Keritot 7b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

this is what he is saying:

Rabbi Akiva:

the blasphemer brings an offering,

even though there is no action in it,

since it was stated concerning it

the law of

karet—

in the place

where the law of

an offering

sin-offering was written. For the karet of the blasphemer was stated in the passage of the sin-offering for idolatry [in the passage of Shelach],

the words of Rabbi Akiva. 125

And we explain:

he holds—

Rabbi Akiva:

since it was necessary to write his karet,

of the blasphemer,

elsewhere. And the karet

of the blasphemer

was written in the place of an offering—

infer from it

that the blasphemer

brings an offering! [Apparently, this is difficult here for Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish, who stated above, on 3b, other reasons for Rabbi Akiva; see Tosafot here.]

And that which is taught in the beraita:

“And it says:

‘He shall bear his sin’”—

comes for the Rabbis,

for the Rabbis said it to Rabbi Akiva.

And this is what the Rabbis said

to him,

the Rabbis

to Rabbi Akiva: You say that this is why the blasphemer brings an offering, since his karet was stated in the place of an offering; and

do you really hold

that

the blasphemer

mentioned in the passage of the sin-offering for idolatry [as it is stated there: “He blasphemes the Lord, and that soul shall be cut off”]

means one who blesses the Name [the blasphemer]!?

That is not so! Rather, that

blasphemer—

means

one who worships

idolatry [who sings and chants for idolatry]. But the blasphemer of whom you speak, namely, one who blesses the Name, is not mentioned there. And if so, his karet was not stated in the place of an offering; therefore, one may not impose a sin-offering for it, because there is no action in it.

[поет и играет перед идолом]. А тот, о ком говоришь ты, то есть проклинающий Всевышнего, там не упомянут. Следовательно, наказание карет за него не сказано в месте, где говорится о жертвоприношении, и поэтому нельзя обязать его принести очистительную жертву, поскольку он не совершает действия .

Rabbi Akiva said to them:

rather,

according to your method,

the karet of one who blesses the Name—

from where do you derive it?

The Rabbis said to him: We learn it through a gezera shava from the Pesaḥ offering. For

it is written concerning one who blesses the Name

in the passage of Emor: “When a man curses his God

and he shall bear his sin.”

And it is written concerning the

offering of

Pesaḥ: “And if he refrains from making the Pesaḥ offering, that soul shall be cut off from among his people …

написано: «А если он воздержится от совершения Песаха, будет истреблена та душа из его народа...

he shall bear his sin,

that man”—

just as there, karet, so here, karet. [The entire passage is according to Rashi’s version, as explained in the Shitah Mekubetzet, letter dalet.]

Весь этот отрывок приведен согласно версии Раши, как объяснено в Шитат Мекубецет, пункт 4].

The Sages taught:

it is written:

“He blasphemes the Lord.” Isi ben Judah says:

The expression “blasphemer” is

like a person saying to his fellow: “You scraped out,”

that is, wiped [for the resh alternates with the dalet]

the bowl

of its cooked food

and diminished it

by your wiping even the body of the bowl! That is, you performed a serious act.

He holds

Isi ben Judah, that

the blasphemer

of the verse

is one who blesses the Name,

which is a serious sin.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: Like a person saying to his fellow: “You scraped out the bowl but did not diminish it”

from it.

He holds: “blasphemer” means one who worships idolatry,

which is a less serious sin than blasphemy.

Another [teaching] was taught: “He blasphemes the Lord”

—“he blasphemes”:

Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah says: The verse is speaking of one who worships idolatry.

And the Sages say: The verse came only to assign karet to one who blesses the Name.

For this blasphemer is one who blesses the Name, and karet was stated there. And these Sages hold like Rabbi Akiva, and they are not the “Sages” mentioned in the beraita above.

Mishna:

There are

women who give birth who

bring an offering

of a woman who gives birth [a sheep for a burnt-offering and a turtledove or a pigeon for a sin-offering],

and

the sin-offering

is eaten.

And there are

women who give birth who

bring an offering

of a sin-offering,

and it is not eaten.

And there are

women who give birth

who do not bring

any offering at all!

These

are the women who

bring an offering and it is eaten: [apart from an Israelite woman who gives birth normally, in whose case there is no novelty].

[помимо обычной еврейской роженицы, в случае которой нет никакого новшества].

One who miscarries

a fetus whose form is

like that of a domesticated animal, wild animal, or bird brings the offering of a woman who gives birth. Since concerning them the Torah used the expression “formation,” as it did concerning a human being, this is a birth,

она приносит жертву роженицы. Поскольку о них в Торе употреблено выражение «создание», как и о человеке, это считается рождением,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say:

She does not bring an offering

until there is in it

in the miscarried fetus

the form of a human being.

One who miscarries a sandal,

a fetus whose form is crushed and appears like a sandal,

or a placenta,

which is the sac in which the fetus lies in its mother’s womb [and although there is now no fetus in it, we say that there had been one and it dissolved],

or a formed amniotic sac,

the skin in which the fetus began to take form, with the form of small limbs inside it,

and one that emerges

when it is

cut up

limb by limb.

And likewise a maidservant

a Canaanite woman

who miscarried brings an offering, and it is eaten.

And these bring

the offering of a woman who gives birth

, and it is not eaten:

One who miscarries and it is not known what she miscarried,

whether it was a miscarried fetus for which she is liable for an offering or not . She brings an offering because of the uncertainty, and she stipulates concerning the burnt-offering that if she is not liable for it, it shall be a freewill offering. But concerning the sin-offering she cannot stipulate, since a sin-offering does not come as a freewill offering. Rather, she brings the bird for a sin-offering without a stipulation, and this offering is called “a bird sin-offering brought because of uncertainty.” And the sin-offering brought because of uncertainty is not eaten, for perhaps it is unconsecrated, and it became an animal carcass through pinching.

And likewise two women

who were together,

who miscarried. One

miscarried a fetus

of the type

of miscarried fetuses that

is exempt

from the offering of a woman who gives birth,

and one of the type

that is

obligatory

for an offering, and it is not known which of them miscarried the type for which one is liable; each of them brings an offering because of the uncertainty, and it is not eaten.

Rabbi Yosei said: When

is it not eaten?

When

both brought their offerings to the Temple, gave them to the priest, and

went

on their ways,

this one to the east and this one to the west. But if both were standing

before us, then

both bring an offering

one sin-offering jointly, and stipulate between themselves that the offering shall be for the one who is liable.

And

therefore it

is eaten

by the priests, since it is certainly a sin-offering, whichever way one considers it. Even though we do not know for whom the offering was sacrificed.

These who do not bring

any offering at all:

One who miscarries a formed sac full of water,

or

full of blood

or

full of colors,

shades.

One who miscarries something like fish, locusts, creeping things, and crawling things

—all these are not included in the category of a fetus, because concerning them the expression “formation” was not stated as it was concerning a human being.

One who miscarries

before

the day

of

forty

of her pregnancy, for this is not considered a fetus, but merely water .

And one born by an abnormal opening,

where the fetus did not emerge through the womb but through an incision in the mother’s side, for this is not “birth,” and she is exempt from an offering.

Rabbi Shimon makes one liable

for the offering of a woman who gives birth

in the case of one born by an abnormal opening.

Gemara:

And we inquire into it:

a maidservant—

from where do we know

that she is liable for the offering of a woman who gives birth?

And we answer:

for the Sages taught:

It was stated: “Speak to

the children of Israel

saying: When a woman conceives,” and afterward the passage of the offering of a woman who gives birth was written.

I have only

that she becomes liable for an offering

but

a woman from

the children of Israel. A convert and a maidservant—

from where?

The verse says: “A woman”—

to include these!

Again we inquire into it:

what is the meaning of

“and likewise a maidservant”

that it teaches in the Mishna? Is it not obvious that a maidservant is liable for the offering of a woman who gives birth, since slaves are liable for all the mitzvot for which a woman is liable? [And if it comes to teach us that she is not excluded by “the children of Israel,” then it should also teach a convert; implying that there is a greater novelty concerning a maidservant, Shitah Mekubetzet, letter yod-zayin.]

And we answer: It was necessary to teach us [that the law applies to] a maidservant, since

you might have thought: when we say

that

every mitzva in which a woman is obligated, a slave

also

is obligated in it, these words

apply specifically

to a matter that is equal for both a man and a woman,

which applies to both of them.

But

the laws

of a woman who has given birth, which apply to women

but

do not apply to men, say that a maidservant should not be obligated. Therefore,

for this reason

the tanna

taught in the Mishna: “And

so too with regard to a maidservant.” 132 .

We learned in the Mishna:

These bring an offering

and it is not eaten … Rabbi Yosei said: When [is this so]? … But if both of them were standing, both bring an offering and it is eaten.

And we explain:

What do they do?

How should they act?

Both bring,

each of them brings

one offering,

a burnt-offering

certainly,

and each of them stipulates a condition concerning her offering: If she is not obligated in it, it shall be a voluntary burnt-offering [and it is called “certainly” because it is certainly hers and not her fellow’s].

And a bird sin-offering

they bring one bird together by way of

doubt,

which they purchase in partnership,

and stipulate

that each of them says: If I am obligated, behold, you waive your share for me, and it shall all be mine and shall be offered for me. Therefore, it is eaten, since in either event it is a valid sin-offering.

With regard to the burnt-offering as well, it would have been possible to bring only one lamb in partnership and stipulate that it be offered for whichever of them is obligated in it; but since it is possible to stipulate that it be a voluntary offering, it is preferable that each bring separately. But since a sin-offering cannot be brought as a voluntary offering, it is preferable that they bring only one offering and stipulate concerning it.

And we raise an objection:

Does Rabbi Yosei indeed hold

that two people concerning whom there is a doubt which of them is obligated to bring a sin-offering bring one offering together

with a stipulation,

stipulating that it be offered for the one who is obligated?

For we learned: Rabbi Shimon says:

If there were two pieces, one of forbidden fat and one of permitted fat, and one person came and ate one of the pieces, and a second came and ate the other—

both bring one sin-offering,

and stipulate concerning it that it shall fulfill the obligation of the one who requires atonement.

Rabbi Yosei says: The two do not bring one sin-offering,

but each brings a provisional guilt-offering.

Evidently, according to Rabbi Yosei—

he has no stipulation!

And here too, let each one bring a doubtful sin-offering separately!?

And we answer:

Rava said: Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to

the offerings of one

who lacks atonement,

that they do not bring the offering in order to atone for their sin, but in order to render themselves fit to eat sacrificial food, such as the offering of a woman who has given birth; those offerings can indeed be brought in partnership, with a stipulation that the offering shall fulfill the obligation of the one who is obligated in it.

And likewise, when Ravin came, he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan: Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to one who lacks atonement.

What is the reason?

Because specifically

there,

with regard to a sin-offering that comes for a transgression, such as eating forbidden fat,

the person requires knowledge

that he knows he sinned,

as it is written: “Or his sin becomes known to him,”

and only then does he bring a sin-offering.

Therefore, they do not bring

two men one sin-offering in partnership

and stipulate,

since neither of them knows that he sinned.

But here, when these two

women

who miscarried

bring

an offering,

they do not bring it because they sinned, but in order

to be permitted to eat sacrificial food.

Therefore, they do not need to know that they are indeed obligated; rather, they can bring it on the basis of doubt and with a stipulation.

There is proof that Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to those who lack atonement:

As the latter clause of that

Mishna

teaches: Rabbi Yosei says: Every sin-offering that comes for a sin—

two do not bring it!

Evidently, Rabbi Yosei disagreed specifically with regard to a sin-offering that comes for a sin.

We learned in the Mishna:

These are the women who do not bring [an offering], etc.; Rabbi Shimon obligates [one who gives birth] by cesarean delivery.

And we explain:

What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason?

Reish Lakish said: The verse states, “And if she gives birth to a female,”

and since it did not write, “And if it is a female,” we expound from “she gives birth”—

to include another birth,

for the laws of a woman who has given birth apply to it as well. And

what is it? A cesarean delivery.

And the Rabbis,

who exempt one who gives birth by cesarean delivery—

what is their reason?

Rabbi Mani bar Pattish said:

For it is written,

“When a woman conceives and gives birth,”

which implies

until she gives birth from the place where she conceives!

It is stated in the Torah that a woman who gives birth [or miscarries] to a female is impure for two weeks, and afterward immerses and is pure for her husband; then the sixty-six days of purity begin, during which, even if she sees blood, she is pure.

And in the case of a woman who gives birth to a male, she is impure for one week, and the days of purity are thirty-three days.

During the days of purity, she is still forbidden to eat teruma and sacrificial food and to enter the Temple until the days of purity end. And on the following day, that is, on the forty-first day for a male and the eighty-first day for a female, she brings her offering and becomes permitted to eat sacrificial food and to enter the Temple.

And if, during the days of purity, she became pregnant again and miscarried, then if the second birth [of the stillborn fetus] took place during the days of purity of the first birth, before the time for the offering for that birth had arrived, she does not need to bring two offerings; rather, she brings only one offering for both births, as though they were one birth in which she gave birth to twins.

But if the second birth took place after the days of purity of the first birth had been completed and the time for the offering had arrived, then even though she had not yet brought an offering for that birth, she is obligated to bring two offerings, a separate offering for each birth.

Mishna:

A woman who miscarries at night,

on the night preceding the day

eighty-one

of the count that she counts following [the preceding] birth of a female—[in the case of a male birth, the law of the Mishna cannot state that she miscarried on the night of the forty-first day following a male birth. Since the stillborn fetus is then less than forty days old [for the first seven days she is forbidden to her husband], no offering is required for it. Commentary of the Rambam on the Mishna].

The School of Shammai exempt her from the offering

for the birth of the stillborn fetus by itself. Even though the day for bringing the offerings for the first birth had already arrived, nevertheless, since it is impossible to offer [the sacrifice] at night, it is as though the time for the offering had not yet arrived; therefore, she brings only one offering for both births.

And the School of Hillel obligate her

to bring an offering by itself for the second birth, since the day on which she brings the offering for the first birth had already arrived, although in practice she cannot offer them, because night is not fit for offering.

The School of Hillel said to the School of Shammai: What is different about the night of the eighty-first day from the eighty-first day!?

For you concede that if she miscarried on the eighty-first day, she is obligated to bring two offerings; and behold, the law of the night is like the law of the day following it, for

if it is equal to it

the night is equal to the day

with regard

to the matter of

impurity,

for if she saw blood on the night of the eighty-first day, she is impure as though she saw it on the following day, since from sunset of the eightieth day the days of purity ended—if so, why

is it not equal to it with regard

to the matter of

the offering!?

The School of Shammai said to them: No!

The night is not equal to the day following it with regard to the offering. For

if you say, with regard to one who miscarries on the eighty-first day,

that she is obligated in a separate offering for the birth of the stillborn fetus,

for it has indeed emerged

from the status of the first birth, and she miscarried

at a time when she was fit to bring an offering

for the first birth.

Can you say this with regard to one who miscarries at night on the eighty-first day,

since

it did not emerge at a time when she was fit to bring an offering,

for offerings are not brought at night, it is as though she miscarried within the eighty days, which is considered entirely one birth, and she brings only one offering.

The School of Hillel said to them: But the woman who miscarries

on

the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat—

let it prove [our position], for she did not emerge at a time when she was fit to bring an offering, and

nevertheless

she is obligated in an offering

in addition to the offering for the birth of the stillborn fetus.

The School of Shammai said to them: No!

This is not a proof.

If you say, with regard to the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat,

that she is obligated in an offering for the stillborn fetus, it is because

although it is not fit to

offer

an individual offering

on it, nevertheless

it is fit to

offer

a communal offering

of the obligations of the day, and it is found that the time is a time fit for an offering.

Can you say this with regard to one who miscarries at night on the eighty-first day, when the night is fit neither for an individual offering nor for a communal offering?

Therefore, there is no basis to obligate her in an offering for the stillborn fetus.

And the School of Shammai continue:

And the blood

that a woman sees on the night of the eighty-first day, which makes her impure,

does not prove

with regard to the offering, as you sought to prove. For these matters are not dependent on one another,

for

behold,

a woman who miscarries within the completion of the period,

within the eighty days,

her blood is impure

because of the birth,

and she is exempt from the offering;

and the same is true of a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day: although her blood is impure, she is exempt from the offering.