Gittin 48a (מח.) — the Talmud in English

As it was stated: One who sells his field

when the Jubilee is in force,

and the substance of the land returns to its owners in the Jubilee, so it follows that the sale is only for the produce:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He brings

the purchaser of first fruits

and recites

over them the Mikra Bikkurim, even though his acquisition of the field is only an acquisition of produce.

Reish Lakish said: He brings

the purchaser of first fruits

but does not recite

over them the Mikra Bikkurim, since he has only an acquisition of produce in the field.

The explanation of their dispute is:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He brings and recites,

because

an acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance.

Whereas

Reish Lakish said: He brings but does not recite,

because

an acquisition of produce is not considered like an acquisition of the substance.

Thus, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed here in accordance with the nature of their dispute elsewhere, and they followed their respective positions.

And it is necessary,

for Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish to disagree regarding the same principle in two different contexts:

If it was stated

that their dispute applies only

in that case

of one who “sells his field for its produce,” I would say:

In that case Reish Lakish said

that he does not recite, since

when

the purchaser

descended

to the field [when he entered it in order to become its owner], he

descended with the intention of produce

alone;

he descended

[with the intention from the outset of acquiring only the produce].

But in this case

of one who “sells his field when the Jubilee is in force,”

when

the purchaser

descended with the intention of acquiring the substance

[the purchaser entered into an acquisition of the substance for a period, until the Jubilee arrives],

say that he concedes to Rabbi Yohanan

that he recites.

And if it was stated in this case

of one who “sells his field when the Jubilee is in force,” I would say:

In this case

alone

Rabbi Yohanan said,

since when he descended, he descended with the intention of acquiring the substance;

but in this case

of one who “sells his field for its produce,” since he descended only with the intention of acquiring the produce,

say that he concedes to Reish Lakish

that he does not recite.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to state their dispute in both of the aforementioned contexts.

Come and hear

a proof that one who sells a field when the Jubilee is in force brings and recites:

As we indeed learned in tractate Bikkurim:

One who purchases a tree and its land,

that person

brings and recites,

even when the Jubilee is in force. And this is a difficulty for Reish Lakish!?

And we answer:

Here,

in the Mishna of Bikkurim,

with what are we dealing? With a time when the Jubilee is not in force.

Come and hear

a proof that one who sells a field when the Jubilee is in force brings and recites:

From what else we learned in tractate Bikkurim:

One who purchases two trees within the field of another

without mentioning the land, that person

brings but does not recite,

because he has no share in the land, but only in the trees.

It follows:

If

he purchased

three

trees, he

brings and recites,

because whoever purchases three trees in land, even if the seller did not mention the land, acquires the land beneath the trees, the area between the trees, and even the land outside them to the extent of “the space required by one gathering figs and his basket”!?

We have therefore learned that even when the Jubilee is in force, one brings and recites whenever he also acquired the land. And this is a difficulty for Reish Lakish!?

And we answer:

Here,

in this Mishna as well,

also

with what are we dealing?

With a time when the Jubilee is not in force.

The Gemara offers another way to resolve the last two difficulties:

And now that Rav Hisda said:

The dispute—

in which Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed concerning one who sells a field when the Jubilee is in force—applies only when he purchased it

in

the years of the

second

Jubilee

year

that the Jewish people observed after entering the Land, because by the second Jubilee they had already become accustomed to the departure of the Jubilee and relied on the assumption that the land would certainly return to them in the Jubilee. If so, from the outset they sold and purchased only an acquisition of produce until the Jubilee.

But

when he purchased it

in

the years of the

first

Jubilee

year

that the Jewish people observed upon entering the Land,

everyone agrees

that he

brings and recites, for they had not yet relied

[the seller and purchaser had not yet become accustomed to returning their lands in the Jubilee], and their acquisition of the field was an “acquisition of the substance.” Although it was destined to return in the Jubilee, this was only an expropriation by the King, and not an acquisition for a limited period and only for the produce.

If so,

even say that it is a time when the Jubilee is in force,

the two last difficulties are not difficult

for Reish Lakish, because:

This—

the Mishna in Bikkurim—

concerns the first Jubilee,

when his acquisition was an acquisition of the substance; therefore, everyone agrees that he brings and recites.

This—

the statement of Reish Lakish that he brings but does not recite—concerns the

second Jubilee.

Shall we say that the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as to whether an acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance

is a dispute

of tannaitic conditions,

meaning that the tannaim of the following beraita also disagreed in this dispute?

a. One who consecrates his ancestral field [a field that came to him as an inheritance by virtue of the division of the Land in the days of Joshua] may redeem it from the consecration until the Jubilee. If the consecrator did not redeem it from the consecration, but someone else redeemed it, then in the Jubilee the field leaves the redeemer’s possession and is divided among the priests.

If no one redeemed it from the consecration, and it remained in the possession of the consecrated property in the Jubilee, tannaim disputed the matter in Arakhin 25b as to whether the priests have a right to it; Rabbi Eliezer’s view is that it remains in the possession of the consecrated property. b. All this applies when one consecrates his ancestral field. But one who consecrates a purchased field—that is, a field he purchased from another—then the field does not go to the priests. Rather, it returns to the owner of the field who sold it to the consecrator, as all this is explicitly stated in the passage in Bechukotai [Leviticus, chapter 23.

As it is taught in a beraita:

From where is it derived with regard to one who purchases a field from his father,

which had belonged to his father under the status of an “ancestral field” and would have been an “ancestral field” of the son—had the son not first purchased it—when his father died and bequeathed it to his son; however, since he purchased it from his father rather than inheriting it, it is an “acquired field” for the son: “

And he consecrated it

[the son],

and afterward his father died,”

and he inherits it,

from where is it derived that it shall be before him

from now

as an

“ancestral field,”

which leaves in the Jubilee for the priests, even though at the time of its consecration it was an “acquired field”?

The verse states: “

And if he consecrates his purchased field, which is not part of his ancestral field,

to the Lord. In the year of the Jubilee the field shall return to the one from whom he purchased it, to whom the inheritance of the land belongs.” Therefore, the verse added the words “which is not part of his ancestral field,” rather than saying, “And if he consecrates his purchased field to the Lord,” in order to teach:

A field that is not fit

at the time of consecration

to be an

“ancestral field”

is the one subject to the law of a consecrator of an “acquired field.”

This one is excluded, for it is fit

at the time of consecration

to be an ancestral field;

it is not treated as an “acquired field,” but as an “ancestral field,” since his father died and he inherited it.

These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Meir says:

The verse did not come to teach about a field whose owner died after the son who had purchased it from him consecrated it, that it is subject to the law of an “ancestral field,” because this is an “acquired field,” since it was so at the time of consecration. Rather:

From where is it derived with regard to one who purchases a field from his father, “

and his father died, and afterward he consecrated it,”

from where is it derived that it shall be before him as an ancestral field,

since he inherited it before he consecrated it?

The verse states: “

And if he consecrates his purchased field, which is not part of his ancestral field,”

and therefore the verse said “which is not part of his ancestral field,” to teach us:

A field that is not

actually

an ancestral field

at the time of consecration is an “acquired field”—

This one is excluded, for it is an ancestral field

actually at the time of consecration, and it is subject to the law of an ancestral field.

There is a novelty in this matter, for before he inherited it from his father, it was already acquired by him through the purchase, with the result that he inherited nothing in it. I would therefore say that this is not an “ancestral field,” but an “acquired field”; consequently, the verse had to include it.

The Gemara explains how one might have said that these tannaim disagreed as to whether an acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance. For:

Whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,

who maintain that the verse came to teach the greater novelty—that even if “he consecrated it and afterward his father died,” it has the status of an “ancestral field”—this is difficult: From where did they derive this!? Perhaps the verse came only to teach the lesser novelty, that if “his father died and afterward he consecrated it,” it has the status of an “ancestral field”!?

Certainly, the reason is that they maintain: “

His father died and afterward he consecrated it”

does not require a verse

to teach us that it is like an “ancestral field”; necessarily, the verse came to teach the novelty that even if “he consecrated it and afterward his father died,” it has the status of an “ancestral field.”

However, this is obvious: If it was already completely acquired by the son, then if the verse had not innovated that upon his father’s death the field becomes an “ancestral field” for the son, we would not have known this by reasoning alone, since he inherited nothing at all. And if you say that according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon no verse is necessary, this can only be because before his father’s death the son possessed merely an “acquisition of produce,” since the field was destined to return in the Jubilee; and now that his father died, he acquired an “acquisition of the substance.”

If so,

is it not with regard to this that they disagree,

Rabbi Meir, who holds that the verse must teach us that in such a field it becomes an “ancestral field” for him through the father’s death, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that it is unnecessary to teach that such a field becomes an “ancestral field” for the son:

Rabbi Meir holds: An acquisition of produce—

the acquisition that was destined to return in the Jubilee, which the son possessed by virtue of what he purchased from his father—

is considered like an acquisition of the substance,

as though it were completely acquired by him,

and

it follows that

in this case—

in this field acquired by the son—

it is through his father’s death that he does not inherit anything,

[there is no inheritance of anything here].

And therefore: Even “

his father died and afterward he consecrated it”

requires a verse

to teach us that nevertheless it has the status of an “ancestral field,” even though his inheritance did not add anything to what he had possessed by virtue of the acquisition.

to teach us that nevertheless it has the status of an “ancestral field,” even though his inheritance did not add anything to what he already possessed by virtue of the acquisition.

Whereas

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

maintain:

An acquisition of produce—

the acquisition that the son possessed by virtue of his purchase from his father—

is not considered like an acquisition of the substance,

and it follows that

in this case—

in this field acquired by the son—

it is only upon his father’s death that he now inherits it

[he inherited it now]; that is, there is a genuine inheritance here for it to be called an “ancestral field” for him,

and therefore: “

His father died and afterward he consecrated it”

does not require a verse.

And

necessarily,

when a verse is required, it is for “

he consecrated it and afterward his father died”;

that is what requires it.

It follows that the tannaim disagreed as to whether an acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance, just as Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said,

rejecting this: The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish does not depend on the dispute between the tannaim:

I can say to you that, in general, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon maintain: “

An acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance,”

and by logical reasoning the father’s death does not make the field an “ancestral field” for the son; certainly, a verse is needed to teach that it becomes an “ancestral field” for him.

And here,

where

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

maintain that the verse came to teach that a field which “he consecrated and afterward his father died” has the status of an ancestral field, and they did not interpret it as teaching only about a field where “his father died and afterward he consecrated it,” their reason is that

they found another verse

and

expounded it

to teach also about a field where “he consecrated it and afterward his father died.”

In other words: Although certainly, if there were only one inclusion, we would expound it only with regard to a field where his father died and afterward he consecrated it—for that is the novelty requiring a verse to teach it, albeit a lesser novelty—in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon this verse contains two inclusions. Therefore, they include even a field where “he consecrated it and afterward his father died.”

And what is the additional inclusion? If you say that the verse came to teach only about a field where “his father died and afterward he consecrated it,” then

let the Merciful One write: “

If he consecrates his purchased field, which is not his ancestral field,”

and we would derive this field from the superfluous wording “which is not his ancestral field.”

And why does the verse say “

which is not part of his ancestral field”!?

Necessarily, the verse came to teach another point:

A field that is not fit to be an ancestral field—this one is excluded—a “field which he consecrated and afterward his father died”—

“a field which he consecrated and afterward his father died”

that is fit

at the time of consecration

to be an ancestral field, and it has the status of an “ancestral field.”

and therefore has the status of an ancestral field.

Rabbi Yosef said: If Rabbi Yohanan had not said: “

An acquisition of produce is considered like an acquisition of the substance,”

Rabbi Yohanan would not have found—

Rabbi Yohanan himself—

his hands and feet in the beit-midrash!

For

indeed

Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yohanan said: “

Brothers who divide an inheritance are purchasers,”

meaning: When brothers divide an inheritance, we do not say that each one received the portion that was originally due to him, based on the principle that there is retroactive clarification. Rather, when they divided it, each one purchased his portion from his brothers; it is even possible that they exchanged their portions, and what was fit for one came to the other.

And

therefore

return

the brothers

to one another at the Jubilee

and return to being as they were before they divided, for the division is a transaction, and a transaction indeed returns at the Jubilee.

And since they return this to one another at the Jubilee, if so, at the outset each one acquired, at the time of the division, only acquisition of produce.

And if it enters your mind [

that is: if Rabbi Yohanan had held ]: “

acquisition of produce is not like acquisition of the substance,”

you would not find anyone who brings first fruits [

you would not find anyone who brings first fruits ] and recites the passage of the first fruits,

except

one sole son after one sole son [

an only son after an only son ]

until

the time of

Joshua son of Nun

, such that there was no “division of inheritance” in the field, for if there had been a division of inheritance, each one who divided the field would have had only acquisition of produce, which does not obligate one in reciting the passage of the first fruits.

But since Rabbi Yohanan himself said: “acquisition of produce is like acquisition of the substance,” if so, even a field in which there was a “division of inheritance”—its owners are obligated to bring first fruits from it and to recite over them.

Rava said: a verse and a beraita [

a verse and a beraita ]

support Resh Lakish

, who said: “acquisition of produce is not like acquisition of the substance.”

A verse

supports Resh Lakish: