Gittin 39a — the Talmud in English

A. One who assesses a person for the Temple, saying, “The assessment of this person is upon me,” gives the Temple his assessment. However, his assessment is not estimated according to what he would be sold for in the market, but according to the amount of the assessment fixed by the Torah in the section of Bechukotai. The assessment is divided according to the years of the assessed person and according to his sex, whether male or female.

B. The Torah did not fix an “assessment” for one younger than a month. By law, one who says concerning one younger than a month, “His assessment is upon me,” gives nothing to the Temple.

C. One who obligated himself to the Temple for the value of a person [and not his assessment], such as one who said, “His value is upon me,” gives the Temple his value, namely, what he would be sold for in the market. Even if he was younger than a month, the one who vowed gives his value to the Temple according to the value for which he is fit to be sold in the market.

D. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagreed concerning one who said about one younger than a month, “His assessment is upon me.” According to the Sages, he pays nothing to the Temple, whereas Rabbi Meir holds: “A person does not render his words void.” When he said, “His assessment is upon me,” since he knows that there is no “assessment” in the Torah for one younger than a month, he intended only to say, “His value is upon me,” and he must pay the Temple according to his value, what he would be sold for in the market.

And we answered:

Who is this?

This

beraita is according to the view of Rabbi Meir, who says: A person does not render his words void. Even here, since a person knows that a slave is fit neither for sacrifice nor for building, when he said “Temple,” he certainly resolved to consecrate by this his value, and his intention was to say, “My value is upon me.”

And the Gemara supports this interpretation:

This too is reasonable—

that this

beraita is according to Rabbi Meir—

from what it teaches in the latter clause

of this beraita:

And so he is,

the master,

who consecrated

the

himself,

he

acts and eats.

His handiwork is not sacred, because

he consecrated only his value.

Granted, if you say that this is Rabbi Meir,

this

is well: the latter clause too is understandable, for there is no difference between whether he consecrated his slave or whether he consecrated his own body, because “a person does not render his words void,” and he certainly intended to obligate himself for his value to the Temple.

But if you say that it is the Sages,

and the reason for the first clause is that anyone who consecrates without specification something that is not fit to become sacred in its body consecrated it to become sacred for its value, so that it will be sold and its value will fall to the Temple,

then

granted

the one who consecrated

his

slave:

it is well explained that he consecrated him for his value, to be sold, because the slave

stands for his value

—[he stands for sale and receipt of money], and one can say that this was his intention.

But he himself [he himself who consecrated himself, as explained in the latter clause]—

does he

stand for his value [does he stand for sale and receipt of money]!? “For a free person has no value.”

Rather, certainly it is Rabbi Meir, and the reason is that “a person does not render his words void.” We say that his intention was not to consecrate the slave himself, and not even for his value; his entire intention was to obligate himself to the Temple for his value, according to what he is worth in the market.

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say—

the law concerning one who consecrates his slave—

is dependent on a dispute between tannaim [the tannaim disagreed in this dispute]:

For it was taught: One who consecrates

his

slave does not commit sacrilege through him,

and is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering and an added fifth if he derived benefit from the consecrated property.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: One commits sacrilege through his hair

of the slave.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: There is misuse of consecrated property through his hair

Is it not that they disagree about this [whether this is the point of their disagreement]:

One master— Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds:

the slave is

sacred

for his value, and therefore one commits sacrilege through his hair.

And the other—the first tanna—

holds: He is not sacred, and therefore one does not commit sacrilege through him.

And we reject this:

But can you understand it thus? According to your reasoning, this

wording, “

one commits sacrilege through him” and “

one does not commit sacrilege through him,” which the tanna used, is difficult!

For its meaning is that, according to everyone, the slave is sacred, and they disagree only concerning the law of sacrilege.

But according to your words, that they disagree concerning the very sanctity—whether it takes effect in the body of the slave—

this, then “

he is sacred” and “

he is not sacred”

should have been required for the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to say!

Rather,

necessarily,

everyone

holds that the slave is

sacred

to be sold for his value.

And here they disagree about this:

One master—the first tanna—

holds: A slave is considered like land, because the slaves were equated with land in the verse: “And you shall give them as an inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit as a possession.”

Just as there is no law of sacrilege with land belonging to the Temple,

so there is no sacrilege with slaves.

the first authority and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel have said!

And the other—Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds:

a slave is

considered like movable property, and the law of sacrilege applies to him.

And we challenge this:

If so, instead of their disagreeing—

until the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagreed—

about his hair, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said, “One commits sacrilege through his hair,”

let them disagree [let them disagree whether one commits sacrilege]

through the slave’s body, when one uses him!?

Rather, because of this difficulty, the Gemara explains their disagreement differently, and according to everyone the slave is sacred, unlike Rav: Everyone—both the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—agrees that a slave is considered like land, and therefore, concerning his body, according to everyone there is no sacrilege.

Just as there is no misuse of consecrated property through consecrated land, so there is no misuse of consecrated property through slaves.

And here they disagree concerning his hair,

the slave’s,

which stands to be cut, whether one commits sacrilege through it.

One master—Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds: hair that stands to be cut

is considered as though it were cut! It is no longer considered attached to the slave’s body, but is movable property, and therefore one commits sacrilege through it.

And the other—the first tanna—

holds: hair that stands to be cut

is not considered as though it were cut, and it is like the slave’s body, whose law is like that of land, through which one does not commit sacrilege.

Let us say that these tannaim—the disputants in this

beraita concerning hair that stands to be cut—

are like those tannaim who disagreed in the Mishna in Tractate Shevuot concerning a similar matter.

It is established for us: one who admits part of the claim must swear that he owes no more than he admitted. But one does not swear when the claim concerned land, whether the admission concerned land or the denial concerned land, and all the more so when both concerned land.

For we learned in Tractate Shevuot [42b]:

Rabbi Meir says: There are things that are like land

with regard to land,

[they are attached to land],

but are not like land! And the Sages do not agree with him in this matter.

How so?—

One who claims against his fellow and says to him:

I gave you ten grapevines laden

with grapes

to guard on my land, so that you would guard them, and now the grapes are gone; pay me their value!

And the other [the guardian]

says to him:

The grapevines that you gave me

were only five! He has thus admitted part of the claim, for he admits to five and denies the obligation for the additional five grapevines.

Rabbi Meir

obligates him to take the oath of one who admits part of a claim, because the law of grapes is not the law of land, concerning which one does not swear; rather, the law of grapes is that of movable property, even while they are still attached to the grapevines.

And the Sages say:

He is exempt from an oath, because

everything attached to land is considered like land, concerning which one does not swear.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina said:

The grapes that stand to be harvested are the point of disagreement between them, and this is how they disagree:

For Rabbi Meir holds: grapes that stand to be harvested

are considered as though harvested! They are no longer considered attached to the ground, but are movable property, and one swears concerning them.

And the Rabbis hold: grapes that stand to be harvested

are not considered as though harvested! Since they are attached to the ground, their law is like land, and one does not swear concerning them.

It follows that the disagreement between the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning hair that stands to be cut is the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Meir.

And we reject this:

You may even say that it is Rabbi Meir: you may say that the tanna who holds that hair that stands to be cut is not considered as though it were cut is Rabbi Meir, despite his holding that grapes that stand to be harvested are considered as though harvested.

For

Rabbi Meir said only there, that grapes that stand to be harvested are considered as though harvested,

but concerning grapes, since their time to be harvested has arrived,

as long as they remain [as long as they continue to exist on the tree] and are not harvested,

they become withered [the grapes become withered] and deteriorate. Therefore, from now on they are considered as though harvested, since their attachment to the tree harms them.

But here, concerning hair, Rabbi Meir will agree that it is not considered as though cut, for although the hair stands to be cut, nevertheless,

as long as it remains—as long as the hair remains on the slave’s head and is not cut—

it continues to improve [it continues to become better]. It follows that it still requires its attachment, and therefore the law of the hair is like the law of the slave himself, who is considered like land.

Here the Gemara returns to the words of Rav Hiyya bar Avin in the name of Rav, that one who renounces ownership of his slave causes him to go free, and he requires a bill of manumission.

When Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef went up

when he went up Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef

from Babylonia to the Land of Israel,

he stated this teaching of Rav [he repeated Rav’s teaching]

before him,

before

Rabbi Yohanan.

He said to him—Rabbi Yohanan said to him: Is it so that

Rav said this [is it possible that Rav said this]?!

And we wonder:

And is

he—Rabbi Yohanan himself—

not saying

this as well, that he wondered at Rav for saying so!?

But Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who renounces ownership of his slave causes him to go free, and he still

requires

a

bill of manumission, which is like Rav’s words.

And we answered: Rabbi Yohanan did not wonder, “Is it possible that Rav said this”?

Rather,

this is what he said to him—Rabbi Yohanan said to Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef: Is it indeed that

Rav said it according to my view [like me]?!

And some say:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Yosef told Rabbi Yohanan only the first part of Rav’s words, “One who renounces ownership of his slave causes him to go free,” and

they did not finish it before him [they did not finish the sentence before him], that “he requires a bill of manumission.”

And concerning this Rabbi Yohanan wondered and

said to him: And is it that

Rav did not say that he

requires a bill of manumission!?

And Rabbi Yohanan follows his own position,

[according to his view],

as Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who renounces ownership of his slave causes him to go free, and he requires a bill of manumission.

The body of the matter: Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One who renounces ownership of his slave causes him to go free, and he requires a bill of manumission.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla

from what was taught:

A convert who died,

and left no heirs after him,

and Israelites seized [and plundered, an expression of plunder]

his property,

for the property of a convert who died and has no heirs is ownerless, and whoever comes first acquires it.

they remain

And there were among them

in these possessions

slaves,

so that

whether

they were

adults, and whether

they were

minors, they acquired

the

themselves immediately upon the death of their master, and became

free persons! No one else could acquire them, since their acquisition of themselves had already preceded this.

Abba Shaul says: Adults

indeed

acquired

the

themselves, to be

free persons.

But the

slaves

minors, whoever holds them

even after some time

acquires them, and they become enslaved to him as slaves, for minors are not capable of acquisition, and they have no legal capacity to acquire themselves.

And now this is difficult for Rabbi Yohanan:

But who wrote a bill of manumission for these!?

That is, the Gemara understands that what is taught—both according to the Sages and according to Abba Shaul—“they acquired themselves as free persons” means that they became completely free and are permitted to marry an Israelite woman. This is satisfactory according to the one who says, “One who renounces ownership of his slave causes him to go free and does not require a bill of manumission,” but according to Rabbi Yohanan it is difficult!?

he—

Rabbi Yoḥanan himself—

not say

this

himself,

when he expressed astonishment that Rav had said it?

But Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who renounces ownership of his slave thereby frees him, but he

still

requires

a

He said—Ulla said concerning Rabbi Abba:

This rabbi resembles those among the Sages who have not learned teachings [this Torah scholar resembles people who have never learned], meaning: the objection has no basis from the outset, and there is nothing in his words.

And we explain:

And what is the reason

that nothing is difficult at all?

Rav Nahman said: This is because

Ulla holds that

the slave of a convert,

after his death, is

like his wife, because of a gezerah shavah, “to her, to her,” from a woman.

Just as his wife is sent away without a bill after his death,

since the husband’s death permits her,

so too his slaves are sent away after his death

without a bill

of manumission.

And we ask:

If so—that you compare a slave after his master’s death to a woman after her husband’s death—

even an Israelite

who has heirs

also should have his slaves go free upon their master’s death, just as his wife goes free without a bill upon his death, and they should not fall into inheritance before his sons!?

And we answer:

The verse says concerning a Canaanite slave: “And you shall give them as an inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit as a possession.” The Torah thereby revealed to us that the sons inherit the slave from their father.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla

from what was taught:

If a convert died

without leaving heirs,

and Jews seized

—that is, plundered—

his

possessions,

his property,

because the property of a deceased convert who has no heirs is ownerless, and whoever takes possession of it first acquires it.

And among the property

were

slaves.

Thus,

whether

they were

adults, or whether

they were

minors, they acquired

their

own persons

immediately upon the death of their master, and they became

free people!

No one else could acquire them, since they had already acquired themselves first.

Abba Shaul says: The adults

indeed

acquired

their

own persons,

to become

free people.

But with regard to the

minors, whoever takes possession of them

even after some time

acquires them,

and they become enslaved to him. Since minors cannot acquire property, they have no legal capacity to acquire themselves. The Gemara now objects to Rabbi Yoḥanan:

But who wrote a bill of manumission for these slaves?!

That is, the Gemara understands the statement—that according to both the Sages and Abba Shaul they “acquired themselves as free people”—to mean that they became completely free and were permitted to marry a Jewish woman. This is understandable according to the opinion that one who renounces ownership of his slave frees him and the slave does not require a bill of manumission. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, there is a difficulty.

He said Ulla concerning Rabbi Abba: This scholar is like one of the Sages

who

have never learned a teaching properly

—like people who have never studied. That is, the objection is invalid from the outset and contains nothing.

And we explain:

What is the reason

that there is no difficulty at all?

Rav Naḥman said:

It is because

Ulla holds

that

the slave of a convert

after the convert’s death is

like his wife,

on the basis of an inference based on the identical expression “to her” from the laws of a wife.

Just as his wife is sent away without a bill of divorce

after his death, since the husband’s death permits her to remarry,

so too his slaves are sent away

after his death

without a bill

of

manumission.

And we challenge this: If so—

if you compare a slave after his master’s death to a wife after her husband’s death—

even a Jew

who has heirs

also

would have his slaves become free upon his death, just as his wife becomes free without a bill of divorce upon his death. They should not pass as an inheritance to his sons!

And we answer: The verse

states concerning a Canaanite slave:

“You shall hold them as an inheritance for your sons after you, to inherit them as a possession.”

The Torah thereby teaches us that sons inherit their father’s slave.

The Torah thereby revealed that sons inherit their father’s slave.

But the slave of a convert, concerning whom the Torah revealed nothing, is like his wife, and he does not require a writ of emancipation.

And we still challenge:

If so:

an Israelite

who abandons

his

slave, and

afterward

dies too does not require a writ of emancipation—as his wife does!? For this slave is not included in the verse, “And you shall take them as an inheritance for your sons after you,” since the father has already died, and the sons never acquired him.

should likewise not require a bill of emancipation—like his wife!? For this slave is not included in the verse, “and you shall bequeath them to your sons after you,” since the father has already died, and the sons never acquired him.

Then why [A0012]why

did

did Amemar say: “One who abandons his slave

and afterward

dies, that slave has no remedy”? Since he abandoned him, the monetary ownership in him was nullified, and his master had only the ownership of the prohibition over him; and ownership of the prohibition alone does not pass by inheritance to the sons, since the law of inheritance applies only to money. Therefore, he has no one who can release him with a writ of emancipation.

Since, once he abandoned him, the monetary ownership in him ceased, and his master retained only the prohibited ownership over him; and prohibited ownership alone is not transferred by inheritance to the sons, since the law of inheritance applies only to monetary ownership. Therefore, there is no one who can release him by means of a document of manumission.

And we conclude: indeed, this statement

of Amemar is difficult!

Rabbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Joshua ben Levi: The halakha is according to Abba Saul

regarding the slaves of a convert who died: the adults acquired themselves as free persons, whereas with regard to the minors, whoever takes possession of them acquires them.

He said

asked

Rabbi Zeira to Rabbi Jacob bar Idi: