Gittin 79b — the Talmud in English

And this which Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: A person may not stand

on Shabbat

on this roof,

which belongs to him,

and catch rainwater from his fellow’s roof

upon which rain has fallen, even though his fellow’s roof is adjacent to his roof, and it is not discernible above on the roof that he is removing from his fellow’s domain into his own domain. For nevertheless, he is removing from one private domain to a second private domain, and the Sages prohibited removing from one domain to another [if they did not make an eruv between them].

And even though the roofs are not used for residence, nevertheless they are considered separate domains,

for just as residences are divided below,

inside the house, so that each house of each of the residents is considered a domain in itself,

so residences are divided above,

on the roof, so that each roof is considered a domain in itself.

And here too, the law is different with a get: if a man had two adjacent roofs, and he lent his wife a place on one of the roofs for the purpose of receiving the get, and she received it on the second, adjacent roof, which he did not lend to her, nevertheless she is divorced. For:

This applies

that the roofs are considered two separate domains only

with regard to Shabbat.

But with regard to a get,

concerning what we said above, that a person lends two places only one place,

it is because of insistence,

for there is a person who insists on lending specifically the courtyard and not the house, and likewise the reverse. But roofs are not used regularly,

and people are not so insistent,

on lending specifically this roof and not the roof adjacent to it.

Abaye said: Two courtyards, one within the other,

one surrounding the other, and the courtyard

inner

was

hers, and the outer

was

his, and the outer walls extended higher,

higher

than

the walls

and he threw the get to her.

the bill of divorce.

Once it reached

the get above the inner courtyard, even though the get had not yet entered the space enclosed by its walls, since they were lower, but meanwhile it had reached only

the

height of

the airspace

enclosed by

the walls

of the

outer courtyard,

which were higher than the inner walls,

she is divorced

immediately, even if the get was subsequently lost.

What is the reason?

Because the

inner courtyard itself is guarded by the outer walls.

Thus, the inner courtyard is guarded from outside also by the outer walls, and therefore they are as though they are “subordinated” also to it and acquire for it. Therefore, when the get reached above the inner courtyard, at the height of the airspace enclosed around it from outside by the outer walls, she is divorced.

This is not so with baskets.

How so? There were

two baskets

[that is, containers]

one within the other.

The basket

inner

was

hers, and the outer

was

his, and he threw the get to her,

the bill of divorce.

even if the get reached

the get

the airspace of the inner one,

into the space of the inner basket,

she is not divorced.

What is the reason?

For it did not come to rest

on the bottom of the vessel, and the walls of the vessel do not acquire, since they are not made for the sake of the space within them, to guard it, for a vessel is made only to place something inside it. And we object:

And when it comes to rest

the get inside the inner basket,

what is there?

But even then the woman cannot acquire the get, since her basket is located inside the outer basket belonging to her husband,

and the purchaser’s vessel is in the seller’s domain,

and there are those who maintain that in such a case the vessel does not acquire for the purchaser!?

And we answer:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a basket that has no bottom.

The outer basket has no bottom [the bottom of the vessel], and it turns out that the inner basket is resting on the ground and not inside the outer basket.

Mishna:

Beit Shammai say: A man may release his wife with a get “

old”

[as the Mishna will explain below].

And Beit Hillel prohibit

divorcing with an old get.

And what is an old get?

Whenever her husband was secluded with her

after

[after]

he wrote it for her,

the get, before giving it to her. And the Gemara will explain the matter.

Gemara:

And the Gemara explains:

In what do they disagree,

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel?

Beit Shammai hold: We do not say

that one must decree

a decree

and invalidate an old get, because

perhaps people will say,

“

Her get preceded her son”

[as will be explained below], and therefore it is permitted to divorce with an old get.

And Beit Hillel hold: We say

that one must decree

a decree

to invalidate an old get, because

perhaps people will say

“

Her get preceded her son.”

That is, there is concern that perhaps the husband will delay the get after its writing and not give it to her until only after two or three years,

and meanwhile sons will be born to her from him, and only afterward he will divorce her with this get. And later, when the matter is forgotten, and people see the date of the get, they will think that the get was given to her on the day it was written, and that the sons were born to her from him afterward, when she was already unmarried, and this is a blemish upon them. Therefore, the Sages decreed and prohibited divorcing with an old get, with which the husband was secluded with her after its writing.

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: If she married

another man on the basis of an old get,

she need not leave

him, for she does not need to be divorced from him, even according to Beit Hillel, who disqualify an old get as an initial matter.

And some say: Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel, if she was divorced

with an old get, and her husband went overseas and cannot give another get,

she may marry

even

initially.

Mishna:

In the time of the Mishna, the nations counted the number of years according to the years of the reign of their kings [the kings instituted this in order to express their rule. Meiri].

And the Sages instituted that Israel, too, should write in their gittin the date according to the count of the years of the reign of the kingdom ruling in that country in which the get was written, because of “the peace of the kingdom.” And he writes: “In such-and-such a year—to such-and-such a king.”

One who was in Babylonia and wrote the date in the get

according to the name of an improper kingdom,

that is, according to the count of the years of another kingdom, which is not an appropriate kingdom, such as the kingdom of Rome [and the Gemara will explain why it is called so].

Or he wrote in Babylonia

according to the name of the kingdom of Media

or

according to the name of the kingdom of Greece,

which had already passed from the world.

Or he wrote, “In such-and-such a year

for the building of the Temple”

[the Temple], and did not write according to the years of the king.

Or he wrote the count of the years

from the destruction of the Temple.

In all these cases the get is invalid, because the date was not written according to the name of the kingdom of that country, as the Sages instituted.

If

the scribe writing the get was

in the east, and wrote

in the get the place that was

“in the west.”

Or the scribe was

in the west,

and wrote in the get

“in the east,”

the get is invalid.

And if the woman went and married another man with one of the invalid gittin listed above, all the following stringencies are imposed upon her:

a.

She must leave this one and that one,

her two husbands, the first and the second, for she is forbidden to both of them forever. Since the get was invalid, her marriage to the second has the status of the wife of a man who committed adultery, who is forbidden both to the husband and to the adulterer.

b.

And she requires a get from this one and from that one.

If she wishes to marry another, she must receive a new get from the first husband, and she must also receive a get from the second husband. As long as the woman is under her husband, he is obligated to provide her sustenance [by Torah law or by the institution of the Sages, and the tannaim disagreed about this].

Likewise, even after her husband dies, she is sustained from his property, because one of the conditions of the marriage contract is: “You shall sit in my house and be sustained from my property all the days of your widowhood,” until she marries a man.

All the property that a married woman brings is called “nichsei melog” [except for property that she brings to her husband as “nichsei tzon barzel,” which become as though they are his property, and he accepts responsibility for the value of the property at the time she brings it to him, so that if he divorces her or dies before her, she has the right to collect from him the value of the property established at the time she brought it in, whether the property decreases in value or increases in value, whether it still exists in the world or is lost].

And the husband consumes the produce of the nichsei melog by the institution of the Sages, while the body of the property belongs to the woman. When he dies or divorces her, the principal returns to the woman.

Likewise, the Sages instituted that the husband must redeem the woman if she is taken captive [“her redemption”], and they instituted this obligation in exchange for his right to consume the produce.

If she brought clothing to him as nichsei melog, and the husband used it, he is not obligated to pay for the wearing-out of the clothing caused by his use of the clothing, for the wearing-out of the clothing is included in the consumption of the produce. However, what remains of the clothing after its use is called “worn remnants,” and they return to the woman upon the husband’s death or when he divorces her.

If the husband dies or divorces her, the woman is entitled to collect from his property the marriage settlement due to her: if she was a virgin when he married her, she collects two hundred zuz; and if she was a widow, she collects a maneh.

And likewise he pays her the value of the tzon barzel. This payment too is among the “conditions of the marriage contract.”

c.

And she has neither a marriage settlement.

d.

Nor produce,

that is, the law of produce, namely her redemption from captivity, which was instituted for her in exchange for the husband’s right to consume the produce. If she is taken captive, neither husband is obligated to redeem her.

e.

Nor sustenance.

f.

Nor worn remnants

of the clothing that she brought to her husband [whether as nichsei melog or as nichsei tzon barzel], and he used it until it wore out; she does not take the remnants of them.

All these, she has none

from

this husband,

and none from

that husband

.

And if she took

them

from this one and from that one—

she must return them.

And one does not say: Since she seized them, we shall not take them from her.

7.

And the child—

is a mamzer from this one and from that one.

If she bore a son from her second husband, he is a complete mamzer, for the bill of divorce of the first was invalid.

And if she bore a son from the first husband, if he took her back after she had married the second, he is a rabbinic mamzer.

8.

And neither this one nor that one renders himself impure

for her upon her death. If both her husbands were kohanim, they are forbidden to render themselves impure for her at her burial—for, with respect to other women, the husband renders himself impure for them, even if he is a kohen—because a kohen does not render himself impure for his disqualified wife.

9.

And neither this one nor that one is entitled—

neither to what she finds, nor to the product of her hands, nor to the annulment of her vows,

for her status is not like that of other women, for whose every one of these the husband is entitled.

10. And if

she was

the woman

a daughter of Israel—

she is

disqualified from the priesthood,

like the law of a married woman who commits adultery while under her husband, for she is a “prostitute” and disqualified from marrying a kohen.