Gittin 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

If she was standing on the roof

of her own house,

and he threw it to her

the husband threw the bill of divorce to her there,

once it reached

the bill of divorce

the airspace of the roof, she is divorced,

even if the bill of divorce was subsequently lost.

If

he

was standing

above

on his own roof,

and she was below

in her own courtyard,

and he threw it to her

into the courtyard,

once it left

the bill of divorce

the domain of the roof

into the airspace of the courtyard, even though

it was erased or burned

before it reached the ground,

she is divorced,

as she had already received the bill of divorce before it was lost.

Gemara:

And we raised a difficulty with this: How does she acquire the bill of divorce in the airspace of the roof?

But it is not safeguarded!

It is not protected there, as the wind may carry it away and it is not destined to come to rest on the ground. And even if the wind does not carry it away but something else happens—for example, a dog eats it or rain erases it while it is in the air—she should not be divorced, since airspace that is not destined to come to rest does not effect acquisition. And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: We are dealing with a roof that has a parapet,

and the bill of divorce enters between the parapet’s partitions, so that the wind cannot carry it away from there.

Ulla bar Menashya, in the name of Avimi, said: Here,

when the bill of divorce reached

within three

handbreadths

of the roof, we are dealing with a case in which anything within three handbreadths of the roof is considered like the roof,

and it is as though it had actually come to rest on the roof. Therefore, the woman acquired the bill of divorce there.

We learned in the Mishna:

He was above and she was below,

and he threw it to her; once it left his domain, if it was erased or burned, she is divorced.

And we raised a difficulty:

But it is not safeguarded

while the bill of divorce is still in the air above the walls of the courtyard [as the Gemara understood that the roof was higher than the walls of the courtyard], since the wind could carry it beyond the courtyard’s partitions. It is thus airspace not destined to come to rest. Why, then, is she divorced when the bill was erased or burned before coming to rest in the courtyard?

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

Here we are dealing

with a case in which the lower partitions

of the courtyard

protrude above the upper ones,

meaning that they are higher than the parapet of the roof. Thus, as soon as the bill left the domain of the roof, it entered between the partitions of the courtyard, and it was safeguarded there.

And likewise Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: This is a case in which the lower partitions protrude above the upper ones.

And likewise Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is a case in which the upper partitions protrude above the lower ones.

Rabbi Abba said to Ulla:

Our Mishna, which states that the airspace of the courtyard effects acquisition like the courtyard itself,

is in accordance with whom

is it? It must be

in accordance with Rabbi, who said

with regard to Shabbat that one who throws an object from the public domain on this side to the public domain opposite it, with a private domain in between, is liable to bring a sin-offering for transferring the object from the public domain into the private domain, because

“an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest.”

An object caught in the airspace of a domain is considered as though it were resting on the ground. Therefore, he is liable for two sin-offerings, as though he had uprooted the object from the public domain and caused it to come to rest in the private domain, and then uprooted it from the private domain and caused it to come to rest in the public domain. Here, too, the bill of divorce caught in the airspace of the courtyard is considered as though it had come to rest on the ground.

He said to him

Rabbi Abba to Ulla:

You may even say

that our Mishna is

in accordance with the Rabbis.

For it is possible to say that

the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi only with regard to this,

and do not hold that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest,

with regard

to liability for the labor of transferring an object on

Shabbat.

But here,

with regard to acquisition by a courtyard,

it is because of safeguarding

that a courtyard safeguards what is inside it for its owner, and therefore it is considered like his hand,

and it is safeguarded,

as the object is protected even while in the air. Therefore, the airspace of the courtyard has the same status as the courtyard itself.

And likewise Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: This is a case in which the lower partitions protrude above the upper ones.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Asi: Is it in accordance with Rabbi, who said: An object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest?

He said to him

Rabbi Asi:

You may even say that it is in accordance with the Rabbis. The Rabbis disagree with Rabbi only with regard to Shabbat; but here it is because of safeguarding, and it is safeguarded.

We learned in the Mishna: Once it left the domain of the roof, if it was

erased

or burned, she is divorced.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: They taught

only when it was erased

the bill of divorce

on its descent,

when it had begun descending into the courtyard after he had thrown it upward, beyond the parapet of the roof.

But if it was erased on its ascent,

while it was still being thrown upward, even though it had left the domain of the roof for the domain of the courtyard and was between the courtyard’s partitions, which protruded above the roof’s parapet,

not

is she divorced.

What is the reason?

Because

initially it was not destined to come to rest,

and the act is not considered “giving” when the bill of divorce is in the process of leaving the woman’s domain; it is considered giving only when it is on a course toward coming to rest and entering her domain.

We learned in the Mishna: Or if it was

burned,

she is divorced.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: They taught this only when the bill of divorce preceded the fire,

meaning that the fire broke out only after the bill had reached the domain of the courtyard. But if

the fire preceded the bill of divorce,

meaning that the fire had already broken out beforehand, she is not divorced.

What is the reason?

Because

initially it was proceeding toward being burned.

From the outset it was destined to be burned and was not destined to come to rest in the courtyard.

Rav Ḥisda said: Domains are distinct with regard to bills of divorce.

If a husband lent his wife a place in his courtyard for the purpose of receiving the bill of divorce, we do not say that he is not particular and intended to lend her his house and roof as well. Rather, he lent her only the courtyard.

Rami bar Ḥama said to Rava: From where does the elder derive

Rav Ḥisda

this?

He said to him

Rava:

The Mishna,

our Mishna,

is the proof!

For it teaches:

If she was standing on the roof, and he threw it to her, once the bill of divorce reached the airspace of the roof, she is divorced.

And we raised a difficulty:

What case are we dealing with?

If you say it is a case where the roof is hers and the courtyard is hers,

meaning that both the roof and the courtyard belonged to the woman, then

why do I need

the bill of divorce

to reach the airspace of the roof?

It had already entered the airspace of her courtyard beforehand.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that it is dealing

with a roof that is his and a courtyard that is his,

meaning that both belonged to the husband. If so,

when it reached

the bill of divorce

the airspace of the roof, what has it accomplished?

The roof belongs to him, so why is she divorced?

Rather, it is obvious

that the case is

one in which the roof is hers and the courtyard is his,

the roof belongs to her and the courtyard to him; therefore, the bill must reach the airspace of the roof.

Come and hear the latter clause

of the Mishna:

He was above and she was below, and he threw it to her; once it left the domain of the roof, if it was erased or burned, she is divorced.

And if the roof is hers and the courtyard is his, why is she divorced?

The bill of divorce entered the husband’s courtyard.

Rather,

it must be

a roof that is his and a courtyard that is hers.

The roof belongs to him [for if it belonged to her, why would the bill need to leave the domain of the roof?], and the courtyard belongs to her. Therefore, she is divorced in the airspace of the courtyard.

But it still follows that the first clause is not parallel to the latter clause. For

the first clause concerns a roof that is hers and a courtyard that is his, while the latter clause concerns a roof that is his and a courtyard that is hers?

Rather, is it not

a case

where he lent her

the husband lent her

a place

within his property for receiving the bill of divorce.

People lend one place, but people do not lend two places.

People do not lend two places.

He intended to lend her only the place that he explicitly lent her, and no more. Therefore, the first clause is referring to a case in which the husband lent her the roof, while the courtyard remained in his domain; and the latter clause is referring to a case in which he lent her the courtyard, while the roof remained in his domain.

This is indeed proof of Ḥisda’s statement.

Rami bar Ḥama said to him

Rava: There is no proof from here, because

that does not necessarily follow.

Is it necessary to establish that the first and latter clauses speak of the same arrangement?

Perhaps this clause is according to its circumstance, and that clause is according to its circumstance.

Each one speaks of the case stated in it.

The first clause concerns a roof that is hers and a courtyard that is his; the latter clause concerns a roof that is his and a courtyard that is hers.

It remains possible to say that when a person lends his wife a place for the purpose of receiving a bill of divorce, he is not particular that she use only that specific place; rather, he intends to lend her all the places belonging to him for the purpose of receiving the bill of divorce.

Rava said: There are three measures with regard to bills of divorce.

We find three cases in which the laws of bills of divorce differ from the other prohibitions of the Torah:

1.

That which Rabbi said

with regard to the laws of Shabbat:

An object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest; and the Rabbis disagree with him.

This applies

when the Rabbis do not hold that an object caught in the air is considered as though it had come to rest

with regard only to Shabbat. But here,

with regard to bills of divorce, the Rabbis agree, as we learned in our Mishna, that the airspace of the courtyard acquires the bill of divorce for the woman. The entire reason that a courtyard acquires an object for a person

is because of safeguarding,

as it safeguards everything inside it for him.

And it is safeguarded.

It is protected even while within the airspace.

2.

And that which Rav Ḥisda said: If one drove a pole into a private domain

within a courtyard

with a basket at its top,

there was a basket at the top of the pole,

and he threw

an object on Shabbat from the public domain

and it came to rest on it,

on top of the basket,

even if the basket is one hundred cubits high, he is liable

to bring a sin-offering for transferring the object from the public domain into the private domain,

because the private domain rises to the firmament.

All the airspace above a private domain has the status of a private domain [unlike the airspace of a public domain, which has the status of a public domain only up to a height of ten handbreadths].

This applies

when even above the courtyard’s partitions the object is considered as though it had come to rest inside the courtyard,

only with regard to Shabbat; but here

with regard to bills of divorce, if a pole was driven into the woman’s courtyard and extended above its partitions, and the husband threw her a bill of divorce which came to rest there, she is not divorced. The reason that a courtyard acquires an object for a woman is

because of safeguarding, and it is not safeguarded.

Since it is resting in a place higher than the partitions surrounding the courtyard, the wind may carry it outside the courtyard, and it is not protected there. An unsafeguarded courtyard does not acquire an object for a person, because it is not comparable to her “hand.”