Gittin 47b (מז:) — the Talmud in English

Every fruit that grows in the same field,

tevel and non-sacred produce are intermingled with one another,

for every fruit contains both the share of the gentile, which is exempt from tithes, and the share of the Jew, which is obligated in tithes,

the statement of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

If the Jew and the gentile divided the produce, then those fruits

belonging to the gentile

[that came into the gentile’s share]

are exempt

from tithes [even if the Jew purchased them from him before the produce had been smoothed, and the Jew himself smoothed it], whereas

those belonging to the Jew

[the produce that came into the Jew’s share]

are obligated

in tithes, as he proceeds to explain the reason.

They disagree only—

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

in that:

One master—

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds: There is retroactive clarification,

meaning: It is retroactively established that the fruit that fell into each person’s share had already been his portion from the outset.

And the other master—

Rabbi—

holds: There is no retroactive clarification.

But according to everyone, a gentile has the power of acquisition in Eretz Yisrael to remove the obligation of tithes,

since according to everyone the gentile’s share is exempt from tithes. This would be an objection to Rabba, who does not hold this way! And we answer:

Here too, it is referring to Syria, and he holds

that even the tanna of this beraita holds:

The conquest of an individual is not considered a conquest.

Rav Hiyya bar Avin said: Come and hear

from our Mishna that a gentile’s acquisition can remove the obligation of tithes and first fruits:

For we learned:

One who sells his field to a gentile,

the seller

must purchase

[is obligated to purchase] from the gentile the first fruits of his produce,

and bring

them

as first fruits

to Jerusalem,

for the betterment of the world.

It follows that

for the betterment of the world, he is not

indeed obligated to purchase the first fruits from him and bring them to Jerusalem, but

by Torah law, he is not.

You have therefore learned that a gentile’s acquisition in Eretz Yisrael can remove the obligation of tithes and first fruits. For if this were not so, the seller would be legally obligated to take the first fruits from the gentile and bring them to Jerusalem, whereas in our Mishna we learned that this obligation exists only for the betterment of the world.

He said—

Rav Ashi answered:

There were two enactments:

That is, indeed, the fundamental obligation to bring the first fruits is not merely an enactment of the Sages, instituted for the betterment of the world; rather, by Torah law he is obligated to bring them. However, at first the Sages removed the mitzva of first fruits from such a field as a safeguard, and then they restored the matter to its original status for the betterment of the world, as the Gemara proceeds to explain:

The first enactment, exempting them from first fruits:

Initially, they would bring them by Torah law

[at first they would bring first fruits from such a field in accordance with Torah law], since a gentile’s acquisition in Eretz Yisrael cannot remove the obligation of tithes and first fruits—

But

once they saw

that the Sages

that they were engaging in this practice

[the expression “chance occurrence”]

and selling

[the Jews were lenient with themselves by selling their fields in Eretz Yisrael to a gentile, thereby violating the prohibition “You shall not show them favor”],

and

because

they thought

the people: Behold,

they remain in their sanctity

[they remain in their sanctity], since first fruits are brought from them, and we are not punished for selling them to a gentile—

Therefore,

the Sages instituted for them

as a safeguard

that they should not bring

[that they should not bring first fruits from such a field]; and this was the first enactment, exempting them from first fruits.

The second enactment, obligating them in first fruits:

Once they saw

the Sages

that one who cannot manage without it sells

[he sells it to a gentile],

and

eventually

the fields become entrenched

in the possession

of

the

gentiles—

The Sages again instituted for them,

restoring the matter to its original status,

that they should bring

first fruits from it, so that he would trouble himself and redeem it from the gentile. This was the second enactment, restoring them to the status of Torah law and obligating them in first fruits.

It was stated:

One who sells his field for “

produce”

alone, so that the purchaser may eat its produce until a certain time and the land will then return to its owner:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He brings

the purchaser brings first fruits from this field, which was acquired by him only for its produce,

and

he also

recites

over them the declaration of first fruits.

And because “

an acquisition of produce”—

which he possesses in the field—“

is considered like an acquisition of the body,”

he can say in the declaration of first fruits: “And now, behold, I have brought the first fruit of the land that You, Hashem, have given me.”

Reish Lakish said: He brings

the purchaser brings first fruits,

and

however, he

does not recite

the declaration of first fruits over them, because since he possesses only “an acquisition of produce” in the field, I cannot refer to this field as “the land that You, Hashem, have given me”—

And because “

an acquisition of produce”—

which he possesses in it—

is not considered like an acquisition of the body.”

Rabbi Yohanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish,

who holds: One who sells his field for its produce brings but does not recite:

From that which is taught in a beraita: It is written in the passage concerning first fruits: “And you shall rejoice with all the good that Hashem, your God, has given you and your household.” Therefore, the verse said: “

and your household,”

teaching that a person brings his wife’s first fruits,

first fruits from a field that his wife brought to him as nikhsei melog, property over which he has only an acquisition of produce,

and recites

the declaration of first fruits. It follows that the husband’s “acquisition of produce” in the field is sufficient for him to bring first fruits and recite the declaration!?

And we answer:

That case is different—

in the field belonging to his wife—because

it is written: “

and your household,”

to include it. On the contrary, from the fact that the verse had to teach us that he brings first fruits from his wife’s field, we may infer that “an acquisition of produce is not considered like an acquisition of the body.”

And some say: Reish Lakish raised an objection to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds: One who sells his field for its produce brings and recites:

As it is taught in a beraita: It is written in the passage concerning first fruits: “

and your household,”

teaching that a person brings his wife’s first fruits and recites!?

It follows that

there—

in the field belonging to his wife—

he

brings and recites because

it is written, “and your household,”

but in general,

in any other field in which he has only an acquisition of produce,

he does not

recite.

We have therefore learned that one who sells his field for its produce brings but does not recite.

He said to him—

Rabbi Yohanan to Reish Lakish:

My reason as well

[the reason for my view, that one who sells his field for its produce brings and recites] is

from here—

from this verse—that I

say

it, [I learned it from here], since the verse taught, with regard to his wife’s field, that his acquisition in it is considered like an acquisition of the body, and the same applies to every other acquisition of produce.

He raised an objection

to Reish Lakish, who says: One who sells his field for its produce brings but does not recite:

If he was traveling

to Jerusalem,

and his wife’s first fruits

[first fruits from property that his wife brought to him as nikhsei melog]

were in his hand, and he heard

on the way

that his wife had died,

then he

brings

those first fruits that were in his hand

and recites

over them, since he inherited ownership of the land itself, and with regard to that field at the time of the recitation we can say: “the land that You, Hashem, have given me.”

It implies: If his wife

died

before he brought them,

yes,

indeed he recites the declaration of first fruits, but if she

did not die,

and he has only an acquisition of produce in the field,

he does not

recite. This is a difficulty for Reish Lakish!?

And we answer:

The same law applies even though his wife did not die—he recites. And as for what troubles you, why did we state: “and he heard that his wife had died”?

“And his wife had died”

was necessary

to be stated

[there is a novel point here], because

it might have entered your mind to say: Let us decree

that in a case where, at the time he took the produce from the field, the field belonged to his wife, and by the time he brought it the field had become his, he should not recite the declaration of first fruits—a decree

on account of the statement of Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina!

As Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said:

The words of Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina are explained here in accordance with the interpretation given by Rashbam in Bava Batra 81b.

If he gathered

the first fruits of his field

and sent them

to Jerusalem

in the hand of an agent.

Or, the agent gathered them,

and the agent died on the way,

and the owner of the field came himself to bring them.

He

brings but does not recite, as it is stated: “

And you shall take, and you shall bring,”

meaning: It is written, “And you shall take from the first of every fruit of the land that you shall bring from your land.” It would have been sufficient for the verse to say only, “And you shall bring from your land”; why did the verse need to mention the taking?

Rather, it teaches:

Until the taking shall be

from the field, that is, the gathering,

and the bringing shall be by one

, by a single person.

Therefore, when the owner gathers the fruits and the agent brings them, the owner does not recite; and likewise, if the agent gathered them and died, and the owner brings them, the owner does not recite. But if the agent gathered them and the agent himself brought them, then the owner recites, because the gathering and the bringing were performed by one person [but the agent never recites, even if he himself gathered them and brought them].

Here too, since at the time of the gathering the field belonged to the woman, and at the time of the bringing it belonged to him, this is like a case in which the taking and the bringing were not performed by one person, and I might have said that he should not recite.

The beraita teaches us

that nevertheless he brings and recites. But the reason for the recitation is not “because” his wife died; rather, it is “even though” his wife died.

And Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish followed

their

respective principles

[Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish conducted this dispute in accordance with their positions, as they had disputed a similar matter elsewhere].