Keritot 22a (כב.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

When it is taught

that

it is forbidden—

for example

when he separated

the blood from the human body.

When Rav Sheshet said

that it is permitted—

it was in a case where he had not separated it.

As it was taught: Blood that is on top of a loaf—

he scrapes it off and eats the loaf.

Blood

between the teeth—

he may suck it out and swallow it, and need not be concerned.

Some teach this statement of Rav Sheshet with regard to

a

different beraita.

As it was taught: Could it be that the milk of bipeds—

a woman’s milk—

one who eats it violates a prohibition? This can be derived

by a kal va-chomer:

Just as with an impure animal, with regard to which you were lenient concerning contact

since it never conveys impurity during its lifetime, as it does not experience gonorrhea or menstruation, nevertheless

you were stringent with regard to its milk

which is forbidden to eat—

with regard to bipeds, with whom you were stringent concerning contact,

as a woman conveys impurity as a menstruant or a woman who experiences a flux,

is it not logical that you should be stringent with regard to their milk?!

The verse states: “But this you shall not eat

from among those that bring up the cud and those that have split hooves, the camel.” And we derive:

This—

it is impure

and its milk [for from the camel we derive in Bekhorot 6b that the milk of an impure animal is forbidden, Rabbeinu Gershom].

But the milk of bipeds is not impure; rather, it is pure,

and it is permitted to eat.

It might be thought:

I will exclude the milk

because

its

prohibition

is not uniform,

as it is forbidden only in the case of an impure animal, whereas the milk of a pure animal is permitted, and therefore it is also permitted in the case of a woman.

But I will not exclude the blood

of bipeds,

for

it is

uniform,

as all blood from an animal is forbidden?

The verse therefore states

at the end of the verse:

“It is impure for you.”

And we derive:

It is impure, but the milk and blood of bipeds are not impure; rather, they are pure

[according to Rabbeinu Gershom’s version] .

And concerning this,

Rav Sheshet said: There is not even a measure of abstinence in the milk of bipeds

—that is, there is no reason even as a pious practice to refrain from it.

We learned there

in tractate Ḥullin:

The heart—

one must slit it and remove its blood.

But if one cooked it and

did not slit it, he does not violate a prohibition because of it,

for eating its blood.

Rabbi Zeira said that Rav said: They taught

that he does not violate a prohibition because of it

only with regard to the heart of a bird, since it does not contain an olive-bulk

of blood .

But in the case of an animal’s heart, which contains an olive-bulk

of blood,

it is forbidden, and one is liable to receive karet for it!

The objection is raised:

It was taught:

The blood of the spleen, the blood of the heart, the blood of the kidneys, and the blood of the limbs are all subject to a prohibition. The blood of bipeds and the blood of creeping animals and crawling creatures are forbidden, but one is not liable for them.

It follows that there is no liability of karet for the blood of the heart, but only a prohibition [even when it contains an olive-bulk, as it teaches that one violates a prohibition because of it]?!

And we answer:

When it teaches

that

one is not liable

to receive karet for the blood of the heart, this applies specifically

to its own blood,

the blood absorbed in the flesh of the heart, which is like the blood of the other limbs.

When Rav said

that for the blood of an animal’s heart one is liable to receive karet, he was referring to blood

that comes to it from elsewhere,

the blood found inside the cavity of the heart, as the reason is explained below .

And we ask: If it is

its own blood, that is the blood of the limbs,

why does the tanna need to state both “the blood of the heart” and “the blood of the limbs”?

And we answer:

By your reasoning, does it not also teach the blood of the kidneys and then teach the blood of the limbs,

so that you would likewise ask why it teaches the blood of the kidneys?

Rather,

you are forced to say that it

teaches

the blood of the kidneys

and then teaches

the blood of the limbs. If so,

here too: it teaches

the blood of the heart

and then teaches

the blood of the limbs!

And we explain: This blood that comes

from elsewhere—

from where does it come to it?

Rabbi Zeira said: At the moment when the soul departs, it is forcefully drawn out.

As the animal breathes, it draws the blood from the place of slaughter into the cavity of the heart. It is therefore the blood of the soul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.

We learned in the Mishna:

For blood with which the soul departs, one is liable.

Five types of blood emerge from the body at the time an animal is bled [or slaughtered].

a. First, black blood emerges, trickling in a weak flow.

b. Subsequently, red blood begins to emerge, while it is still merely trickling.

c. Subsequently, the blood flows in a strong stream.

d. Finally, the flow of blood diminishes again, and it merely trickles.

e. After all this, congealed blood emerges, whose emergence occurs after death.

It was stated: What is the “blood of bloodletting” with which the soul departs?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As long as

it

flows in a stream.

That is, only the third blood. With the first two, the blood of the soul has not yet emerged. With the fourth, the blood upon which the soul depends has already emerged [although the animal is still alive]!

Reish Lakish said: From the black drop onward.

That is, all three types of blood, apart from the first, black blood, are the blood of the soul [and, of course, apart from the congealed blood, which emerges after death ].

The objection is raised:

It was taught:

What is the “blood of the soul”? As long as it flows in a stream! Once the congealed blood emerges,

it is excluded from the category of blood of bloodletting

because it trickles.

And we infer:

Is it not saying

that even

the first

red blood, before the flowing,

and the

last blood, after the flowing,

trickle,

and both

are equivalent to congealed blood!

For the entire reason that we exclude congealed blood is that it trickles, and these also trickle; if so, they are not included in “blood with which the soul departs.”

This is a refutation of Reish Lakish,

who said that both are included in the blood with which the soul departs!? And we answer:

No!

Rather, the tanna intends

to exclude only the blackening blood,

to say that it is not the blood of the soul; rather, its status is that of congealed blood.

But the first and last blood, although it trickles, are indeed the blood of the soul!

The objection is raised:

It was taught:

What is the blood of the soul? As long as it flows in a stream! Once

blood

first and last emerges, because it trickles.

This is a refutation of Reish Lakish!?

And we answer:

He could have said to you,

Reish Lakish:

It is a dispute among tannaim.

As it was taught: What is the blood of the soul—

as long as it flows in a stream; this is the statement of Rabbi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: From the black drop onward.

And I hold in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, whereas the beraita cited above follows Rabbi.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written:

“And he shall drink the blood of the slain,”

which indicates that blood is called a drink that one drinks only when it emerges after the creature has become a slain body, that is, after death.

This excludes flowing blood,

which emerges at the time the soul departs and is not called a drink,

as it does not render produce susceptible

to ritual impurity [“produce” is the language of the verse, as it is written: “When water is placed upon seed,” referring to all food] .

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If one let blood from an animal and received its blood in two cups —

what is the law?

Regarding

the consumption of the blood in

the first

cup, everyone agrees that he is

liable

to karet, since spurting blood, which according to everyone is the blood of the soul, is mixed into it.

My question concerns

the

cup

last,

which contains only blood that emerged after the spurting:

is he liable

for consuming it

or not?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

This is the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish!

For it was stated: If one let blood from an animal and received its blood in two cups.

Reish Lakish said: He is liable to bring two sin-offerings,

since he is liable even for the second cup, although it contains only blood that dripped after the spurting.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable to bring only

a

single

sin-offering, for the first cup alone, which contains spurting blood.

And they followed their respective positions, for above they disagreed as to whether one is liable for dripping blood that emerges after spurting blood.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda renders one liable for residual blood.

Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement

that the blood sprinkling on the altar effects atonement: if one sprinkled residual blood from the offering upon it, the sprinkling is invalid and does not effect atonement.

As it is stated: “For the blood

is it that effects atonement through the soul.”

And we expound:

Only blood through which the soul departs

effects atonement,

but blood through which the soul does not depart does not effect atonement.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too have learned

that Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement:

For it was taught:

It is stated: “Any person of the House of Israel … who eats any blood … and I will cut it off from among its people.” The verse should have said

“blood.”

And

what does the verse teach by saying “any blood”?

Rather,

since it is stated

later in the verse

“For the blood is it that effects atonement through the soul,” I know

that one is liable to karet

only

for

the blood of sacred offerings,

which is specifically the blood

through which the soul departs,

as only it is fit to effect atonement. But

ordinary blood and residual blood,

even residual blood of sacred offerings, do not effect atonement [as the wording “through the soul it effects atonement” indicates that specifically the blood of the soul effects atonement] —

from where

do we know that one is liable to karet for them?

The verse states: “Any blood,”

to include these as well with regard to karet.

And

who is the anonymous author of the Sifra —

it is Rabbi Yehuda!

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that residual blood does not effect atonement.

Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva renders one liable for uncertain misuse

of consecrated property to bring

a provisional guilt-offering.

Although generally one brings a provisional guilt-offering for an uncertainty only when the intentional violation of the matter would entail karet—so that if he knew with certainty that he had sinned, he would bring a sin-offering—whereas misuse of consecrated property entails neither karet when intentional nor a sin-offering when one certainly misused it unintentionally, but rather a guilt-offering, nevertheless, one is liable to bring a provisional guilt-offering for uncertainty concerning misuse, as is derived in a beraita in the Gemara.

And the Sages exempt him

from a provisional guilt-offering, since certain misuse does not entail a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes

with regard to payment to the Temple treasury

that he does not bring his payment for misuse,

as he need not pay the Temple treasury the money he misused—the principal plus an additional one-fifth—

until it becomes known to him

that he certainly misused the consecrated property,

and he then brings

with it

a guilt-offering

for

certain misuse 29 .

Rabbi Tarfon said:

According to Rabbi Akiva,

why should this person who brings

[that is, why should he bring]

two guilt-offerings,

first a provisional guilt-offering and, once it becomes known to him, a certain guilt-offering? Granted, in the case of every provisional guilt-offering, the provisional guilt-offering and the sin-offering that he brings at the end, once he learns of the transgression, are not a single type of offering: the sin-offering is female, whereas the guilt-offering is male. But here, where they are one type of offering, why should he bring it twice?

Rather, he should bring the payment for misuse and its added fifth,

the principal of the money concerning which he is uncertain whether he misused it, together with its added fifth,

and he should bring

a ram for

a guilt-offering worth

the value of

two sela,

[as is the law for all guilt-offerings, which must have this value],

and say: If I certainly misused the property

[that is, if it becomes known to me in the future that I indeed misused it], then

this is my payment for misuse,

the principal together with the added fifth,

and this is my guilt-offering.

The ram is brought now as a certain guilt-offering for misuse.

And if I misused it only doubtfully,

[that is, if I will forever remain uncertain whether I misused it], then

the money

shall be

a voluntary offering

for the purchase of offerings for the altar,

and

the

guilt-offering

that I am bringing now shall be a

provisional guilt-offering.

Therefore, he can do so,

for

indeed

the

same

type of offering that he brings for “when it becomes known,”

when he learns with certainty that he misused the property,

he brings

also

for “when it has not become known,”

when he remains uncertain, since in both cases he brings a two-year-old ram. Therefore, he can bring a single offering now and make a stipulation. This is not so in the case of other provisional guilt-offerings, where the sin-offering and the guilt-offering are not of the same type.

Rabbi Akiva said: The words of Rabbi Tarfon appear

in the case of

a minor misuse,

when he misused only a small amount, for then it is worthwhile for him to bring his payment for misuse now, thereby gaining by avoiding the need to bring two guilt-offerings.

But in the case of a substantial misuse,

suppose he were to encounter uncertain misuse involving one hundred maneh

—

would it not be better for him

would it not be preferable for him

to bring a guilt-offering

an additional one

worth two sela,

when it becomes known to him with certainty that he misused the property,

and not bring

now

a payment for uncertain misuse involving one hundred maneh?

For if he brings the guilt-offering for misuse now [with a stipulation], he must bring the money with it as well, since otherwise he does not fulfill his obligation concerning the guilt-offering, and he will consequently suffer a substantial loss now.

It follows from these words of Rabbi Akiva that

Rabbi Akiva concedes to Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor misuse

that he may bring the offering with a stipulation. He disagrees with him only in the case of a substantial misuse, since it is not worthwhile for him.