Ketubot 17b (יז:) — the Talmud in English

And this applies only according to the one who reads and studies, but according to the one who teaches

others,

there is no measure to it!

And we thereby learn that in the case of one who neither reads nor studies, people do not interrupt their work if he has those attending to his burial. Rashi. Tosafot wrote that with regard to interrupting work, they do interrupt it even for one who neither reads nor studies.]

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if there are witnesses that she went out with a hinuma,” etc.:

And the Gemara explains:

What is a hinuma? Surḥav bar Pappa said in the name of Ze’iri: a canopy of myrtle

a myrtle wedding canopy].

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: a kerita

a veil]

with which the bride covers herself:

And we further learned:

“Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says

even the distribution of roasted grain is evidence

,” etc.:

And we raised the following question:

The tanna

of the Mishna

speaks

in Judea, and there the distribution of roasted grain is

evidence,

but

in Babylonia, what

sign would they give for maidens?

Rav said: They would pour perfumed oil on the heads of the Sages.

The women would place on the heads of the scholars the perfumed oil designated for the wedding canopy and rub it into their hair.]

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Do you mean the oil used for washing the hair?!

Did they really give them the oil designated for the wedding canopy? They were not the ones celebrating, whereas the people who use this oil wash their heads with it.]

He said to him

Abaye said to Rav Pappa:

Orphan!

You are an orphan with regard to the custom! What do you mean—

did your mother not perform for you the pouring of perfumed oil on the heads of the Sages at the time of the event

that is, at the time of the wedding canopy]?!

This is similar to the case of a certain scholar who arranged his son’s match

he betrothed his son]

with the family of Rabba bar Ulla—and some say, Rabba bar Ulla arranged his son’s match with a certain scholar—and he poured perfumed oil on the heads of the Sages at the time of the event.

And the Gemara asks: In Judea, where there was only the distribution of roasted grain,

what about a widow?

What sign would they give that a woman was a widow? After all, roasted grain was often distributed, and it was possible that it would mistakenly also be distributed at the wedding of a widow?

Rav Yosef taught: A widow has no kisnei!

That is, they were extremely careful not to distribute roasted grain at the wedding of a widow.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in the case of one who says to his fellow

‘This field belonged to your father, and I purchased it from him,’ that he is deemed credible

,” etc.:

And we ask:

But let it teach: “Rabbi Yehoshua concedes in the case of one who says

to his fellow, ‘This field was yours, and I purchased it from you,’”

and why did Rabbi Yehoshua speak only of a case in which the claimant says to him, “This field belonged to your father”

? And we answer: It states “This field belonged to your father”

because he wishes to teach

in

the latter clause—

“If there are witnesses that it belonged to him, and he says, ‘I purchased it from him,’ he is not deemed credible.”

And the Gemara explains:

What are the circumstances

in which he is not deemed credible to say, “I purchased it from him”?

If the possessor consumed

the produce for the requisite

three

years of

presumptive ownership, why is he not deemed credible

to claim that he purchased it, since after he has consumed the produce of the land for three years without objection, he no longer needs to safeguard his deed, as a person does not take such great care to preserve his documents?

And if the possessor did not consume

the produce for

three years of presumptive ownership, it is obvious that he is not deemed credible!

And therefore Rabbi Yehoshua stated that the claimant says to him: “This field belonged to your father.”

And we ask:

If so, with regard to his father as well: If he consumed the produce for three years of presumptive ownership, why is he not deemed credible? And if he did not consume it for three years of presumptive ownership, it is obvious that he is not deemed credible!

And we answer:

Granted, with regard to his father, one can find

a novel case in the Mishna,

for example, that he consumed

the produce of

the

field

for

two

years during the father’s lifetime and one during the son’s lifetime

when he was a minor.

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rav Huna, for Rav Huna said: One does not establish presumptive ownership

that is, the law of presumptive ownership does not apply]

with regard to the property of a minor, even after he comes of age,

because he does not know how to protest; and even if he remains in this field for many more years, it is not presumptive ownership, since its beginning was when he was a minor. Therefore, here he is not deemed credible.

And we ask:

W

hy

did Rav Huna come to teach us the law of the Mishna?!

Surely our Mishna is certainly not dealing with Rav Huna’s law, for if it were, what did Rav Huna teach us?

And we answer: In fact, the Mishna is dealing with Rav Huna’s law. And as for your question—what did Rav Huna teach us—

if you wish, say:

Rav Huna stated the inference from the Mishna,

and indeed he did not come to introduce anything beyond the Mishna.

And if you wish, say—

Rav Huna teaches the law that

“even after he comes of age

he does not acquire presumptive ownership

.”

A

nd we ask: Even so,

let him teach it

in the latter clause of the Mishna

itself, a

nd as for your question, in what circumstances is he not deemed credible?—

Let us establish it as a case in which he consumed

the produce

for

two

years in his presence, and

one year

not in his presence, and in a case where

during that year

the seller fled

to another place; therefore his presumptive ownership is not valid, since the seller could not protest in his presence during that year.

And we answer: It is impossible to establish the case with a “fled” person in the manner of

“fled”

in which you established the latter clause of our Mishna.

Because of what

did he flee?

If

it is speaking

of one who fled because of

persecution of

lives, it is obvious that he is not deemed credible! For

he

could not protest

even from the place where he was staying, since he feared that they might discover where he was hiding and kill him! If so, there is still no novel element in the latter clause of the Mishna.

And if

the latter clause of the Mishna is speaking of a case

where he fled because of

monetary

debts,

his flight does not invalidate the presumptive ownership, since he was still

required to protest

from the place where he was staying,

for

it is

established for us

that

a protest made not in his presence is a valid protest,

and one who flees because of money does not fear that people will discover where he currently lives.

Therefore, the latter clause of our Mishna cannot be established as a case in which he consumed the produce for three years in his presence. Rather, it must be established as a case in which he consumed it before the father, as explained above; and because of the latter clause, Rabbi Yehoshua likewise used in the first clause the wording, “This field belonged to your father.”

The Gemara brings proof that a protest made not in his presence is effective:

As we learned: Three lands

are considered distinct from one another

with

regard to

presumptive ownership: Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee;

and therefore, if

the

original owner of the field

was in Judea, and the purchaser established presumptive ownership

of the field

in the Galilee,

or if the owner of the field was

in the Galilee, and the purchaser established presumptive ownership

in

Judea, this is not presumptive ownership until he is with him in the same country.

And we raised the following question: What does

this tanna, who said that the purchaser’s presumptive ownership in another land is ineffective,

hold? If he holds

that

a protest made not in his presence is a valid protest,

then

even

if the seller was

in Judea and

the purchaser in the

Galilee, too,

it should constitute presumptive ownership, since the seller was required to protest from his location.

And if he holds

that

a protest made not in his presence is not a valid protest,

then

even

if the seller was in one city in

Judea and

the purchaser in another city in

Judea, too, it should not

constitute presumptive ownership until he comes to protest in his presence?

And we answer:

Rabbi Abba bar Memel said: In fact, he holds

that this tanna

holds that a protest made not in his presence is a valid protest, and the Mishna

which states that a protest between Judea and the Galilee is ineffective

was taught with regard to a time of emergency,

when caravans were not traveling between them; and the possessor can say, “I did not hear the seller’s protest, and therefore I did not safeguard my deed.”

A

nd we ask: If so,

what is different about Judea and the Galilee that it mentions,

since in a time of emergency there is no presumptive ownership even between two towns in the same country?