses,” and we expound that the matter must be established through both of them equally, half on the testimony of each one.

And

therefore, if we are uncertain whether he testifies concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, we proceed

here stringently—

when one of the witnesses dies, two others from the marketplace are required to testify concerning him, in case they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document.

And here stringently

—when neither of the witnesses has died, each one is required to testify concerning both himself and his fellow, in case they testify concerning their handwriting.

But

this is what it teaches us

in the Gemara above—

that Rabbi is certainly of the opinion

that they testify concerning their handwriting,

both leniently

when one of the witnesses dies, in which case he may join with another witness and testify concerning his fellow’s signature,

and

and stringently

when he has not died, in which case each of the witnesses must testify concerning both his own handwriting and his fellow’s handwriting.

And proof that Rabbi held this way:

As Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: In the case of two people who signed a document, one of whom died, two people from the marketplace are required to testify concerning him,

as explained above. Since, according to the Sages, they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, if the surviving witness joins with one person from the marketplace to testify concerning the signature of the deceased witness, three-quarters of the money would be extracted on his testimony.

And in this matter Rabbi is lenient,

as we said, since he holds that they testify concerning their handwriting even in a lenient case,

whereas the Sages are stringent.

And we challenge this: According to the Sages, who held that they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, if one of the witnesses dies, and the Sages say that two others from the marketplace are required to testify concerning him,

and if there are not two

people from the marketplace,

but

only

one

person from the marketplace and the surviving witness,

what

is the halakha? Can he not authenticate the document in any way?

Abaye said:

The surviving witness can

write

his

signature on a shard

—on pottery—

and throw it

into the court,

—and leave it in the court—

and the court will authenticate it

(and examine it),

—and the court will validate his signature on the document based on its resemblance to this signature—

and

then

he himself need not testify concerning his signature,

since it has already been authenticated,

and he goes, while this one

—that other witness from the marketplace—

testifies concerning the other one —concerning the witness who died. Since now, even according to the Sages, three-quarters of the money is not extracted on the testimony of one witness: the surviving witness never testified concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, and his signature was authenticated by means of the shard on which he signed it. Therefore, he can testify concerning his fellow’s signature together with the other witness from the marketplace.

concerning the witness who died—since now, even according to the Rabbis, three-quarters of the money are not brought out on the testimony of one witness, because the remaining witness never testified concerning the maneh in the document, and his signature was validated by means of the “earthenware” upon which he signed it. Therefore he can testify concerning the signature of his fellow by joining with the other witness from the marketplace.

And

the surviving witness must sign

specifically on a shard,

—on pottery—

but not on a scroll .

What is the reason?

Perhaps he will find it

—the scroll on which he signed—

a dishonest person, who will write whatever he wishes above it

—and write in his name whatever he wants—

and

he will be deemed credible, because

we learned: “If he produced against him”

a document in

his handwriting stating that he owes him, he collects from unencumbered property,

even though the document contains no witnesses . Here too, if he produces his signature against him, he could forge whatever he wants and obligate him.

Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the Sages,

that they testify concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, and the second witness need not testify concerning his own signature in order to authenticate it.

And we challenge this:

Obviously!

After all,

when there is a single sage and a majority, the halakha follows the majority!

What, then, is Shmuel teaching us by his statement?

And we answer:

It might have entered your mind

that here the halakha follows Rabbi, because we have established that

“the halakha follows Rabbi over an individual colleague,” and

we might have thought that

even over his colleagues

the halakha follows him.

This is what Shmuel teaches us:

The halakha follows the Sages; only when Rabbi is opposed by one individual colleague does the halakha follow Rabbi, but when he is opposed by several colleagues, the halakha follows them.:

(Mnemonic: Nah Nad Had)

The Gemara brings another discussion that arose בעקבות Shmuel’s statement that the halakha follows the Sages:

Rav Hanana bar Hiyya said to Rav Yehuda, and some say

—and some say

it was Rav Huna bar Yehuda

who said

to Rav Yehuda, and some say

—and some say

it was Rav Hiyya bar Yehuda

who said

to Rav Yehuda: Did Shmuel really say this,

that the halakha follows the Sages?!

But

there was an incident involving

a certain document that emerged from the court of Mar Shmuel,

which was signed by Rav Anan bar Hiyya and Rav Hanan bar Rabba as witnesses. They came to authenticate their signatures in Shmuel’s court,

and it was written in it

—in the document of authentication issued by the court—

“When Rav Anan bar Hiyya came and testified concerning his signature, and another person was with him, namely Rav Hanan bar Rabba; and when Rav Hanan bar Rabba came and testified concerning his signature, and another person was with him, namely Rav Anan bar Hiyya, we approved and authenticated it properly.”

—Since Rav Anan bar Hiyya came and testified concerning his signature, with another witness, Rav Hanan bar Rabba, together with him; and since Rav Hanan bar Rabba came and testified concerning his signature, with another witness, Rav Anan bar Hiyya, together with him, we therefore approved and authenticated the document properly.

It is apparent that Shmuel held like Rabbi, that each of the witnesses must testify also concerning his fellow’s signature. Why, then, did he say above that the halakha follows the Sages?

Rav Yehuda said to him:

Shmuel actually held like the Sages. However,

that particular document

that came before him and which he authenticated in accordance with Rabbi’s opinion was a document

belonging to orphans. And he was concerned

that

Shmuel

the document might come

before

a

court of mistaken judges, and Shmuel thought: Perhaps there is someone who holds that,

in general,

the halakha follows Rabbi over an individual colleague but not over several colleagues, whereas in this matter

the halakha follows Rabbi

even over several colleagues .

Therefore

he reasoned

Shmuel:

I will act beneficially, so that the orphans will not suffer a loss.

—I will authenticate the document even according to Rabbi’s opinion, so that the orphans will not suffer a loss under any circumstances.

The Gemara brings another law concerning the authentication of documents:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

In the case of a document that was authenticated in court, and the borrower claims that the entire document is forged and that the authentication is also forged, and there is before us

one witness

from among the witnesses to the document, and

one judge

from among the judges who authenticated the document,

they may join together

to authenticate the document a second time .

Rami bar Hama said: How excellent is this teaching!

Rava said: What is its excellence?

The law is not so, because

what the witness testifies to, the judge does not testify to, and what the judge testifies to, the witness does not testify to.

Since the witness testifies concerning the monetary obligation recorded in the document, in accordance with the opinion of the Sages, whereas the judge testifies, “The document was authenticated in my presence” .

Rather, when Rami bar Yehezkel came, he said: Do not accept these principles that Yehuda my brother stated in the name of Shmuel.

—Do not accept the principles that Yehuda my brother stated in the name of Shmuel; in truth, a witness and a judge do not join together!