Gittin 79b (עט:) — the Talmud in English

And this statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel: A person may not stand

on Shabbat

on this roof,

which belongs to him,

and collect rainwater from his neighbor’s roof

when rain has fallen on it, even though his neighbor’s roof is attached to his roof and it is not apparent on the roof that he is transferring the water from his neighbor’s private domain into his own private domain. Nevertheless, he is transferring an object from one private domain to another, and the Sages prohibited transferring objects from one domain to another [unless they established an eruv between them].

Although roofs are not used as dwelling places, they are nevertheless considered separate domains,

just as dwelling places are divided below,

inside the house, since each dwelling of the residents is considered a separate domain,

so dwelling places are divided above,

on the roof, so that each roof is considered a separate domain.

Here, however, the law concerning a bill of divorce is different. If a man had two adjoining roofs and lent his wife a place on one roof for the purpose of receiving the bill of divorce, but she received it on the other adjoining roof, which he had not lent to her, she is nevertheless divorced. This is because:

This applies

only when the roofs are considered two separate domains,

with regard to Shabbat.

But with regard to a bill of divorce,

concerning the statement above that a person lends only one place and not two,

it is because of his insistence:

some people insist on lending specifically the courtyard and not the house, or the reverse. But roofs are not used regularly,

and people are not so particular

about lending specifically this roof and not the adjoining roof.

Abaye said: If there were two courtyards, one within the other,

with one surrounding the other, and the

inner

courtyard belonged to

her, while the

outer

courtyard belonged to

him, and the outer walls extended,

above

the

inner walls, and he threw the bill of divorce to her,

the bill of divorce.

Once it reached

the area above the inner courtyard, even though the bill had not yet entered the space enclosed by its walls, since those walls were lower, but meanwhile it had reached only

the

height of the

airspace

enclosed by the

walls

of the

outer

courtyard, which were higher than the inner walls,

she is divorced

immediately, even if the bill of divorce was subsequently lost.

What is the reason?

Because the

inner courtyard itself is protected by the outer walls.

The inner courtyard is protected from the outside also by the outer walls. Therefore, those walls are as though they are “assigned” to it as well and acquire the bill of divorce on its behalf. Consequently, once the bill reached the area above the inner courtyard, at a height of airspace enclosed from the outside by the outer walls, she is divorced.

This is not so with baskets.

What are the circumstances? There were

two baskets

[that is, containers]

one inside the other. The

basket

inside

belonged to

her, while the outer

basket belonged to

him, and he threw the bill of divorce to her,

the bill of divorce.

Even if the bill reached

the bill’s

airspace inside,

that is, into the space of the inner basket,

she is not divorced.

What is the reason?

Because it did not come to rest

on the bottom of the vessel, and the walls of the vessel do not acquire it, since they were not made to protect the space within them. A vessel is made only to place something inside it. And we challenge this:

But if it did come to rest,

the bill of divorce inside the inner basket,

what would that accomplish?

Even then, the woman could not acquire the bill, since her basket is located inside the outer basket belonging to her husband.

And when the purchaser’s vessel is in the seller’s domain,

there are authorities who hold that such a vessel does not acquire an item on behalf of the purchaser!?

And we answer:

Here, what are we dealing with? With a basket that has no bottom.

The outer basket has no bottom [the base of the vessel], and therefore the inner basket is resting on the ground rather than inside the outer basket.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: A man may divorce his wife with a bill of divorce called

“old”

[as the Mishna will explain below].

And Beit Hillel prohibit

divorcing with an old bill of divorce.

And what is an old bill of divorce?

Any bill after the husband was alone with her

after

[that is, after]

he had written it for her,

before giving it to her. The Gemara will explain the matter.

Gemara:

The Gemara explains:

With regard to what do they disagree,

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel?

Beit Shammai hold: We do not say

that a

decree should be enacted to invalidate an old bill of divorce, because

“

perhaps people will say

that

her bill of divorce preceded her son

[as will be explained below]. Therefore, it is permitted to divorce with an old bill of divorce.

And Beit Hillel hold: We do say

that a

decree should be enacted to invalidate an old bill of divorce, because

“

perhaps people will say

that

“

her bill of divorce preceded her son.” That is, there is concern that the husband may retain the bill of divorce after writing it and give it to her only after two or three years, during which time she will bear sons from him, and only afterward will he divorce her with this bill. Later, when the matter has been forgotten, people will see the date on the bill and assume that it was given to her on the day it was written, and that the sons were born to her afterward, when she was already unmarried. This would cast a blemish on them. Therefore, the Sages enacted a decree prohibiting divorce with an old bill of divorce, after the husband had been alone with her following its writing.

and meanwhile sons will be born to her from him, and only afterward he will divorce her with this get. And later, when the matter is forgotten, and people see the date of the get, they will think that the get was given to her on the day it was written, and that the sons were born to her from him afterward, when she was already unmarried, and this is a blemish upon them. Therefore, the Sages decreed and prohibited divorcing with an old get, with which the husband was secluded with her after its writing.

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: If she married

another man on the basis of an old bill of divorce,

she need not leave him,

that is, she does not have to be divorced from him, even according to Beit Hillel, who initially prohibit an old bill of divorce.

And some say: Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: If she was divorced

with an old bill of divorce, and her husband went overseas and cannot give her another bill,

she may marry

even

initially.

Mishna:

In the time of the Mishna, the nations counted the years according to the years of their kings’ reigns [the kings instituted this practice to express their authority. Meiri].

The Sages enacted that Jews, too, should write the date in their bills of divorce according to the regnal years of the kingdom ruling in the country where the bill was written, because of “the welfare of the kingdom.” One writes: “In such-and-such a year of King so-and-so.”

If someone was in Babylonia and wrote the date in the bill of divorce

according to the years of an improper kingdom,

that is, according to the years of another kingdom that is not the proper kingdom, such as the Roman kingdom [the Gemara will explain why it is called improper],

or he wrote in Babylonia

according to the years of the Median kingdom

or

according to the years of the Greek kingdom,

which had already passed from the world,

or he wrote, “In such-and-such a year

since the building of the Temple” [the

Temple], rather than writing according to the years of the king,

or he wrote the number of years

since the destruction of the Temple,

in all these cases the bill of divorce is invalid, because its date was not written according to the kingdom of that country, as the Sages enacted.

If

the scribe writing the bill of divorce was

in the east and wrote

in the bill that the place was

“in the west,”

or the scribe was

in the west

and wrote in the bill that the place was

“in the east,”

the bill of divorce is invalid.

If the woman went and married another man on the basis of one of the invalid bills listed above, all of the following stringencies are imposed upon her:

a.

She must leave both men

her two husbands, the first and the second, since she is forbidden to both of them forever. Since the bill of divorce was invalid, her marriage to the second man has the status of a married woman who committed adultery, who is forbidden both to her husband and to the man with whom she committed adultery.

b.

And she requires a bill of divorce from both men.

If she wishes to marry someone else, she must receive a new bill of divorce from her first husband, and she must also receive a bill of divorce from the second husband. As long as the woman is living with her husband, he is obligated to provide her sustenance [by Torah law or by the enactment of the Sages; the tannaim disagree about this].

Likewise, even after her husband dies, she is sustained from his estate, because one of the conditions of the marriage contract is: “You shall remain in my house and be sustained from my property throughout the entire period of your widowhood,” until she marries another man.

All the property that a married woman brings into the marriage is called property for the wife’s benefit [apart from property that she brings to her husband as iron-flock property. Such property becomes as though it belongs to him, and he accepts responsibility for its value at the time she brings it to him. If he divorces her or dies before her, she has the right to collect from him the value of the property established when she brought it to him, whether the property decreases or increases in value, and whether it still exists or has been lost].

By rabbinic enactment, the husband receives the produce of this property, while the property itself belongs to the woman. When he dies or divorces her, the principal returns to the woman.

The Sages likewise enacted that the husband must redeem his wife if she is taken captive [her “redemption”], and they established this obligation in exchange for his right to receive the produce.

If she brought clothing into the marriage as property for her benefit and the husband used it, he need not pay for the wear caused by his use, since the wear is included in his right to receive the produce. However, what remains of the clothing after it has been used is called “worn remnants,” and it returns to the woman when the husband dies or divorces her.

If the husband dies or divorces her, the woman is entitled to collect from his estate the marriage settlement due to her. If she was a virgin when she married, she collects two hundred dinars; if she was a widow, she collects one hundred dinars.

He must likewise pay her the value of the iron-flock property. This payment too is among the conditions of the marriage contract.

c.

And she has neither a marriage settlement.

d.

Nor produce,

that is, the law concerning produce: her redemption from captivity, which was enacted in exchange for the husband’s right to receive the produce. If she is taken captive, neither husband is obligated to redeem her.

e.

Nor sustenance.

f.

Nor the worn remnants

of the clothing she brought to her husband [whether as property for her benefit or as iron-flock property], which he used until it wore out; she does not receive the remaining pieces of them.

Vo vsekh etikh sluchayakh u nee net

ni ot

odnogo muzha

i ni ot

drugogo

.

A esli ona vzyala

ikh

u odnogo i u drugogo —

pust vernёт. I ne govoryat: raz ona zavladela imi, nelzya zabirat ikh u nee.

We do not say that once she has taken them, they should not be removed from her possession.

7.

A rebenok

— mamzer i ot odnogo, i ot drugogo.

Esli ona rodila syna ot vtorogo muzha, on yavlyaetsya polnym mamzerom, tak kak get pervogo muzha nedeystvitelen.

Esli zhe ona rodila syna ot pervogo muzha, i pervyy muz vnov prinyal ee posle togo, kak ona vsyla zamuzh za vtorogo, rebenok yavlyaetsya mamzerom po postanovleniyu mudretsov.

8.

Ni odin iz nix ne stanovitsya nechistym

po ee smerti. Esli oba ee muzhа byli kohanim, im zapreshcheno oskvernyatsya radi nee pri ee pogrebenii. Eto nesmotrya na to, chto v sluchaye s drugimi zhenshchinami muzh oskvernyaetsya radi nix, dazhe esli on kohen, — ved kohen ne oskvernyaetsya radi svoey nedopustimoy zheny.

9.

Ni odin iz nix ne imeet prava —

ni na naydennoe ey, ni na zarabotok ee ruk, ni na otmenu ee obetov,

tak kak ee status ne takov, kak u drugikh zhenshchin, v otnoshenii kotorykh muzh imeet prava na vse eto.

10. A esli

zhenshchina byla

zhitelnitsey

Izrailya —

ona

stanovitsya nedopustimoy dlya kohena,

po zakonu o zamuzhney zhenshchine, izmenivshey muzhу: ona schitaetsya «rasputnoy» i ne mozhet vyyti zamuzh za kohena.