Ketubot 13a — the Talmud in English

If so,

if we say that Rav Naḥman could not hold in accordance with Rabban Gamliel

but only in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua—

there is a difficulty: one halakhic ruling contradicts another halakhic ruling!

For we hold that the halakha follows Rav Naḥman in monetary matters

.

But in this case, with regard to the claim for the ketuba,

относительно требования выплаты по кетубе,

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said

that

the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel.

And if so, there is a contradiction between the halakha concerning a claim for one hundred dinars and the halakha concerning a claim for a ketuba.

Rather, is it not that one may conclude from here, as we explained, that Rav Naḥman concedes Rabban Gamliel’s ruling: that a woman is deemed credible to extract money from the person presumed to be in possession of it when she has a definite claim together with a migo or a presumptive status?

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from here:

Mishna:

With regard to one who marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin but does not find her to be a virgin,

she says: “I was struck by a piece of wood,”

before betrothal, and I am entitled to a ketuba of one hundred dinars, in accordance with the opinion of the Sages above (11a).

And he says: “No, rather,”

perhaps

“you were possessed by a man,”

you had intercourse with a man before I betrothed you

“and,”

you are not entitled to a ketuba at all.

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say:

the woman is

deemed credible

because she makes a definite claim, and they hold that when one makes a definite claim and the other makes an uncertain claim, the definite claim prevails even against the person presumed to be in possession.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live by her mouth,”

to rely upon her words.

Rather, she is presumed to have been possessed [

had intercourse]

with a man

before betrothal, and she is entitled to nothing

until she brings proof of her statement,

as the burden of proof rests upon one who seeks to extract money from another:

Gemara:

And we analyze it:

What are their claims concerning?

For what amount of the ketuba is she claiming from him, and what is the amount that the husband wishes to give?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Our Mishna is referring

to two hundred and one hundred.

She says: I was struck by a piece of wood, and I am entitled to a ketuba of two hundred dinars, even though you did not know that I had been struck by a piece of wood.

And he says: You had intercourse with a man before I betrothed you as a wife, and you are entitled to only one hundred dinars.

Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that one who marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin and finds that she had intercourse is entitled to a ketuba of one hundred dinars.

Rabbi Elazar said: It refers to one hundred and nothing.

She claims one hundred dinars because she was struck by a piece of wood, while he says: You are entitled to nothing, because you had intercourse with a man, and my acquisition of you was a transaction entered into in error.

The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It refers to two hundred and one hundred

because

he holds

that our Mishna should be established

in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: Whether he knew about her

being struck by a piece of wood

or whether he did not know about her,

her ketuba is

two hundred dinars.

And Rabbi Elazar says: It refers to one hundred and nothing,

because

he holds

that our Mishna should be established

in accordance with the opinion of the Sages, who say: Whether he knew about her

being struck by a piece of wood

or whether he did not know about her,

her ketuba is

one hundred dinars.

And we raise two questions concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan:

a.

Granted, Rabbi Elazar did not state his opinion in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan

by establishing our Mishna as referring to a woman claiming two hundred dinars, because

he establishes it

in accordance with the opinion of the Sages,

and

it is preferable to establish an unattributed Mishna according to the view of the Sages rather than according to Rabbi Meir, who is a lone opinion.

But Rabbi Yoḥanan, why did he not say

that the Mishna should be established according to the Sages,

as

Rabbi Elazar established it,

in accordance with Rabbi Elazar?

And we explain:

He holds that

Rabbi Yoḥanan

holds that one who marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin and finds that she had intercourse is entitled to a ketuba of one hundred dinars.

And if we establish our Mishna

here according to the Sages, who hold that the ketuba of a woman struck by a piece of wood is one hundred dinars, there would be no dispute between them. For whether

согласно Мудрецам, которые считают, что поврежденной деревом полагается кетуба в сто динаров, то между ними не будет спора. Ведь

he,

who claims that she had intercourse with a man,

says that her ketuba is

что ее кетуба составляет

one hundred, and whether

а

she,

who claims that she was struck by a piece of wood,

says that her ketuba is

что ее кетуба составляет

one hundred.

And if so,

what difference is there

between

his claim

and

her claim,

since according to both of them she is entitled to a ketuba of one hundred dinars? Consequently, Rabbi Yoḥanan must establish our Mishna according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that the ketuba of a woman struck by a piece of wood is two hundred dinars. Then there is a difference between his claim that she had intercourse and is entitled to one hundred dinars and her claim that she was struck by a piece of wood and is entitled to two hundred.

And we further raise a question concerning Rabbi Yoḥanan:

b.

Granted, according to Rabbi Elazar,

who said that if one marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin and finds that she had intercourse, she is entitled to nothing,

this is why it teaches two cases.

It is clear why the Mishna presents two forms of a claim for a ketuba, each with different claims: 1. The previous Mishna: she claims, “After you betrothed me, I was raped.” 2.

Our Mishna: she claims, “I was struck by a piece of wood.”

For one Mishna

is one

of them: Our Mishna, in which she says that she was struck by a piece of wood, teaches that a woman struck by a piece of wood is entitled to one hundred dinars even when her husband did not know about it,

to exclude the opinion of Rami bar Ḥama,

who said above, concerning a woman struck by a piece of wood, that when he did not know about it, according to everyone she is entitled to nothing.

And

one Mishna

is one

of them: The previous Mishna, in which she claims, “After you betrothed me, I was raped,” while he says that she was raped before betrothal and that his acquisition of her was a transaction entered into in error, teaches that one who marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin and finds that she had intercourse is entitled to nothing,

to exclude the opinion of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin, who said in the name of Rav Sheshet

above (11a) that her ketuba is one hundred dinars.

But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who said that one who marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin and finds that she had intercourse is entitled to a ketuba of one hundred dinars—and consequently, the explanation of the previous Mishna, in which the husband claims that she had intercourse before betrothal and that his acquisition of her was a transaction entered into in error, is that he claims she is not entitled to two hundred, but she is entitled to one hundred—if so, it is difficult:

why do I need two cases?

Why was the previous Mishna written? If it is to teach us the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua concerning a definite and an uncertain claim, and that the money is maintained in its presumptive status, it would have sufficed to teach our Mishna, which discusses her claim, “I was struck by a piece of wood.” It would teach us both that a woman struck by a piece of wood whose husband did not know about it is entitled to a ketuba, unlike Rami bar Ḥama’s statement that she is entitled to nothing, and also the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua.

And we answer: Even according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, there is a novel teaching in each of the two Mishnayot.

One Mishna

is one

of them: It is

to acquaint you with the force of Rabban Gamliel’s opinion.

And

one Mishna

is one

of them: It is

to acquaint you with the force of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion.

The Gemara explains:

The first,

the previous Mishna, in which she claims, “After you betrothed me, I was raped,” is

to acquaint you with the force of Rabbi Yehoshua,

who does not deem her credible,

although it is possible to say that she has a migo,

since she could have made a stronger claim: that she was struck by a piece of wood after betrothal, in which case she would not be disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. The fact that she did not make this claim proves that she is telling the truth; nevertheless, Rabbi Yehoshua holds that she

is not deemed credible.

The latter,

our Mishna, is

to acquaint you with the force of Rabban Gamliel, for although it is impossible to say that she has a migo,

according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who established our Mishna according to Rabbi Meir, who said that the ketuba of a woman struck by a piece of wood whose husband did not know about it is two hundred dinars, she has no stronger claim to make. Even if she were to claim that she was struck by a piece of wood while married, it would make no difference whether she was struck by a piece of wood while married or before that. Nevertheless, the Mishna teaches us that Rabban Gamliel holds that she

is deemed credible:

Mishna:

A woman, even if she is unmarried, who had intercourse with a Natin or a mamzer is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

a.

They saw

an unmarried woman who was

speaking,

that is, secluded,

with a certain man

in the marketplace,

and they said to her: “What is the status [

his lineage]

of this man?”

She said to them:

“He is so-and-so, and he is a priest.”

That is, he is a man of established lineage fit for the priesthood.

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible,

and she is presumed to have had intercourse with a fit person and is fit to marry into the priesthood.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live by her mouth.”

Rather, she is presumed to have had intercourse with a Natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof of her statement.

Since she made herself available, she does not take care to whom she gives herself.

b.

If

the unmarried woman

was pregnant, and they said to her: “What is the status of this fetus?”

From whom did you become pregnant—from a fit person or from a person who disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood? She said:

“From a certain man, and he is a priest,”

he is a fit person.

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is deemed credible;

she [and her daughter ] are fit to marry into the priesthood.

And Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live by her mouth. Rather, she is presumed to be pregnant by a Natin or a mamzer, until she brings proof of her statement,”

that she became pregnant from a fit person.

But with regard to inheritance, even according to Rabban Gamliel she is not deemed credible.

Gemara:

And we analyze it:

What

is the intention of the Mishna by stating that they saw her

“speaking”?

Ze'iri said:

that they saw her

seclude herself,

and although they did not see her engage in intercourse, she is disqualified according to Rabbi Yehoshua, as will be explained below, because they adopted an additional stringency with regard to matters of lineage.

Rav Asi said:

that they saw her

engage in intercourse.

But if they saw only that she secluded herself, she is not disqualified according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

And we challenge Rav Asi:

Granted, according to Ze'iri,

who established the Mishna as referring to “she secluded herself,”

this is why it teaches

the expression

“speaking.”

But according to Rav Asi,

who established the Mishna as referring to “she engaged in intercourse,”

what is the meaning of “speaking”?

Why did the Mishna use the expression “speaking”?

And we answer: The Mishna wanted to use

a euphemistic expression [

a refined expression]. Similarly, we find that a verse uses the language of eating when it refers to intercourse.

As it is written [

Proverbs 30]

“She ate and wiped her mouth and said: ‘I have committed no iniquity.’”

We further challenge Rav Asi:

Granted, according to Ze'iri, this is why it teaches two cases.

It is clear why the Mishna presents the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabban Gamliel in two forms: a.

“speaking,”

to acquaint you with the force of Rabbi Yehoshua, who disqualifies her even though they did not see her engage in intercourse. b.

And

b.

“pregnant,”

to acquaint you with the force of Rabban Gamliel, who deems her credible even though she certainly had intercourse.

But according to Rav Asi,

who explained that even the case of “speaking” means that they saw her engage in intercourse,

why do I need two cases?

And we answer:

One

of the cases, that of seeing her speaking, was written

to render her fit

according to Rabban Gamliel.

And one

of the cases, that of the pregnant woman, was written

to render

the

d

aughter

fit,

meaning that if the fetus is female, she is fit to marry into the priesthood according to Rabban Gamliel.

For had the Mishna written only the case in which they saw her speaking, I would have said that she is deemed credible according to Rabban Gamliel only with regard to herself, because she had an original presumptive status of fitness, and she is maintained in that presumptive status rather than disqualified due to the uncertainty. But with regard to the fetus, which has no presumptive status of fitness, I would have said that she is not deemed credible. Therefore, the Mishna teaches the case of the pregnant woman, also teaching that she is deemed credible with regard to the fetus.

And we analyze it:

This works according to the one who says

below, who explains the Mishna as meaning that

according to the opinion of

Rabban Gamliel, who

renders her fit,

he holds that he

also renders

the fetus

fit,

in which case it is clear why the Mishna presents two cases: one to render her fit and one to render the fetus fit.

But according to the one who says

that the Mishna means that

according to the opinion of

Rabban Gamliel, who

renders her fit, he disqualifies her daughter,

and when Rabban Gamliel said in the case of the pregnant woman that she is deemed credible, he meant only with regard to herself and not with regard to the fetus—if so,

what can one say

according to Rav Asi? Why were the two cases written?

And we answer:

Rav Asi holds like

that

one who says

that

according to the one who renders her fit, he renders her daughter fit.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: According to Ze'iri, who says that the meaning of “speaking” is “secluding herself,” and

according to this, even if she merely secluded herself with a man,

Rabbi Yehoshua said that she

что

is not deemed credible

and is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood.

This is difficult:

Did Rav not say: They administer lashes

lashes for rebellious conduct

for seclusion

with a married woman,

but they do not prohibit

the woman

to

her husband because of

the seclusion

in which she secluded herself with another man, as they do not presume that she had intercourse with him?

Shall we say

that Rav’s statement is

not in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion,

who holds that because of seclusion she is presumed to have had intercourse?

Abaye said to him:

You may even say that Rabbi Yehoshua

agrees with Rav that seclusion does not prohibit her to her husband. The reason that in the Mishna he presumes that she had intercourse and disqualifies her from marrying into the priesthood is

the “elevated standard”

которую

that they instituted with regard to lineage,

of the priesthood, where they adopted the stringency of presuming that she had intercourse.

And we further challenge Rav Asi, who established our Mishna as referring to a case in which they saw her engage in intercourse: