Gittin 67a (סז.) — the Talmud in English

“Tell the scribe, and he shall write, and tell so-and-so and so-and-so, and they shall sign.”

And because of the scribe’s embarrassment [embarrassment],

embarrassment,

they are concerned,

lest he think that he is not accepted as a witness and be embarrassed by this,

and they have one of those witnesses sign together with the scribe [the agents will be concerned for the scribe’s embarrassment and will have only one of the agents sign together with the scribe],

the agents might be concerned about the scribe’s embarrassment and have only one of the agents sign together with the scribe,

but the husband did not say

that they should do

so [thus], and the get is invalid. And they will validate it unlawfully! Since a mishap could result if they permit the scribe’s signature on a get, every get on which the scribe has signed as a witness must be invalidated, so that scribes will not sign as witnesses on gittin.

in this manner, and the bill of divorce is invalid. Yet they might validate it improperly! Since allowing the scribe’s signature as a witness on a bill of divorce could lead to a mishap, every bill of divorce on which the scribe signed as a witness must be declared invalid, so that scribes will not sign bills of divorce.

Rather, you are forced to say that Rabbi Yosei holds that even when the husband tells the witnesses, using the expression “tell,” they cannot become agents to tell someone else; there is no possibility for them to appoint agents to tell the scribe to sign the get. If so, the scribe signs only if he hears from the husband himself that he is instructing him to do so. Therefore, the Mishna, which follows his view, validated a get on which the scribe signed, since there is no concern that he signed without the husband’s instruction.

If so, the difficulty for Shmuel returns: How can he hold that there is a possibility that the get is valid when the scribe wrote the get at the instruction of the agents? After all, he follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, and according to Rabbi Yosei there is no agency for the transmission of words alone.

And we answer: In reality, Rabbi Yosei holds that when the husband tells the witnesses, using the expression “tell,” they become agents to transmit the husband’s instructions. In this case, Shmuel was uncertain whether “write,” which the husband said to the witnesses, refers to writing the get itself, in which case it is invalid if someone else wrote it, or whether it refers only to the signing of their handwriting, in which case the get is valid when written by the scribe, since this is equivalent to his saying: “Tell the scribe to write the get.” Regarding this, Rabbi Yosei agrees that agency is effective, and the get was written at the husband’s instruction in accordance with the law.

Accordingly, there is no difficulty concerning how the Mishna, according to Rabbi Yosei, validated a get in which the scribe signed, and did not fear the ruin that could result from this,

since the Master said later in our discussion, concerning a husband who tells the witnesses: “Tell the scribe and he shall write, and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they shall sign,” that although the get is

later in our discussion, concerning a case in which the husband tells the witnesses: “Tell the scribe to write,” and “Tell so-and-so and so-and-so to sign,” that although the bill of divorce is

valid,

b

ut

as an initial matter

you shall not do this in Israel.

Accordingly,

it is uncommon

for a husband to instruct witnesses to tell others to write and sign a get.

And since according to Rabbi Yosei it is uncommon for the scribe to sign a get without having heard the instruction directly from the husband, since even when the husband tells the agents, using the expression “tell,” the get is not valid as an initial matter, the Mishna validated a get signed by the scribe and another witness. There is no need to enact a decree invalidating this get because of an uncommon circumstance.

And we challenge this: It is true that there is no concern, in the case of a get containing the scribe’s signature and that of another witness, that perhaps the husband told two people: “Tell the scribe and he shall write, and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they shall sign,” since this is uncommon.

But still,

let us be concerned lest he told them

[them—the husband]

to two witnesses

[to two witnesses]:

“Tell the scribe and he shall write, and you shall sign,”

for in this manner they did not enact a decree prohibiting it as an initial matter.

And since this is so, it is common for the husband to tell them to tell the scribe to write,

a

nd there is concern that

those witnesses went because of the scribe’s embarrassment

[the witnesses went because of the scribe’s embarrassment],

and had the scribe sign together with one of them

[and had the scribe sign the get together with one of them],

although the husband did not say so,

and this is an invalid get.

Why, then, did the Mishna validate a get containing the scribe’s signature and that of another witness, and not enact a decree concerning it because of this concern!?

And we answer:

They say:

They said in response that one may say:

This too

[also this arrangement, in which he instructs the agents to tell others only concerning the writing of the get,]

is valid,

[but as an initial matter]

it is not to be done.

If so, it is an uncommon matter, and therefore there is no need to enact a decree prohibiting a get containing the scribe’s signature and that of another witness.

And we challenge this:

This works well according to the one who says

that if the husband tells the witnesses in this manner, and they act according to his instruction, it is

valid

[but as an initial matter]

it is not to be done,

and therefore there is no concern about this possibility in a get containing the scribe’s signature and that of another witness.

But according to the one who says

[according to that one] who disagrees and says that if the husband tells the witnesses in this manner, and they act according to his instruction, it is

valid and it is to be done

[as an initial matter],

what can be said?

After all, there is concern, in the case of a get containing the scribe’s signature and that of another witness, that the husband told the witnesses in this manner, since this is common; in that case, the get would be invalid.

Rather,

the Gemara retracts this and says:

Rabbi Yosei said two things

to invalidate the get: both when the husband told three people, “Give,” and when he said, “Tell so-and-so and he shall write, and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they shall sign.” In both cases the get is invalid, because Rabbi Yosei holds that words cannot be transmitted to an agent [one cannot appoint an agent for a verbal instruction alone], and even when he tells them using the expression “tell,” they do not become agents.

And those amoraim who later dispute, with regard to one who says “tell,” whether he may do so as an initial matter or only after the fact, dispute the matter according to Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Yosei, in this case the get is entirely invalid.

Accordingly, the statement of Rav Hisda cited above—that the Mishna’s ruling, “A get containing the scribe’s signature and that of another witness is valid,” follows the opinion of Rabbi Yosei—is well explained. There is no concern that perhaps the agent instructed the scribe to sign and not the husband, since according to Rabbi Yosei agency cannot exist for the purpose of instructing another to sign a get, even when the husband told the agent using the expression “tell.” The scribe will not sign without the husband’s instruction.

And Shmuel,

who said above that it requires study whether the husband’s statement “write” refers to the witnesses’ signing their handwriting, but with regard to the writing of the get itself it is equivalent to the husband telling them, “Tell the scribe and he shall write,” in which case the get is valid—

follows his view

[his view, that of Rabbi Yosei]

in one respect

[in one matter]: words cannot be transmitted to an agent when he did not tell the agent using the expression “tell.”

But he disagrees with him

[and disagrees with Rabbi Yosei]

in one respect

[in one matter]: when he tells the agents using the expression “tell,” according to Shmuel, if he made them agents to tell the scribe to write, the agency is effective, and this is a valid get.

Therefore, Shmuel was uncertain when the husband told them using the expression “write”: Does he mean the text of the get itself, so that if he gave it to someone else to write the get it is invalid? Or perhaps he means only the signing of their handwriting on the get, and as long as they themselves signed it, it is valid, since regarding the text of the get he is not particular that specifically they write it. It is therefore considered as though he told them, “Tell the scribe and he shall write,” and if they appointed a scribe to write it, their agency is effective and the get is valid.

With regard to the main matter,

we learned above:

Shmuel said that Rabbi said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says that words cannot be transmitted to an agent.

Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi, said to him,

to Rabbi:

“Since Rabbi Meir and Hanina Ish Ono disagree with Rabbi Yosei,

and hold that a verbal instruction can be transmitted through an agent who will transmit it to another,

what did Rabbi see that led him to say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?”

He said to him,

Rabbi said:

“Be silent, my son, be silent. You did not see Rabbi Yosei. Had you seen him

[if you had seen him], you would have understood why I ruled in accordance with him, because

his reasoning

[his explanation]

was with him

in providing an explanation for all his statements; he would resolve and clarify his words.

As it was taught: Isi ben Yehuda would enumerate the virtues of the Sages:

Rabbi Meir—

he was

a sage and a scribe.

Rabbi Yehuda—

he was

a sage when he wished,

for when he wished to be deliberate and settled in his statements, he was a sage.

Rabbi Tarfon—

he was like

a pile of nuts.

Just as with a pile of nuts, if a person takes one of them, all the nuts gather and fall one upon another, so too Rabbi Tarfon: when a student came to ask him a matter, he would bring him a proof from Torah, from Midrash, from Mishna, from halakha, and from aggada—all together.

Rabbi Yishmael—

he was like

a well-stocked shop,

in which wine was always ready, so that the shopkeeper did not need to tell customers, “Wait, and I will bring it to you.” So too Rabbi Yishmael: whenever a person needed to learn from him, the material was immediately available to him, and his learning was arranged in his mouth.

Rabbi Akiva—

he was like

a well-organized storehouse

[a storehouse divided into compartments], so that each type could be kept separately, in an orderly manner.

Rabbi Akiva was like a poor man who took his basket and went out to the field. When he found barley, he harvested it and placed it in his basket; when he found wheat, he harvested it and placed it there; and likewise when he found beans and lentils. When he came home, he arranged each type separately.

So too Rabbi Akiva: when he learned from his teachers, he heard a matter of Scripture from them, followed by a halakha, followed by a Midrash, and followed by an aggada. After he had heard all the matters, he applied himself to reviewing and memorizing them until everything was arranged in his mouth. He did not say, “I will study Scripture separately, Midrash separately, and so on”; rather, he learned whatever came to hand.

But when he became great, he arranged his lessons by subject. He organized the Midrash of Sifre and Sifra separately and taught them separately to his students; he arranged the halakhot separately and taught them to his students; and he did the same with aggadot, and so on.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri—

he was like

a peddler’s basket,

for a peddler who comes to a city has with him everything that people request from him. So too Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: when a person needed to ask him a matter of Scripture, he answered him; and likewise with regard to Midrash and aggada. This praise is not like the praise of Rabbi Akiva, for Rabbi Akiva learned everything together and only afterward arranged it.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya—

he was like

a basket of

spices,

which contains many varieties. He was also similar to the peddler’s basket, except that the peddler had more varieties and tied each one in a separate bundle so that it would be ready when people requested it.

The Mishna of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov—

a kab and pure,

for he did not teach as much as his colleagues, but whatever he said in the beit-midrash was pure, as the halakha is always in accordance with him.

Rabbi Yosei—

his reasoning was with him,

as explained above.

Rabbi Shimon—

he grinds much,

he studies much,

and produces little

[a small amount], as will be explained.

The tanna

means by this statement, “and produces little,” that he

forgot little

[a small amount],

and what he produced

that is, those few matters that he forgot,

was only bran,

which is waste, for he forgot only matters that did not appear to him to be the halakha.

Rabbi Shimon said likewise to his students: “My sons, study my measures”

[learn my Torah], because

my measures

[my Torah] are

the select portions

from

among

the

select portions of his measures

the selected principles of his Mishnayot,

of Rabbi Akiva.

Therefore, my halakhic rulings are “selection after selection.”

With regard to the main matter,

we learned above:

“If he said to two people: ‘Tell the scribe and he shall write, and tell so-and-so and so-and-so and they shall sign,’ Rav Huna said that Rav said:

This get is

valid

[but as an initial matter]

you shall not do this in Israel,

but the husband himself must appoint the scribe and the witnesses who will sign the get.

Ulla said to Rav Nahman, and some say

[there are those who say that]

Rav Nahman

asked this

of Ulla: “Since it is valid, why

as an initial matter

‘shall you not do this in Israel’?”

He said to him:

Because

we are concerned that she might hire

the woman

witnesses

who would say in her husband’s name to the scribe to write a get and to the witnesses to sign it, and the scribe and witnesses would do so, thinking that the husband had instructed them to do this.

And we consider the matter:

Are we concerned

that witnesses would agree to lie on behalf of the woman?

But was it not taught: “With regard to witnesses who signed a deed of sale for a field or a woman’s get, the Sages did not suspect this matter,”

that perhaps the witnesses signed falsely, without the consent of the owners!

It is demonstrated from this beraita that there is no concern that witnesses will testify falsely.

And we answer: The beraita is referring to an act of signing a document, and indeed

the act they do not perform

[they do not perform]—the witnesses do not perform the act of signing falsely, and there is no concern for this.

But

speech,

namely, saying a false statement to others so that they will act, while those others think that the husband instructed them,

they do say,

the witnesses, and there is concern for this.

Another halakhic ruling:

If

he said to two people: “Tell the scribe and he shall write, and you shall sign,”

then there is no concern that perhaps the woman will hire witnesses who will tell others to sign, since the witnesses do not sign the get unless they heard the instruction directly from the husband himself.

Rav Hisda said: It is valid, but it is not to be done

as an initial matter, as a decree lest people come to validate even a case in which the husband tells witnesses to tell others to sign. In that case, there would be concern that perhaps the woman will hire witnesses who will tell others in the husband’s name to sign.

Rabba bar bar Hana said: It is valid, and it is to be done

as an initial matter.

Rav Nahman said: It is valid, but it is not to be done. Rav Sheshet said: It is valid, and it is to be done.

Rabba said: It is valid, but it is not to be done. Rav Yosef said: It is valid, and it is to be done.