Keritot 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

Because it can be refuted: What is true of an individual and the community is that they do not

their sacrifices

undergo change; can you say

the same of a nasi, whose

sacrifice may

undergo change if they remove him from his position as nasi?

Rather, Abaye said: From here

we must derive

the following:

The gzera shava of

“mitzvot, mitzvot”

that is written with regard to all three

teaches one from the other

in tractate Horayot, with regard to the rule that anything whose intentional violation is punishable by karet requires a sin-offering for its unwitting violation. And

since they are derived from one another

by this gzera shava,

why do I need it to be written that there are three

“knowledges”

with regard to an individual, with regard to a nasi, and with regard to the community?

Rather,

if it is not needed for their own matters, since they are already derived by means of

“mitzvot, mitzvot,”

apply it

to

a case where he becomes aware of it only after Yom Kippur, in which case he brings a sin-offering.

And we raised the following difficulty:

But say: It is only when he becomes aware of it after Yom Kippur that he brings a sin-offering, because Yom Kippur does not come solely for

the atonement

of this sin

alone;

it comes

and therefore Yom Kippur is properly excluded from effecting atonement for one who became aware of his sin only after Yom Kippur.

But

one who had already brought

a provisional guilt-offering, which comes for the sin

that he committed,

the provisional guilt-offering

comes for that sin;

perhaps here too it effects complete atonement,

entirely,

so that when he becomes aware

of the sin

after he has brought a provisional guilt-offering,

he

does not bring a sin-offering!?

Rava said: The verse states

with regard to a sin-offering: [Leviticus 4]

“Or it becomes known to him”—

he is obligated to bring it

in any event.

And we raised the following difficulty:

Now that it says

that even if he has already brought a provisional guilt-offering, nevertheless

when he becomes aware of it

after bringing the provisional guilt-offering, he

brings a sin-offering,

if so—

why does the provisional guilt-offering come?

Rabbi Zeira said: So that if he dies

before bringing the sin-offering, he

dies without sin!

Rava strongly objected to this: If he dies,

why does he require the atonement of the provisional guilt-offering? For

death itself cleanses,

atoning for him like a sacrifice does!

Rather, Rava said: It comes to protect him

in the interim, until he becomes aware of it and brings a sin-offering,

from suffering.

We learned in the Mishna:

A bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case,

if she became aware after its pinching that it was not required, it must be buried.

Rav said: And it atoned

for her! The initial assumption was that she became aware that she had given birth, and it atoned for her, so that she no longer needed to bring a sin-offering.

And we refuted this:

If so,

if the sacrifice was effective in effecting atonement,

why must it be buried?

And we answered:

Because

it became disqualified through lack of awareness,

as it is not adequately guarded

since it is brought for a doubtful case; and from the outset it was not intended to be eaten, like every bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case.

And we wondered:

When

is it

not adequately guarded? If initially,

before the pinching, it was

alive,

and a living creature does not contract ritual impurity!?

If ultimately,

after it was pinched, then

you have established it for her,

since you said that it effects atonement!?

And we answered:

Rather, the Mishna

is speaking

of a case where she became aware that she had not given birth.

By law, it should be permitted for benefit,

since it turns out that it is not a sacrifice at all. Nor is it prohibited on account of non-sacred animals slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, since non-sacred animals are prohibited in the Temple courtyard only when slaughtered, not when pinched.

And why must it be buried?

By rabbinic decree,

so that people would not come to benefit from a bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case even when it has not become known that it was not required.

And when Rav’s statement that it atoned

was stated,

it was stated with regard to this—

As we learned above:

If a woman brought a bird sin-offering for a doubtful case, and, before it was pinched, she became aware that she had certainly given birth,

she should make it a definite offering,

because

from the same species that she brings for an unrecognized case

[a bird], she

brings

also

for a recognized case

[a bird]. Rav is commenting on this Mishna and says:

And if she became aware that she had given birth after it was pinched,

he sprinkles its blood and presses out its blood,

in accordance with the procedure for a definite bird sin-offering [see Rashi for how he would do this], and through this sin-offering she fulfills her obligation as a woman who has given birth, even though she initially brought it as a doubtful offering, because the sprinkling and pressing out of the blood are the essential elements of atonement [Rabbeinu Gershom]. And since

it

has

atoned,

as a definite sin-offering of a woman who has given birth, it is

permitted to eat.

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is prohibited to eat it, by decree, lest people say: A bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case may be eaten 62 .

Levi taught a beraita in accordance with Rav: A bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case, if, after it was pinched, she became aware that she had certainly given birth—

he sprinkles its blood and presses out its blood, and once it has atoned, it is permitted to eat.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan: A bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case: If, before it was pinched, she became aware that she had not given birth—

it becomes non-sacred or is sold to her fellow woman.

If, before it was pinched, she became aware that she had certainly given birth—

she makes it a definite offering, for from the same species that she brings for an unrecognized case, she brings for a recognized case.

If she became aware that she had given birth after it was pinched—

he sprinkles and presses out

its

blood, and it effects atonement, but it is prohibited to eat,

lest people say that a bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case may be eaten.

And if

he pressed out its blood, and

only

afterward she became aware that she had given birth—

it is prohibited even for benefit,

like every bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case, since

it was brought as a doubtful offering from the outset,

and she did not become aware that she had given birth until after its blood had been pressed out,

its doubt effected atonement

like a bird sin-offering brought for a doubtful case,

and it is gone.

Its law is therefore as follows: a) It is prohibited to eat, since at the time the blood was pressed out there was a doubt whether it was non-sacred, in which case the pinching renders it an animal carcass. b) It is likewise prohibited for benefit, since at the time the blood was pressed out there was an aspect according to which it was sacred. Once it is sacred but may not be eaten, it is prohibited for benefit, since it is prohibited to treat it contemptuously by feeding it to dogs.

From the words of Tosafot above, on page 22b, in the passage beginning “If,” it appears that the prohibition against eating is rabbinic. Rashash wrote that it is demonstrated from the beraita before us that it is by Torah law. The Chazon Ish likewise wrote, in Nega’im 13:8, that the offering is not eaten because its blood was sprinkled under the law governing an offering brought in a case of uncertainty!.

The early authorities dispute whether, if it became known to her that she had given birth after she had brought a bird sin-offering in a case of uncertainty, she must bring a definite sin-offering, as in the case of an asham talui.

According to Tosafot [above, 22b], bringing the sin-offering in a case of uncertainty suffices to exempt her even in the definite case. The bird sin-offering brought in a case of uncertainty differs from an asham talui, which is an obligation in its own right; whereas the entire purpose of bringing the former is to exempt her in the event that she is obligated. [Or Same’aḥ, Shegagot 11b, and Chazon Ish, Nega’im, there].

The Shitta Mekubbetzet there, however, holds that she is obligated to bring a definite offering, as in the case of an asham talui.

Mishna:

One who sets aside two sela for an asham,

as an asham must be purchased for at least the value of two sela,

and purchased two rams with them as asham offerings, if one of them was worth two sela

[for example, because the price rose, or because the seller gave him a discount from the market price]—

it shall be offered

that one

as his asham.

, and the other

since it was purchased as an asham with consecrated money designated for the purchase of an asham—

shall be left to develop a blemish, then sold, and its proceeds shall go to a freewill offering,

as is the law concerning the surplus of an asham.

If he misappropriated this money and

purchased two rams with it

in order

to

eat them as

non-sacred animals,

the money has become non-sacred, and he now has two obligations [in addition to the fact that he has still not fulfilled his obligation by bringing the asham whose money he misappropriated]:

a. He must pay the Temple treasury the principal and the additional fifth as restitution for the first asham. Since he misappropriated two sela, which are eight dinars, he owes the Temple treasury the principal together with the fifth, ten dinars.

b. He must bring an asham for misuse of consecrated property worth two sela, as is the law governing one who misuses consecrated property.

Therefore, if

one

of the rams [which he purchased with the consecrated money]

was worth two sela, and one

the second ram

was worth ten zuz—

the ram

worth two sela shall be offered as his asham

for which he is now liable by reason of misusing consecrated property.

And

the ram

the second,

which is worth ten dinars, shall be offered

for his misuse, and the Gemara explains that this is on account of the first asham, as payment for what he misappropriated from the Temple treasury, since he is obligated to bring an asham for his earlier sin, for which he had set aside the money .

If he used the money to purchase one ram

as an asham and

one ram

as a non-sacred animal,

and it turns out that he misappropriated only one sela, then

if

the ram

designated for the asham is now worth

two sela

it shall be offered as his asham

the first one, since it was purchased for that purpose.

And

the ram

the second

he shall offer

for his misuse, as an asham offering for having misused the money, [and now the term “his misuse” refers to the asham for misuse of consecrated property and not to payment for his misuse],

and with it he shall bring one sela and its fifth

as payment for what he misappropriated from the Temple treasury.

Gemara:

The Gemara raises a discussion:

What does the term

“his misuse,”

which it teaches in the first clause,

concerning one who purchased two rams as non-sacred animals with the two sela, mean:

and the second—

for his misuse?

If you say

that he brings

a ram as an asham

for his misuse, worth the principal and the fifth, which is ten dinars—

then

does that mean that the fifth

for his misuse is not paid to the Temple treasury in money, but

together with

the offering of the

ram

as an asham for his misuse

he brings it?

That cannot be.

But it is written [Leviticus 5]:

“

And he shall pay for what he took from the sacred property for his sin,

and he shall add its fifth to it”;

apparently,

the fifth

together with

the return of the money he

misappropriated

to the Temple treasury

he brings it, and not as an addition to the value of the asham offering.

Furthermore,

this

it teaches in the latter clause:

if he purchased with the money a ram

as an asham and

one ram

as a non-sacred animal, if the one designated as the asham was worth two sela, it shall be offered as his asham, and the second for his misuse, and with it he shall bring one sela and its fifth.

Apparently, the fifth

he brings together with what he misappropriated, and not that he brings the fifth together with the asham for misuse of consecrated property .

Rather,

“his misuse,”

which it teaches in the first clause, means that he pays the Temple treasury what he took from it—that is,

the benefit he derived from the sacred property from

those

two sela that I set aside for an asham,

by

purchasing two rams with them as non-sacred animals.

Therefore, that ram

that was worth two sela—

he offers it as a ram for the asham

for his misuse.

And

that ram which is

worth ten zuz, he gives it

as payment

for the benefit he derived from the sacred property.

For it is

payment for

what he misappropriated and its fifth; and what does “his misuse”

mean?—

what he misappropriated.

We challenge this:

How did you interpret

“his misuse”

in the first clause—

as payment for

what he misappropriated?

If so,

consider the latter clause: if he purchased with the money he had set aside for his asham one ram

as

an asham and

one ram

as a non-sacred animal, if the one designated as the asham was worth two sela, it shall be offered as his asham

the first one

, and the second as

an

asham for misuse of consecrated property, and with it he shall bring one sela and its fifth.

Apparently,

“his misuse” means

a ram

for an

asham

for the misuse!? But this is difficult, for it follows that

in the first clause he calls

“his misuse”

what he misappropriated, meaning the payment of the money he misappropriated to the Temple treasury,