Gittin 38b (לח:) — the Talmud in English

And

Rav Ḥanina bar Rav Kattina said that Rabbi Yitzḥak said: There was an incident involving a woman who

was

half-slave and half-free

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and they compelled her master

to release the half of her that was owned by him,

and made her free

entirely.

And Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

Why did they compel him to free her?

Because

they treated her as available to all!

For she was forbidden to a Jew on account of the half of her that was enslaved, and she was likewise forbidden to a slave on account of the half of her that was free; and it was impossible to designate her exclusively for any man. Consequently, they treated her as available for licentious relations.

This proves that there is no prohibition against freeing her when it is done to prevent transgression, which presents a difficulty to Abaye! And we answer:

How can these cases be compared?

Is the matter under discussion comparable to the proof?

There,

that slave woman

was not fit for a slave

[she was not fit] because of the half of her that was free,

and

also

was not fit for a free man,

because of the half of her that was enslaved. Therefore, she was prone to licentiousness, and her master was compelled to free her.

But

here,

where we are dealing with an ordinary slave woman, who is permitted to a Canaanite slave and to a Hebrew slave,

it is possible

for the master

to designate her for his slave

[to designate her for his slave],

and

by doing so

to guard her,

to protect her from licentiousness.

And since it is possible to prevent her from transgressing without freeing her, the prohibition against freeing her was not set aside.

The Gemara returns to the matter itself: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Anyone who frees his slave violates a positive mitzva, as it is stated “

You shall work them forever.”

The Gemara raises an objection

from a beraita that we learned:

There was an incident involving Rabbi Eliezer, who entered a synagogue

to pray,

but did not find ten

men for a quorum,

and freed

his

slave, and completed the

quorum of

ten!

But this is difficult: How could he do so? Does he not violate a positive mitzva?

And we answer:

A mitzva is different.

For he freed him for the purpose of communal prayer, and since it was for the sake of a mitzva, he does not violate the prohibition.

The Sages taught:

It is written: “And also from the children of the resident aliens who reside among you, from them you may acquire, and from their families who are with you, whom they have begotten in your land; and they shall be your holding. And you shall bequeath them to your children after you, to inherit as a holding,

and you shall work them forever.”

This is not a mitzva; rather,

it is a permission,

it is,

the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Since the verse stated with regard to the seven nations, “You shall not allow any soul to live,” the verse had to permit us to keep alive the children of resident aliens, who were born to a father from the other nations and to a Canaanite mother, and to acquire them as slaves.

Rabbi Akiva says: “

You shall work them forever” —

it is an obligation,

and one who frees them nullifies a positive mitzva.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps Rabbi Eliezer,

who freed his slave in order to complete the quorum, did not do so because “a mitzva is different,” but because

Rabbi Eliezer held

that

he follows the one who says

that this is nothing more than

a permission

in general?!

Why, then, did we need to say above, “A mitzva is different”?

And we answer:

That cannot enter your mind

that Rabbi Eliezer held this way,

as

behold,

it is explicitly taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: “

You shall work them forever” —

it is an obligation.

Necessarily, then, “a mitzva is different.”

Rabba said: For these three matters, householders lose their property

[because of the sin of the following three matters, householders are punished and lose their wealth]:

A. Because

they release their slaves into freedom

[they free their slaves], and thereby violate the positive prohibition of “You shall work them forever.”

B.

And

because

they inspect their property on Shabbat

[they examine and look over their fields on Shabbat], in order to ascertain the needs of the field.

C.

And

because

they set their meal on Shabbat

[they set the time of their meal on Shabbat]

at the time

when the scholar lectures in

the beit-midrash.

They should have set the meal before or after the lecture, so as not to miss it.

As Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There were two families in Jerusalem:

One set its meal on Shabbat,

at the time when the scholar delivered his lecture in the beit-midrash.

And the other set

the principal part of

its meal on the eve of Shabbat

[on Friday night], because this would cause them to neglect the beit-midrash during the day.

And both were uprooted!

The first because it set its meal at the time of the scholar’s lecture; and the second because it should have set the principal part of its meal during the day, as the honor of the day takes precedence over the honor of the night. And if they were concerned about neglecting the beit-midrash, they should have set the meal at a time other than the lecture.

Rabba said that Rav said: One who consecrates

his

slave,

saying of him, “Let him be consecrated” —

the slave goes

out

to freedom.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

Because this consecration can have no other meaning than release into freedom. For it cannot be explained that he consecrates the slave’s body to the Most High, since

his body

of the slave

is not consecrated,

as he is fit neither for the altar nor for Temple maintenance.

Nor can it be explained that he undertakes

to

consecrate the value of

the monetary value

of the slave, since

he did not say “The value of my slave is upon me.”

“The value of my slave is upon me.”

Necessarily, his intention is to release the slave into freedom. And the reason he used the expression “consecration” is that

“that he may become a holy nation”

is what he said.

He intends to bring him into the complete sanctity of Israel by having him go free, as it is stated with regard to Israel, “For you are a holy people.”

This is not comparable to one who consecrates an impure animal [or any other thing unfit for the altar], whose sanctity is sanctity of its monetary value. For with other things it is not possible to interpret the declaration as meaning “that it may become a holy nation,” and therefore sanctity of monetary value takes effect in them. But with a slave, in whom the sanctity of “a holy nation” is applicable, sanctity of monetary value does not take effect.

And Rav Yosef said

in the name of

Rav: One who renounces ownership of his slave

has set him free!

Once he renounced ownership of him, his ownership of him has been removed, the slave acquires himself, and he is a free man.

The one who says

in Rav’s name, “One who

consecrates

his slave has set him free,”

all the more so

will Rav

with regard to one who renounces ownership of

his slave, agree that he has set him free.

But

the one who says

in Rav’s name, “One who renounces ownership of his slave has set him free,” holds that Rav said this specifically when he explicitly renounced ownership of him,

but

with regard to

one who consecrates him, he did not

say this, because there is no certainty that the master’s intention was to release him into freedom:

perhaps

his intention was actual consecration, and

to

consecrate

the monetary value

of the slave to the Most High,

is what he said.

They raised a dilemma:

In the case of a slave whose master’s monetary ownership of him has been removed, and the slave acquires himself—for example, when his master renounced ownership of him or consecrated him—does he still

require a bill of manumission,

in order to remove his status as a slave with regard to the prohibition and permit him to marry an Israelite woman?

Or

perhaps

he does not require

a bill of manumission. Since his master has no authority over him, he automatically becomes an Israelite in every respect.

And we resolve the dilemma:

Come and hear

that he requires a bill of manumission, from

what Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said that Rav said:

Whether

it is a

certain

slave whom his master renounced ownership of,

or this one

whom his master consecrated,

the slave has gone

out

to freedom.

But

nevertheless, he

requires

still

a bill of manumission,

to bring him into the sanctity of Israel.

And this is Rav’s position. But Shmuel holds that he does not require a bill of manumission, and he derives this from “a slave of a man”: A slave over whom his master has no authority is not called a slave, as brought above.

Rabba said: And we raise an objection against our tradition,

we challenge our tradition in the name of Rav, “One who consecrates his slave has set him free,” from

that which is taught:

One who consecrates

all

his property, and there were slaves among it,

the slave becomes consecrated for his monetary value, and

the treasurers are not authorized to set them free.

Although every slave can acquire himself by giving money to his master [and we find that a slave can have money of his own, such as when a person gives him money on the condition that his master has no authority over that money], and thereby goes free, this slave, who was consecrated for his monetary value, cannot be released by the treasurers in exchange for money, because his body is not owned by the consecration, only his monetary value; and only one who owns the slave’s body can set him free.

But they sell

the treasurers

them,

the slaves consecrated for their monetary value,

to others,

and through this they are released from their sanctity.

And those

who took

them

from the consecration, if they wish, can

set them free.

Rabbi says: I say that he too

[the slave himself]

gives

the consecration

his own monetary value, and goes

free.

Because

the treasurer is

like one who sells him

the slave

to him

[to the slave himself]. Just as he can sell him to others by means of a sale, so too he can sell him to the slave himself by means of a sale, rather than by release.

This proves that the slave does not go free because his master consecrated him; rather, he becomes consecrated for his monetary value. This presents a difficulty to Rav, who said, “He has gone free.”

And we answer: Are you raising

a Mishnaic teaching as an objection against Rav

[are you challenging Rav from a beraita]?!

But

Rav is a tanna

himself,

and he disagrees

with the tanna of the beraita, holding that the slave does not become consecrated for his monetary value; rather, he goes free.

Come and hear

a challenge to Rav from that which is taught:

It is written: “

But every devoted thing

that a man dedicates to the Lord, from all that is his, from man to beast.”

And we explain: “

From man” —

these are his Canaanite slaves and slave women.

If he consecrates them, they are sanctified with sanctity of monetary value for Temple maintenance.

This presents a difficulty to Rav, who said that they are not consecrated. Here we cannot answer that Rav is a tanna and disagrees with this beraita, since this interpretation is derived from the verse itself.

And we answer: Here we are dealing with a case

where he said “

for their value.”

He did not consecrate him without qualification; rather, the master explicitly made a vow and said: “The value of my slave is incumbent upon me!” Thus, he undertakes to pay the value of the slave to the hekdesh, and nothing more.

The Gemara challenges this answer:

If so, the other

beraita concerning one who consecrates his slave—which we cited above as an objection to Rav—

also

should be explained in this manner!? We should interpret that beraita as dealing with a case in which he did not consecrate the slave himself, but rather vowed: “I hereby undertake his value.”

And we reject this: It is impossible to establish that beraita as referring to one who says, “The value of my slave is incumbent upon me.”

For if so,

with regard to that which it teaches, “

The treasurers are not authorized to emancipate them,”

the following difficulty arises:

Treasurers—what

is their function!?

What connection do treasurers have here!? For the hekdesh has acquired no rights in the slave’s body; it has only a monetary claim against the owner for the value of the slave, and nothing more.

Furthermore,

there is another reason that we are compelled to say that the beraita is not speaking of one who vows the value of the slave to the hekdesh, for it teaches: “

But they sell them to others, and the others emancipate them.”

And if the beraita is speaking of one who says, “The value of the slave is incumbent upon me,” the difficulty arises: “

Others,”

what is their function!?

For those others have acquired no rights whatsoever in the slave, since even the hekdesh had acquired nothing in him.

Furthermore,

there is another reason that the beraita cannot be established in this manner, for it teaches: “

Rabbi says: I say that he too gives his own value and goes free, because it is as though he sold him to himself.”

And if

it is speaking of one who became liable

for the value of

the slave,

what is the meaning of “

because it is as though he sold him to himself”!?

For the hekdesh did not acquire the slave, and he is still under the authority of his master; so how can the treasurer sell the slave to himself?

Come and hear

an objection to Rav from that which was taught in a beraita:

One who consecrates

his

slave,

that slave

continues to perform

his labor,

and eats

for his sustenance from the proceeds of his work.

And this is not misappropriation of consecrated property (me'ila), because the slave’s labor does not belong to the hekdesh.

For he consecrated

only

his

value,

but his body is not consecrated.