Keritot 26a — the Talmud in English

Rav Taḥlifa, the father of Rav Huna (son of Taḥlifa), said in the name of Rava: The first ones,

those liable for sin-offerings and guilt-offerings,

also should not be brought ![](pamud.bmp "

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to resolve it neither from Rav Dimi nor from Abaye,

for their resolutions are forced,

but from this:

for Rabbi Elazar said in explanation of the words of the Mishna that Yom Kippur atones for those liable for a conditional guilt-offering, and he derives it from the verse:

“A sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware”—

“Yom Kippur atones.”

And from it

we derive that specifically

it is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware for which Yom Kippur atones; but

a transgression

of which he is aware,

such as a definite guilt-offering after he became aware of it, or a guilt-offering that comes for intentional transgression,

it does not atone

for on Yom Kippur.

And Rav Taḥlifa, the father of Rav Huna, said in the name of Rava: Those liable for lashes over whom Yom Kippur passed—

he is liable. 41 .

And we raised a difficulty:

It is obvious;

for

what difference is there

between lashes

and those liable for sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings

whose liability Yom Kippur does not lessen?

And we answered:

It might have entered your mind to say: There,

with regard to those liable for sin-offerings and guilt-offerings,

it is monetary liability

that he incurred toward the Most High, and therefore Yom Kippur does not exempt him from monetary liability.

But here,

with regard to lashes,

it is a bodily liability; say that it does not

remain incumbent upon him, since Yom Kippur atoned for it. For this reason

it teaches us

that he is liable for lashes.

And we examined it: Why did you say that it does not atone for those liable for lashes?

But did we not learn

that the scapegoat sent away atones for all transgressions, including those committed intentionally? For we learned that the scapegoat sent away atones for

those of which he became aware and

for

those of which he did not become aware,

for

a positive commandment and

for

a prohibition!?

This is not difficult: This

case, in which it does not atone, speaks

when they formally warned him,

so that he became liable for lashes. Whereas

that

case, in which it does atone, speaks when

they did not formally warn him,

so that he is not liable for lashes.

And we raised a difficulty:

But if so,

with regard to a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware, Yom Kippur atones and exempts him from an offering—

(Mnemonic: yoledet, metzora, nazir, sota, eglah)

A woman of uncertain childbirth over whom Yom Kippur passed should not bring

the childbirth offering,

for surely Yom Kippur atoned for her, since it is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware,

as she herself is uncertain about it?!

Rav Hoshaya said:

It is written [Leviticus 15] that the atonement of Yom Kippur is only

“for all their sins”—

“but not for all their ritual impurities,”

and a woman after childbirth brings a sin-offering in order to become pure, and not as atonement for a sin.

And according to Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says: A woman after childbirth is a sinner,

because when she crouches to give birth she swears that she will never again give birth—

what is there to say?

Answer it: Even according to him,

when a woman after childbirth brings an offering,

she brings it in order to be permitted to eat consecrated food, and she does not bring it for atonement,

for the sin of her oath was atoned for her through the pain of childbirth. Rashi.

Rav Ashi said: We too have learned this: A woman who has upon her a doubtful bird sin-offering, and Yom Kippur passed over her—

she is liable to bring it after Yom Kippur, because it makes her fit to eat sacrificial offerings.

And again we raise a difficulty:

But if so, a person with an uncertain status as a metzora over whom Yom Kippur passed does not bring

an offering,

for surely Yom Kippur passed over him, since it is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware!?

Rav Oshaya said: “For all their sins”—

“but not for all their ritual impurities,”

and a person with tzaraat is not a sinner requiring atonement.

But Rav Shmuel bar Naḥmani said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Afflictions come for seven matters,

for malicious speech and so forth. This implies that they come to atone for the sin of the person with tzaraat!?

(Mnemonic: gimmel-gimmel-gimmel, shin-shin-lamed-tsadi)

The mnemonic consists of the initial letters of the seven matters for which afflictions come. And they were explained in tractate Arakhin.

And we answered: Even according to him,

when a person with tzaraat brings

an offering,

he does not bring it for atonement, but he brings it in order to be permitted to eat consecrated food.

And the atonement for the sin is through the suffering that the person with tzaraat suffers from the tzaraat.

But if so, a nazirite of uncertain status,

impure, who is uncertain whether he became impure,

over whom Yom Kippur passed does not bring an offering

, for surely Yom Kippur atoned, since it is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware? Rav Oshaya said: “For every sin”—

“but not for every impurity.”

And according to Rabbi Elazar ben Ha-Kappar, who says: A nazirite is a sinner

because he afflicted himself by abstaining from wine,

what is there to say?

And we answered:

A

impure nazirite,

when he brings an offering, he does not bring it for atonement

, but it is in order to initiate pure naziriteship for him

. But if so, a woman suspected of adultery of uncertain status over whom Yom Kippur passed should not bring

the jealousy-offering,

for surely Yom Kippur atoned for her, since it is a sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware

it is!?

And we answered: There, there is

a man who had relations with her

who

is aware of it.

Rava said: When a woman suspected of adultery brings it,

she brings it to clarify the sin

and not for atonement.

But if so, concerning a beheaded heifer over which Yom Kippur passed, and so forth!

Abaye said: The murderer is aware. Rava said: The verse says:

[Numbers 35]

“And the land shall not be atoned for the blood that was shed in it,”

to exclude another atonement.

Rav Pappa said: The verse says:

[Deuteronomy 21]

“Atone for Your people Israel

whom You redeemed”—

this atonement is fit to atone for those who went out from Egypt,

for the Holy One, blessed is He, redeemed us from the hands of Egypt. That is to say, even if many generations have already passed, as many as have passed since the Exodus from Egypt, the blood is not atoned for except through the atonement established for it by the Torah.

Now that you have said: A sin of which only the Omnipresent is aware—

Yom Kippur atones.

Say: If he becomes aware of it after Yom Kippur, he likewise should not bring a sin-offering!?

And only when he became aware before Yom Kippur, so that he had already become liable for a sin-offering, only then is he not exempted through the atonement of Yom Kippur.

Rabbi Zeira said: You cannot say

this. Because

the verse is written with the word

the word

“knowledge”

[or “he became aware”] concerning a sin-offering three times:

with regard to the sin-offering

of an individual,

and with regard to

the sin-offering

of a ruler, and with regard to

the sin-offering

of the community,

in order to teach us through the extra one of the three mentions of knowledge that in every situation in which he becomes aware of his sin, even if he becomes aware of his sin only after Yom Kippur has passed, nevertheless he is liable for a sin-offering.

And we reject this: These three verses that require definite knowledge in order to make him liable for a sin-offering

are necessary

for their own purposes, and are not free for us to expound from them!

For if the verse had been written with regard to an individual, I would have said: All of them,

the ruler and the community,

are derived from the individual, for there is room to refute: What is special about an individual, whose entire offering is a female

and since he is lenient, he becomes liable for a sin-offering only when his knowledge of his sin is definite. Would you say the same concerning a ruler, who brings a goat, and concerning the community, which brings only males for all its offerings? Since their law is more stringent, they should become liable for a sin-offering even in a case of uncertainty. Therefore it was necessary to write knowledge concerning them, to teach you that they are liable for a sin-offering only when they become definitely aware that they sinned.

Let us write

knowledge

concerning the nasi, and bring the latter

individual and community

from the nasi?

An individual cannot be derived from a nasi, for one can refute it: What is unique about a nasi is that he is not

himself

subject to

liability for an offering for

hearing a voice,

for witnesses are adjured to come and testify, and if they deny knowledge of the testimony they are liable for an offering, whereas a nasi, who is the king, is not obligated to testify, since this is not in keeping with his honor. Therefore, it is impossible to adjure him to come and testify.

Can you say the same of an individual, who is subject to hearing a voice!

And the community cannot be derived from a nasi, for one can refute it: What is unique about a nasi is that he has in his offering

there is

a female [animal],

for the sin of idolatry,

a female [animal].

Whereas the community brings a male goat.

Let us write

knowledge

concerning the community, and bring an individual and a nasi from it?

One can refute it: What is unique about the community is that they are liable only for unawareness of a matter,

that they issued an erroneous ruling

together with an unwitting act,

when the people act according to their erroneous ruling, whereas an individual and a nasi do not have an erroneous ruling, but only an unwitting act.

And if you say, indeed

from one “

knowledge”

it does not come,

as we challenged,

let one knowledge be derived from two

knowledges.

And the third knowledge would be superfluous, to teach us that he is liable for a sin-offering even if it became known to him after the Day of Atonement that he had sinned.

It is also impossible to derive one from two.

For if you say,

“Let us not write knowledge concerning an individual, and let it be derived from a nasi and the community?”

One can refute it: What is unique about the nasi and the community is that they are not subject to hearing a voice; can you say the same of an individual, who is subject to hearing a voice!

“Let us not write the verse concerning knowledge regarding the community, and let it be derived from the knowledge of an individual and a nasi?”

One can refute it: What is unique about an individual and a nasi is that there is a female [animal] in the offering; can you say the same of the community, whose offering contains no female [animal]!”

Rather, from here it can be derived:

Let us not write it concerning the nasi, and let

his knowledge

be derived from the knowledge of an individual and the community.

For

what can you challenge? If it is because they are not subject to hearing a voice and are liable only for unawareness of a matter—

an individual,

who is subject to hearing a voice and is liable even without unawareness of a matter,

proves [otherwise].

And if it is because an

individual

has a female [animal] in every offering,

the community proves [otherwise], for their offering contains no female [animal].

And nevertheless,

until they have knowledge they are not liable

to bring a sin-offering.

And if so,

why do I need knowledge to be written concerning the nasi?

Therefore,

if it does not concern its own matter, since it is derived from an individual and the community, assign it to the case where it becomes known to him after the Day of Atonement, that he brings a sin-offering.

Abaye said: If knowledge were not written concerning the nasi, it could not be derived from an individual and the community,