Gittin 39a (לט.) — the Talmud in English

a. One who consecrates a person’s erekh, saying, “The erekh of this person is upon me,” gives the hekdesh his prescribed value. However, his value is not assessed according to the price for which he would be sold in the market, but according to the rate of the erekh prescribed by the Torah in the passage of Bechukotai. The erekh varies according to the years of the person whose value is being assessed and according to his sex, whether male or female.

b. The Torah did not prescribe an erekh for one less than a month old. By law, therefore, one who says of a child less than a month old, “His erekh is upon me,” gives nothing to the hekdesh.

c. One who undertakes to give to the hekdesh the monetary value of a person [and not his prescribed erekh], for example, by saying, “His value is upon me,” gives to the hekdesh the amount for which he would be sold in the market. Even if he was less than a month old, the one who made the vow gives his value to the hekdesh, according to the price for which he would be fit to be sold in the market.

d. Rabbi Meir and the Sages disagree concerning one who says of a child less than a month old, “His erekh is upon me.” According to the Sages, he pays nothing to the hekdesh. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains: “A person does not render his words futile.” When he said, “His erekh is upon me,” since he knows that the Torah does not prescribe an erekh for one less than a month old, he intended only to say, “His value is upon me,” and he must pay the hekdesh his market value.

And we answer:

Who is the author

of this beraita—it is according to the view of

Rabbi Meir, who says: A person does not render his words futile.

Here too, since a person knows that a slave is not fit either to be sacrificed or to be used for construction, when he used the expression “hekdesh,” he certainly resolved to consecrate his monetary value through this statement, and intended to say, “His value is upon me.”

The Gemara supports this interpretation:

This too is logically apparent

—that this beraita is according to Rabbi Meir—

from the fact that it teaches in its latter clause

of this beraita:

And likewise,

the master

who consecrated

him

himself,

he

works and eats.

The products of his labor are not consecrated, because

he consecrated only his monetary value.

Granted, if you say that this is according to Rabbi Meir,

this beraita,

it is well

that even the latter clause is readily understood. For there is no difference between one who consecrates his slave and one who consecrates his own person, since “a person does not render his words futile”; he certainly intended to obligate himself to give his value to the hekdesh.

But if you say that it is according to the Sages,

and the reason for the first clause is that anyone who consecrates without specification an object that is not fit to become consecrated in its own substance consecrates it to its monetary value, so that it will be sold and its proceeds will go to the hekdesh,

then

granted

with regard to one who consecrates

his slave,

it can be explained well that he consecrated him for his value, to be sold, because the slave

stands for his monetary value

[he is destined for sale and the receipt of money], and one may say that this is what he intended.

But he himself

[the person who consecrated himself, as stated in the latter clause]—does he

stand for his monetary value

[is he destined for sale and the receipt of money]!? “For a free man has no monetary value.”

Rather, certainly this is according to Rabbi Meir. The reason is that “a person does not render his words futile,” and we say that he did not intend to consecrate the slave himself, nor even to consecrate him for his value. His entire intention was to obligate himself to give the hekdesh his monetary value, according to what he is worth in the market.

And the Gemara discusses this:

Shall we say

that the law concerning one who consecrates his slave is

subject to a dispute between tanna’im

[that tanna’im disagreed concerning this matter]:

As it was taught: One who consecrates

his

slave, there is no misuse of consecrated property involving him,

meaning that he is not liable to bring a guilt-offering and add a fifth if he derives benefit from the hekdesh.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: There is misuse of consecrated property involving his hair

of the slave.

Is it not the case that they disagree about this

[is this not the basis of their dispute]:

For one

—Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds that

the slave is

consecrated

for his monetary value, and therefore there is misuse of consecrated property involving his hair.

And the other

—the first tanna—

holds: He is not consecrated,

and therefore there is no misuse of consecrated property involving him.

And we reject this:

But can you understand it so?

According to your explanation, there is a difficulty with

this

wording: “

There is misuse of consecrated property involving him” and “

and

there is no misuse of consecrated property involving him,”

as the tanna stated!

For its meaning is that, according to everyone, the slave is consecrated, and they disagree only with regard to the law of misuse of consecrated property.

But according to your statement, that they disagree about the essential status of the consecration—whether it takes effect upon the slave’s body—

this

wording should have been:

consecrated

and

not consecrated,

it should have been necessary

for the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to say so!

Rather,

necessarily,

everyone

holds that the slave is

consecrated

to be sold for his monetary value.

And here they disagree about this:

For one

—the first tanna—

holds: A slave is considered like real estate,

because slaves were equated with land, as the verse states: “And you shall bequeath them [the slaves] to your sons after you, to inherit as a permanent possession.”

Just as there is no law of misuse of consecrated property with regard to consecrated land, so there is no misuse of consecrated property with regard to slaves.

And the other

—Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds that a slave

is

considered like movable property,

and the law of misuse of consecrated property applies to him.

And we challenge this:

If so, rather than disagreeing

—before the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagreed—

with regard to his hair,

as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said, “There is misuse of consecrated property involving his hair,”

let them disagree

[let them dispute] whether there is misuse of consecrated property involving

the

slave

himself,

when one uses him!?

Rather, as a result of this difficulty, the Gemara explains their dispute differently, and according to everyone the slave is consecrated, contrary to Rav’s view:

Everyone

—both the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—agrees that

the slave

is considered like real estate,

and therefore, with regard to his body, everyone agrees that there is no misuse of consecrated property.

And here they disagree with regard to his hair

of the slave

that is destined to be cut, whether there is misuse of consecrated property involving it.

One master—

For one

—Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

holds:

Hair that is destined to be cut

is considered as though it has already been cut!

It is no longer considered attached to the slave’s body, but rather is movable property, and therefore there is misuse of consecrated property involving it.

And the other

—the first tanna—

holds:

Hair that is destined to be cut

is not considered as though it has already been cut,

but is like the slave’s body, and its law is like that of land, with regard to which there is no misuse of consecrated property.

Shall we say that these tanna’im

of this beraita, who disagree concerning hair that is destined to be cut,

are like those tanna’im

who disagreed in the Mishna in tractate Shevuot concerning a similar matter?

It is established that one who admits to part of a claim must take an oath that he does not owe more than he admitted. However, one does not take an oath when the claim concerns land, whether the admission concerned land or the denial concerned land—and certainly when both of them concerned land.

As we learned

in tractate Shevuot [42b]:

Rabbi Meir says: There are things that are like land

in relation to land,

because they are attached to the land,

but are not like land; and the Sages do not agree with him

in this matter.

What are the circumstances?

One who makes a claim against another and says to him:

I gave you ten grapevines laden

with grapes

to guard

on my land, so that you would guard them, and now the grapes are gone; pay me their value!

And the other

[the guardian]

says to him:

The grapevines that you gave me

were only five!

He has therefore admitted to part of the claim, since he admits to five and denies liability for the additional five grapevines.

Rabbi Meir

obligates

him to take the oath of one who admits to part of a claim, because the grapes do not have the status of land, with regard to which one does not take an oath. Rather, the grapes have the status of movable property, even while they are still attached to the vines.

And the Sages say:

He is exempt from taking an oath, because

anything attached to the land has the status of land,

with regard to which one does not take an oath.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said:

The difference between them concerns grapes that are standing to be harvested,

and this is the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi Meir holds that

grapes that are standing to be harvested

are considered like harvested grapes!

They are no longer considered attached to the land, but rather like movable property, and one takes an oath concerning them.

And the Rabbis hold that

grapes that are standing to be harvested

are not considered like harvested grapes!

Since they are attached to the land, their status is that of land, and one does not take an oath concerning them.

It follows that the dispute between the first tanna and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning hair that is destined to be cut is the same as the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir.

And we reject this:

You may even say that it is Rabbi Meir

—you may say that the tanna who holds that hair destined to be cut is not considered as though it has already been cut is Rabbi Meir, despite his view that grapes standing to be harvested are considered like harvested grapes.

For

Rabbi Meir stated this only there

with regard to grapes standing to be harvested, that they are considered like harvested grapes,

but only with regard to grapes,

because once the time has come for them to be harvested, as long as

they remain

[as long as they continue to exist on the vine] and are not harvested,

they deteriorate

[the grapes become withered] and spoil. Therefore, from that point onward they are considered as though they have been harvested, since remaining attached to the vine is detrimental to them.

But here,

with regard to hair, Rabbi Meir would agree that it is not considered as though it has already been cut. For although the hair is destined to be cut, nevertheless, as long as

it remains

on the slave’s head and is not cut, it

continues to grow

[it continues to improve]. It follows that it still requires its attachment, and therefore the law of the hair is like that of the slave himself, who is considered like land.

And here the Gemara returns to the statement of Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin in the name of Rav: One who renounces ownership of his slave sets him free, but the slave requires a deed of emancipation.

When

he went up,

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef

went up from Babylonia to Eretz Yisrael, he

stated this teaching of Rav

[he repeated Rav’s teaching]

before

before

Rabbi Yoḥanan.

He said to him

Rabbi Yoḥanan: Is it possible that

Rav said so

[is it possible that Rav said this]?!

And we are surprised:

And

is it possible that

he

—Rabbi Yoḥanan himself—

did not say

also

so,

that he was astonished that Rav had said so!?

But did Ulla not say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who renounces ownership of his slave sets him free, and

he still

requires

a

deed of emancipation,

which is precisely like Rav’s statement.

And we answer: Rabbi Yoḥanan was not expressing astonishment by saying, “Is it possible that Rav said so”!

Rather,

this is what he said to him

—Rabbi Yoḥanan to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef: Is it truly the case that

Rav said in accordance with my view

[like me]!?

And some say:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef told Rabbi Yoḥanan only the first part of Rav’s statement, “One who renounces ownership of his slave sets him free,” and

they did not complete it before him

[they did not finish the sentence in his presence], namely, “he requires a deed of emancipation.”

Concerning this, Rabbi Yoḥanan was astonished and

said to him: And

is it possible that

Rav did not say

that he

requires a deed of emancipation!?

And Rabbi Yoḥanan followed his own view

[according to his position],

as Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who renounces ownership of his slave sets him free, and he requires a deed of emancipation.

The discussion itself: Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who renounces ownership of his slave sets him free, and he requires a deed of emancipation.

Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Ulla

from what was taught in a beraita:

If a convert died

without leaving heirs after him,

and

[they plundered, an expression of plunder]

the Jews

his

property,

for the property of a convert who died without heirs is ownerless, and whoever takes possession first acquires it.

And there were

among these assets

slaves,

then

whether

they were

adults, and whether

they were

minors, they acquired

for themselves

themselves

immediately upon the death of their master, and became

free men!

No other person can acquire them, since they acquired themselves first.

Abba Shaul says: The adults

indeed

acquired

for

themselves,

to become

free men.

But with regard to

minors, anyone who takes possession of them,

even after some time,

acquires them,

and they become enslaved to him. For minors are not capable of acquisition and have no legal capacity to acquire themselves. And now there is a difficulty for Rabbi Yoḥanan:

But who wrote a deed of emancipation for these slaves!?

That is, the Gemara understands that the statement—both according to the Sages and according to Abba Shaul—“they acquired themselves and became free men” means that they became completely free and are permitted to marry a Jewish woman. This is understandable according to the one who says, “One who renounces ownership of his slave sets him free and does not require a deed of emancipation”; but according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, there is a difficulty!?

Ulla said

concerning Rabbi Abba:

This scholar resembles one of the Rabbis

[this Torah scholar resembles someone]

who has never learned a teaching

[like people who have never studied]. That is: The question is entirely invalid, and there is nothing in his words.

And we explain:

And what is the reason

that there is no difficulty at all?

Rav Naḥman said: It is because

that

Ulla holds

that

the slave of a convert,

after the convert’s death, is

like his wife,

by means of a gezerah shavah, “to her, to her,” from a woman.

Just as his wife is sent away without a deed

after his death, since the husband’s death permits her,

so too his slaves are sent away

after his death

without a deed

of emancipation. And we challenge this:

If so

—if you compare a slave after the death of his master to a woman after the death of her husband—

even a Jew

who has heirs

as well

should have his slaves become free upon their master’s death, just as his wife becomes free without a deed upon his death, and they should not fall into inheritance before his sons!? And we answer:

The verse says

with regard to a Canaanite slave:

“And you shall bequeath them to your sons after you, to inherit as a permanent possession.”

The Torah thereby revealed that sons inherit their father’s slave.

But the slave of a convert, concerning whom the Torah revealed no law, is like his wife, and he does not require a document of manumission.

Yet we still raise an objection:

If so:

an Israelite

who abandons

his

slave, and

afterward

dies, too

should not require a document of manumission—just like his wife!? For this slave is not included in the verse, “And you shall take them as an inheritance for your children after you,” since the father has already died, and the sons never acquired him.

Why, then,

[why]

did Amemar say: One who abandons his slave

and afterward

dies—the slave has no remedy.

Since, once he abandoned him, the monetary ownership in him ceased, and his master retained only the prohibited ownership over him; and prohibited ownership alone is not transferred by inheritance to the sons, since the law of inheritance applies only to monetary ownership. Therefore, there is no one who can release him by means of a document of manumission.

And we conclude: Indeed, this statement

of Amemar is difficult!

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: The halakha is in accordance with Abba Shaul

regarding the slaves of a convert who died: the adult slaves acquire themselves and become free persons, whereas whoever takes possession of the minors acquires them.

Rabbi Zeira

asked

Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi: