Gittin 80b (פ:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

Our Mishna, which disqualifies a get that was not written in the name of the kingdom,

is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

But the Sages say: Even if he did not write

the date in the get

in the name of the santar of the city,

the elder appointed to determine the boundaries of the fields belonging to the people of the city, if he wrote the date in the get according to the count of the years of his tenure,

she is divorced,

since it is not necessary to write it in the name of the kingdom.

There was a certain get in which it was written

the date

in the name of Istandera

the ruler

of “

Bishkhar” [

a place-name], who was the king’s servant in that country.

Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda sent it before Rabba: What is the halakha in a case like this?

Is the get valid?

He sent back to him: In this case, even Rabbi Meir concedes

that it is valid.

What is the reason? —

Because

he is of that kingdom,

as this ruler is subordinate to the kingdom of the country, and therefore this is considered as though he had written the name of the kingdom.

The Gemara raised an objection:

And in what way is this different from the santar of the city,

for we have received a tradition that Rabbi Meir disqualifies a get written in his name, although he too is subordinate to the kingdom of the country?

And we answer:

There,

in the case of the santar of the city,

the matter is degrading to them,

as his authority is the least important of all, and it is a disgrace to the king that, of all his other servants, specifically this one should be mentioned.

But

here,

in the case of the ruler of Bishkhar,

the matter is honorable to them,

as it is an honor to the kingdom that he is mentioned, since his authority is important.

Rabbi Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav:

Our Mishna, which completely disqualifies a get that was not written in the name of the kingdom, to the extent that the child born from the second husband whom she married with such a get is a mamzer,

is

the statement of Rabbi Meir.

But the Sages say:

Although the get is invalid ab initio,

the child

of the second husband

is valid.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir that if he altered

in the get

his name,

the husband’s, or

her name,

the wife’s, or

the name of his city,

or

the name of her city, the child is a mamzer.

Rav Ashi said: We too have learned this

in our Mishna, that the Sages concede in the case where he “altered his name” that the child is a mamzer.

As we learned:

If he altered his name and her name, the name of his city and the name of her city —

she must leave both this man and that man, and all these ways apply to her.

Who teaches this?

Who is the tanna who taught this statement in the Mishna?

If you say Rabbi Meir,

if so,

let us combine them and teach them together

with the ruling at the beginning of the Mishna, concerning one who altered the name of the kingdom, since they are of the same category: the get is invalid because it was not written properly. Why did the Mishna divide them into two distinct matters?

Rather, conclude from it

that the latter clause, “he altered his name,” is according to

the Sages,

and therefore the Mishna wrote it separately, because it is only there that the Sages concede that the child is a mamzer.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from it!

We learned in the Mishna:

All those forbidden relations concerning whom they said

that their rival wives are permitted, if those rival wives went and married, and these women were found to be aylonit, she must leave both this man and that man.

And we infer:

“Married”—yes!

Only when the rival wives married another man are they prohibited to the yavam.

But if they merely

had illicit relations

with another man, without marriage,

“no!”

They are not thereby prohibited from undergoing yibbum with the yavam after their illicit relations.

The reason is that a yevama’s marriage to a stranger is more severe than her having an illicit relationship with him. For if she married another man and then returned to the yavam, people might say that the yavam had performed ḥalitza with her first, after which she married that man. When the latter divorced her, the yavam returned and married her. But this is prohibited by the lav of “who shall not build”: since the yavam did not build his brother’s house, because he performed ḥalitza with her rather than yibbum, he may not build it again; it is prohibited for the yavam to marry his ḥalutza.

But if she merely had an illicit relationship, there is no such concern, because illicit relations are not so publicized, and even those who know of it will not assume that she had undergone ḥalitza first; rather, they will assume that it was merely an act of promiscuity, that she had an illicit relationship without ḥalitza. Therefore she is permitted to the yavam.

If so, this is difficult:

Shall we say, let it be

from here

a refutation of Rav Hamnuna?

For Rav Hamnuna said: A shomeret yavam

who is awaiting yibbum

who had an illicit relationship is prohibited to her yavam, whereas our Mishna implies that if she merely had an illicit relationship, she is permitted to the yavam. And we answer:

No,

do not infer this from the Mishna, and therefore there is no refutation here of Rav Hamnuna!

Rather,

“married,” and the same applies to “had illicit relations.”

In the case of illicit relations as well, they are prohibited to the yavam, in accordance with Rav Hamnuna.

And the fact that it teaches

in our Mishna “

married”—it used an elevated expression.

“Married” is a euphemism for illicit relations.

There are those who say

that this discussion proceeds in the opposite manner:

We should explain the Mishna as follows:

“Married,” and the same applies to “had illicit relations.”

Shall we say that it supports

our Mishna

Rav Hamnuna, for Rav Hamnuna said: A shomeret yavam who had an illicit relationship is prohibited to her yavam?

And we reject this:

No!

Rather,

it teaches specifically “married,”

and not illicit relations,

because it is confused with

something similar and liable to be confused

with a woman whose husband went overseas,

when witnesses came and testified that her husband had died, and she went and married another man; if her first husband arrives, we prohibit her from returning to him, although this marriage was under duress, and one who acted under duress is permitted to her husband, because people might say that her first husband divorced her before she married the second, and the second divorced her, with the result that her first husband would violate the prohibition against remarrying his divorced wife after she had married. Here too, we prohibit the rival wife from undergoing yibbum only when she married another man, for this reason: people might say that the yavam performed ḥalitza with her before she married the second man, with the result that the yavam would violate the prohibition of “he shall not build.”

But in the case where she had an illicit relationship, since, as stated, there is no such concern, she is indeed permitted to undergo yibbum, contrary to the opinion of Rav Hamnuna.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who marries his yevama,

and

her rival wife went and married another man, and this woman, who had been an aylonit, was found to be so—she must leave

both this man and that man.

And it is necessary.

The Mishna needed to teach us both cases in which rival wives who were subject to yibbum mistakenly married without yibbum, that all the stringencies of the Mishna apply to them, despite the similarity between the cases.

For had it taught us

only

the first case,

in which it became clear that the forbidden relation, on account of whom the rival wives had been exempted, was an aylonit, I might have said that it is specifically there that the rival wife is penalized and all the stringencies are imposed upon her, because

the mitzva of yibbum was not fulfilled,

as she hastened to marry on the basis of the forbidden relation who exempted her, and not because she thought that the mitzva of yibbum had already been fulfilled.

But here,

in the latter clause,

where the mitzva of yibbum was fulfilled,

as the rival wife married because she thought that the mitzva of yibbum had already been fulfilled by the yevama, but it ultimately became clear that she was an aylonit,

I might say, no

we should not penalize her, since she was not required to wait any longer.

Therefore, the Mishna must teach us that even in such a case she is penalized.

And had it taught us here,

in the latter clause, I might have said that she is penalized specifically here

because the two women were placed before him,

as both yevamot fell before the yavam for yibbum simultaneously, and the one who married knew that she too was subject to the bond of yibbum. She should have waited until she knew with certainty that the yibbum of her rival wife had taken effect, meaning that the rival wife had emerged from the uncertainty of being an aylonit, at which point she herself would be released from the bond of yibbum. Since she did not wait, she should be penalized.

But there,

in the first clause, in the case of the rival wife of a forbidden relation,

she was not placed before him,

as from the very beginning, when the women fell before the yavam, the rival wife thought that she was not subject to yibbum, because of the forbidden relation who removed her from the bond of yibbum. Since in her view she had the presumptive status of being exempt from yibbum, she had no reason to consider that she needed to wait until it became clear that the forbidden relation was not an aylonit. Therefore,

I might say, no,

we should not penalize her.

It is necessary.

Therefore, the Mishna needed to teach us this case as well, that she is penalized here too.

We learned in the Mishna:

The scribe wrote, and made a mistake, and gave a get to the woman and a release

to the man, and so on.

Rabbi Elazar says: If it emerged immediately,

it is not a get. If it emerged after some time, it is a get.

The Gemara raised a question:

What are the circumstances of “immediately,” and what are the circumstances of “after some time”?

What period of time is still called “immediately”?

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: As long as they are sitting and occupied with that same matter

concerning her divorce,

that is “immediately,”

and then the husband is believed to say that the get and the release were switched between them.

If they stood up

from that matter,

that is “

after some time,”

at which point the husband is no longer believed to say that they switched their documents.

And Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

As long as the woman

has not married

another man,

that is “immediately.”

If she married

another man,

that is “after some time.”

And we raise an objection: We learned in our Mishna: If it emerged after some time, it is a get.

The first man does not have the power to forfeit the second man’s right.

Granted, according to Rav Adda bar Ahava,

who says that it is called “after some time” only after the woman has married a second husband,

this is why it teaches

that he is not believed to forfeit the right of the

second man.

But according to Shmuel,

who says that immediately upon their ceasing to discuss that matter the husband is no longer believed,

what is the meaning of “second”?

She has not yet married a second man at all!