Gittin 48a — the Talmud in English

For it was stated: One who sells his field ![](pamud.bmp "

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at a time when the Jubilee is in force,

and the substance of the land returns to its owners at the Jubilee, so it is found that the sale is only for the produce:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He brings

the purchaser of first fruits

and recites

over them the “Declaration of First Fruits,” even though his acquisition of the field is only a “fruit-acquisition.”

Resh Lakish said: He brings

the purchaser of first fruits

but does not recite

over them the “Declaration of First Fruits,” since he has in the field only a “fruit-acquisition.”

And the explanation of their dispute is:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He brings and recites,

because

a fruit-acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the substance.

Whereas

Resh Lakish said: He brings but does not recite,

because

a fruit-acquisition is not considered like an acquisition of the substance.

It follows that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish disagreed in a manner resembling the dispute in which they disagreed here, and they followed their respective positions.

And it is necessary,

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish had to disagree over one reasoning in two cases:

If it was stated

their dispute only

with regard to that

case of “one who sells his field for its produce,” then I would say:

with regard to that Rabbi Shesh Lakish said

that he does not recite, since

the

purchaser

when he descended

to the field [when he descended to become its owner],

he descended with the intention of produce

alone;

he descended

[he initially descended with the intention of acquiring only the produce].

But with regard to this

case of “one who sells his field at a time when the Jubilee is in force,”

the

purchaser

descended with the intention of its substance

[the purchaser descended to acquire the substance for a period, until the Jubilee arrives],

say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan

that he recites.

And if it was stated with regard to this

case of “one who sells his field at a time when the Jubilee is in force,” I would say:

with regard to this

alone

Rabbi Yoḥanan said,

since when he descended, he descended with the intention of the substance,

but with regard to this

case of “one who sells his field for its produce,” since he descended only with the intention of produce,

say that he concedes to Resh Lakish

that he does not recite.

Therefore

it is necessary

to inform us of their dispute in the two manners mentioned.

Come and hear

a proof that one who sells a field at a time when the Jubilee is in force brings and recites:

For we learned in the tractate of First Fruits:

One who purchases a tree and its soil,

he

brings and recites,

even though the Jubilee is in force; and this is difficult for Resh Lakish!?

And we answer:

Here,

in the Mishna of First Fruits,

with what are we dealing? At a time when the Jubilee is not in force.

Come and hear

a proof that one who sells a field at a time when the Jubilee is in force brings and recites:

From what we also learned in the tractate of First Fruits:

One who purchases two trees within his fellow’s field

without mentioning the soil, he

brings but does not recite,

because he has no share in the soil, but only in the trees.

It follows:

this

if he purchased

three

trees,

he brings and recites,

because anyone who purchases three trees in land, even though the seller did not mention the soil, that purchaser acquires the soil beneath the trees, what is between the trees, and even what is outside them, to the measure of “the full space for gathering [figs] and his basket”!?

We have thus learned that even at a time when the Jubilee is in force, he brings and recites whenever he also acquired the soil; and this is difficult for Resh Lakish!?

And we answer:

Here,

in this Mishna as well,

also

with what are we dealing?

At a time when the Jubilee is not in force.

And the Gemara adds another way to resolve the two latter difficulties:

And now that Rav Ḥisda said:

The dispute—

in which Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish disagreed concerning one who sells a field at a time when the Jubilee is in force—is only when he purchased

in

the years of the

Jubilee

the

second,

the second year of Jubilee observed by Israel since their entry into the Land. This is because by the second Jubilee they had already become accustomed to the departure of the Jubilee and relied on the assumption that the land would certainly return to them at the Jubilee; and if so, from the outset they sold and purchased only for a fruit-acquisition until the Jubilee.

But

when he purchased

in

the years of the

Jubilee

the

first

observed by Israel upon their entry into the Land,

everyone agrees

that he

brings and recites, for they had not yet relied

[the seller and the purchaser, since they had not yet become accustomed to returning their lands at the Jubilee], and their acquisition when they purchased the field is an “acquisition of the substance”; and although it is destined to return at the Jubilee, it is only a royal expropriation, and is not an acquisition for a period and for produce alone.

If so

[even say that it is at a time when the Jubilee is in force]

it is not difficult

for Resh Lakish concerning the two latter difficulties, because:

This—

the Mishna in First Fruits—

concerns the first Jubilee,

when his acquisition is an acquisition of the substance; therefore, everyone agrees that he brings and recites.

This—

that Resh Lakish said, “He brings but does not recite”—

concerns the second Jubilee.

Shall we say that the dispute of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish, whether a fruit-acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the substance,

Shall we say that the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish over whether a right to produce is considered like ownership of the substance itself

is a dispute among תנאים

that they disputed, so that the תנאים of the following beraita also disputed concerning this matter?

a. One who consecrates his ancestral field [that is, a field that came to him by inheritance through the division of the Land in the days of Joshua], the consecrator may redeem it from consecration until the Jubilee. If the consecrator did not redeem it from consecration, but another redeemed it from consecration, then at the Jubilee the field leaves the redeemer and is divided among the priests.

And if no one redeemed it from consecration, but at the Jubilee it remained in the possession of consecration, the תנאים disagreed about this in Arakhin 25b as to whether the priests have a right to it, and Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is that it remains in the possession of consecration. b. All this concerns one who consecrates his ancestral field. But one who consecrates his purchased field, that is, a field he purchased from another, in that case the field does not go out to the priests; rather, it returns to the owner of the field who sold it to the consecrator, as all this is explicit in the portion of Beḥukotai [Leviticus chapter 23].

For it was taught:

From where is it derived concerning one who purchases a field from his father,

which belonged to his father under the status of an “ancestral field,” and was destined to be the son’s “ancestral field”—had the son not purchased it initially—when the father dies and bequeaths it to his son; but since he purchased it from his father and did not inherit it, for the son it is a “purchased field”— “

And he consecrated it”

[the son], “

and afterward his father died,”

and he inherited him,

from where is it derived that it should be before him

from now

as a “

ancestral field,”

which goes out at the Jubilee to the priests, even though at the time of the consecration it was a “purchased field”?

The verse states: “

And if he consecrates his purchased field, which is not from his ancestral field

to the Lord. In the year of the Jubilee the field shall return to the one from whom he purchased it, to the one to whom belongs the inheritance of the land.” Therefore the verse added and said, “which is not from his ancestral field,” rather than saying, “And if he consecrates his purchased field to the Lord,” in order to teach:

A field that is not fit

at the time of consecration

to be “

an ancestral field”

is subject to the law of one who consecrates his “purchased field.”

This one is excluded, for it is fit

at the time of consecration

to be an ancestral field,

so that its law is not that of a “purchased field,” but rather that of an “ancestral field,” since his father died and he inherited him.

These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Meir says:

The verse did not come to teach concerning a field whose father died after his son, who had purchased it from him, consecrated it, that it should have the status of an “ancestral field,” for this is a “purchased field,” since at the time of consecration it was such; rather:

From where is it derived concerning one who purchases a field from his father, “

and his father died, and afterward he consecrated it,”

from where is it derived that it should be before him as an ancestral field,

since he inherited it before he consecrated it?

The verse states: “

And if he consecrates his purchased field, which is not from his ancestral field,”

and therefore the verse said, “which is not from his ancestral field,” to teach us:

A field that is not

actually

an ancestral field

at the time of consecration is a “purchased field”—

This one is excluded, for it is actually an ancestral field

at the time of consecration, and the law of an ancestral field applies to it.

And there is a novelty in the matter, for before he inherited it from his father it was already acquired by him by virtue of the purchase, and it follows that he inherited nothing at all in it. I would have said: This is not an “ancestral field,” but a “purchased field”; therefore the verse had to include it.

And the Gemara explains how there was room to say that these תנאים disagreed over whether a fruit-acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the substance; for:

Whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,

who hold that the verse came to teach a greater novelty, that even if “he consecrated it and afterward his father died,” the law of an “ancestral field” applies to it—yet is it not difficult: From where do they derive this!? Perhaps the verse came only to teach the lesser novelty, that if “his father died and afterward he consecrated it,” the law of an “ancestral field” applies to it!?

The reason is certainly that they hold: “

His father died and afterward he consecrated it”

does not require a verse

to teach us that it is like an “ancestral field”; and necessarily the verse came to teach the novelty that even if “he consecrated it and afterward his father died,” the law of an “ancestral field” applies to it.

However, this is obvious: If it was already entirely acquired by the son, then if the verse had not innovated that upon his father’s death the field becomes for the son an “ancestral field,” we would not have known this from reasoning, since he inherited nothing at all. And if you say that according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon a verse is not needed, this is only because before his father’s death the son had merely a “fruit-acquisition,” since the field was destined to return at the Jubilee; and now that his father died, he acquired in it an “acquisition of the substance.”

And if so,

is it not with regard to this that they disagree, Rabbi Meir, who holds that the verse must teach us concerning such a field that it becomes an “ancestral field” for him through the father’s death, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that it need not teach us that such a field becomes for the son an “ancestral field”:

Rabbi Meir, who holds that the verse must teach that in such a case the field becomes an “ancestral field” for him through his father’s death, and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, who hold that it is unnecessary to teach that such a field becomes an “ancestral field” for the son:

For Rabbi Meir holds: A fruit-acquisition—

the acquisition destined to return at the Jubilee, which the son had by virtue of what he purchased from his father—

is considered like an acquisition of the substance,

as though it were entirely acquired by him,

and

if so, it follows that

with regard to this—

in this field acquired by the son—

at his father’s death he does not inherit anything at all,

[there is no inheritance of anything],

and therefore: even “

his father died and afterward he consecrated it”

his father died and afterward he consecrated it”

requires a verse

to teach us that nevertheless the law of an “ancestral field” applies to it, even though his inheritance added nothing to what he had by virtue of the acquisition.

Whereas

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

hold:

A fruit-acquisition—

which the son had by virtue of his purchase from his father—does not

count as an acquisition of the substance,

and if so, it follows that

with regard to this—

in this field acquired by the son—

it is now, at his father’s death, that he inherits it

[now he inherited it], that is, there is an actual inheritance here for it to be called for him an “ancestral field,”

and therefore: “

His father died and afterward he consecrated it”

does not require a verse.

And

necessarily,

when a verse was required, it was required for “

he consecrated it and afterward his father died”;

that is what required it.

It follows that the תנאים disagreed whether a “fruit-acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the substance,” just as Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish disagreed.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said,

to reject this, that the dispute of Rabbi Yoḥanan and Resh Lakish is not dependent on the dispute of the תנאים:

I will always say to you: In general, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold: “

A fruit-acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the substance,”

and by reasoning the father’s death does not make the field for the son an “ancestral field”; certainly a verse is needed to teach us that it becomes an “ancestral field” for him.

And here,

where they hold,

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,

that the verse came to teach us that a field which “he consecrated and afterward his father died” has the law of an ancestral field, and they did not interpret it as teaching only about a field where “his father died and afterward he consecrated it,” their reason is that

they found

another

verse and expounded it

to teach also about a field where “he consecrated it and afterward his father died.”

That is, although certainly, if there were only one inclusion, we would expound it only concerning a field where his father died and afterward he consecrated it, which is a novelty requiring a verse to teach it, and is the lesser novelty, nevertheless, according to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon there are two inclusions in this verse, and therefore they include even a field where “he consecrated it and afterward his father died.”

And what is the additional inclusion? For if you say that the verse came to teach only about a field where “his father died and afterward he consecrated it,” then

let the Merciful One write: “

If he consecrates his purchased field which is not his ancestral field,”

and we would derive from the superfluous wording “which is not his ancestral field” that it refers to this field; and

what is “

from his ancestral field”!?

It necessarily follows that the verse came to teach additionally:

A field that is not fit to be an ancestral field, this one is excluded—

“a field where he consecrated it and afterward his father died”—

which is fit

at the time of consecration

to be an ancestral field, and the law of an “ancestral field” applies to it.

and therefore has the status of an ancestral field.

Rabbi Yosef said: If Rabbi Yoḥanan had not said: “

A fruit-acquisition is considered like an acquisition of the substance,”

he would not have found—

Rabbi Yoḥanan himself—

his hands and feet in the house of study!

For

it was

Rabbi Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “

Brothers who divided an inheritance are purchasers,”

that is, when brothers divide an inheritance, we do not say: Each one received his portion that was originally due to him, because there is “retroactive designation”; rather, when they divided, each one purchased his portion from his brothers, and it is even possible that they exchanged their portions, and what was fitting for this one came to that one.

And

therefore

return

the brothers

to one another at the Jubilee

and return to being as they were before they divided, for the division is a transaction, and a transaction indeed returns at the Jubilee.

And since they return this to one another at the Jubilee, if so, at the outset each one acquired, at the time of the division, only acquisition of produce.

And if it enters your mind [

that is: if Rabbi Yohanan had held ]: “

acquisition of produce is not like acquisition of the substance,”

you would not find anyone who brings first fruits [

you would not find anyone who brings first fruits ] and recites the passage of the first fruits,

except

one sole son after one sole son [

an only son after an only son ]

until

the time of

Joshua son of Nun

, such that there was no “division of inheritance” in the field, for if there had been a division of inheritance, each one who divided the field would have had only acquisition of produce, which does not obligate one in reciting the passage of the first fruits.

But since Rabbi Yohanan himself said: “acquisition of produce is like acquisition of the substance,” if so, even a field in which there was a “division of inheritance”—its owners are obligated to bring first fruits from it and to recite over them.

Rava said: a verse and a beraita [

a verse and a beraita ]

support Resh Lakish

, who said: “acquisition of produce is not like acquisition of the substance.”

A verse

supports Resh Lakish: