Keritot 22b (כב:) — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

The Sages taught:

At the beginning of the passage of the asham talui it is stated:

“And if a person

sins.” Before that passage, the passage of the asham for misuse of consecrated property is written. This teaches you:

To render one liable to bring an asham talui for uncertain misuse of consecrated property

[as the Gemara will explain].

These are the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages exempt

one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property from bringing an asham talui. And we raised a difficulty:

Shall we say that this is the issue over which

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages disagree:

Rabbi Akiva maintains that we derive a matter written above

namely, misuse of consecrated property,

from a matter written below,

from the asham talui written below it, and therefore one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property is liable to bring an asham talui.

And the Sages maintain that we do not derive a matter written above from a matter written below?

Rav Pappa said:

Rabbi Akiva and the Sages did not disagree about this. Rather,

everyone

maintains that

we do derive a matter written above from a matter written below.

And there is proof of this:

For if

you were to say that they disagree about this,

the slaughter of a burnt-offering, which must take place in the

north

even

in the case of cattle.

The requirement of the north is written only with regard to sheep and goats, and cattle, the matter written above it, is derived from it by virtue of the principle that we derive a matter written above from a matter written below.

According to the Sages,

who do not maintain that we derive a matter written above from a matter written below,

we would find no way

to derive this requirement from anywhere?!

Rather,

it is certainly the case that even the Sages agree that we derive a matter written above from a matter written below. And

here, this is the reason that the Sages exempt

one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property from bringing an asham talui:

They derive

the law of the asham talui by means of a gzera shava,

“commandments”—

“commandments” from the sin-offering

of forbidden fat [a designation for an ordinary sin-offering, since the passage of the sin-offering follows in the Torah the prohibition against forbidden fat], in both of which the word “commandments” is stated. Accordingly, we derive:

Just as there,

the sin-offering is brought only for

a matter for which one who violates it intentionally is liable to karet, and for which one who violates it unintentionally

is liable to bring

a sin-offering, so too, for every matter for which one who violates it intentionally is liable to karet and for which one who violates it unintentionally is liable to bring a sin-offering, one brings an asham talui for uncertainty about it. This excludes misuse of consecrated property, for which one is not liable to karet for intentional violation

and not liable to a sin-offering for unintentional violation. Therefore, one does not bring an asham talui for uncertainty about it.

As it was taught

that there is no karet for misuse of consecrated property:

If he misused consecrated property intentionally, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says:

His punishment is

death

at the hands of Heaven.

And the Sages say: It is subject only to a prohibition

—meaning lashes—but according to everyone, one is not liable to karet.

And Rabbi Akiva maintains: When we derive “commandments”—“commandments” from the sin-offering for forbidden fat, this is what we derive: Just as there

the verse speaks of

a

sin-offering,

a fixed

sin-offering, for which the poor and the wealthy are equal,

so too here,

with regard to an asham talui, one is liable only when he is uncertain about a sin for which, if his knowledge that he had sinned were certain, he would be liable to bring

a

fixed

offering. This excludes

one who, when he becomes certainly aware of his sin, is liable to bring

a sliding-scale offering,

such as for impurity involving the Temple or its sacred items,

for he is not

liable to bring an asham talui for uncertainty about it.

And now that the gzera shava was needed for this purpose, we may once again derive a matter written above from a matter written below, in order to render one liable to bring an asham talui for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property.

And the Sages maintain: A gzera shava cannot be applied only partially!

Rather, we must apply the gzera shava between the asham talui and the sin-offering completely: An asham talui is brought only for a matter for which one who violates it intentionally is liable to karet and one who violates it unintentionally is liable to a sin-offering, and not for misuse of consecrated property, for which one is not liable to karet for intentional violation and not liable to a sin-offering for unintentional violation.

And we raised a difficulty:

Rather, by inference, Rabbi Akiva maintains that a gzera shava can be applied only partially? But we have established that a gzera shava cannot be applied only partially?!

And we answer:

Rather, everyone

maintains that

a gzera shava cannot be applied only partially. And here, this is the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s

position: It is because

the verse says

at the beginning of the passage of the asham talui:

“And if a person.”

And we expound: The

vav

of “and if a person”

adds to the preceding matter,

which is the law of misuse of consecrated property, written immediately before it,

and teaches the matter written above from the matter written below.

That is, the juxtaposition of the matter written above with the matter written below [mentioned above] reveals that here the gzera shava from the sin-offering to the asham talui is not to be expounded completely—not even in order to exempt misuse of consecrated property from an asham talui. Rather, misuse of consecrated property is to be compared to the asham talui, rendering one liable to bring it; and the gzera shava must, against its ordinary rule, be expounded only partially, in order to exempt a sliding-scale sin from an asham talui.

And the Sages maintain:

This comparison, based on the vav adding to the preceding matter, does not come to teach the matter written above from the matter written below. On the contrary,

the matter written below

[the asham talui]

is derived from the matter written above

[the asham for misuse of consecrated property]. This teaches you that one must purchase

the asham

talui at a value of

two

silver

shekels,

as is the law with regard to the asham for misuse of consecrated property, concerning which it is explicitly written: “according to your valuation in silver shekels”.

And since the comparison did not come to derive the law of misuse of consecrated property from the asham talui, we must now expound the gzera shava completely, to exempt misuse of consecrated property from an asham talui.

And Rabbi Akiva maintains: A comparison cannot be applied only partially!

Rather, the comparison must be applied completely, including from the matter written above to the matter written below, and one who is uncertain whether he misused consecrated property is liable to bring an asham talui.

And we raised a difficulty:

By inference, the Sages maintain that a comparison can be applied only partially. But we have established that a comparison cannot be applied only partially?!

And we answer: No! Rather,

everyone

maintains that

a comparison cannot be applied only partially. And here, this is the reason for the Sages’ position: The

gzera shava

“commandments”—“commandments”

comes to exempt misuse of consecrated property from an asham talui, and

it removes it from the comparison

of the matter written above with the matter written below, which came to render one liable to bring an asham talui for misuse of consecrated property [since the gzera shava is preferable to the comparison. Once the comparison must be upheld with regard to deriving the matter written below from the matter written above, it is preferable to say that a gzera shava can be applied only partially rather than to say that a comparison can be applied only partially. Arukh LaNer].

And we raised a difficulty:

And Rabbi Akiva,

where does he derive that the

asham

talui must be purchased

with silver shekels?

[For, as stated, if Rabbi Akiva derived this law by means of the matter written below from the matter written above [as do the Sages], he would not have been able to derive the matter written above from the matter written below with regard to an asham talui for misuse of consecrated property, so that the gzera shava would not be only partial. Shita Mekubetzet, Zevahim 48a, paragraph 8].

And we answer:

He derives it from “This is the law of the asham”—

one law for all asham offerings! With regard to

the

asham that is worth silver shekels.

Just as the asham for misuse of consecrated property must be worth silver shekels, so too all asham offerings must be worth silver shekels.

And since there is no need to derive by means of the comparison that the matter written below derives from the matter written above with regard to the requirement of silver shekels, necessarily the comparison comes to derive the matter written above from the matter written below, rendering one liable to bring an asham talui for uncertainty about misuse of consecrated property. The gzera shava will apply only partially, with regard to a sliding-scale offering [in order that the comparison not be nullified entirely, we apply the gzera shava partially. We therefore now retract what we said above, that the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s position is that a comparison cannot be applied only partially].

And the Sages

maintain:

Although it is written, “This is the law of the asham,”

nevertheless,

it was necessary to write, “And if a person”

and to expound:

“The vav adds to the preceding matter,” and it teaches the matter written below from the matter written above,

that the asham talui too must be worth silver shekels.

For if it were derived from “This is the law of the asham,” I would have said: When I say “one law for all asham offerings”

with regard to the requirement of silver shekels,

this applies to other definite asham offerings. But with regard to an asham talui, since it comes for uncertainty about

eating

forbidden fat

[and the same applies to all prohibitions for which one brings a sin-offering],

I would say that its uncertainty should not be more stringent than its certainty. Just as for his certainty

about the sin he brings a

sin-offering worth a dinar

[at the value of a “danka,” which is a low value of a silver ma'a, one-sixth of a dinar—not specifically a danka, but any value, the term “danka” being used as an example of a low value. Rashi, Zevahim 48a, s.v. danka],

so too for his uncertainty,

that is, for an asham talui, he should be liable only to bring

an asham worth a dinar.

Therefore the Merciful One wrote, “And if a person.”

And we expound:

“The vav adds to the preceding matter,”

that indeed an asham talui is more stringent than a definite sin-offering, and it must be purchased for the value of two silver shekels.

And we raised a difficulty:

This works according to the one who expounds “This is the law of the asham”;

it is possible to say that Rabbi Akiva maintains this position.

But according to the one who does not expound “This is the law of the asham”

[for this is a dispute between amoraim in Menahot 3b, whether we expound a similar derivation with regard to a meal-offering from “And this is the law of the meal-offering”—one law for all meal-offerings],

what can be said?

From where does Rabbi Akiva derive that an asham talui must be worth silver shekels?

And we answer: He

derives

a gzera shava,

“according to your valuation”—“according to your valuation,” from the asham for misuse of consecrated property,

for “according to your valuation” is written with regard to an asham talui [and likewise with regard to an asham for robbery] and also with regard to the asham for misuse of consecrated property.

And

the asham for a betrothed maidservant,

which

does not have written in it

“according to your valuation,”

we derive

the requirement that it be worth silver shekels by means of the gzera shava

“with a ram”—“with a ram”

from the asham for misuse of consecrated property, since in both cases “with the ram of the asham” is stated. [The asham of a nazirite and the asham of one afflicted with tzaraat are brought as a lamb, and we said above, on 10b, that since a ram, which is two years old, is purchased for two sela, a lamb, which is one year old, is purchased for one sela.]

We learned in the Mishna: If it is uncertain whether I misused the money, the money is offered as a gift-offering, and the asham is an asham talui.

And we raised a difficulty concerning that which it teaches:

“And if it is uncertain”:

What is it saying?

For this is certainly the case: At present he is uncertain whether he misused the property or not, since that is the subject of the Mishna.

And we answer:

Rava said: Read

that he stipulates and says as follows:

If I remain uncertain forever,

and he will never learn whether he misused the property or not,

let

the offering

be an asham talui.

We learned in the Mishna:

The same type of offering that he brings for “known” he brings for “unknown.”

And we raised a difficulty:

Ultimately,

he gained nothing from the stipulation he made. For

when it becomes known to him

later that he certainly misused the consecrated property,

he must bring a definite asham

for misuse of consecrated property

does he not?

For it might have entered our minds that the law of a definite asham is like that of a sin-offering, and that certain knowledge that he sinned is required at the time he brings the offering; therefore, he does not fulfill his obligation with an offering that he brought before becoming aware of his sin.

And we answer:

Rava said: From the statements of both of them,

Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva [who concedes to Rabbi Tarfon with regard to a small amount of misuse],

we learn

that a

definite asham

is different from a sin-offering, and

does not require prior knowledge

before the offering is brought. Therefore, even after he learns that he certainly misused the property, he has fulfilled his obligation with this asham, although he sacrificed it before becoming aware of the matter.

Mishna:

A woman who brought a bird sin-offering

for

an uncertainty,

for example, she miscarried and does not know what she miscarried, whether it was something for which she is liable to bring the childbirth offering or not [see above, 7b, in the Mishna “There are women who bring an offering”]. The law is that she brings her burnt-offering [a lamb if she is wealthy, and a bird if she is poor] and stipulates that if she is liable to bring a childbirth offering, this offering will fulfill her obligation, and if not, it will be a gift-offering. But the sin-offering [which is a bird whether she is wealthy or poor], with regard to which she cannot stipulate that it should be a gift-offering, she brings for an uncertainty. That sin-offering is not eaten by the priests, because perhaps she is not liable to bring it, in which case it is not a sin-offering but an ordinary nonconsecrated bird, and it is therefore a carcass because of the pinching performed upon it.

If, before it was pinched,

the sin-offering,

she learned

that what

she had given birth to

was something for which she is

certainly

liable to bring an offering,

she shall make it

as a

definite

sin-offering, and it is eaten by the priests.

For

it is

from

the same

type that she brings for

“known”

that she brings

also

for

“unknown,”

since whether the woman who certainly gave birth or the woman who is uncertain whether she gave birth, she brings the same offering—namely, a turtledove or a young pigeon as a sin-offering.

There were before him two pieces of meat.

One piece

was

of unconsecrated meat, and one piece

was

of sacrificial property. He ate one of them, and does not

know

which one he ate—

he is exempt

from an asham talui, in accordance with the view of the Sages in the preceding Mishna, who exempt one from an asham talui in a case of uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

Rabbi Akiva obligates him to bring an asham talui,

in accordance with his position in the preceding Mishna, where he obligates one to bring an asham talui in a case of uncertain misuse of consecrated property.

If he ate

also

the second one

afterward,

he brings a definite guilt-offering

for misuse of consecrated property,

definitely,

for now it is certain that he ate the piece of sacrificial property.

If

one person

ate the first one, and another came and ate the second one—

this one brings an asham talui, and that one brings an asham talui,

for each one is uncertain whether he committed misuse of consecrated property,

the statement of Rabbi Akiva 39 .

Rabbi Shimon says: Both bring one guilt-offering

for misuse of consecrated property,

one

jointly. And each one says to the other: If you committed misuse, my share in the offering is waived for you, and the entire guilt-offering is offered on your behalf.