Gittin 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

that we impose a vow upon him

the priest

in public

before his service! Since a vow imposed in public cannot be annulled or released, we are certain that he will divorce her. Therefore, he may descend and perform the service immediately.

We nevertheless ask:

This works according to the one who says:

a vow imposed in public cannot be annulled

or released! Therefore, he may descend and perform the service by virtue of this vow.

But according to the one who says: “

Even a vow imposed in public

can be annulled

and released,”

what can be said!?

What purpose does the vow serve? He can still have it released by a Sage!?

And we answer: This is what we are dealing with:

that we impose a vow upon him

the priest

with the consent of the public!

That is, the members of the public before whom he takes the vow say to him: “We impose this vow upon you with our consent!” Such a vow cannot be released, according to everyone.

This

is what

Ameimar said: The halakha is: even according to the one who says: “

A vow imposed in public can be annulled” —

But if he took a vow

with the consent of the public, it cannot be annulled.

That is: it cannot be released by a Sage!

And this applies—

that it cannot be released—only when he needs to have it released

for

the sake of

a voluntary matter.

But

if releasing it is necessary

for the sake of a mitzva, it can be annulled,

even though he took the vow with the consent of the public.

What is an example of a voluntary matter?

Like that case of a teacher of children

a teacher of young children,

upon whom Rav Aḥa imposed a vow with the consent of the public,

that he should no longer teach children, because

he was abusive toward the children

he abused the children, striking them excessively.

And

afterward

Ravina reinstated him

by releasing his vow, because

no

other teacher

who was as exacting

in his teaching

as he was

could be found.

This is an example of a matter involving a mitzva, for the sake of which even a vow taken with the consent of the public may be released.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the witnesses sign the bill of divorce for the betterment of the world:

And we inquire: Do the witnesses need to sign the bill of divorce only

for the betterment of the world

!?

But according to the fundamental law

of Torah law!

it

is written

in Jeremiah, chapter 32: “Fields shall be purchased for money,

and the deed shall be written and sealed.”

From there we learn that a document is invalid without the signatures of witnesses; and a bill of divorce is also a document of severance.

A. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar disagree concerning all documents:

Rabbi Meir says: The signatures of witnesses effect the document. Through the witnesses’ signatures on the document itself, they make it a document; and according to his view, the statement in the verse, “and the deed shall be written and sealed,” is essential to validating the document, so that it must contain signatures.

And Rabbi Elazar says: The witnesses before whom the document is delivered effect the document. In his view, the document becomes a document through the witnesses who are present when it is delivered; and in the case of a bill of divorce, they observe the delivery of the bill of divorce to the woman, so there is no need for them to sign the document itself. According to his view, the statement in the verse, “and the deed shall be written and sealed,” is not an essential condition for validating the document, but merely “good advice”: by means of the signatures, the holder of the document will not need to bring witnesses who were present at its delivery, as will be explained.

Said

he replied,

Rabba:

It is necessary

for the reason of “the betterment of the world”

only according to Rabbi Elazar, who says: The witnesses before whom the document is delivered effect the document,

and according to his view, what is stated, “and the deed shall be written and sealed,” is not an obligation but good advice. And in his view

the Sages instituted

that there should be in a bill of divorce

witnesses’ signatures, for the betterment of the world!

The betterment is as follows: If the bill of divorce were executed only before witnesses present at its delivery, the woman might become agunah,

for sometimes the witnesses die

the witnesses who were present at the delivery die.

Alternatively, sometimes they go

the witnesses who were present at the delivery

to overseas countries

Sometimes they go overseas! If the husband were to challenge the divorce and say, “I did not divorce her,” there would be no one to testify for the woman that the bill of divorce had indeed been delivered to her by her husband.

But once witnesses have signed it, their signatures testify that the bill of divorce was prepared with the husband’s consent, in order to divorce his wife. Since we see the bill of divorce in the woman’s possession, it necessarily follows that the bill was delivered to her by the husband in order to divorce her with it, and there is no longer any need to bring the witnesses who were present at the delivery. [

Some of the early authorities explain that the signatures of witnesses are effective in themselves even if there truly were no witnesses present at the delivery, because Rabbi Elazar concedes that witnesses’ signatures also effect the document, and therefore it is unnecessary to produce witnesses who were present at its delivery as proof.

Others explain that the signatures of witnesses alone are not independently effective. Rather, through the signatures we know that the document was delivered, and we presume that it was presumably executed properly, in the presence of witnesses at its delivery. Thus, for purposes of proof, we do not need to bring the witnesses present at the delivery before the court; this is the betterment of the world. But the document itself is not valid without witnesses present at its delivery.

Rav Yosef said

he replied:

You can even say

that Rabban Gamliel’s enactment was

for

the approach of

Rabbi Meir. Nevertheless, it is properly understood, because the Mishna does not refer to the signatures themselves, which according to Rabbi Meir are certainly required by Torah law and not because of the enactment, but rather:

The Sages instituted

that

the

witnesses

who sign

specify

their

names in bills of divorce, for the betterment of the world!

As it was taught in a beraita: At first, the witness would write

in the bill of divorce:

I, so-and-so,

signed as a witness,

but he did not state his name explicitly; rather, his handwriting itself was considered his signature.

Then, only

if

the

handwriting of the witness appeared elsewhere

in another document, the bill of divorce was

valid.

For if the husband challenged it and said, “It is a forged bill of divorce,” the woman would have to authenticate the signatures and prove that they were indeed the handwriting of the witnesses, and that she had not forged them herself. Since the witnesses’ names did not appear in the document, it would not be known who the witnesses were, and the woman could not find witnesses who recognized their signatures. She would have to search for other documents that had already been authenticated in court and find a document containing signatures resembling those on this bill of divorce; only then would the bill of divorce be validated.

And if not—

if no similar signatures were found elsewhere—the bill of divorce was

invalid,

if the husband challenged it and said that it was forged.

Therefore,

Rabban Gamliel said: The Sages instituted a great enactment

that

the witnesses

specify

their

names in the bill of divorce, for the betterment of the world!

Since their names are explicitly written in the bill of divorce, we can search for people who know and recognize them, and they will testify that the signatures are indeed theirs, thereby validating the bill of divorce.

And we ask: Must the witnesses sign specifically with their explicit names,

and

is

a sign

alone

not

sufficient for them to sign!? For according to what was said, through a mere sign we cannot identify the witnesses, and we will not find witnesses to authenticate it.

But Rav,

when he would sign a bill of divorce,

would draw a fish

and would not write his name; rather, this sign was the form of his signature.

And

likewise

Rabbi Ḥanina would draw a palm branch

and this was his signature.

And likewise

Rav Ḥisda

would sign in the form of the letter

samekh.

And likewise

Rav Hoshaya

would sign in the form of the letter

ayin.

And likewise

Rabba bar Rav Huna would draw a ship’s mast

as his signature.

How could they do this without specifying their names!? Was this not contrary to Rabban Gamliel’s enactment, according to Rav Yosef!?

And we answer:

The Sages are different,

for they were permitted to sign with mere signs, because

the people were knowledgeable

about

their signs!

That is, since it was well known that this was each one’s signature, witnesses to authenticate their signatures could easily be found.

And we ask:

But initially, how did they make them known?!

How did these Sages begin publicizing that this was their signature!? It cannot be said that they began doing so by signing documents, because at first, before their signatures had become known, they were prevented from doing so by Rabban Gamliel’s enactment.

And we answer: The Sages began signing in this manner

in letters!

They used these signs in letters of questions and responsa and in letters conveying greetings; once their signatures had become familiar to everyone, they were permitted to sign in this manner even on documents.

We learned in the Mishna: And

Hillel instituted the prosbul

for the betterment of the world:

We learned there

in tractate Sheviit:

If the lender prepared a

prosbul

before the time arrived for the remission of debts, the debt

is not remitted,

and the lender may collect his debt; and

this is one of the matters that Hillel the Elder instituted!

He instituted this because

he saw that the people

were concerned about the Sabbatical year and

refrained from lending to one another

on the eve of the Sabbatical year,

and transgressed what is written in the Torah: “

Beware lest there be a base thought in your heart

saying, ‘The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,’ and you look malevolently upon your needy brother and do not give him; then he will call to the Lord against you, and there will be sin in you.”

Therefore,

he arose and instituted the prosbul,

through which the Sabbatical year does not remit the debts! Once he provided them with this solution, they no longer refrained from lending to one another.

And this is the substance of the prosbul:

The lender writes in the prosbul document for the court:

I hereby deliver to you, so-and-so and so-and-so,

the

judges in such-and-such a place,

my documents, so that you may be the ones who compel the borrower to repay his debt, while I will not compel him, so that

any debt that I have with so-and-so, I may collect whenever I wish!

And the judges

themselves are the ones who

sign below,

at the bottom of the prosbul document,

or the witnesses.

And we wonder:

And

is it possible

that there is such a thing

can such a thing be possible,

that by Torah law the Sabbatical year remits, and Hillel instituted that the Sabbatical year should not remit

the debt through the prosbul!? Is he not thereby uprooting a Torah law?

He said

he replied,

Abaye:

In the Sabbatical year at the present time

when the law is only rabbinic—the law of prosbul applies only;

and

it follows the view of

Rabbi,

who maintains that the remission of debts does not apply by Torah law at the present time. Since it applies now only by rabbinic law, the Sages have the power to uproot it, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi says:

It is written concerning the remission of debts: “

And this is the matter of the remission: remission

of every creditor’s hand.” From the juxtaposition of the words “the remission, remission,” it appears that:

The verse speaks of two remissions

of the Sabbatical year:

one, the remission of the land,

so that it may not be worked during the seventh year,

and one, the remission of debts,

so that the debt may not be exacted once the seventh year has passed!

The Torah juxtaposed these two laws to one another in order to teach:

When you remit the land,

then

you remit debts.

But

when you do not remit the land,

even then

you do not remit debts!

Since the remission of the land does not apply at the present time, because the sanctity of the Land has lapsed, the remission of debts likewise does not apply at the present time.