Keritot 22a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

When it was taught

that

it is forbidden—

for example

when he separated

the blood from the body of the person.

When Rav Sheshet said

that it is permitted—

when he did not separate it.

As it was taught: Blood that is on top of a loaf—

he scrapes it off and eats it.

Blood

that is between the teeth—

he sucks and swallows it, and need not be concerned.

There are those who teach this statement of Rav Sheshet concerning

a

different beraita.

As it was taught: One might have thought that the milk of two-legged walkers,

a woman’s milk,

one who eats it transgresses a prohibition? And it is a logical inference

—it can be learned by a kal va-chomer that it is forbidden:

Just as concerning an impure animal, with whose contact you were lenient

—for it never causes impurity during its lifetime, since it has neither a flux nor menstruation—nevertheless

you were stringent concerning its milk

—for it is forbidden for consumption—

concerning two-legged walkers, with whose contact you were stringent,

for a woman becomes impure as a menstruant and a woman with a flux,

is it not logical that you should be stringent concerning their milk?!

Стих говорит: «Но это не ешьте из тех, кто жует жвачку и имеет раздвоенное копыто: верблюда».

The verse says: “But this you shall not eat,

from among those that bring up the cud and those that part the hoof: the camel.” And we expound:

this—

impure

is it and its milk [from the camel we learn in Bekhorot 6b to forbid the milk of an impure animal, Rabbenu Gershom].

But the milk of two-legged walkers is not impure, but pure,

for it is permitted for consumption.

One might have thought:

I will exclude the milk

because

its

prohibition is not

the same in every case

—it is forbidden only in an impure animal, whereas the milk of a pure animal is permitted, and therefore it is also permitted in a woman.

But I will not exclude the blood

of two-legged walkers,

which

is

the same in every case

—for all blood from an animal is forbidden?

The verse therefore says

at the end of the verse:

“It is impure for you.”

And we expound:

It is impure, but the milk and blood of two-legged walkers are not impure, but pure

[the reading of Rabbenu Gershom] .

And concerning this

Rav Sheshet said: there is not even a mitzva of abstention in it

in the milk of two-legged walkers.

We learned there

in tractate Chullin:

The heart—

he splits it and removes its blood.

But if he cooked it and

did not split it, he does not transgress concerning it,

for eating its blood.

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: They taught

that he does not transgress concerning it

only with regard to the heart of a bird, since it does not contain an olive-sized portion

of blood .

But the heart of an animal, which contains an olive-sized portion

of blood,

is forbidden, and one is liable to excision for it!

He raised an objection:

it was taught:

The blood of the spleen, the blood of the heart, the blood of the kidneys, and the blood of the limbs—these are subject to a prohibition. The blood of two-legged walkers and the blood of creeping things are forbidden, but one is not liable for them.

It follows that the blood of the heart involves no excision, but only a prohibition [even when it contains an olive-sized portion, for it teaches that one transgresses a prohibition]?!

And we answer:

When it teaches

that

one is not liable for it

to excision concerning the blood of the heart, this means specifically

for its own blood

that is absorbed in the flesh of the heart, which is like the other blood of the limbs.

When Rav said

that for the blood of an animal’s heart one is liable to excision, he meant blood

that comes to it from elsewhere,

which is found within the cavity of the heart, as he explains the reason below .

And we challenge: If it is

its own blood, that is the blood of the limbs,

why does the tannaitic authority need to state the blood of the heart as well?

And we answer:

By your reasoning, does it not teach the blood of the kidneys and teach the blood of the limbs?

And would you challenge it: why does it teach the blood of the kidneys?

Rather,

you are forced to say that

it teaches

the blood of the kidneys

and then teaches

the blood of the limbs. If so,

here too: it teaches

the blood of the heart

and then teaches

the blood of the limbs!

And we explain: This blood that comes

from elsewhere—

from where does it come to it?

Rabbi Zeira said: At the time when the life-soul departs, it burns intensely.

For the animal, with its breathing, draws the blood from the place of slaughter into the cavity of the heart, and it is therefore the blood of the life-soul, and one is liable to excision for it.

We learned in the Mishna:

For blood with which the life-soul departs, one is liable.

Five types of blood leave the body at the time of bloodletting [or slaughtering the animal].

A. First, black blood comes out, flowing in a weak stream.

B. Afterward, the red blood begins to come out, while it still merely trickles.

C. Afterward, the blood pours out in a strong stream.

D. Finally, the blood again diminishes, and merely trickles.

E. After all this, the blood of the residue comes out; its emergence is after death.

It was stated: Which is the “blood of bloodletting” with which the life-soul departs?

Rabbi Yohanan said: As long as

it

pours in a stream.

That is, only the third blood. With the first two, the blood of the life-soul has not yet come out. With the fourth, the blood upon which the life-soul depends has already come out [even though the animal is still alive]!

Resh Lakish said: From the black drop onward.

That is, all three bloods, apart from the first black one, are the blood of the life-soul [and, obviously, apart from the blood of the residue, which emerges after death ].

He raised an objection:

it was taught:

Which is the “blood of bloodletting” with which the life-soul departs? As long as it pours in a stream! Once the blood of the residue emerges,

it is excluded from the category of bloodletting blood

because it trickles.

And we infer:

Is it not saying that even

the red blood

first

before the streaming,

and the

last blood after the streaming,

which trickles,

both are

like the blood of the residue?

For the entire reason that we exclude the blood of the residue is because it trickles, and these too trickle; if so, they are not included in “blood with which the life-soul departs.”

This is a refutation of Resh Lakish,

who said that both are included in the blood with which the life-soul departs!? And we answer:

No!

Rather, the tannaitic authority intends

to exclude only the blackening blood,

to say that it is not the blood of the life-soul, but has the status of the blood of the residue.

But the first and last blood, although it trickles, is indeed the blood of the life-soul!

И отвечаем: Реш Лакиш мог бы сказать тебе: это спор таннаев. Как сказано в барайте: какая кровь является кровью жизни? — всё время, пока она льётся струёй, — таково мнение рабби. Рабби Элазар, сын рабби Шимона, говорит: начиная с первой почерневшей капли и далее. Я придерживаюсь мнения рабби Элазара, сына рабби Шимона, а приведённая выше барайта выражает мнение рабби. Ученики школы рабби Ишмаэля учили: написано:

He raised an objection:

it was taught:

Which is the blood of the life-soul? As long as it pours in a stream! Once

blood

first and last emerges, because it trickles.

Is this a refutation of Resh Lakish!?

And we answer:

Resh Lakish can say to you:

Resh Lakish says:

It is a dispute between tannaitic authorities.

As it was taught: Which is the blood of the life-soul—

as long as it pours in a stream, the words of Rabbi. Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: From the black drop onward.

And I hold like Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, whereas the earlier beraita follows Rabbi.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught:

It is written:

“And he shall drink the blood of the slain,”

which implies that the blood is called a drink that one drinks only when it emerges after he has become slain, that is, after death.

To exclude streaming blood,

which emerges at the time the life-soul departs and is not called a drink,

for it does not render seeds susceptible

to receive impurity [“seeds” is the language of the verse, as it is written, “and when water is placed upon seed,” referring to every food] .

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If one let blood from an animal, and received its blood in two cups—

what is [the law]?

Regarding

the eating of the blood in the cup

first,

everyone agrees that he is

liable

for karet, for streaming blood, which according to everyone is the blood of the soul, is mixed into it.

But my question is

regarding

the

last cup,

which contains only blood after the streaming:

is he liable

for it

or not?

Rabbi Zeira said to him:

Rabbi Zeira said:

This is the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish!

For it was stated: If one let blood from an animal, and received its blood in two cups.

Resh Lakish said: He is liable for two sin-offerings,

for he is liable even for the second cup, although it contains only the oozing blood that comes after the streaming.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable for only

one sin-offering,

one,

for the first cup alone, which contains streaming blood.

And they followed their respective methods, for above they disputed whether one is liable for oozing blood that comes after streaming blood.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda declares one liable for residual blood.

Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Yehuda agrees with regard to atonement,

that the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar effects atonement: if one sprinkled residual blood from the offering upon it, the sprinkling is invalid and does not effect atonement.

As it is stated, “For the blood—

it is the one that effects atonement by means of the soul.”

And we derive:

Blood through which the soul departs

alone

effects atonement, while that through which the soul does not depart does not effect atonement.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We too have learned

that Rabbi Yehuda agrees with regard to atonement:

For it was taught:

It is stated: “Any man of the House of Israel ... who eats any blood ... and I shall cut him off from among his people.” It should have said

“blood.”

And

what does the verse come to teach by saying “any blood”?

Rather,

since it is stated

later in the verse:

“For the blood is the one that effects atonement by means of the soul,” I know only

that one is liable for karet

for

for

sacred blood,

which is specifically that blood

through which the soul departs,

for it alone is fit to effect atonement. But

non-sacred blood and residual blood,

even if it is sacred blood, which does not effect atonement [as it is written, “by means of the soul he shall effect atonement,” implying that only the blood of the soul effects atonement]—

from where

do we know that one is liable for karet for them?

The verse therefore says, “any blood,”

to include these also as subject to karet.

And

the anonymous Sifra, whose view is it—

it is Rabbi Yehuda’s!

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that residual blood does not effect atonement.

Mishna:

Rabbi Akiva declares one liable for uncertain sacrilege

in consecrated property

to bring a provisional guilt-offering.

For although ordinarily one brings a provisional guilt-offering for an uncertainty only concerning a matter whose intentional violation is punishable by karet—so that if he knows with certainty that he sinned, he brings a sin-offering—whereas sacrilege involves neither karet when intentional nor a sin-offering when one certainly sinned unintentionally, but rather a guilt-offering, nevertheless one is liable for an uncertain case of it to bring a provisional guilt-offering, as we will derive in the beraita in the Gemara.

And the Sages exempt

him from a provisional guilt-offering, because certain sacrilege does not involve a sin-offering.

And Rabbi Akiva agrees

with regard to payment to the consecrated property

that he does not bring his sacrilege-payment,

for he need not pay the consecrated property the money in which he committed sacrilege—the principal together with an added fifth—

until it becomes known to him

that he certainly committed sacrilege,

and he shall bring

then

with it a guilt-offering

for sacrilege,

certain 29 .

Rabbi Tarfon said:

According to the words of Rabbi Akiva,

what need does this man have to bring [

that is, why should he bring]

two guilt-offerings,

a provisional guilt-offering at first and, when it becomes known to him, a certain guilt-offering? For granted, in every provisional guilt-offering, the provisional guilt-offering and the sin-offering that he brings at the end, when it becomes known to him, are not one offering, since the sin-offering is female and the guilt-offering is male. But here, where they are one offering, why should he bring it twice?

Rather, he should bring the sacrilege-payment and its fifth,

the principal of the money concerning which it is uncertain to him whether he committed sacrilege, together with its fifth,

and he should bring

a ram for

a guilt-offering worth

the value of

two sela [

as is the law for all guilt-offerings, which must have this value]

and say: If I certainly committed sacrilege,

that is, if it becomes known to me in the future that I indeed committed sacrilege, then

this is my sacrilege-payment,

the principal together with the fifth,

and this is my guilt-offering.

The ram is offered already now as a certain guilt-offering for sacrilege .

And if I committed sacrilege only uncertainly,

that is, if I shall always remain uncertain whether I committed sacrilege or not, then

the money

shall be

a voluntary donation

for the maintenance of the altar,

and

the

guilt-offering

that I bring now shall be a guilt-offering

provisional.

And therefore he can do so,

for

behold,

from

the same

type of offering that he brings for “when it becomes known,”

when it becomes certainly known to him that he committed sacrilege, he

brings

also

for “when it has not become known,”

when he is uncertain; in both cases he brings a two-year-old ram. Therefore, he can bring one offering now and make a condition. This is not so with other provisional guilt-offerings, for the sin-offering and the guilt-offering are not of the same type .

Rabbi Akiva said: The words of Rabbi Tarfon appear correct

in the case of

a minor act of sacrilege,

when he committed sacrilege only with a small sum, in which case it is worthwhile for him to bring his sacrilege-payment now, thereby gaining by avoiding the bringing of two guilt-offerings.

But in the case of a major act of sacrilege,

if an uncertain act of sacrilege involving one hundred maneh should come into his hands,

and

would it not be better for him

would it not be preferable for him

to bring a guilt-offering

additional

worth two sela,

when it becomes known to him with certainty that he committed sacrilege,

and not bring

now

the uncertain sacrilege-payment of one hundred maneh?

For if he brings now the guilt-offering for sacrilege [with a condition], he must bring the money along with it, since otherwise he does not fulfill the obligation of the guilt-offering, and he is found to lose a great deal now.

And from these words of Rabbi Akiva it is implied that

Rabbi Akiva agrees with Rabbi Tarfon in the case of a minor act of sacrilege,

that he can bring [the offering] with a condition. He disputes with him only in the case of a major act of sacrilege, because it is not worthwhile for him .