Keritot 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

As we learned

in tractate Terumot:

A non-priest who ate teruma transgresses two prohibitions: a) theft, since teruma is property belonging to the priests; b) the prohibition against eating teruma, as it is written (Leviticus 22:10): “And no non-priest may eat what is sacred.”

If the non-priest ate teruma unwittingly, he must pay the principal and an additional fifth, in order to atone for the unwitting transgression of eating teruma, as it is written there, verse 14. This payment is called “payment for teruma.”

If a married woman committed adultery, if she is an Israelite woman, her death is by strangulation. But if she is the daughter of a priest, her death is by burning, as it is written in Leviticus 21:9.

The daughter of a priest may eat teruma as long as she has not married an Israelite. But if she married an Israelite, she may not eat teruma for as long as she is married. If she is widowed or divorced by the Israelite, then, if she has children from her Israelite husband, she does not return to eating teruma. If she has no children from him, she returns to eating teruma.

If the daughter of a priest married an Israelite and ate teruma

unwittingly, she

pays the principal

as any thief does,

but she does not pay the additional fifth.

Only a non-priest is liable for the “payment for teruma” consisting of the principal and an additional fifth as atonement, as stated above in the passage: “And no non-priest may eat what is sacred.” But the daughter of a priest is not considered a “non-priest,” even while she is married to an Israelite, when she may not eat teruma. The reason she is not considered a “non-priest” is that she may still return to eating teruma if she is widowed or divorced without having children from him. Even if she is widowed while she has children from him, she can still marry a priest and eat teruma by virtue of being the wife of a priest.

And

if she committed adultery while married to her husband,

her death is by burning,

as is the law of the daughter of a priest who committed adultery.

The daughter of a priest who

married one of those disqualified

from marrying her, such as a ḥalal or a mamzer, through whose intercourse she becomes disqualified from priestly status, and she ate teruma,

pays the principal and the additional fifth,

because once she has been disqualified through him, she is considered a non-priest and may never eat teruma again.

And

once she has been disqualified,

her death is by strangulation!

If she then committed adultery [after having been disqualified] with another man while still a married woman, her law is death by strangulation, like an Israelite woman who committed adultery. Since she has been disqualified and is considered a non-priest, she does not have the status of the daughter of a priest,

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

His reasoning is that although she was not initially a non-priest when she was born, since she is now a non-priest, her status is that of a non-priest in every regard. This is consistent with his position stated above, that a king and a high priest, after they have been anointed and no longer require anointing oil, are considered non-priests with regard to anointing oil, even though initially they were not non-priests in relation to it.

And the Sages say: Both this one

the daughter of a priest who has not been disqualified,

and that one

the daughter of a priest who has been disqualified,

pays the principal but does not pay the additional fifth, and her death is by burning.

One who was not initially a non-priest is not considered a non-priest. [The Sages here are Rabbi Yehuda, consistent with his position stated above concerning anointing oil in the case of a king and a high priest].

Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik asked: The burning of the daughter of a priest is not dependent upon the designation “non-priest,” for the Torah does not mention the term “non-priest” in this regard. If so, since according to Rabbi Meir, once she has been disqualified from priestly sanctity by marrying someone forbidden to her, her death is not by burning, apparently this should likewise be the law according to Rabbi Yehuda. Yet this is unlike the payment of the additional fifth, concerning which it is explicitly stated in the Torah that it depends upon the designation “non-priest”: “And no non-priest may eat what is sacred,” etc. Derekh Emuna [Terumot 12:12], he asked: Apparently the comparison is not parallel. With regard to the daughter of a priest who married an Israelite, Rabbi Meir agrees that she does not pay the additional fifth, since she can still return to eating teruma [and the entire dispute is only when she has been completely disqualified, as explained in the Gemara]. If so, with regard to the prohibition against applying anointing oil, Rabbi Meir should likewise exempt one who applies it to a king, since if the people rebelled against him and then reinstated him as king, he would apparently require another anointing, and it would follow that he has not been completely removed from the status of one requiring anointing. He answered that, in the case of the daughter of a priest, since she can in the future return to her father’s teruma, even now, while she is married to an Israelite, her status as a priest’s daughter has not been revoked; she is merely forbidden to eat teruma for the present, as long as she remains married to her Israelite husband [as is explained in Ḥullin 132b, where it is stated that one may give her the priestly gifts at that time]. In contrast, a king currently has no law of anointing at all; only in the future could the law of anointing be reestablished for him. Therefore, his status as a non-priest is not revoked. He further asked there, that the comparison is still not parallel according to Rabbi Yehuda. For it is self-evident according to everyone that an Israelite woman who was married to a priest and was divorced or whose husband died pays the additional fifth, even though she was not a non-priest throughout her entire life. Apparently, the reason is that although there was a period when she was not a non-priest, nevertheless, since she is now a non-priest and was also initially a non-priest, the designation “non-priest” applies to her. If so, the same should apply to a king and a high priest: although there was a period when they required anointing, since before their anointing they were non-priests with regard to the oil, and again after their anointing, we should therefore say that they are considered non-priests in relation to it. And he answered that in fact, once a person was not considered a non-priest for even one moment, the designation “non-priest” can never apply to him. The reason that an Israelite woman who was married to a priest and was divorced pays the additional fifth is that even when she ate teruma, this was not an intrinsic status of eating for her; rather, she ate by virtue of being her husband’s acquired property. Therefore, this does not remove from her forever the designation “non-priest.” See Kovetz Hearot 47:9, where he writes about this matter. See also Meshekh Ḥokhma, Numbers 3:45, where he discusses other places in which “non-priest” is mentioned in the Torah. We return to explain the dispute concerning the measure of applying anointing oil:

Rav Yosef said:

The

dispute

is only

with regard to applying anointing oil

to a non-priest,

, and with the distinctions that we stated

[and the explanations that we gave]. That is: Rabbi Meir compares application to anointing, which has no measure, whereas Rabbi Yehuda derives the application of anointing oil from the application of teruma, whose measure is explicitly stated as an olive-bulk.

But ordinary application,

such as the prohibition against placing frankincense on a sin-offering meal-offering, as it is written (Leviticus 5:11), “And he shall not place frankincense upon it,” is,

according to everyone,

measured by

an olive-bulk.

For everyone derives the laws of application throughout the Torah from the application of teruma, except in the case of anointing oil, where Rabbi Meir holds that application is compared to anointing.

The fundamental statement: A tanna taught before Rabbi Elazar: Anyone who is included in anointing

meaning one to whom it is forbidden to apply anointing oil to others, namely, an Israelite,

is included in the prohibition “he shall not be anointed,”

meaning that it is forbidden for others to apply it to him.

And anyone who is not included in anointing is not included in the prohibition “he shall not be anointed,”

excluding a gentile, who is permitted to apply it to others; consequently, others are permitted to apply it to him.

He said to him,

Rabbi Elazar said to the tanna:

You have stated it well!

For

“he shall not be anointed”

is written

with an extra yod, and we should expound it as though the yod were written in the middle of the word,

and read it as: “He shall not anoint,”

which indicates that he may neither anoint himself nor have others anoint him. One who is forbidden to anoint himself and others is forbidden to have others anoint him. But with regard to a gentile, who is not forbidden to anoint himself, we do not read “he shall not anoint” with regard to him, and there is no prohibition against others anointing him.

Rav Ḥananya taught before Rava: From where is it derived that a high priest who took from the anointing oil that was on his head

when he was anointed at the beginning of his tenure,

and applied it to his intestines,

from where is it derived that he is liable?

As it is stated:

“It shall not be applied to the flesh of a person,”

and since it is not written, “It shall not be applied to the flesh of a non-priest,” this indicates that it is forbidden to apply it to any person, even to a high priest or king who have already been anointed with that oil.

Rabbeinu Peretz that this statement also follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. The exemption stated with regard to a high priest applies only to the prohibition of application. That is, when he applies it to his head, which is the manner of his anointing to become high priest, he is excluded from “whoever applies some of it to a non-priest,” since a high priest is not considered a non-priest. But with regard to the prohibition of anointing, when he applies it to the rest of his body, which is not the place of his anointing, a high priest is subject to the same law as everyone else, since it is stated, “It shall not be applied to the flesh of a person,” and he too is included in the category of person. Ramban likewise wrote this [Exodus 30:33]. See Arukh LaNer, who wishes to explain the distinction between them differently: anointing is when one rubs in the oil and absorbs it into the flesh, whereas application is when one places it on the body without rubbing. Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: What is different

about a high priest who took from the anointing oil that was on his head and applied it to his intestines, so that you hold him liable,

from that which was taught in a beraita: A priest who anointed himself

with

teruma oil,

after he anointed himself with the teruma oil, his

grandson

who is

an Israelite

is permitted to

roll

to rub himself

against it

and thereby transfer the oil to himself,

and he need not be concerned

about the prohibition against a non-priest anointing himself with teruma oil.

It follows from here that when oil is used and the mitzva associated with it is fulfilled, the sanctity of the teruma oil is nullified. Why, then, should we not say the same with regard to anointing oil, whose mitzva of anointing has been fulfilled?

He said to him,

Rav Ashi said:

There

with regard to teruma,

“And they shall die through it, because they have profaned it,”

is written

(Leviticus 22:9). And

since he profaned it

the oil by anointing himself with it,

it has indeed become profaned

and has become non-sacred!

explains that since it was used permissibly, it was nullified and profaned. The Minḥat Ḥinukh [279] inferred from his wording that if a non-priest anointed himself with teruma oil, it is forbidden for another non-priest to roll against him, since the oil has not yet been profaned. It becomes profaned when the mitzva of teruma is fulfilled through the priest’s proper use of it. However, Tosafot in Menahot [69] wrote in the name of Rabbeinu Ḥayyim that there is no distinction in this matter between a priest and a non-priest. In Yoma [81a] we learned that if a non-priest swallowed dates of teruma and vomited them while they remained whole, and another person ate them, the second person does not pay the additional fifth, since the designation teruma has already been removed from them. Rabbeinu Ḥayyim explains that this is based on the principle stated here in the sugya: they were already profaned through his eating. According to Rashi, however, this cannot be the explanation, since it was the eating of a non-priest; according to him, the reason must be that they are considered digested. See the Tosafot Yeshanim there. It is further necessary to discuss whether teruma becomes profaned through chewing, or only through swallowing. We learned in Ketubot [30b] that a non-priest who ate teruma does not become liable to death until the moment of swallowing. Tosafot Yeshanim wrote there Tosafot Yeshanim that through chewing alone it has not yet become profaned. However, this is according to the approach of Rabbeinu Ḥayyim. According to Rashi, who holds that teruma is not profaned through the eating of a non-priest, this proof does not apply. See Divrei Yeḥezkel [1], which elaborates in explaining the view of Rashba that it becomes profaned through chewing alone, but nevertheless remains rabbinically forbidden to non-priests. in Yoma [77b] wrote in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that one can prove from here that the prohibition against anointing oneself with teruma is only rabbinic, since according to Torah law there is no reason to say that it has already become profaned. The Kafot Temarim there asked: If so, why did the Gemara raise an objection from anointing oil, which does not become profaned, and require a derivation from the verse to distinguish between them? The prohibition concerning anointing oil is from the Torah, and therefore it remains forbidden even after the anointing has been performed. See Divrei Yeḥezkel [15], which explains this. In the novellae of Rav Yitzḥak Zev Halevi [79], he inferred from the words of Rambam that the entire permission based on the oil’s having already been profaned applies only to anointing and not to eating. He explained the distinction there: the prohibition against anointing oneself with teruma is not like the eating of a non-priest, which is intrinsically a prohibited act, like forbidden foods. Rather, its basis is that teruma was not designated for a non-priest’s anointing, but for a priest’s anointing. When the non-priest anoints himself with it, he nullifies and alters the law of the teruma for which it was designated. Therefore, once its law has already been fulfilled through a priest’s anointing himself with it, this prohibition has been removed. Nevertheless, the designation teruma has not been removed from it, and therefore it remains forbidden to eat, since the prohibition against eating depends upon the intrinsic designation of teruma that applies to it. But with regard to anointing oil, it is written

(ibid. 21:12):

“For the crown of the anointing oil of his God is upon him”

the Merciful One calls it anointing oil, for even though

it was used to anoint him and

is upon him

after he has been anointed, nevertheless,

it has not become profaned!

We learned in the Mishna:

For these one is liable for their intentional violation

to receive karet, and for their unwitting violation to bring a sin-offering, and for uncertainty concerning them to bring a provisional guilt-offering, except for one who renders the Temple or its sacred offerings impure, because his offering is an ascending-and-descending offering.

Minḥat Ḥinukh [108] discusses whether this innovation also applies to a king: whether the oil does not become profaned after his anointing [and likewise if a non-priest anoints himself with it, according to the aforementioned view of Rabbeinu Ḥayyim], or whether this is a specific law stated only with regard to a high priest. In Tzafnat Pa'ne'aḥ [second edition 75a], he gave a reason to distinguish between a king and a high priest. In the case of a high priest, the law of anointing stated with regard to him sanctifies him forever. Therefore, as long as the oil is upon him, the mitzva involving it has not yet been fully completed. Even if the oil dries, he will retain sanctity by virtue of the initial anointing; nevertheless, as long as it remains upon him, it also continues to sanctify him, and therefore the oil does not lose its sanctity. In contrast, in the case of a king, the entire law of anointing applies only to his immediate appointment. That is, the law of anointing was stated for the purpose of appointing him king, and once he has been anointed with this oil, it is considered that the mitzva involving the oil has already been fulfilled. It teaches

in the Mishna:

“except for one who renders the Temple or its sacred offerings impure.”

And we raised a question about it:

From what does he exclude him?

From which law did the tanna exclude him from the general category of those liable for karet?

And we answer:

This is what it teaches: “Except for one who renders the Temple or its sacred offerings impure,”

who does not bring a provisional guilt-offering

when he is uncertain whether he committed this transgression. For a provisional guilt-offering is brought only for uncertainty concerning a fixed sin-offering, meaning that had he certainly sinned, he would have brought a fixed sin-offering. But for the impurity of the Temple or its sacred offerings, when he certainly sinned, he brings an ascending-and-descending offering.

And we raise an objection:

And let the Mishna also teach: “Except for one over whom Yom Kippur passed, who

also

does not bring a provisional guilt-offering,”

since Yom Kippur atones for those liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering and protects them [if indeed they sinned] until they become aware of it and bring a fixed sin-offering!? [As we learned below, on page 25a.]

Reish Lakish said: When it teaches

in the Mishna those who are exempt from a provisional guilt-offering, it does so only

where his sin still exists

[that is, the sin they committed still remains],

and

even so,

the Merciful One exempted him

from a provisional guilt-offering. For example, one who is uncertain whether he entered the Temple while impure: according to the possibility that he indeed entered, his sin has not been atoned for, and nevertheless he does not bring a provisional guilt-offering, since a provisional guilt-offering is brought only for uncertainty concerning a fixed sin-offering. This is an innovation, and that is why the Mishna teaches it.

But one over whom

Yom Kippur passed,

then

his sin no longer exists, for Yom Kippur atoned for it,

and it is not an innovation that he is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering. That is why the Mishna did not teach it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

another answer: The Mishna did not mention one over whom Yom Kippur passed, who is exempt from a provisional guilt-offering, because the Mishna was speaking

of

one who

rejects

the atonement of Yom Kippur,

saying: “Let it not atone for me,”

I do not want the atonement of

Yom Kippur!

In such a case he is not exempt from a provisional guilt-offering,

for if he retracts

through repentance

after Yom Kippur

and wants atonement,

he must bring a provisional guilt-offering,

because Yom Kippur does not atone for one who does not want its atonement.

Rambam [Shegagot 3:10], it is clear that he follows the version of the texts before us, for he wrote: “If he rejects it, etc., and says or thinks in his heart that these do not atone for him.” See there the commentary of Rabbi Yosef Korkos. And Reish Lakish,

who did not wish to establish the Mishna as referring to one who rejects the atonement of Yom Kippur,

held: Even for one who rejects it, Yom Kippur atones.

And

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagreed

in the dispute

of these amoraim:

Rambam also indicate that he distinguishes between these matters, as stated above. In the Laws of Repentance [1:3] he wrote: “The essence of Yom Kippur atones for those who repent,” thereby ruling in accordance with the Sages over Rabbi, as the Kesef Mishne wrote there. In the Laws of Unintentional Transgressions [3:10] he wrote: “Neither Yom Kippur nor a sin-offering or guilt-offering atones except for those who repent and believe in their atonement,” thereby ruling in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, as the Kesef Mishne wrote there. See also Shitah Mekubetzet [14b]. It was stated:

he

brings a sin-offering and

says

“My sin shall not achieve atonement for me”—

Abaye said—

It does not effect atonement!

Rava said—

It does effect atonement!

And we explain:

Where he said:

“Let my sin-offering not be sacrificed

at all,”—

everyone agrees that it does not effect atonement.

For

this

is written

(Leviticus 1):

“He shall offer it”

“according to his will.”

That is, the owner of the offering must desire its sacrifice, whereas this person does not desire its sacrifice.

Where they disagree

is in a case

where he said:

“Let it be sacrificed, but let it not effect atonement.”

Abaye said: It does not effect atonement—

for he said:

“Let it not effect atonement,”

and anyone who repudiates atonement does not achieve atonement.

Rava said: It does effect atonement—

since he said:

“Let it be sacrificed,”

he achieves atonement through it, for atonement does not depend on his desire to achieve atonement. Rather,

atonement

comes automatically!

The same applies to Yom Kippur: according to Abaye, if one does not desire its atonement, it does not effect atonement for him. According to Rava, atonement comes automatically.

And Rava retracted his position,

and conceded that a sin-offering and Yom Kippur do not effect atonement for one who does not desire their atonement, as is demonstrated by the following beraita.

As it was taught: One might have thought that Yom Kippur effects atonement both for those who repent and for those who do not repent?

And it is a logical inference,

for one can derive by a binyan av that it should not effect atonement for those who do not repent. For—

Just as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering effect atonement, and Yom Kippur effects atonement.

And therefore we can derive by a binyan av:

Just as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering effect atonement only for those who repent

[as it is written with regard to them, “according to his will”; and if he has not repented of the transgression, he does not desire atonement],

so too, Yom Kippur effects atonement only for those who repent.

But this inference can be refuted:

No! If you say this with regard to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering,

which effect atonement only for those who repent because their atonement is limited—

for they do not effect atonement for an intentional transgression as they do for an unintentional transgression,

A guilt-offering does effect atonement even for an intentional transgression; the beraita is referring to a sin-offering, which effects atonement only for an unintentional transgression. Rashi].

[A guilt-offering does effect atonement even for an intentional transgression; the beraita is referring to a sin-offering, which effects atonement only for an unintentional transgression. Rashi.]

Would you say this with regard to Yom Kippur,

whose atonement is extensive—

for it effects atonement for an intentional transgression as it does for an unintentional transgression?

And since it effects atonement for an intentional transgression as it does for an unintentional transgression,

it is logical that it should

effect atonement both for those who repent and for those who do not repent;

and one cannot derive by a binyan av from a sin-offering, which does not effect atonement for those who do not repent.

The verse states

(Leviticus 23:27):

“But

on the tenth day of this seventh month is Yom Kippur.” The word “but” is a limitation, teaching us that

Scripture divided

this law: Yom Kippur is not a day of atonement for everyone, but only for some of them—namely, only for those who repent.

We inquire about this:

What

that is, who are those considered

“those who repent,”

for whom alone a sin-offering, a guilt-offering, and Yom Kippur effect atonement,

and

what is meant by

“those who do not repent,”

for whom Yom Kippur, a sin-offering, and a guilt-offering do not effect atonement?

If you say

“those who repent”

means

one who sinned unintentionally,

and he is called one who repents because he did not wish to sin, and when he learns of it he regrets the transgression he committed; and

“those who do not repent”

means

one who sinned intentionally,

who does not repent and regret the transgression when he becomes aware of it—

this cannot be said. For the beraita first teaches: “Just as a sin-offering and a guilt-offering effect atonement only for those who repent, so too Yom Kippur effects atonement only for those who repent.” According to your interpretation, this means that they effect atonement only for an unintentional transgression and not for an intentional one.

And afterward, in rejecting the derivation of the law of Yom Kippur from a sin-offering and a guilt-offering,

it teaches: “No, if you say this with regard to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering

which do not effect atonement for an intentional transgression as they do for an unintentional transgression, would you say this with regard to Yom Kippur, which effects atonement even for an intentional transgression?”

What, then, is it saying in rejecting the derivation? It cannot be learned that Yom Kippur is like a guilt-offering and a sin-offering because they do not effect atonement for an intentional transgression. But that is precisely what was stated at the outset: that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering do not effect atonement for an intentional transgression!? [See Rashi!].

Furthermore, it initially states that Yom Kippur likewise does not effect atonement for an intentional transgression, like a sin-offering and a guilt-offering. If so, how can we now refute the derivation of the law of Yom Kippur from a sin-offering and a guilt-offering on the grounds that Yom Kippur effects atonement even for an intentional transgression? That is the very law we seek to derive from a sin-offering and a guilt-offering—that Yom Kippur should not effect atonement for an intentional transgression!?

Rather,

when we say that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering do not effect atonement for “those who do not repent,” this means

as in the statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: If one ate forbidden fat and designated a sin-offering

for it,

and then became an apostate,

while he was an apostate the offering was unfit for sacrifice because of the principle: “The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination,”

and

afterward

he repented,

nevertheless,

since

the offering

was rejected

from being sacrificed while he was an apostate—

it remains rejected,

and may never be sacrificed . Since it was rejected for even one moment, the disqualification of “rejection” took effect upon it .

Regarding this, the tanna said that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering do not effect atonement for “those who do not repent”—that is, those who do not repent of the transgression from the time they designate the offering until the time it is sacrificed. For in the interim he was an apostate, and at that time he had not repented of any transgression.

The same applies to Yom Kippur: if he became an apostate before Yom Kippur, when Yom Kippur arrives he is not fit to receive atonement for the transgressions he has committed up to that point, because Yom Kippur does not effect atonement for apostates. And since he was once rejected from receiving atonement through Yom Kippur for these transgressions, he remains rejected forever. Even if he subsequently repents and another Yom Kippur arrives, he will not achieve atonement for the transgressions he committed before becoming an apostate.

Regarding this, the tanna said: One might have thought that Yom Kippur effects atonement for those who do not repent—that is, for one who was an apostate on the previous Yom Kippur and was rejected from atonement at that time. It is logical that he should not achieve atonement for the transgressions that were then upon him, for since he was rejected from atonement for them at that time, he remains rejected forever, as with a sin-offering and a guilt-offering: if he became an apostate after designating them, they remain permanently rejected from sacrifice. The beraita then challenges this: What can be said about a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, which effect atonement only for an unintentional transgression? Would you say the same about Yom Kippur, which effects atonement even for an intentional transgression [if he repents before Yom Kippur]? Perhaps it also effects atonement for one who had been rejected? The verse therefore states “but,” indicating a division: it does not effect atonement for transgressions for which he had previously been rejected from receiving atonement on Yom Kippur.

And we reject this: One cannot compare someone who was rejected from Yom Kippur’s atonement with someone who designated an offering and became an apostate. For

although

with regard to an offering

it was rejected,

the

offering

from sacrifice, because the disqualification of rejection took effect upon the offering, with regard to Yom Kippur,

the person

does not acquire a “disqualification”; he remains

eligible for atonement

as he is,

like anyone else, once he repents.

Rather,

“those who repent”

mentioned by the tanna means

one who says: “Let my sin-offering effect atonement for me,”

the offering for

my sin. “Those who do not repent”

means one who says: “Let my sin-offering not effect atonement for me,”

the offering for

my sin.

Regarding this, the tanna said that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering effect atonement only for those who repent—that is, for one who desires their atonement. Similarly, Yom Kippur effects atonement only for one who desires Yom Kippur to effect atonement for him. [However, the law concerning Yom Kippur had to be derived from the verse “but,” which indicates a division, because it cannot be derived from a sin-offering and a guilt-offering: their atonement is limited, as they effect atonement only for an unintentional transgression, unlike Yom Kippur, which effects atonement even for an intentional transgression] .

It thus follows that the beraita proves that one who repudiates his offering and says, “Let my sin-offering and my guilt-offering not effect atonement for me,” does not achieve atonement, in accordance with Abaye.

And we conclude:

Learn from this!

And therefore Rava retracted his position .

And they raise a contradiction

between beraitot. For the beraita here teaches that Yom Kippur does not effect atonement for those who do not repent, meaning one who repudiates atonement.

But on the other hand, it was taught:

One might have thought that Yom Kippur would effect atonement only for

one

who fasted on it, did not perform labor on it, and designated it as a “holy convocation,”

who recited the order of the day’s prayers. But one who

did not fast on it, performed labor on it, and did not designate it as a “holy convocation”—might one have thought that Yom Kippur would not effect atonement

for him?

The verse states: “It is Yom Kippur”

and it effects atonement

in any event.

Evidently, Yom Kippur effects atonement even for one who repudiates its atonement, for surely one who does not observe the mitzvot of the day is repudiating the day’s atonement [Shita Mekubetzet, letter 25]!

And both

beraitot—this one and the one taught above—

are the anonymous Sifra

[Torat Kohanim]

and

they

contradict one another!?

And we answer:

Abaye said: This is not difficult. This

teaching, that one who repudiates atonement does not achieve atonement,

is Rabbi Yehuda’s

[for the anonymous Sifra is Rabbi Yehuda]. And

this

teaching, that one who repudiates atonement does achieve atonement,

is Rabbi’s.

For we find that Rabbi holds that Yom Kippur effects atonement even without repentance, and the same applies to one who repudiates it.

As it was taught: Rabbi says: With regard to all the transgressions in the Torah, whether one repented

of them

or whether one did not repent,

Yom Kippur effects atonement! Except for one who casts off the yoke

of all the mitzvot,

one who brazenly interprets the Torah,

who relates to the words of Torah with insolence and contempt,

and one who violates the covenant of the flesh,

who did not circumcise himself.

For

with regard to these three transgressions, only

if he repented does Yom Kippur effect atonement

for

him; and if not, Yom Kippur does not effect atonement

[and in tractate Shevuot 13a, Rabbi derives this from verses].

Rava said: Both this and that

the two beraitot—

were stated by Rabbi according to his own view,

for Rabbi holds that Yom Kippur effects atonement even for those who do not repent.

But Rabbi concedes with regard to the transgressions of Yom Kippur itself

that if one violated the mitzvot of Yom Kippur itself,

it does not effect atonement

for them. This is the subject of the earlier beraita, which derives from the word “but,” indicating a division, that Yom Kippur does not effect atonement for those who do not repent. The beraita that teaches that Yom Kippur effects atonement for one who did not fast on it and performed labor on it is referring to other transgressions; for transgressions of the day itself, Yom Kippur does not effect atonement.

Proof that Rabbi concedes that one does not achieve atonement without repentance for transgressions of Yom Kippur itself:

For if you do not say so—

the punishment of karet for Yom Kippur,

which the Torah states applies to one who eats or performs labor on it,

according to Rabbi,

who holds that Yom Kippur effects atonement even without repentance—

since at every moment,

every moment of Yom Kippur,

it effects atonement,

then

how can you find it

possible for him to be punished by karet? For immediately after he transgresses, he has already achieved atonement! [Granted, in the case of other transgressions punishable by karet, this can be found: he may be punished before Yom Kippur, before there was time for him to achieve atonement.] Rather, it is certainly the case that according to Rabbi, Yom Kippur does not effect atonement for transgressions of the day itself without repentance .

And we reject this:

And they reject this: What is the difficulty? Perhaps

one can find a case of karet on Yom Kippur—for example:

he performed labor

and worked

throughout the entire night, and at daybreak he died!

Thus,

he did not see the daytime,

he did not live long enough to see the day

for it to effect atonement for him,

for only the day of Yom Kippur effects atonement, not the night [as it is written: “For

on the day

of this one he shall effect atonement for you”].

We challenge this rejection:

Granted, you can find karet for the night,

that case can be found. But

how can you find karet for the day,

when he transgressed during the daytime hours—

how can you find it?!

For the verse concerning karet states: “On the very day of this one” [Rashi, Shevuot].

And we reject this again:

What is the difficulty? Perhaps

one can find karet for the daytime in a case where

while he was eating bread

a piece of meat choked him

[a piece of meat that he ate together with the bread] ,

and he died

immediately,

so that he had no time during the daytime

after the transgression

for Yom Kippur to effect atonement for him.

.

Alternatively,

for example,

he performed his act close to sunset, and there was no time left for him during the day,

so that not a single moment of the day remained after the transgression

to atone for it,

and when Yom Kippur ended, he would be punished with karet for what he had done on Yom Kippur.

Alternatively,

for example, that

while he was performing his act, a hoe severed his thigh,

as in the course of his work he struck his thigh with the hoe with which he was working,

and he died, since there was no time left during the day

after the transgression

to atone for it.

If so, we have no proof that Rabbi concedes with regard to the transgressions of Yom Kippur itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: also one who blasphemes.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is the meaning of “also one who blasphemes”?

That is, with regard to what statement are the Rabbis speaking?

And we answer:

The Rabbis heard Rabbi Akiva teach

in the Mishna, in the enumeration of those liable to karet and those liable to bring sin-offerings,

one who consults a ba'al ov. [

The Mishna is Rabbi Akiva's, as it teaches that one who blasphemes is liable to bring a sin-offering, and Rabbi Akiva indeed maintains this, as stated below.]

And he did not teach one who consults a yideoni,

because there is no sin-offering for it.

They said to him,

the Rabbis said to Rabbi Akiva:

What is different about

one who consults a yideoni

that he does not bring a sacrifice,

because

there is no action involved in it [

A yideoni is one who places the bone of an animal called a “yideoni” into his mouth, and the bone speaks by means of sorcery], if so,

one who blasphemes also

whom you said is liable to bring a sin-offering,

has no action involved in it,

but only speech, and he too should be exempt from bringing a sacrifice . [

The reasoning of Rabbi Akiva will be explained below, and likewise above, 3b, in the statements of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. See also Rashi and Tosafot here.]

The Sages taught: One who blasphemes brings a sin-offering

when he does so inadvertently

since karet is stated with regard to it

when done intentionally [and the sin-offering is contingent upon liability to karet for the intentional act, as explained above, 3a],

the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And

the verse

says: “He shall bear his sin”!

And below the Gemara explains this verse.

And we raise a difficulty against Rabbi Akiva:

And

is it

a general principle that wherever karet is written with regard to an offense, one brings a sacrifice?

But the Paschal offering and circumcision,

as

it is written with regard to them that there is karet, yet one does not bring a sacrifice

for one who did not offer the Paschal sacrifice or did not circumcise himself. If so, here too, with regard to one who blasphemes, despite the fact that karet is written with regard to it, from where does Rabbi Akiva know that he brings a sacrifice?!