Gittin 66b — the Talmud in English

Or

who said

to three: “Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife”—

since he explicitly said to them, “Write,”

these shall write

and sign it themselves

and give it,

and they are not permitted to tell a scribe to write and witnesses to sign, since he made them his agents and his witnesses, and in such a case an agent cannot appoint another agent.

And if

he said to three: “Give a bill of divorce to my wife”—

since he did not say to them, “Write and give,”

these

are permitted to

tell others, and they shall write

and sign and give it,

because

he did not make them agents and witnesses, but

made them a court,

so that they would attend to the matter of the bill of divorce; therefore they can transmit the husband’s words to others.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And this is the halakha

that

Rabbi Hanina of Ono brought up from the prison

in the name of Rabbi Akiva, who had been imprisoned there:

I have received

from my teachers,

concerning one who says

the husband

to three: “Give a bill of divorce to my wife”—

that they may tell others and write it, because he made them a court,

and this supports the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei said: We said [said]

to

the agent,

that is, to Rabbi Hanina, who became an agent in this halakha to recite it in the study hall:

We too have received

from our teachers, but not as you say; rather,

even if he said to the great court in Jerusalem: “Give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

they are not permitted to tell another to write it.

And if they are not expert in writing a bill of divorce, such as a new court that has not yet learned to write a properly formulated document,

they shall learn

to write

and write

it themselves

and give it,

since they themselves must do what the husband told them, and they cannot transmit his words to others.

If

the husband

said to ten: “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife” -

since he did not say to them, “All of you write,”

one

of them

writes

the bill of divorce,

and two sign

on it,

but if the husband said:

“All of you write it,”—

one writes and all sign,

for this was his intention.

Therefore, if one of them dies

before he signed the bill of divorce—

this is an invalid bill of divorce,

for whenever the bill of divorce was not made in accordance with the husband’s instruction, it is invalid. And the husband insisted that they all participate with their signatures in testifying concerning the bill of divorce.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: They sent to him from the study hall [from the study hall] of

the study hall of

Rav, to Shmuel:

Let our teacher teach us:

what is the law if

the husband said

to

to two: “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

but they did not write the bill of divorce themselves,

and said

the two

to a scribe, and he wrote, and they signed—what is the law?

Is what was stated in the Mishna—that the witnesses themselves must write the bill of divorce and cannot appoint another—referring to the signatures in the bill of divorce, and here the witnesses themselves did sign; or perhaps the Mishna is referring to the writing of the bill of divorce, and since another wrote the bill of divorce, it is invalid?

He sent to them [to them]:

[to them]:

Let her leave

her husband if she married on the basis of this bill of divorce, because we are uncertain whether the bill of divorce is valid or not.

And the matter requires study,

for the matter is not entirely clear to us, and it is still necessary to clarify the halakha with those greater than he, because there is uncertainty in the matter, whether the bill of divorce is valid or not.

And we raised the question:

What [what are]

the sides of the uncertainty, because of which

the matter requires study?

If you say [if you say] that his uncertainty was

[that the uncertainty was]

because

he held

that

the husband’s instruction to write the bill of divorce

is mere words, [they are merely a verbal instruction], and when the two whom the husband instructed to write appoint another in their place, it follows that they are agents of the husband only to transmit a verbal instruction

.

And it is uncertain to him

whether

a verbal instruction [a verbal instruction]

[an instruction alone]

may be transmitted [whether it can be transmitted]

[whether it may be transmitted]

to an agent,

who will be an agent concerning transmission of the instruction said to him; and if so, the two became agents to tell the scribe to write,

or it may not be transmitted to an agent,

and it is not possible to appoint an agent to transmit a mere verbal instruction, and they are not agents to transmit to the scribe the instruction to write ; and if so, the bill of divorce was written by the scribe without the husband’s instruction. And this is not similar to one who transmits a bill of divorce to his agent, who can return and appoint another agent, since there he became an agent for transmitting the bill of divorce .

If we say that this was Shmuel’s uncertainty, and concerning this he said, “The matter requires study,”

it is impossible to say so, for

Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says: A verbal instruction may not be transmitted

to an agent!

And they cannot become the husband’s agents for transmitting to the scribe the instruction that he should write ,

And since he held that this was the halakha, Shmuel should not have needed to clarify this matter with those greater than he.

Rather,

one must say that

this is what was uncertain to Shmuel

and this was the matter about which he was uncertain:

This [this] that the husband said to the two

[this instruction] that the husband gave to the two men,

“Write it,”

what was his intention?

Did [did] he intend only the signing of their

[he intend] only the signing of

handwriting

in the bill of divorce, but as for the writing of the bill of divorce itself, he intended that the scribe should write it,

or [or] perhaps when he said “Write it,” he intended that they themselves should write the

[perhaps] when he said, “Write,” he intended that they themselves write

writing of the bill of divorce

itself, and since they did not write it, the bill of divorce is invalid.

And we raise an objection:

Could he not resolve it

for Shmuel, this question,

from the Mishna

ours,

for we learned:

If he said to two, “Give a bill of divorce to my wife,” or

said

to three, “Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife”—

these

whom the husband instructed

shall write

themselves

and give it

themselves.

It follows from the Mishna that when the husband instructs them with the expression “Write it,” they themselves must write the bill of divorce! Why, then, did Shmuel not resolve from the Mishna that if the husband said to the witnesses, “Write it,” and they gave it to another to write the bill of divorce, it is invalid even if they themselves signed it?

And we answer:

That itself [this matter itself]

[this matter itself]

is what was uncertain to him

in the words of the Mishna:

Whether the

“write it”

in the Mishna refers to the signing of their

handwriting,

and what is written in the Mishna, “these shall write,” refers to the signing of their handwriting in the bill of divorce;

or

perhaps “write it”

refers to the writing of the bill of divorce,

and they themselves must also write the writing of the bill of divorce itself.

And we raise an objection: How is it possible to say that this was Shmuel’s uncertainty? For

it is obvious that the “write it”

in the Mishna

refers to the writing of the bill of divorce.

For it teaches in the latter clause: Rabbi Yosei said, “We said to the agent: We too have received that even if he said to the great court in Jerusalem, ‘Give a bill of divorce to my wife’”—

they shall learn

to write,

and write

themselves

and give it to her.

And now,

if you say

that the “write it” in the Mishna

refers to the writing of the bill of divorce—

then

it is properly

understood that there can be a court that needs to learn how the bill of divorce must be written.

But if you say

that the “write it” in the Mishna refers to the signing of their

handwriting,

this is difficult:

Is there a court that does not know how to sign its signature? [Can there be a court that does not know how to sign its signature?] For in every judgment of a court they must sign.

After all, they must sign every court ruling.

And we answer:

Yes, there is a new court [there is a new court]

that has not yet issued a judgment and has not yet learned to sign documents.

And if so, one cannot resolve from the Mishna that the writing mentioned there means the writing of the bill of divorce itself, and it is possible to be uncertain whether the “write it” in the Mishna refers to the signing of the bill of divorce or to the writing of the bill of divorce.

And we raise an objection: According to what we have now said, that Shmuel was uncertain whether the “write it” that the husband said to the witnesses referred to writing the bill of divorce itself or only to signing their handwriting,

and if we hold [and if we hold] according to the possibility

[if we adopt] the possibility

that this “write it”

in the Mishna refers to the signing of their

handwriting,

could Shmuel infer from this that

the writing of the bill of divorce

itself, if they told a scribe and he wrote it, is

valid?

For Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says: A verbal instruction may not be transmitted to an agent!

And they do not become agents for transmitting to another the husband’s words to write the bill of divorce. And even if the husband does not insist that they themselves write it, if the scribe writes it as their agent, there is a deficiency in the husband’s instruction, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

And if so, even if Shmuel was uncertain whether the husband’s intention in saying “Write it” was that they themselves should write the bill of divorce or not, nevertheless he should have resolved that if the agents told the scribe to write the bill of divorce, it is invalid, because it was not written according to the husband’s instruction.

And we answer:

They said,

they answered in the study hall, that one should say:

If we hold

according to the possibility

that the “write it”

in the Mishna refers to the signing of their

handwriting,

Shmuel holds that the bill of divorce is valid when the agents instruct the scribe to write the bill of divorce, because Shmuel holds that concerning the

writing of the bill of divorce,

since the husband does not insist that specifically the witnesses whom he appointed write it,

it becomes [is considered]

[as if]

as

though

the husband said to the agents

to the agents:

“Tell

others to write the bill of divorce.”

And Rabbi Yosei concedes in

this case

that

the husband

says, “Tell

another to write”

that agents can be made for this instruction, to transmit to another the command that the husband commanded him . And we raise the question:

And we raise the question:

Does Rabbi Yosei concede

that agency applies to a mere verbal instruction

when

the husband says to them in the language

“Tell them”?

And yet we learned: a scribe wrote

the bill of divorce

and

signed

one witness

after him—

the bill of divorce is valid, since it contains the testimony of two: the scribe’s handwriting and the signature of the other.

.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said: “A scribe signed,” we learned

in the Mishna, and what is written, “a scribe wrote,” refers to the signature of his handwriting, for if the scribe signed together with the other witness, the bill of divorce is valid.

And Rav Hisda said: The Mishna

that validates a scribe’s signature on a bill of divorce

whose is it

[according to whose method is it]? It is according to the method of

Rabbi Yosei, who said: Matters cannot be entrusted to an agent.

For according to his method, there is no concern lest the husband did not instruct the scribe to sign, but rather instructed his agent to tell this scribe to write the bill of divorce and others to sign it, and the agent was concerned lest the scribe be embarrassed to say, “They do not accept him as a witness,” and because of this concern the agent instructed the scribe to sign.

Since according to his method, a person signs the bill of divorce only if he heard the instruction directly from the husband himself, and not from the agent, because the agent is not permitted to say to the witnesses, “Sign on the bill of divorce of so-and-so,” and since the Mishna follows Rabbi Yosei, according to whose method there is no such concern, it therefore validates the bill of divorce on which the scribe is signed as a witness.

And from here we learn that Rabbi Yosei also disputes the case in which the husband says to them in the wording, “Tell,” that they cannot become agents to convey his instruction to another.

For,

and if it enters your mind

that

Rabbi Yosei agrees in the case in which one says, “Tell,”

that they become agents to convey the husband’s instruction to another, then how did they permit, according to Rabbi Yosei’s method, a bill of divorce that contains the scribe’s signature and the signature of one additional witness? After all,

a harmful result would emerge from it

[a ruin would emerge from it] if they permit this bill of divorce, because

sometimes

[it happens that]

he says to them

the husband

to two: