Ketubot 12b — the Talmud in English

When they saw that they were belittling them

the widows, for they considered it easy to divorce them because their marriage contracts were small,

they instituted for them two hundred

so that they would not be divorced so easily. And they instituted this only for the widows of priests, because priests are more distinguished, and the divorce of their daughters is more disgraceful for them than that of an Israelite.

When the Sages saw

that they were withdrawing from them

because they did not wish to marry the widow of a priest, because

people said:

people:

“Rather than marry a priest’s widow, let us go and marry an Israelite virgin”

[for they would say: instead of marrying a priest’s widow, who has had intercourse, let us go and marry an Israelite virgin], since their marriage contracts were equal, therefore

they returned them to their original wording.

They restored the first enactment, that the marriage contract of a priest’s widow is only one hundred zuz.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The court of the priests would collect for a virgin”

the daughter of a priest

four hundred zuz:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: No

not only

did they say this concerning the court of the priests alone

that they may collect more for the marriage contracts of their daughters,

but even distinguished families among Israelites, if they wished to act in the manner in which the priests act

to collect a larger marriage contract for their daughters,

they may do so.

The beraita challenges

Shmuel from that which was taught:

“One who wishes to act in the manner in which the priests act”

to collect an additional marriage contract,

such as an Israelite daughter

who married

a priest, or

likewise

a priest’s daughter

who married

an Israelite, may do so.

And the Gemara infers from the word “such as” in the beraita:

Specifically, such as

an Israelite daughter

who married

a priest, and a priest’s daughter

who married

an Israelite, this

is the case in which they may collect a large marriage contract, because

there is an aspect of priesthood.

But an Israelite daughter

who married

an Israelite,

in whom there is no aspect of priesthood at all,

not

will they be able to collect for her a marriage contract larger than two hundred.

And we reject this: One may not infer this. And what the tanna said, “such as”—he said it by way of

“it is not necessary to say,”

and this is what the tanna said:

“It is not necessary to say: an Israelite daughter

who married

an Israelite, for he cannot say to her, ‘I am elevating you’

[for her husband cannot say to her that she was elevated through him], and it is more obvious that she may collect a marriage contract larger than two hundred.

But an Israelite daughter

who married

a priest, for he can say to her

her priestly husband:

‘I am elevating you’

[for he can say to her that she rose to priesthood through him],

I might say

[I would say] that

she may not

collect a large marriage contract from him.

He teaches us

that even in such a case, if he wishes, she collects a large marriage contract:

Mishna:

The next three mishnayot discuss the woman’s credibility when there is uncertainty concerning her intercourse: when she had intercourse, how she had intercourse, and with whom she had intercourse. In all three mishnayot, the woman’s claim is a definite claim, and by virtue of it she is believed according to Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua maintains that “we do not live by her mouth” [and the Ritva explained this expression: the world stands upon truth, and we do not live on the basis of her truth].

The foundation of the dispute is the following: where there is a presumption, and uncertainty arose whether a change occurred in the presumption, can the definite claim of the person upon whom the change in the presumption depends—who claims that no change occurred through him—say that we have no grounds at all to be uncertain about the matter?

Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the definite claim of the person upon whom the change in the presumption depends neither adds nor detracts. Therefore, we must consider the uncertainty concerning the change in the presumption as though nothing had been added to clarify the uncertainty through his definite claim. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer, however, hold that the definite claim of the person upon whom the change in the presumption depends is sufficient to prevent uncertainty from arising for us as to whether a change occurred in the presumption.

“One who marries a woman and does not find her hymen,”

and he comes to divorce her, and there is a dispute between the husband and the wife over how much she is entitled to in her marriage contract.

She says: ‘After you betrothed me I was raped!’

At the time of the betrothal I was a virgin, and only afterward was I raped,

“and your field was inundated,”

an expression based on a torrential rain that damages a field: your fortune caused me to be raped and not to be a virgin at the time of the marriage, and therefore I am entitled to a marriage contract of two hundred.

And he,

her husband,

says: ‘It is not so’

[perhaps it was not as you said],

but

perhaps

“before I betrothed you”

you were raped, and at the time of the betrothal you had already had intercourse,

“and my acquisition was an erroneous acquisition.”

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say:

The woman

is believed,

since she makes a definite claim while he makes an uncertain claim, and she collects her marriage contract, and her status is that of a virgin.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: We do not live by her mouth, to rely upon her words,

but

the one who seeks to extract from another bears the burden of proof, and since she wishes to extract a marriage contract from him, she must bring proof of her words.

Therefore

“she has the presumption of having had intercourse before she was betrothed”

that is, she has the presumption that she had already had intercourse at the time of the betrothal,

“and she deceived him,”

and it is an erroneous acquisition, as in the case of one who married her under the presumption that she was a virgin and she was found to have had intercourse, in which case she receives nothing,

“until she brings proof of her words,”

that she was raped after she was betrothed:

Gemara:

The Gemara attempts to compare the reasoning of the dispute in our Mishna with the reasoning of another dispute that we learned.

It was stated,

we learned:

“A person

makes a definite claim:

‘I have one hundred zuz with you,’ and the other,”

the defendant,

says

to him with the claim of “perhaps”:

“I do not know

whether you lent it to me.”

Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna say: He is liable

the defendant must pay.

And Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say: He is exempt

the defendant is exempt from paying. [In any event, they administer to him an oath of inducement, by rabbinic enactment, for his words are credible in that he does not know that he owes him one hundred zuz].

And the Gemara explains the reasoning of those who dispute:

Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda say: He is liable,

because they hold that when the claims of the parties are a claim of

“definite”

on one side

and

a claim of

“uncertain”

on the other side, the one who claims

“definite” is preferable

to the claim of uncertainty.

But

Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan say, “He is exempt,”

because they hold that since opposite the claimant’s definite claim stands the defendant’s monetary presumption , therefore

“place the money under the presumption of its owner”

[leave the money under the presumption of the owner who holds it], and we follow the monetary presumption , since it is preferable to the claimant’s “definite” claim . Thus, it is explained that there is a dispute in reasoning where there is one who seeks to extract and one who holds the money, and the one who seeks to extract makes a definite claim, while the holder makes an uncertain claim: Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda hold that the one who claims “definite” is preferable to the holder, while Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan hold that the holder is preferable to the one who claims “definite.”

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This ruling of Rav Huna and Rav Yehuda,

that we have just learned, that one who seeks to extract money with a claim of “definite” from a holder who makes a claim of “uncertain”—“definite” is preferable—

is that of Shmuel!

It is similar in reasoning to the words of Shmuel, who said concerning our Mishna that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel, who holds that a woman is believed with a definite claim to extract her marriage contract from the husband who holds the money, despite the fact that he makes an uncertain claim.

And where were Shmuel’s words stated?

Concerning that

which we learned

later, in the Mishna following the next Mishna: a woman who had not been married and

was pregnant,

and we do not know from whom she became pregnant, so that we may know whether the fetus is fit to marry into the priesthood or disqualified from the priesthood.

And they said to her: “What is the nature of this fetus,”

that is, did you become pregnant from a man whose seed is fit, or from one whose seed is disqualified?

And she said:

“From a certain man”

I became pregnant,

“and he is a priest!”

He is of distinguished lineage and fit for the priesthood.

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is believed,

and the fetus is fit for the priesthood.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha follows Rabban Gamliel.

And Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said to Rav Yehuda: Shinana

[sharp and incisive one like you ], behold,

you told us in the name of Shmuel

[you already told us in the name of Shmuel] that

the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel,

in his dispute with Rabbi Yehoshua

even in the first one

[in our Mishna, which precedes this Mishna, where they disputed concerning the claim for a marriage contract, Rabban Gamliel saying that she is believed with a definite claim; and in our Mishna the novelty is greater that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel].

If so, from here it is already possible to learn also concerning the pregnant woman that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel, and there is no need to repeat that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel also concerning the pregnant woman.

And we inquire about it:

What is “even in the first one”?

Why, concerning the claim for a marriage contract, is it a greater novelty that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel?

And we explain: The novelty is that

“even though it could be said, ‘Place the money under the presumption of its owner,’”

that the money should be left under the presumption of the husband, nevertheless

Rabban Gamliel said

that the claim of

a definite claim is preferable

to extract the money from its presumptive status against the husband’s uncertain claim.

And now the Gemara discusses:

Let us say,

should we say that

Rav Yehuda and Rav Huna, who say in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

both hold that a “definite” claim seeking to extract is preferable to an “uncertain” claim seeking to retain? Whereas

Rav Naḥman and Rabbi Yoḥanan, who say in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua,

both hold that the holder, even if he makes an “uncertain” claim, is preferable to a “definite” claim that comes to extract money.

And we reject this: There is a distinction in reasoning between the case discussed by Rav Naḥman concerning a claim of one hundred zuz and the case discussed by Rabban Gamliel concerning a claim for a marriage contract.

And so

Rav Naḥman can say to you: As for me, when I say

concerning the claim of one hundred zuz that the other cannot extract with a definite claim from the holder, even if the holder makes a claim of uncertainty, I can hold

even in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

who said concerning a claim for a marriage contract that the woman is believed with a definite claim to extract her marriage contract.

For

Rabban Gamliel stated there only this much,

in our Mishna and in the next Mishna, that she is believed to extract,

but

because

there is a migo,

that she has a migo supporting her claim, for she could have made a better claim. For example, in our Mishna, where she claims, “After you betrothed me I was raped,” she could have claimed, “I was struck by wood,” which is a better claim, for through it she is not disqualified from the priesthood, whereas through the claim that she was raped after the betrothal she is disqualified from the priesthood, since an Israelite woman who was raped is forbidden to a priest.

This proves that from the fact that she did not make the better claim, she is speaking the truth.

Likewise, in the next Mishna, where she claims, “I was struck by wood,” and my marriage contract is one hundred, she has a migo, for she could have claimed, “I became struck by wood while under your authority,” in which case her marriage contract would be two hundred. By virtue of the migo, she is believed to extract her marriage contract from her husband.

But here,

in the case discussed by Rav Naḥman concerning one who claims one hundred zuz with a definite claim, while the defendant claims uncertainty,

what migo is there

for the claimant, by virtue of which he should be believed to extract money from the holder? Therefore Rav Naḥman holds that the money is left under the presumption of the holder, and he is exempt from paying.

Alternatively,

another distinction may be made in reasoning between the case discussed by Rav Naḥman concerning a claim of one hundred zuz and the case discussed by Rabban Gamliel concerning a claim for a marriage contract:

Rabban Gamliel stated there only this much,

concerning a claim for a marriage contract, that she is believed to extract from the husband who holds the money by claiming that she was raped after he betrothed her,

but

because

we say, “Establish her upon her presumption,”

that she has a bodily presumption supporting her claim, for the uncertainty concerns the time of the betrothal: whether she was then a virgin and a marriage contract of two hundred became incumbent upon him, or whether she had already had intercourse. The woman has the bodily presumption that she was born a virgin; establish the woman upon her presumption that she was still a virgin at the time of her betrothal, and only now, after the betrothal, was she raped.

But here

regarding a claim for a maneh, where one says certainly and the other says perhaps,

what

what

presumption does this one have

the claimant, by virtue of which he should be believed to extract money from the one in possession?

And therefore Rav Nahman holds that the one in possession of the money has the advantage, and is exempt from paying.

And the Gemara concludes:

This too is indeed reasonable, as we have explained,

that we are compelled to say

that Rav Nahman is the one who stated [this] in accordance with Rabban Gamaliel.