Gittin 80b — the Talmud in English

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

our Mishna, which invalidates a bill of divorce that was not written for the name of the kingdom,

these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

But the Sages say: even if he did not write

the date in the bill of divorce

for the name of the santer of the city,

an elder appointed over determining the boundaries of the fields of the city’s inhabitants, if he wrote the date in the bill of divorce according to the count of the years of his tenure,

she is divorced,

since it is not necessary to write it for the name of the kingdom.

There was a certain bill of divorce in which it was written

the date

for the name of Istandara

the ruler

of “

Bashkhar” [the name of a place],

which was the slave of the king of the country.

Rav Naḥman bar Rav Ḥisda sent it before Rabba: In a case like this, what is the ruling?

Is the bill of divorce fit?

He sent to him: In this matter, even Rabbi Meir concedes

that it is fit.

What is the reason? —

Because

it is of that kingdom,

this ruler is subordinate to the kingdom of the country, and therefore the matter is considered as though he wrote the name of the kingdom.

And we raised it:

And in what way is this different from the santer of the city,

concerning whom we have received that Rabbi Meir invalidates it, although he too is subordinate to the kingdom of the country?

And we answered:

There,

in the case of the santer of the city,

the matter is disgraceful for them,

his authority is the least important of all, and it is a disgrace for the king that of all the other servants they mention specifically him.

But

here,

in the case of the ruler of Bashkhar,

the matter is praiseworthy for them,

it is an honor for the kingdom that he is mentioned, since his authority is important.

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Huna, who said in the name of Rav:

Our Mishna, which entirely invalidates a bill of divorce that was not written for the name of the kingdom, to such an extent that the child from the second husband whom she married with such a bill of divorce is a mamzer,

these are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

But the Sages say:

although the bill of divorce is invalid initially,

the child

from the second husband

is fit.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir that if he changed

in the bill of divorce

his name

of the husband or

her name

of the woman or

the name of his city

or

the name of her city, the child is a mamzer.

Rav Ashi said: We too have learned this

in our Mishna, that the Sages concede concerning “he changed his name” that the child is a mamzer.

For so we learned:

“He changed his name and her name, the name of his city and the name of her city” —

“She must leave this one and that one, and all these ways apply to her.”

Who taught this?

Who is the tanna who taught this matter in the Mishna?

If you say Rabbi Meir,

if so,

let him combine them and teach them together

with the law at the beginning of the Mishna, that he changed the name of the kingdom, since they are of the same matter—the bill of divorce is invalid because it was not written properly—and why did the Mishna divide them into two different matters?

Rather, conclude from it

that the latter clause of “he changed his name,” according to

the Rabbis,

is theirs, and therefore the Mishna wrote it separately, because only there do the Sages concede that the child is a mamzer.

And we conclude: Indeed,

conclude from it!

We learned in the Mishna:

“All the forbidden relations concerning whom they said

that their rival wives are permitted, these rival wives went and married, and these [forbidden relations] were found to be aylonit, she must leave this one and that one.”

And we infer:

“They married”—yes!

Only when the rival wives married another man are they forbidden to the yavam.

But if they merely

committed adultery

with another man, without marriage,

no!

They are not then forbidden to undergo yibbum with the yavam after their adultery.

And the reason for the matter is that the marriage of a yevama to a stranger is more severe than adultery with him. For when she married another, if she returns to the yavam, there is concern that people will say that the yavam performed ḥalitza for her first, and afterward she married that man. And when the latter divorced her, the yavam returned and married her. But this matter is forbidden by the negative commandment of “who shall not build”: since the yavam did not build his brother’s house [because he did not perform yibbum with her, but performed ḥalitza for her], he shall not build it again, for it is forbidden for a yavam to marry his ḥalutza.

But if she merely committed adultery, there is no such concern, because adultery does not have so much publicity, and even those who know of it do not think that she performed ḥalitza previously; rather, they assume that this was mere promiscuity, that she committed adultery without ḥalitza. And therefore she is permitted to the yavam.

And if so, one can raise an objection:

Let us say, let it be

from here

a refutation of Rav Hamnuna.

For Rav Hamnuna said: A shomeret yavam

who is waiting for yibbum

who committed adultery is forbidden to her yavam

whereas it follows from our Mishna that if she merely committed adultery she is permitted to her yavam? And we answer:

No,

do not infer this from the Mishna, and therefore there will not be from here a refutation of Rav Hamnuna!

Rather,

“They married,” and the same law applies to “they committed adultery.”

For even when they committed adultery they are forbidden to the yavam, in accordance with Rav Hamnuna.

And this that it teaches

in our Mishna

“they married”—it used an improved expression.

For “they married” is a euphemism for adultery.

And there are those who say

this discussion in the opposite manner:

We must explain the Mishna:

“They married, and the same law applies to ‘they committed adultery.’”

Let it be said that our Mishna supports him

our Mishna

in favor of Rav Hamnuna, for Rav Hamnuna said: A shomeret yavam who committed adultery is forbidden to her yavam.

And we reject this:

No!

Rather,

it teaches specifically “they married”,

,

because it is confused with—

for this resembles and is confused with

a woman whose husband went overseas,

and witnesses came and testified that her husband had died, and she went and married another man, and if her husband arrived, we forbid her to return to him, although this marriage of hers is in the category of compulsion, and a woman compelled in this manner is permitted to her husband, because perhaps people will say that her first husband divorced her before her marriage to the second, and the second divorced her, and it follows that her first husband transgresses the prohibition of remarrying his divorced wife after marriage. And here too, we forbid the rival wife to undergo yibbum only when she married another man, for this reason: people will say that the yavam performed ḥalitza for her before her marriage to the second, and it follows that the yavam transgresses the prohibition of “he shall not build.”

But when she committed adultery, as stated, this concern does not exist, and she is indeed permitted to undergo yibbum, and not in accordance with Rav Hamnuna.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who marries his yevama,

and her rival wife went

“and married another, and this one was found to have been an aylonit, she must leave”

this one and that one.

And it is necessary.

The Mishna needed to teach us the two cases in which rival wives who were obligated in yibbum married mistakenly without yibbum, and all the stringencies of the Mishna apply to them, despite the similarity of the cases.

For if it had taught us

only

in this first one,

where it became clear that the forbidden relation, on account of whom the rival wives were exempted, was an aylonit, I would say that specifically there we penalize the rival wife and impose upon her all the stringencies, because

the mitzva of yibbum was not fulfilled,

for she hurried to marry on the basis of the forbidden relation who exempts her, and not because she thought that the mitzva of yibbum had already been fulfilled.

But here,

in the latter clause,

where the mitzva of yibbum was fulfilled,

for the rival wife married because she thought that the mitzva of yibbum had already been fulfilled by the yevama, except that in the end it became clear that she was an aylonit,

I would say, no,

we should not penalize her, since she did not need to wait any longer.

Therefore the Mishna needs to teach us that even in such a case we penalize her.

And if it had taught us here,

in the latter clause, I would say that specifically here we penalize her,

because the matter was placed before him,

for the two yevamot initially fell to yibbum simultaneously, and this one who married knew that she too had a bond of yibbum, and she should have waited until she knew with certainty that the yibbum of her rival wife had taken effect—that is, that her rival wife had left the uncertainty of being an aylonit—and then she would be exempt from the bond of yibbum. And since she did not wait, she should be penalized.

But there,

in the first clause, in the case of the rival wife of a forbidden relation,

where the matter was not placed before him,

for already at the beginning of the falling before the yavam, the rival wife thought that she did not require yibbum, because of the forbidden relation who removes her from the bond of yibbum, and since in her view she had the presumption of being removed from yibbum, she should not have imagined that she needed to wait until it became clear that the forbidden relation was not an aylonit. And therefore

I would say, no,

we should not penalize her.

It is necessary.

Therefore the Mishna needed to teach us also this case, that here too we penalize her.

We learned in the Mishna:

“The scribe wrote, and erred, and gave a bill of divorce to the woman and a receipt

to the man, etc.”

Rabbi Elazar says: If it emerged immediately,

it is not a bill of divorce. If it emerged after a time, it is a bill of divorce.

And we raised it:

What are the circumstances of “immediately,” and what are the circumstances of “after a time”?

What period of time is still called “immediately”?

And we answered:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: As long as they are sitting and occupied with that matter

with the matters of her divorce,

this is “immediately”,

and then the husband is trustworthy to say that they exchanged the bill of divorce and the receipt between them.

If they stood up

from that matter,

this is “

after a time,”

for then the husband is no longer trustworthy to say that they exchanged their documents between them.

And Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

as long as the woman

has not married

another man,

this is “immediately.”

If she married

another man,

this is “after a time.”

And we object: We learned in our Mishna: If it emerged after a time, it is a bill of divorce:

“It is not within the power of the first one to deprive the second one of his right.”

Granted, according to Rav Adda bar Ahava,

that only after she married a second husband is it called “after a time,”

this is why it teaches

that he is not trustworthy to deprive

the second one of his right.

But according to Shmuel,

that immediately when they stood up from that matter the husband is no longer trustworthy,

what is “the second one”?

For she has not yet married a second one at all!