Gittin 79a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

She was standing on the roof

of hers,

and he threw it to her

the husband threw the get to her for her sake,

once it reached

the get

the airspace of the roof, she is divorced,

even if the get was subsequently lost.

If

he

was standing

above

on his roof,

and she below

in her courtyard,

and he threw it to her

into the courtyard,

once it exited

the get

the domain of the roof

into the airspace of the courtyard, even though

it was erased or burned

before it reached the ground,

she is divorced,

for she had already received the get before it was lost.

Gemara:

And we raised a difficulty concerning it: How does she acquire the get in the airspace of the roof?

But it is not guarded!

It is not guarded there, for the wind blows it away, and it is not destined to come to rest on the ground. And even if the wind does not blow it away but something else occurs—for example, a dog eats it or rain erases it in the air—she should not be divorced, since airspace that is not destined to come to rest does not acquire. And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: We are dealing with a roof that has a parapet.

And the get enters between the partitions of the parapet, and the wind cannot blow it away from there.

Ulla bar Menashya said in the name of Avimi: Here,

when the get reached

within three

handbreadths

of the roof, we are dealing with this, for anything within three handbreadths of the roof is considered like the roof,

and it is as though it actually came to rest on the roof, and therefore the woman acquired the get there.

We learned in the Mishna:

He is above and she is below,

and he threw it to her; once it exited the domain of the roof, even if it was erased or burned, she is divorced.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

But it is not guarded

while the get is still in the air above the walls of the courtyard [for the Gemara assumed that the roof was higher than the walls of the courtyard], since the wind could blow it outside the partitions of the courtyard, and it is airspace that is not destined to come to rest; why, then, is she divorced when the get was erased or burned before it came to rest in the courtyard?

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

Here we are dealing

with a case where the lower partitions

of the courtyard

project beyond the upper ones,

meaning that they are higher than the parapet of the roof, so that immediately upon exiting the domain of the roof, it enters between the partitions of the courtyard, and it is guarded there.

And Rabbi Elazar likewise said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: It is a case where the lower partitions project beyond the upper ones.

And Ulla likewise said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: It is a case where the upper partitions project beyond the lower ones.

Rabbi Abba said to Ulla:

Our Mishna, which says that the airspace of the courtyard acquires like the courtyard itself,

is in accordance with whom

is it? Necessarily, it is

in accordance with Rabbi, who says

with regard to Shabbat that one who throws an object from the public domain on this side to the public domain opposite it, with a private domain in the middle, is liable for a sin-offering for transferring from the public domain to the private domain, because

“an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest.”

An object caught in the air of a domain is considered as though it were resting on the ground. Therefore, he is liable for two sin-offerings, since it is as though he uprooted it from the public domain and caused it to come to rest in the private domain, and then uprooted it from the private domain and caused it to come to rest in the public domain. Here too, the get that is caught in the airspace of the courtyard is considered as though it had come to rest on the ground.

He said to him

Rabbi Abba to Ulla:

Even if you say

that our Mishna is

in accordance with the Rabbis.

For it is possible to say that

the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi only to this extent,

and they do not hold that “an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,”

with regard

to liability for the labor of transferring on

Shabbat.

But here,

with regard to acquisition by a courtyard,

it is on account of guarding it

that the courtyard guards what is within it for its owners, and therefore it is considered like his hand,

and it is guarded,

for the object is guarded even in the air, and therefore the law of the airspace of the courtyard is like that of the courtyard itself.

And Rabbi Asi likewise said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: It is a case where the lower partitions project beyond the upper ones.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Is it in accordance with Rabbi, who says: An object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest?

He said to him

Rabbi Asi:

Even if you say it is in accordance with the Rabbis, the Rabbis disagreed with Rabbi only with regard to Shabbat; but here it is on account of guarding it, and it is guarded.

We learned in the Mishna: Once it exited the domain of the roof,

it was erased

or burned, she is divorced.

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: This was taught

only when it was erased

the get

on the way downward,

when it began descending into the courtyard, after he threw it upward, beyond the parapet of the roof.

But if it was erased on the way upward,

while it was still being thrown upward, even though it exited the domain of the roof into the domain of the courtyard, and it was between the partitions of the courtyard that projected beyond the parapet of the roof,

not

is she divorced.

What is the reason?

Because

from the outset, it was not directed toward coming to rest,

for it is not called “delivery” when the get is on the way out of the woman’s domain, but only when it is on its way to come to rest and enter her domain.

We learned in the Mishna: Or

was burned

she is divorced.

Rav Nahman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: This was taught only when the get preceded the fire,

when the fire broke out only after the get had reached the domain of the courtyard. But if

the fire preceded the get,

when the fire had already broken out beforehand, she is not divorced.

What is the reason?

Because

from the outset it was proceeding toward being burned.

From the outset it was destined to be burned, and it was not destined to come to rest in the courtyard.

Rav Hisda said: Domains are divided with regard to divorce documents.

When a husband lent his wife a place in his courtyard for the purpose of receiving the get, we do not say that he is not particular and that his intention was to lend her also his house and roof; rather, he lent her only the courtyard.

Rami bar Hama said to Rava: From where does the elder derive,

Rav Hisda,

this?

He said to him

Rava:

The Mishna,

our Mishna,

is it!

For it teaches:

She was standing on the roof, and he threw it to her; once the get reached the airspace of the roof, she is divorced.

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

With what are we dealing?

If you say it is her roof and her courtyard,

that the roof and the courtyard both belonged to the woman, then

why do I need

that the get should reach

the airspace of the roof?

For it had already entered the airspace of her courtyard beforehand.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it is speaking

of his roof and his courtyard,

that both belonged to the husband; if so,

when it reached

the get

the airspace of the roof, what of it?

For the roof is his, so why is she divorced?

Rather, it is obvious

that it is speaking

of her roof and his courtyard,

that the roof is hers and the courtyard is his, and therefore the get must reach the airspace of the roof.

Come and consider the latter clause

of the Mishna:

He is above and she is below, and he threw it to her; once it exited the domain of the roof, even if it was erased or burned, she is divorced.

And if it is her roof and his courtyard, why is she divorced?

For the get entered the husband’s courtyard.

Rather,

it must be

his roof and her courtyard.

The roof is his [for if it were hers, why would the get need to exit the domain of the roof], and the courtyard is hers. Therefore, she is divorced in the airspace of the courtyard.

And it still presents a difficulty, for the first clause does not resemble the latter clause. For

the first clause concerns her roof and his courtyard, while the latter clause concerns his roof and her courtyard?

Rather, is it not

speaking of a case

where he lent her

the husband lent her

a place

in the area of his house for receiving the get.

For people lend one place, but people do not lend two places.

People do not lend [two places].

For he intended to lend her only the place that he explicitly lent her, and no more. Therefore, the first clause is speaking of a case where the husband lent her the roof, while the courtyard remained in his domain. And the latter clause is speaking of a case where he lent her the courtyard, while the roof remained in his domain.

And this is a proof of the words of Hisda.

Rami bar Hama said to him

Rami bar Hama said to Rava: There is no proof from here, for

it is not necessarily so.

Is it necessary to establish that the first and latter clauses speak of one arrangement?

Perhaps this one is according to what is stated in it, and that one is according to what is stated in it.

Each one speaks in accordance with the arrangement stated in it.

The first clause: her roof and his courtyard; the latter clause: his roof and her courtyard.

And it is always possible to say that when a person lends his wife a place for the purpose of receiving the get, he is not particular about that specific place alone; rather, he intends to lend her all the places belonging to him for the purpose of receiving the get.

Rava said: There are three measures with regard to divorce documents.

In three cases we find that there is a difference between the laws of divorce documents and the other prohibitions of the Torah:

1.

That which Rabbi said

with regard to the laws of Shabbat:

An object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest. And the Rabbis disagreed with him.

This applies

that the Rabbis do not hold that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest, only

with regard to Shabbat. But here,

with regard to divorce documents, the Rabbis agree, as we learned in our Mishna, that the airspace of the courtyard acquires the get for the woman. For the entire reason that a courtyard acquires for a person is

on account of guarding it,

for it guards for him everything within it.

And it is guarded.

It is guarded even within the airspace.

2.

And that which Rav Hisda said: If one drove a pole into a private domain

within the courtyard

and there was a basket at its top,

there was a basket at the top of the pole,

and he threw

an object on Shabbat from the public domain

and it came to rest upon it,

on top of the basket,

even if the basket is one hundred cubits high, he is liable

for a sin-offering, because of bringing in from the public domain to the private domain,

because the private domain rises up to the firmament,

for all the airspace above a private domain has the status of a private domain [unlike the airspace of the public domain, whose law is that of the public domain only up to a height of ten handbreadths].

This applies

that even above the partitions of the courtyard it is considered as though it had come to rest within the courtyard, only

with regard to Shabbat, but here

with regard to divorce documents, if there was a pole driven into the woman’s courtyard, extending above the partitions of the courtyard, and the husband threw her a get and it came to rest there, she is not divorced. For the reason that a courtyard acquires for a woman is

on account of guarding it, and it is not guarded.

Since it is resting in a place higher than the partitions surrounding the courtyard, the wind blows it outside the courtyard and it is not guarded there. And an unguarded courtyard does not acquire for a person, because it does not resemble “her hand.”