Keritot 22b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

It is stated at the beginning of the passage of the conditional guilt-offering

“And if a soul

sins.” And before that passage the passage of the guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated property was written. This teaches you:

to make one liable for a conditional guilt-offering for uncertainty concerning misuse of consecrated property

as will be explained below,

the words of Rabbi Akiva. And the Sages exempt

in a case of uncertainty concerning misuse from a conditional guilt-offering. And we raised an objection to this:

Shall we say that Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagree about this

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages:

that Rabbi Akiva holds that the upper passage,

which is written above, namely, misuse,

is derived from the lower passage,

from the conditional guilt-offering that is written below, so that also in a case of uncertainty concerning misuse one is liable for a conditional guilt-offering.

And the Sages hold that the upper passage is not derived from the lower passage?

Rav Pappa said:

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages did not disagree about this. Rather,

everyone

holds that

the upper passage is derived from the lower passage.

And there is proof for this,

for if so

that you were to say that they disagree about this,

the slaughter of a burnt-offering, which must be in the

north

even

in the case of cattle.

For north is written only with regard to sheep, and cattle, which is written above it, derives it by virtue of the principle that the upper passage is derived from the lower passage.

According to the Sages,

who do not hold that the upper passage is derived from the lower passage,

you will not find it

from where to derive it?!

Rather,

certainly, the Sages also agree that the upper passage is derived from the lower passage. And

here, this is the reason of the Sages, who exempt

in a case of uncertainty concerning misuse from a conditional guilt-offering:

for they derive

the conditional guilt-offering by means of a gzera shava

“commandments” -

“commandments” from the sin-offering

of fat [a designation for an ordinary sin-offering, since the passage of the sin-offering is adjacent in the Torah to the prohibition of fat], in both of which the word “commandments” is stated. Therefore we derive:

Just as there,

the sin-offering is only

for a matter for intentional violation of which one is liable to karet and for unintentional violation of which

one is liable to bring

a sin-offering; so too, every matter for intentional violation of which one is liable to karet and for unintentional violation of which one brings a sin-offering—one brings for its uncertainty a conditional guilt-offering; excluding misuse, for intentional violation of which one is not liable to karet

and for unintentional violation of which one does not bring a sin-offering. Therefore, one does not bring a conditional guilt-offering for its uncertainty.

For it was taught

that there is no karet for misuse:

If he intentionally misused consecrated property, Rabbi says:

his punishment is

death

at the hand of Heaven.

And the Sages say: it is subject only to a prohibition

alone, namely, lashes; but for karet, according to everyone, one is not liable.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: when we derive “commandments—commandments” from the sin-offering for fat, this is what we derive: just as there

in the sin-offering the verse spoke

of a

sin-offering

of fixed value,

in which the poor and the wealthy are equal,

so too here,

in the conditional guilt-offering one is liable only when he is uncertain about a sin for which, in the event of certain knowledge, one would be liable

for a

offering

of fixed value, excluding

one who becomes liable for his sin when it becomes known to him with certainty,

an ascending-and-descending offering,

such as impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred things,

for he does not

become liable for a conditional guilt-offering for its uncertainty.

And now, since the gzera shava was necessary for this, we again have to derive the upper passage from the lower passage, in order to make one liable for a conditional guilt-offering in a case of uncertainty concerning misuse.

And the Sages hold: a gzera shava is not applied partially!

Rather, we must derive the gzera shava of the conditional guilt-offering from the sin-offering completely: one brings a conditional guilt-offering only for a matter for intentional violation of which one is liable to karet and for unintentional violation of which one brings a sin-offering, and not for misuse, for intentional violation of which one is not liable to karet and for unintentional violation of which one does not bring a sin-offering.

And we raised an objection to this:

Rather, by implication, Rabbi Akiva holds that a gzera shava may be applied partially? But we have established that a gzera shava is not applied partially?!

And we answer:

Rather, everyone

holds

that a gzera shava is not applied partially. And here, this is the reason of Rabbi Akiva

because

the verse says

at the beginning of the passage of the conditional guilt-offering

“And if a soul.”

And we expound:

The vav

of “and if a soul” is

an addition to the preceding matter,

which is misuse, written before it,

and the upper passage is derived from the lower passage.

That is, the derivation of the upper passage from the lower passage [mentioned above] comes to reveal that here one should not expound the gzera shava from the sin-offering to the conditional guilt-offering completely, even in order to exempt misuse from a conditional guilt-offering. Rather, misuse must be compared with the conditional guilt-offering and one must be made liable for it; and the gzera shava must necessarily be expounded only partially, to exempt a sin involving an ascending-and-descending offering from a conditional guilt-offering.

And the Sages hold:

this comparison of the vav “an addition to the preceding matter” did not come to teach that the upper passage is derived from the lower passage; rather, on the contrary,

the lower passage [

conditional guilt-offering ]

is what derives from the upper passage [

from the guilt-offering for misuse]. To teach you that it must be purchased,

for the guilt-offering

conditional, that its monetary value be

in silver

two

shekels,

in accordance with the law of the guilt-offering for misuse, concerning which it is explicitly written, “according to your valuation, silver shekels” .

And since the comparison did not come to derive misuse from the conditional guilt-offering, from now on the gzera shava must again be expounded completely, to exempt misuse from a conditional guilt-offering.

And Rabbi Akiva holds: a comparison is not applied partially!

Rather, it must be compared completely, including the upper passage to the lower passage, and in a case of uncertainty concerning misuse one must be made liable for a conditional guilt-offering.

And we raised an objection to this:

By implication, the Sages hold that a comparison may be applied partially. But we have established that a comparison is not applied partially?!

And we answer: No! Rather,

everyone

holds

that a comparison is not applied partially. And here, this is the reason of the Sages: the gzera shava

comes

“commandments—commandments”

to exempt misuse from a conditional guilt-offering, and

it removes it from the comparison

of the upper passage from the lower passage, which came to make one liable for a conditional guilt-offering for misuse [for the gzera shava is preferable to the comparison. Since the comparison must be upheld with regard to deriving the lower passage from the upper passage, it is preferable to say that a gzera shava is not applied partially than to say that a comparison is not applied partially. Arukh la-Ner].

And we raised an objection to this:

And Rabbi Akiva,

this law that a

guilt-offering

conditional must be purchased

with silver shekels—from where does he derive it? [

for, as stated, if Rabbi Akiva derived this law through the lower passage from the upper passage [as do the Sages], he would not have derived the upper passage from the lower passage with regard to a conditional guilt-offering for misuse, so that the gzera shava would not be partial. Shita Mekubetzet, Zevahim 48a, letter 8] .

And we answer:

He derives it from “This is the law of the guilt-offering”—

one law for all guilt-offerings! With regard to a

matter of

a guilt-offering worth silver shekels.

For just as the law of the guilt-offering for misuse is that it is worth silver shekels, so too all guilt-offerings.

And since there is no need to derive the lower passage from the upper passage with regard to silver shekels, necessarily the comparison came to derive the upper passage from the lower passage, to make one liable for a conditional guilt-offering for uncertainty concerning misuse. And the gzera shava will be only partial, with regard to the ascending-and-descending offering [so that the comparison not be nullified completely, we derive the gzera shava partially. We now retract from what we said above, that the reason of Rabbi Akiva is that a comparison is not applied partially].

And the Sages

hold:

even though “This is the law of the guilt-offering” is written,

nevertheless

it was necessary to write “And if a soul”

and to expound

“the vav is an addition to the preceding matter,” and the lower passage is derived from the upper passage

that the conditional guilt-offering too must be worth silver shekels.

For if it were only from “This is the law of the guilt-offering,” I would say: when I say “one law for all guilt-offerings,”

it is with regard to silver shekels,

this applies to other certain guilt-offerings; but a conditional guilt-offering, since it comes for uncertainty concerning

eating

fat [

and the same is true of all transgressions for which there is a sin-offering],

I might say: its uncertainty should not be more stringent than its certainty. Just as its certainty

of the sin brings for it

a sin-offering worth a danka [

at the value of a danka, which is a low value of a silver ma'a, one-sixth of a dinar—not specifically at the value of a danka, but at any value; rather, “danka” was mentioned as an example of a low value. Rashi, Zevahim 48a, s.v. danka],

so too its uncertainty,

namely, a conditional guilt-offering, he should be liable to bring only

a guilt-offering worth a danka.

For this reason the Merciful One wrote, “And if a soul.”

And we expound:

“The vav is an addition to the preceding matter,”

that indeed a conditional guilt-offering is more stringent than a certain sin-offering, and one is liable to purchase it at the value of two silver shekels .

And we raised an objection to this:

This works for the one who expounds “This is the law of the guilt-offering,”

for it is possible to say that Rabbi Akiva holds this way.

But according to the one who does not expound “This is the law of the guilt-offering” [

for it is a dispute among amoraim in Menahot 3b whether we expound this kind of exposition with regard to a meal-offering, from “And this is the law of the meal-offering”—one law for all meal-offerings],

what can be said?

From where does Rabbi Akiva derive that a conditional guilt-offering is worth silver shekels?

And we answer:

He derives

a gzera shava

“according to your valuation—from ‘according to your valuation’ from the guilt-offering for misuse,

for in the conditional guilt-offering [and likewise in the guilt-offering for robbery] “according to your valuation” is written, and likewise in the guilt-offering for misuse.

And

the guilt-offering for a betrothed maidservant

which

does not have written in it

“according to your valuation,”

we derive

the law that it is worth silver shekels by means of the gzera shava

“with a ram—with a ram”

from misuse, for in both of them it says “with the ram of the guilt-offering.” [The guilt-offering of a nazirite and the guilt-offering of a leper come as a lamb, and we said above, 10b, that since a ram, which is two years old, is purchased for two sela, a lamb, which is one year old, is purchased for one sela.]

We learned in the Mishna: “And if it is uncertain whether I misused [the money], the money is a voluntary offering, and the guilt-offering is a conditional guilt-offering.”

And we raised an objection concerning that which it teaches:

“And if it is uncertain”:

What is it saying?

For certainly this is the case: at present he is uncertain whether he misused [the money] or not, for this is what the Mishna is discussing.

And we answer:

Rava said: Read [it]:

that he stipulates and says as follows:

“If he remains in his uncertainty forever,

so that it never becomes known to him whether he misused [the money] or not,

let

the offering

be a conditional guilt-offering.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“Of the same type that he brought for ‘known,’ he brings for ‘not known.’”

And we raised an objection to this:

Ultimately,

he gained nothing from the stipulation that he made. For

when it becomes known to him

afterward that he certainly misused [the money],

must he bring a guilt-offering

for misuse

for certain misuse?

For it entered our mind that the law of a certain guilt-offering is like that of a sin-offering, and certain knowledge that he sinned is required at the time of bringing the offering; he does not fulfill his obligation with an offering that he brought before his knowledge.

And we answer:

Rava said: From the words of both of them,

of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva [who agrees with Rabbi Tarfon with regard to minor misuse],

we learn:

that

a certain guilt-offering

differs from a sin-offering, and

does not require knowledge at the outset

before bringing the offering. Therefore, even after it becomes known to him that he certainly misused [the money], he fulfills his obligation with this guilt-offering, although he offered it before the knowledge .

Mishna:

A woman who brought a bird sin-offering

for

uncertainty,

for example, she miscarried and does not know what she miscarried, whether it was something for which she is liable for a birth-offering or not [see above, 7b, in the Mishna, “There are women who bring an offering”]. The law is that she brings her burnt-offering [a lamb when wealthy, and a bird when poor] and stipulates: if she is liable for a birth-offering, this will fulfill her obligation, and if not, it will be a voluntary burnt-offering. But the sin-offering [which is a bird whether she is wealthy or poor], concerning which she cannot stipulate that it be voluntary, she brings for uncertainty. That sin-offering is not eaten by the priests, because perhaps she is not liable for it, and it turns out that it is not a sin-offering but merely an ordinary non-sacred bird, and it is a carcass because of the pinching performed upon it.

If, before the pinching

of the sin-offering

it became known to her

that what

she gave birth to

is something for which she is

certainly

liable to bring an offering,

she shall make it

as a sin-offering

for certain!

And it shall be eaten by the priests.

For

behold,

from

that same

type that she brings for “

‘known’”

she brings

also

for “

not known,”

for whether she gave birth certainly or gave birth doubtfully, she brings that same offering, namely, a turtledove or a young pigeon for a sin-offering .

A. Two pieces of meat were before him.

One piece

one

of non-sacred meat, and one piece

one

of sacred meat. He ate one of them, and he does not

know

know which of them he ate—

he is exempt

from a suspended guilt-offering! And this is according to the opinion of the Sages in the preceding Mishna, who exempt one from a suspended guilt-offering in a case of uncertainty concerning meila.

Rabbi Akiva obligates him in a suspended guilt-offering,

and this is in accordance with his position in the preceding Mishna, which obligates a suspended guilt-offering in a case of uncertainty concerning meila.

If he ate

also

the second one

afterward,

he brings a guilt-offering

for meilot

with certainty,

for now it is certain that he ate the piece of sacred meat.

If

a person

ate the first one, and another came and ate the second one—

this one brings a suspended guilt-offering, and that one brings a suspended guilt-offering,

for each one is uncertain whether he committed meila,

the words of Rabbi Akiva 39 .

Rabbi Shimon says: Both of them bring one guilt-offering

for meilot

one

in partnership . And each one says to the other: If you committed meila, then my share in the offering is forgiven you, and the entire guilt-offering shall be sacrificed on your behalf .