Gittin 66b (סו:) — the Talmud in English

Or

who said

to three men: “Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife”—

since he explicitly told them, “Write,”

they must write

and sign it themselves

and give it,

and they are not permitted to tell a scribe to write and witnesses to sign, because he appointed them as his agents and witnesses; and in such a case, an agent cannot appoint another agent.

But if

he said to three men: “Give a bill of divorce to my wife”—

since he did not tell them, “Write and give,”

they

are permitted to

tell others, who may write

and sign it and give it,

because

he did not appoint them as agents and witnesses; rather, he

made them a court,

so that they would attend to the matter of the bill of divorce. Therefore, they may transmit the husband’s instructions to others.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And this is the halakha

that

Rabbi Ḥanina of Ono brought up from the prison

in the name of Rabbi Akiva, who had been imprisoned there:

I have received

from my teachers

that when

the husband says

to three men: “Give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

they may tell others to write it, because he made them a court,

and this supports the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yosei said: We said

that is, we said]

to the agent

that is, to Rabbi Ḥanina, who had been appointed an agent to transmit this halakha in the study hall:

We too have received

from our teachers—but not as you said. Rather,

even if he said to the Great Court in Jerusalem: “Give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

they are not permitted to tell another person to write it.

And if they are not expert in writing a bill of divorce—for example, a new court that has not yet learned to write properly—

they should learn

to write

and write

it themselves

and give it,

because they themselves must carry out what the husband told them, and they cannot transmit his instructions to others.

If

the husband

said to ten men: “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife” -

since he did not say to them, “All of you write,”

one

of them

writes

the bill of divorce,

and two sign

it.

But if the husband said:

“All of you write it,”

one writes and all sign,

as this was his intention.

Therefore, if one of them dies

before he signed the bill of divorce,

this bill of divorce is invalid,

because whenever the bill of divorce was not prepared in accordance with the husband’s instruction, it is invalid. The husband had insisted that all of them participate by signing as witnesses to the bill of divorce.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: They sent a message to him from the study hall

of

Rav to Shmuel:

Let our teacher instruct us:

what is the halakha if

the husband said

to

two men: “Write and give a bill of divorce to my wife,”

but they did not write the bill of divorce themselves;

and

the two men

said to a scribe, who wrote it, and they signed it—what is the halakha?

Does the statement in the Mishna that the witnesses themselves must write the bill of divorce, and may not appoint another, refer to the signatures on the bill of divorce—in which case, here the witnesses themselves signed it—or perhaps the Mishna refers to writing the bill of divorce, and since another person wrote it, it is invalid?

He sent them

a reply:

“She must leave

her husband,” if she married on the basis of this bill of divorce, because we are uncertain whether the bill of divorce is valid.

“And the matter requires further study,”

as the matter is not entirely clear to us, and the halakha must still be clarified with scholars greater than he, because there is uncertainty whether the bill of divorce is valid.

And we inquire:

What

are the aspects of the uncertainty, on account of which

“the matter requires further study”?

If you say

that his uncertainty was

because

he thought

that

the husband’s instruction to write the bill of divorce

is merely words

and when the two men whom the husband instructed to write appoint another in their place, they are agents of the husband to transmit words alone,

and he was uncertain

whether

words

alone

can be transmitted

to

an agent

who would be an agent for transmitting the instructions given to him—and if so, the two men became agents to tell the scribe to write—

or whether they cannot be transmitted to an agent,

and it is not possible to appoint an agent merely to transmit words. Thus, they are not agents to transmit the instruction to the scribe to write, and if so, the bill of divorce was written by the scribe without the husband’s instruction. This is unlike a case in which one gives a bill of divorce to his agent, who may then appoint another agent, since there the agent was appointed to deliver the bill of divorce.

If we say that this was Shmuel’s uncertainty, and this is what he meant when he said, “The matter requires further study,”

this cannot be said, since

Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who said: Words cannot be transmitted to an agent!

They cannot be agents of the husband to transmit instructions to the scribe to write,

and therefore this matter is not subject to uncertainty.

And since he held that this was the halakha, Shmuel should not have needed to clarify the matter with scholars greater than he.

Rather,

one must say that

this is what Shmuel was asking,

and this was the matter about which he was uncertain:

This

instruction that the husband gave the two men,

“Write it,”

what was his intention?

Did

he intend only that they affix

their signatures

to the bill of divorce, while he intended that the scribe write the bill of divorce itself,

or

perhaps, by saying “Write it,” he intended that they themselves write

the text of the bill of divorce

itself, and since they did not write it, the bill of divorce is invalid?

And we raise a difficulty:

Shmuel could resolve

this question

from our Mishna,

which states:

We learned:

If he said to two men, “Give a bill of divorce to my wife,” or

if he said

to three men, “Write a bill of divorce and give it to my wife,”—

they

whom the husband instructed

must write

it themselves

and give it

themselves.

It follows from the Mishna that when the husband instructs them using the expression “Write,” they themselves must write the bill of divorce. Why, then, did Shmuel not resolve from the Mishna that if the husband told the witnesses, “Write it,” and they gave it to another to write, it is invalid even if they themselves signed it?

And we answer:

This itself

is

what Shmuel was asking

regarding the wording of the Mishna:

Does

“Write it”

in the Mishna refer to their

handwriting,

meaning that the statement in the Mishna, “they must write,” refers to affixing their handwriting to the bill of divorce,

or

perhaps “Write it”

refers to the text of the bill of divorce,

and they must themselves write the actual text of the bill of divorce as well?

And we raise a difficulty: How can it be said that this was Shmuel’s uncertainty?

It is obvious that

“Write it” in the Mishna

refers to the text of the bill of divorce.

As it teaches in the latter clause: “Rabbi Yosei said: We said to the agent: We too have received that even if he said to the Great Court in Jerusalem, ‘Give a bill of divorce to my wife,’

they should learn

to write,

and write

it themselves

and give it to her.”

And now,

if you assume

that “Write it” in the Mishna

refers to the text of the bill of divorce,

then

it is well

understood that there could be a court that must learn how the bill of divorce should be written.

But if you assume

that “Write it” in the Mishna refers to

their handwriting,

this is difficult:

Is there a court that does not know how to sign its members’ signatures?

After all, they must sign every judgment of the court.

And we answer:

Yes, there is a new court,

a court that has not yet issued a judgment and has not yet learned to sign documents.

Accordingly, the Mishna cannot establish that the writing under discussion means writing the bill of divorce itself; it remains possible to be uncertain whether “Write it” in the Mishna refers to signing the bill of divorce or to writing the text of the bill of divorce.

And we raise a difficulty: According to what we have now said—that Shmuel was uncertain whether “Write it,” which the husband said to the witnesses, refers to writing the bill of divorce itself or merely to affixing their signatures—

and if we hold

according to the possibility

that this “Write it”

in the Mishna refers to

their handwriting,

can Shmuel infer from this that

the text of the bill of divorce

itself, if they told the scribe to write it, is

valid?

But Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who said: Words cannot be transmitted to an agent!

They do not become agents for transmitting the husband’s instructions to another person to write the bill of divorce. Even if the husband does not insist that they write it themselves, if the scribe writes it as their agent, something is lacking in the husband’s instruction, and the bill of divorce is invalid.

If so, even if Shmuel was uncertain whether, by saying “Write it,” the husband intended that they themselves write the bill of divorce, he should nevertheless have resolved that if the agents told the scribe to write the bill of divorce, it is invalid, because it was not written in accordance with the husband’s instruction.

And we answer:

They said

in the study hall that one should say:

If we hold

according to the possibility

that “Write it”

in the Mishna refers to

their handwriting,

Shmuel holds that the bill of divorce is valid when the agents instruct the scribe to write it, because Shmuel holds that with regard to

the text of the bill of divorce,

since the husband does not insist that specifically the witnesses whom he appointed write it,

it is considered

as though

the

husband

said

to the agents,

“Tell

others to write the bill of divorce.”

And Rabbi Yosei concedes in

this case that the husband

says

“Tell”

“Tell

another to write it,”

that the agents may be appointed for this instruction, to transmit to another the command that the husband gave him.

And we inquire:

Does Rabbi Yosei concede

that agency applies to the transmission of words alone

when

the husband says to them using the expression

“Tell”?

And didn't we learn: “A scribe wrote”

the bill of divorce

and

signed

one

other [witness]—

the bill of divorce is valid,

because it contains the testimony of two: the scribe's handwriting and the other person's signature.

And Rabbi Yirmeya said: “We learned ‘the scribe signed’”

in the Mishna, and what is written, “a scribe wrote,” refers to the signature of his handwriting: if the scribe signed together with the other witness, the get is valid.

And Rav Hisda said: The Mishna

that validates the scribe's signature on a get

whose view is it?

[In accordance with whose view is it?] It is in accordance with

Rabbi Yosei, who says: Instructions cannot be entrusted to an agent.

According to his view, there is no concern that perhaps the husband did not instruct the scribe to sign; rather, he instructed his agent to tell this scribe to write the get and other witnesses to sign it, and the agent was concerned that the scribe would be embarrassed to say that he was not accepted as a witness, and because of this concern the agent instructed the scribe to sign.

Since according to his view a person signs a get only if he heard the instruction directly from the husband himself, and not from the agent, because the agent is not authorized to say to the witnesses, “Sign the get of so-and-so,” and since the Mishna follows Rabbi Yosei, according to whose view there is no such concern, it therefore validates a get on which the scribe is signed as a witness.

And from here we learn that Rabbi Yosei also disagrees in the case where the husband tells them using the expression, “Say,” that they cannot become agents to convey his instruction to another.

For,

if it could enter your mind

that

Rabbi Yosei concedes in the case of one who says, “Say,”

that they become agents to convey the husband's instruction to another, then how did they permit, according to Rabbi Yosei's view, a get on which the scribe signed together with one additional witness? For

a mishap would result from it

[a calamity would result from this] if they permitted this get, because

sometimes

[it happens that]

he says to them

the husband

to two: