Gittin 81a (פא.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

a right that is fit for the second husband.

Once they had moved on from that matter, and she had left the presence of the witnesses with the status of a divorced woman, she acquired the right to marry a second husband, and the husband is not believed when he seeks to deprive her of that right.

Mishna:

If

the husband wrote a bill of divorce

in order to divorce his wife, but then changed his mind

and decided not to divorce her—

Beit Shammai say: He renders her unfit for the priesthood!

Since the bill of divorce has already been written, there is here “a scent of divorce,” and her status is that of a divorced woman who is forbidden to a koen [if her husband dies, or if he himself is a koen].

And Beit Hillel say:

If he changed his mind about divorcing her, she is certainly not rendered unfit for the priesthood.

Rather, even more than this:

Even if he gave her

the bill of divorce, but gave it to her

on condition, and the

condition was not

fulfilled,

and the bill of divorce was nullified—

he does not render her unfit for the priesthood,

and she has no status whatsoever as a divorced woman.

Gemara:

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashe of Dovil, sent

[the name of a place]

to Shmuel:

Our Master, teach us:

A case came before us involving a koen who wrote a bill of divorce for his wife, but changed his mind and ultimately did not give her the bill of divorce.

And a rumor spread about him

throughout the city:

“So-and-so, the koen, wrote a bill of divorce for his wife,”

and behold,

she remains married to him and serves him!

What is

the ruling? Must we remove her from him because of the rumor, so that people will not say, on the basis of this rumor, that the koen indeed divorced her but subsequently remarried her, thereby making him a koen who remarries his divorced wife?

Shmuel sent back to him: “Let her leave,”

because of the rumor! But

the matter requires investigation,

before we remove her from him.

And we inquire about this:

What is

the investigation?

If you say

that one must investigate

whether we suppress the rumor—

whether it is possible to silence the townspeople and nullify the rumor, in which case she may remain with her husband—

or whether we do not suppress it,

so that if it is impossible to nullify the rumor, she must leave her husband—

That cannot be what was meant!

For Nehardea is Shmuel’s place,

his place of residence,

and in Nehardea they do not suppress rumors!

The judges of Nehardea did not customarily silence a rumor, so that people would not suspect them of supporting transgressors.

If so, it is impossible that Shmuel said that one must investigate whether it is possible to nullify the rumor!

Rather,

it is necessarily necessary to investigate

whether in that place they use “writing” to refer to giving,

meaning: If in the city it is customary to call giving a bill of divorce “writing,” then the rumor must be taken seriously and she must be removed from him, since the rumor is that the koen wrote a bill of divorce, implying that he also gave it to her, because in this city giving is called “writing.”

If it is not customary to call giving “writing,” then the rumor is not to be taken seriously, since the rumor is only that he wrote a bill of divorce for her, and writing the bill of divorce alone does not prohibit the woman to the koen.

And we raise an objection:

But if they call

even if it is customary to call

giving

“writing,”

so what? But

for the writing itself, do they not call it

“writing”?

After all, actual writing is also called “writing”; if so, how do we know that the rumor refers to giving rather than to writing alone? And why must we remove her from him because of this rumor?

And we answer:

Yes, if the matter becomes clear,

if it is indeed established

that they call giving

“writing,”

then, although actual writing is also called writing, nevertheless one must be stringent and remain concerned, because

perhaps

the townspeople who spread the rumor that he wrote a bill of divorce for his wife—

“He gave it,” they meant!

They intend to spread a rumor that he both wrote and gave her a bill of divorce, and therefore we must remove her from him.

We nevertheless continue to challenge Shmuel, who said that because of the rumor

“Let her leave.”

But did Rav Ashi not say,

that even in a case where we are concerned about a rumor—for example, if a rumor spreads in the city that a woman is betrothed to a certain man, and we learned [below, 88b] that she is forbidden to marry anyone until she receives a bill of divorce from that man—nevertheless, if the rumor spread after she had already married another man, we are not concerned about it, because

we do not heed any rumor that arises after marriage!

Here, too, the woman has been married to this koen for many years. Why, then, should we remove her from her husband on the basis of the rumor?

And we answer:

What, then, does “let her leave” also mean,

as Shmuel said?

Let her leave the second husband!

If this koen dies and she marries another koen, she must leave him because of the rumor concerning her that she is divorced and therefore forbidden to a koen. This rumor had already spread before that marriage, and therefore one must be concerned about it. But she need not leave the first husband because of the rumor.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if you remove her from the second husband but not from the first,

you cast aspersions upon the sons

of the

first koen!

For people will say that they are ḥalalim, born of the marriage of a koen and a divorced woman. After all, they see that we removed the woman from the second husband, which proves to them that the matter was investigated and found to be true: She was indeed divorced from the first husband.

And we answer:

Since

only

from the second husband do we remove her,

as they see that we remove her only from the second husband,

and

if

from the first husband we do not remove her, it will occur to them to say:

“The first husband divorced her shortly before his death,”

and it is because of that divorce that we remove her from the second husband, and not because of the divorce about which the rumor spread, for if that were the reason, we would also remove her from the first husband. Therefore, no aspersion will be cast upon the sons of the first husband.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai: Come and see that the earlier generations were unlike—

the later generations.

The Gemara explains which generations are meant:

The earlier generations—

Beit Shammai,

who were stringent in the Mishna and rendered her unfit for the priesthood.

The later generations—

Rabbi Dosa.

And

as it was taught:

A koen’s daughter

who was taken captive,

having been captured by gentiles,

may eat teruma,

and we do not fear that a gentile had intercourse with her while she was in captivity and thereby rendered her unfit to eat teruma,

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

Rabbi Dosa said: What did this Arab do to her

who captured her? Did he

render her unfit for the priesthood merely because he squeezed her between her breasts?

That is, captors do not treat female captives with such complete abandon as to rape them; rather, they merely play with them.

By contrast, Beit Shammai were stringent regarding the sanctity of priestly lineage, to the extent that they rendered a woman unfit for the priesthood merely because a bill of divorce had been written, whereas Rabbi Dosa was lenient with regard to the priesthood.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai: Come and see that the earlier generations were unlike—

the later generations.

The earlier generations

used to

bring their produce

into the house

through the teraksmon,

the main entrance of the house’s courtyard,

in order to make it liable for the tithe

by “seeing the face of the house.”

But

the later generations brought their produce through roofs and through courtyards,

and not through the entrance of the house, so that it would not see “the face of the house”—

in order to exempt it from the tithe.

For Rabbi Yannai said: Untithed produce does not become liable for tithing

by Torah law,

until it sees the face of the house,

meaning that it enters through the entrance of the house.

As it is stated [Deuteronomy 26:13],

“I have removed the sacred matter from the house,”

which indicates that entry into the house is a condition for establishing the untithed produce as liable for tithing, together with the completion of the work on it.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

Even

entry into the

courtyard

of the house

establishes

the produce as liable for tithing, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 26:12] in the passage concerning the removal of tithes:

“And they shall eat within your gates—

and be satisfied,”

indicating that from the moment the untithed produce enters the gate of the courtyard, it becomes liable for tithing.

Mishna:

If one divorces his wife and she spends the night with him

afterward

at an inn,

in a lodging place—

Beit Shammai say: She does not require a second bill of divorce from him.

And Beit Hillel say: She requires a second bill of divorce from him,

for he certainly had intercourse with her at the inn for the purpose of betrothal, and therefore she requires a second bill of divorce from him.

When

do Beit Hillel maintain that she requires a second bill of divorce from him?

When she was divorced after marriage,

because, since they are accustomed to one another, presumably he had intercourse with her at the inn.

And

Beit Hillel

concede with regard to one divorced after betrothal,

who spent the night with him at an inn,

that she does not require a second bill of divorce from him, because he is not familiar with her.

He is not accustomed to her, and we do not fear that he had intercourse with her.

Gemara:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies specifically

when witnesses saw

that he

had intercourse with her

at the inn.