Keritot 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Taḥlifa, the father of Rav Huna (son of Taḥlifa), said in the name of Rava: The first clause,

those liable to bring sin-offerings and guilt-offerings,

also should not be inferred

to resolve it neither from the statement of Rav Dimi nor from that of Abaye,

for their resolutions are forced,

but rather from this:

that Rabbi Elazar said in explanation of the Mishna’s statement that Yom Kippur atones for those liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering, and he derives it from the verse:

“A sin known to no one but the Omnipresent –

Yom Kippur atones.”

And from this

we learn that specifically

Yom Kippur atones for a sin known to no one but the Omnipresent, but

a transgression

that he knows about,

such as a definite guilt-offering after he became aware of his obligation, or a guilt-offering brought for an intentional transgression,

Yom Kippur does not atone

for it.

And Rav Taḥlifa, the father of Rav Huna, said in the name of Rava: One liable to receive lashes when Yom Kippur passed over him –

remains liable 41 .

And we raise a question:

Is it obvious?

For

what difference is there

between lashes

and those liable to bring sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings,

whose liability is not diminished by Yom Kippur?

And we answer:

It might enter your mind to say: There,

in the case of those liable to sin-offerings and guilt-offerings,

it is a monetary obligation

that he incurred toward Heaven, and therefore Yom Kippur does not release him from a monetary obligation.

But here,

in the case of

lashes, which is an obligation concerning the body, say that he is not liable,

because Yom Kippur atoned for him. Therefore,

it teaches us

that he remains liable to receive lashes.

And we inquire about this: Why did you say that it does not atone for those liable to lashes?

But we learned in a Mishna

that the scapegoat atones for all transgressions, including those committed intentionally. For we learned that the scapegoat atones for

known

and

unknown

sins, for

positive

and

negative commandments!?

This is not difficult: This

statement that it does not atone refers to a case where

they formally forewarned him,

so that he became liable to lashes. Whereas

that

statement that it does atone refers to a case where

they did not formally forewarn him,

so that he is not liable to lashes.

And we raise a difficulty:

If so,

since Yom Kippur atones for a sin known to no one but the Omnipresent and releases a person from bringing an offering—

(Mnemonic: A woman who gave birth, a leper, a nazirite, a sota, and a heifer)

In the case of a woman whose status as one who gave birth is uncertain, when Yom Kippur passed over her, she should not bring

the offering of a woman who gave birth,

for Yom Kippur atoned for her, since it is a sin known to no one but the Omnipresent,

as she herself is uncertain about it?!

Rav Hoshaya said:

It is written [Leviticus 15] that the atonement of Yom Kippur applies only

“for all their sins”

and not for all their ritual impurities.

A woman who gave birth brings a sin-offering in order to become pure, not as atonement for a sin.

And according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says: A woman who gives birth is a sinner,

because when she is in the throes of childbirth she swears that she will never again give birth,

what can be said?

Answer this: Even according to him,

when a woman who gave birth brings an offering,

she brings it in order to be permitted to eat consecrated food, not for atonement.

Her sin for the oath was atoned for through the pain of childbirth. Rashi.

Rav Ashi said: We too have learned this in a Mishna: In the case of a woman upon whom there is an uncertain bird sin-offering, and Yom Kippur passed over her –

she is obligated to bring it after Yom Kippur, because it enables her to eat of the offerings.

And we raise another difficulty:

If so, in the case of a leper whose status is uncertain, when Yom Kippur passed over him, he should not bring

an offering,

for Yom Kippur passed over him, since it is a sin known to no one but the Omnipresent!?

Rav Oshaya said: “For all their sins” –

“and not for all their ritual impurities,”

and a leper is not a sinner who requires atonement.

But Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Afflictions come on account of seven matters,

including evil speech and so forth. This implies that they come to atone for the leper’s sin!?

(Mnemonic: Roof, theft, arrogance, slander)

The mnemonic consists of the initials of the seven matters on account of which afflictions come. They are explained in tractate Arakhin.

And we answer: Even according to him,

when a leper brings

an offering,

he does not bring it for atonement; rather, it is in order to be permitted to eat consecrated food.

The atonement for the sin comes through the suffering that the leper endures from the afflictions.

If so, in the case of a nazirite

who is impure, whose impurity is uncertain,

when Yom Kippur passed over him, he should not bring an offering

, for Yom Kippur atoned, since it is a sin known to no one but the Omnipresent? Rav Oshaya said: “For all sins” –

“and not for all ritual impurity.”

And according to Rabbi Elazar HaKappar, who says: A nazirite is a sinner

because he afflicted himself by abstaining from wine,

what can be said?

And we answer:

A nazirite

who is impure,

when he brings an offering, he does not bring it for atonement

, but in order to initiate his naziriteship of purity.

If so, in the case of a sota whose status is uncertain, when Yom Kippur passed over her, she should not bring

the sota offering,

for Yom Kippur atoned for her, since it is a sin known to no one but the Omnipresent

itself?!

And we answer: There, there is

the man who had relations with her

who

knows about it.

Rava said: When a sota brings

her offering, it comes to clarify the transgression

and not for atonement.

If so, in the case of a calf whose neck is broken, when Yom Kippur passed over it, and so forth!

Abaye said: The murderer knows. Rava said: The verse states:

[Numbers 35]

“And the land shall not be atoned for the blood that was shed upon it,”

excluding another form of atonement.

Rav Pappa said: The verse states:

[Deuteronomy 21]

“Atone for Your people Israel

whom You redeemed” –

this atonement is fit to atone for those who left Egypt,

since the Holy One, blessed be He, redeemed us from the hands of the Egyptians. That is, even if many generations have already passed, as many as have passed since the Exodus from Egypt, the blood is not atoned for except through the atonement established for it by the Torah.

Now that you have said: “A sin known to no one but the Omnipresent” –

Yom Kippur atones.

Say: When he becomes aware of it after Yom Kippur, he likewise need not bring a sin-offering!?

Only when he became aware before Yom Kippur, so that he had already become liable to a sin-offering, is he not released by the atonement of Yom Kippur.

Rabbi Zeira said: You cannot say

this. Because

the verse is written with the word

“

knowledge” [“or it is made known”] in the context of a sin-offering three times:

or “he becomes aware” three times regarding a sin-offering:

with regard to the sin-offering

of an ordinary individual,

and with regard to

the sin-offering

of a ruler, and with regard to

the sin-offering

of the community.

This teaches us, through the redundancy of one of these three references to knowledge, that in every case where he becomes aware of his sin, even if he becomes aware of his sin only after Yom Kippur has passed, he is nevertheless liable to bring a sin-offering.

We reject this: These three verses that require certain knowledge in order to make one liable for a sin-offering

are necessary

for their own purposes, and are not available for deriving this law!

For if the verse had been written only with regard to an ordinary individual, I would say: All of them,

the ruler and the community,

are derived from the ordinary individual, but this can be refuted: What is true of an ordinary individual, whose entire offering is female,

and since his status is lenient, he becomes liable to a sin-offering only when his knowledge of his sin is certain. Can you say the same regarding a ruler, who brings a goat, and the community, whose offerings are all male? Since their law is stringent, they should become liable to a sin-offering even on the basis of uncertainty. Therefore, it was necessary to write the requirement of knowledge with regard to them, to teach you that they are liable to a sin-offering only when they become certain that they sinned.

Let the Torah write

knowledge

with regard to the nasi, and let the cases of

an individual and the community

be derived from the nasi?

The case of an individual cannot be derived from that of the nasi, because it can be refuted: What is unique about the nasi? He is not

subject to

a

sacrificial obligation for

hearing a voice

, since witnesses are administered an oath to come and testify, and if they deny knowing the testimony, they are obligated to bring an offering; but a nasi, who is the king, is not obligated to testify, since this is not befitting his honor. Therefore, it is impossible to administer an oath to him to come and testify.

Can you say the same with regard to an individual, who is subject to the law of hearing a voice?

And the community cannot be derived from the nasi, because it can be refuted: What is unique about the nasi? He has

a

female animal among his offerings

for the sin of idolatry,

a female

. Whereas the community brings a male goat.

Let the Torah write

knowledge

with regard to the community, and let an individual and a nasi be derived from it?

It can be refuted: What is unique about the community? They are liable only for an unintentional decision

that they issued an erroneous ruling

together with an unintentional act

, meaning that the people acted in accordance with their erroneous ruling; whereas an individual and a nasi are not subject to an erroneous ruling, but only to an unintentional act.

And if you would say: Indeed,

from one

instance of “knowledge”

it cannot be derived,

as we refuted,

let one instance of knowledge be derived from the other two

instances of knowledge.

And the third instance of knowledge would then be superfluous, teaching us that one is liable to bring a sin-offering even if he became aware after Yom Kippur that he had sinned.

Nor can one instance be derived from the other two.

For if you say:

Let the Torah not write the requirement of knowledge with regard to an individual, and let it be derived from the nasi and the community?

It can be refuted: What is unique about the nasi and the community? They are not subject to the law of hearing a voice; can you say the same with regard to an individual, who is subject to the law of hearing a voice?

Let the Torah not write the requirement of knowledge with regard to the community, and let it be derived from the knowledge stated with regard to the individual and the nasi?

It can be refuted: What is unique about the individual and the nasi? A female animal is included among their offerings; can you say the same with regard to the community, which has no female animal among its offerings?

Rather, from here it can be derived:

Let the Torah not write it with regard to the nasi, and let

his requirement of knowledge

be derived from the knowledge stated with regard to the individual and the community.

For

what refutation can you raise? If it is because they are not subject to the law of hearing a voice and are liable only for an unintentional decision—

an individual,

who is subject to the law of hearing a voice and is liable even without an unintentional decision,

can disprove this.

And if it is because

an individual

has a female animal among all his offerings

the community can disprove this, since its offering contains no female animal

. Nevertheless,

until they acquire knowledge, they are not liable

to bring a sin-offering.

And if so,

why do I need the Torah to write the requirement of knowledge with regard to the nasi?

Therefore,

if it is not needed for its own matter, since it can be derived from the individual and the community, apply it to the case where he becomes aware after Yom Kippur, teaching that he brings a sin-offering.

Abaye said: If the Torah had not written the requirement of knowledge with regard to the nasi, it could not be derived from the individual and the community,