Gittin 81a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

a right appropriate to the second.

Since they withdrew from that matter, and she left the presence of the witnesses with the status of a divorced woman, she acquired the right to marry the second, and the husband is not trusted to deprive her of her right.

Mishna:

He wrote

the husband a get

to divorce his wife, but reconsidered

and decided not to divorce her—

Beit Shammai say: He disqualifies her from the priesthood!

since, as the get has already been written, there is here “the scent of a get,” and her status is that of a divorced woman who is forbidden to a kohen [if her husband dies, or if he himself is a kohen].

And Beit Hillel say:

if he reconsidered divorcing her, she certainly was not disqualified from the priesthood.

But more than this,

even though they gave her

the get, but they gave it to her

on a condition, and

it was not fulfilled

the condition,

and the get was annulled—

he did not disqualify her from the priesthood,

and she has no status whatsoever of a divorced woman.

Gemara:

Rav Yosef, son of Rav Menashya of Divil, sent to

a place-name]

Shmuel:

Let our teacher instruct us:

An incident came before us involving a kohen who wrote a get for his wife, but reconsidered and ultimately did not give her the get.

And a rumor went out about him

in the city:

So-and-so, the kohen, wrote a get for his wife,

and behold,

she sits under him and serves him!

What is the ruling?

Must we remove her from him because of the rumor, so that people will not say, on the basis of this rumor, that the kohen indeed divorced her but afterward took her back, and it emerges that a kohen took back his divorced wife?

Shmuel sent back to him: She must leave

because of the rumor! But,

the matter requires investigation,

before we remove her from him.

And we inquire concerning it:

What is

the investigation?

If you say

that one must investigate

whether we annul the rumor,

whether it is possible to silence the residents of the city and annul the rumor, in which case she may remain with her husband,

or whether we do not annul it,

for if it is not possible to annul the rumor, she must leave her husband.

It is impossible to say this!

But Nehardea is Shmuel’s place,

the place where Shmuel lived,

and in Nehardea, they do not annul rumors!

The judges of Nehardea did not practice silencing rumors, so that they would not suspect them of supporting the hands of transgressors.

And if so, it is impossible that Shmuel said that one must investigate whether it is possible to annul the rumor!

Rather,

necessarily, one must investigate

whether in that place they call giving “writing”,

if in the city they are accustomed to calling giving “writing,” then one must take the rumor into consideration and remove her from him, since the rumor is that the kohen wrote a get, and it follows from this that he also gave her the get, since in this city they call giving “writing.”

And if they are not accustomed to calling giving “writing,” then one does not take the rumor into consideration, since the rumor is only that he wrote her a get, and by the writing of the get alone the woman does not become forbidden to the kohen.

And we object:

But if they call

even if they are accustomed to calling

giving “

writing,”

what of it? But

do they not call the writing itself “

writing”?

After all, they also call actual writing “writing”; and if so, from where do we know that the rumor refers to giving and not only to writing? And why must we remove her from him because of this rumor?

And we answer:

Yes! For if it becomes clear

if the matter is indeed clarified

that they call giving “

writing,”

then although they also call actual writing “writing,” nevertheless one must be stringent and be concerned, because

perhaps

the residents of the city who spread the rumor that he wrote his wife a get—“

‘He gave,’ they are saying!”

They intend to spread a rumor that he both wrote and gave a get, and therefore we must remove her from him.

And we still object to Shmuel, who said, because of the rumor,

she must leave.

But did Rav Ashi not say,

even in a case in which we are concerned about a rumor, such as when a rumor emerges in the city about a woman that she is betrothed to so-and-so, concerning whom we learned [below, 88b] that she is forbidden to marry anyone until she receives a get from that so-and-so, nevertheless, if the rumor emerged after she was already married to another man, we are not concerned about it, because

any rumor that comes after marriage, we are not concerned about it!

But here, the woman has been married to this kohen for many years; why should we remove her from her husband on the basis of the rumor?

And we answer:

What does “she must leave,” also

which Shmuel said, mean?

She must leave the second!

For if this kohen dies and another kohen marries her, she must leave him because of the rumor concerning her that she is divorced and forbidden to a kohen. And this rumor emerged before this marriage, and therefore one must be concerned about it. But she need not leave the first because of the rumor.

And we object:

If so,

that you remove her from the second but not from the first,

you cast aspersions upon the sons

of the

first kohen!

For people will say that they are ḥalalim, born from the marriage of a kohen and a divorced woman, since they see that we removed the woman from the second, and it is proven to them that the matter was investigated and found to be true: that she was indeed divorced from the first.

And we answer:

Since

only

from the second do we remove her,

from the fact that they see that we remove her only from the second,

and

if

we do not remove her from the first, it will come

to say: “The first divorced her shortly before his death,”

the first one, and because of this divorce we remove her from the second, and not because of the divorce about which the rumor emerged; for then we would also remove her from the first. Therefore there will be no aspersion upon the sons of the first.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai: Come and see, unlike the earlier generations

the later generations.

And the Gemara explains who the generations are:

The earlier generations—

Beit Shammai,

who were stringent in the Mishna, disqualifying her from the priesthood.

The later generations—

Rabbi Dosa.

And as

it was taught in a beraita:

the daughter of a kohen,

a captive,

who was captured by gentiles,

eats teruma,

and we are not concerned lest a gentile had intercourse with her while she was in captivity and disqualified her from eating teruma,

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

Rabbi Dosa said: What did this Arab do to her

who captured her? But did he

disqualify her from the priesthood merely because he pressed her between her breasts?

That is, the captors do not treat female captives with such abandon as to rape them; rather, they merely play with them.

Whereas Beit Shammai were stringent concerning the sanctity of priestly lineage, to the extent that they disqualified a woman from the priesthood merely because of the writing of the get, in contrast to Rabbi Dosa, who was lenient concerning the priesthood.

And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ilai: Come and see, unlike the earlier generations

the later generations.

The earlier generations,

were

bringing their produce

into the house

through the tarkasmon,

the main entrance of the house’s courtyard,

in order to obligate them in the tithe

by “seeing the face of the house.”

Whereas

the later generations bring their produce through roofs and through enclosures,

and not through the gate of the house, so that they will not see “the face of the house”—

in order to exempt them from the tithe.

For Rabbi Yannai said: Untithed produce does not become obligated in the tithe

by Torah law,

until it sees the face of the house,

that it enters through the entrance of the house.

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 26:13],

“I have removed the sacred matter from the house,”

which implies that bringing it into the house is a condition for establishing the untithed produce’s obligation in the tithe, together with the completion of the work.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

even

bringing it into

the courtyard

of the house

establishes

the grain as obligated in the tithe, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 26:12] in the section of the removal of tithes, “

And they shall eat within your gates—

and be satisfied,”

and it implies that from the moment the untithed produce enters the gate of the courtyard, it becomes obligated in the tithe.

Mishna:

One who divorces his wife, and she spent the night with him

afterward

at an inn,

at a lodging-place—

Beit Shammai say: She does not require a second get from him.

And Beit Hillel say: She requires a second get from him,

for certainly he had intercourse with her at the inn for the sake of betrothal, and therefore she requires a second get from him.

When

do Beit Hillel hold that she requires a second get from him?

When she was divorced from the marriage,

for since they are accustomed to one another, presumably he had intercourse with her at the inn.

And they agree,

Beit Hillel,

with regard to one divorced from betrothal,

and she spent the night with him at the inn,

that she does not require a second get from him, because he is not familiar with her.

For he is not accustomed to her, and we are not concerned lest he had intercourse with her.

Gemara:

Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The dispute

between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies specifically

when they saw

witnesses

that she had intercourse

at the inn.