Gittin 38b — the Talmud in English

And

Rav Ḥanina bar Rav Ketina said that Rav Yitzḥak said: There was an incident involving a certain woman who

was

half a maidservant and half a free woman ![](pamud.bmp "

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and they compelled her master

to free the half of her that was acquired by him,

and made her free

completely.

And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Why did they compel him to free her?

Because

they practiced with her a practice of promiscuity!

For she was forbidden to an Israelite because of the half of servitude in her, and she was even forbidden to a slave because of the half of freedom in her, and it was impossible to designate her for any man, and because of this they practiced with her an act of promiscuity through prostitution.

This proves that there is no prohibition of a positive commandment in freeing her when it is for the purpose of preventing transgression, and it is difficult for Abaye!? And we answer:

How can you understand it thus—

is the case under discussion comparable to the proof!?

There,

that maidservant

was not fit for a slave

[she was fit] because of the half of freedom in her,

and

also

was not fit for a free man,

because of the half of servitude in her; and therefore she was prone to prostitution, and they compel her master to free her.

But

here,

where we are dealing with an ordinary maidservant who is permitted to a Canaanite slave and to a Hebrew slave,

it is possible

for the master

to designate her for his slave

[to designate her for his slave],

and

by means of this

to guard her,

to protect her from prostitution.

And since it is possible to prevent her from transgression without freeing her, the prohibition of the positive commandment to free her was not permitted.

The substance [of the matter]: Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Whoever frees his slave transgresses a positive commandment, as it is stated: “

You shall work them forever.”

An objection

from the beraita that we learned:

There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer, who entered a synagogue

to pray,

and did not find ten

men for the quorum,

and freed

his

slave, and completed the

quorum of

ten!

And this is difficult: How did he do so!? Behold, he transgresses a prohibition of a positive commandment.

And we answer:

A mitzva is different.

For they freed him for the purpose of public prayer, and since it was for a matter of a mitzva, he does not transgress.

The Sages taught:

It is written: “And also from the children of the resident settlers who dwell with you, from them you shall acquire, and from their families who are with you, whom they begot in your land, and they shall be for you as a possession. And you shall bequeath them to your sons after you, to inherit as a possession

, you shall work them forever.”

And this is not a mitzva, but

permission

it is,

the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

For since Scripture said concerning the seven nations, “You shall not let any soul live,” Scripture needed to permit us to keep alive the children of the resident settlers, who were born to a father from the other nations and to a Canaanite mother, and to acquire them as slaves.

Rabbi Akiva says: “

You shall work them forever,”

it is an obligation,

and one who frees them annuls a positive commandment.

And we challenge:

And perhaps Rabbi Eliezer

who freed his slave in order to complete the quorum did so not because “a mitzva is different,” but because

he held

Rabbi Eliezer

in accordance with the one who says

that this is nothing but

permission

alone!?

And why, then, did we need to say above: “A mitzva is different”?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that Rabbi Eliezer held this way,

for

behold,

it is explicitly taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: “

You shall work them forever”—

it is an obligation.

And necessarily, “a mitzva is different.”

Rabba said: Through these three matters householders descend from their property

[because of the sin of the following three matters, householders are punished and descend from their property]:

A. Because

they bring their slaves out to freedom

[they free their slaves], and thereby transgress the prohibition of the positive commandment, “You shall work them forever.”

B.

And

because

they inspect their property on Shabbat

[they examine and look at their fields on Shabbat], in order to ascertain the needs of the field.

C.

And

for

setting their meal on Shabbat

[they set the time of their meal on Shabbat]

at the time

when the scholar lectures in

the beit-midrash.

And they should have set the meal before the lecture or after it, so as not to miss it.

For Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: There were two families in Jerusalem:

One set its meal on Shabbat,

at the time of the scholar’s lecture in the beit-midrash.

And one set

the main part of its

meal on the eve of Shabbat

[on the night of Shabbat] because of neglecting the beit-midrash during the day.

And both were uprooted!

This one because it set its meal at the time of the scholar’s lecture; and this one because it should have set the main part of its meal during the day, for the honor of the day takes precedence over the honor of the night; and if they were concerned about neglecting the beit-midrash, they should have set the meal not at the time of the lecture.

Rabba said in the name of Rav: One who consecrates

his

slave,

saying concerning him, “Let him be consecrated

”—he

the slave

goes out to freedom.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because this consecration has no other meaning besides going out to freedom—for it is impossible to interpret his words as consecrating the slave’s body to the Most High, since

his body

of the slave

is not consecrated,

since he is fit neither for the altar nor for repairs of the Temple.

Nor is it possible to interpret that he undertakes

to

consecrate the value of

the worth

of the slave, since

he did not say: “The worth of my slave is upon me.”

“The worth of my slave is upon me.”

Necessarily, his intention is to bring the slave out to freedom. And this that he says the expression “consecration,”

“so that he may be a holy people”

he is saying.

He intends to bring him into the complete sanctity of Israel by his going out to freedom, as it is stated concerning Israel: “For you are a holy people.”

And this is not similar to one who consecrates an impure animal [or any other thing that is unfit for the altar], which is sanctity of monetary value. For concerning other things it is not applicable to interpret that it is “so that he may be a holy people,” and therefore sanctity takes effect in it according to its value. But concerning a slave, in whom the sanctity of “a holy people” is applicable, sanctity of monetary value does not take effect in him.

And Rav Yosef said

in the name of

Rav: One who declares his slave ownerless

goes out to freedom!

For once he declared him ownerless, his ownership over him has already lapsed, and the slave acquires himself, and he is a free man.

The one who says

in the name of Rav: “The

one who consecrates

his slave goes out to freedom,”

all the more so

will Rav admit

with regard to one who declares ownerless

his slave that he goes out to freedom.

But

the one who says

in the name of Rav, “One who declares his slave ownerless goes out to freedom,” holds that Rav said this specifically when he explicitly declares him ownerless,

but

concerning

one who consecrates, he did not

say this, because there is no necessity that the master’s intention is to bring him out to freedom, for

perhaps

his intention is actual consecration, and

to

undertake

the worth

of the slave for the Most High

he is saying.

They raised a question before them:

A slave whose monetary acquisition that his master has in him has lapsed, and the slave acquired himself—such as when his master declared him ownerless or consecrated him—is he still

in need of a bill of emancipation,

in order to remove from him the name of slave with regard to the prohibition, and permit him to an Israelite woman?

Or

perhaps,

he does not need

a bill of emancipation. Since his master has no authority over him, he automatically becomes an Israelite in every respect.

And we resolve it:

Come and hear

that he does need a bill of emancipation, from that which

Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rav:

One

slave,

this

whose master declared him ownerless,

and this one

whose master consecrated him,

goes out

the slave

to freedom.

And

nevertheless, he

needs

still

a bill of emancipation,

to bring him into the sanctity of Israel.

And this is Rav’s method. But Shmuel held: He does not need a bill of emancipation, and he expounds this from “a male slave”: a slave over whom his master has no authority is not called a “slave,” as brought above.

Rabba said: And we raise an objection against our teaching,

we challenge our teaching in the name of Rav, “One who consecrates his slave goes out to freedom,” from that which

is taught:

One who consecrates

all

his property, and there were slaves among it,

the slave becomes consecrated according to his value, and

the treasurers are not authorized to bring them out to freedom.

And although every slave acquires himself by giving money to his master [and we find that a slave can have money of his own, such as when a person gives him money on condition that his master has no authority over this money], and thereby goes out to freedom, this slave who was consecrated according to his value—the treasurers are not authorized to free him with money, because his body is not acquired by the consecration, but only his value, and only the owners of the slave’s body can free him.

But they sell

the treasurers

them,

the slaves consecrated according to their value,

to others,

and through this they are released from their sanctity.

And

those

others

who acquired them from the consecration, if they wish, they

bring them out to freedom.

Rabbi says: I say, even he

[the slave himself]

gives

the consecration

the value of himself, and goes out

to freedom.

Because

the treasurer

is as though he sells him

the slave

to him

[to the slave himself]. And just as he can sell him to others by way of a transaction, so too he can sell to the slave himself by way of a transaction, and not by way of emancipation.

This proves that the slave is not freed through his master’s consecrating him, but becomes consecrated according to his value. And this is difficult for Rav, who said “he goes out to freedom.”

And we answer: Is it

a teaching that you cast against Rav

[are you challenging Rav from a beraita]!?

But

Rav is a tannai

himself,

and disagrees

with the tannai of the beraita, and holds that the slave does not become consecrated according to his value, but goes out to freedom.

Come and hear

a challenge against Rav from that which is taught:

It is written: “

But every ban

that a man bans to the Lord, from all that is his, from man to beast.”

And we explain: “

From man”—

these are his Canaanite slaves and maidservants.

For if he consecrated them, they are consecrated with the sanctity of monetary value for the repairs of the Temple.

And this is difficult for Rav, who said that they are not consecrated. And here we cannot answer that Rav is a tannai and disagrees with this beraita, for this is expounded from a verse.

And we answer: Here, with what are we dealing?

That he said “

for their value.”

He did not consecrate him without specification; rather, the master vowed explicitly and said: “The value of my slave is upon me!” For he undertakes to pay the value of the slave to the hekdesh, and no more.

The Gemara raises an objection to the answer:

If so, the other

beraita concerning one who consecrates his slave—which we raised above as an objection to Rav—

also

should we explain in this way!? And should we interpret that beraita as dealing with a case in which he did not consecrate the slave himself, but vowed: “I hereby take his value upon myself.”

And we reject this: It is impossible to establish that beraita as referring to one who says, “The value of my slave is upon me.”

For if so,

as it teaches:

“The treasurers are not authorized to set them free,”

there is a difficulty:

What

is the function of the treasurers!?

For what concern are treasurers here!? After all, hekdesh has no acquisition whatsoever in the body of the slave; it has only a monetary claim for the value of the slave against the owners, and no more.

Furthermore,

for another reason we are compelled to say that the beraita is not speaking of one who vows to hekdesh the value of the slave, for it teaches:

“But they sell them to others, and others set them free.”

And if the beraita is speaking of one who says, “The value of the slave is upon me,” there is a difficulty:

“Others,”

what is their function!?

After all, others have no acquisition whatsoever in the slave, for even hekdesh had nothing in him.

Furthermore,

for yet another reason it is impossible to establish the beraita in this manner, for it teaches:

“Rabbi says: I say that he too gives the value of himself and goes free, because he is like one who sells him to himself.”

And if

it is speaking of one who became liable

for the value of

the slave,

what is

“because he is like one who sells him to himself”!?

For hekdesh did not acquire the slave, and he is still under the authority of his master; so how can the treasurer sell the slave to himself?

Come and hear

to raise an objection to Rav from that which was taught in a beraita:

One who consecrates

his

slave,

that slave

works

at his labor

and eats

for his sustenance from the products of his hands.

And it is not misuse [of consecrated property], because the products of the slave’s hands do not belong to hekdesh. Since he

consecrated

only

the

value

but his body is not sanctified.