Gittin 16a — the Talmud in English

And the proof

is from that which

we learned

in tractate Tohorot [9:8], concerning the joining of water:

the pouring stream,

a flow of water pouring through the air from a vessel situated in a high place to a vessel situated in a low place.

And

so too

the katפרes,

a stream of water flowing on the ground or on a sheet, on the slope of a mountain, from above downward.

And

so too,

“liquid wet enough to make wet,”

the dampness of water at a very low degree of wetness, which wets only one who touches it, but does not pass from him to another place, because of its low moisture.

Each of these things is not considered a joining of water:

neither with regard to impurity,

for example, if in one place there is impure water and in a second place there is pure water, and the pure water is “poured,” flowing from above downward into the impure water, the pure water found in the upper vessel does not become impure from the water in the lower vessel, because the column of water poured from above downward is not considered a connection between the impure water below and the pure water above.

And likewise, if in a high place on a mountain there is pure water, and below there is impure water, and the water from above flows downward [the stream on the mountain’s slope is called katפרes], the upper water does not become impure, because katפרes is not a connection.

And likewise, if there is water in two places on level ground, or even in one long vessel, with impure water on one side and pure water on the other side, and between them there is a connection of water dampness at the level of “liquid wet enough to make wet” [such that only one who touches the water’s dampness becomes wet, but the small amount of dampness that passes to him is so slight that if he touches another place, the place he touched will not become wet]—this is not a connection, and the pure water does not become impure.

nor with regard to purity.

Two incomplete mikvaot, each of which contains less than forty seah, which were adjacent to one another, and between them there is a connection of water in the form of a “pouring stream,” or katפרes, or “liquid wet enough to make wet”—this is not a connection, and it is impossible to join the water in the two mikvaot and combine it to forty seah.

These are the words of the Mishna there.

And if so, what was Ilfa uncertain about when he washed half of a hand and it dried, but moisture of water at the level of “liquid wet enough to make wet” remained upon it, and he then washed the second half? Do the two washings combine? But the connection of “liquid wet enough to make wet” is nothing, as is demonstrated in the Mishna; and if so, what is his uncertainty?

And we resolve it:

It is necessary

to say that this is what Ilfa was asking about, but

there is

on the half-hand that he washed moisture of water of a greater measure,

“wet enough to make another wet.”

That is, the moisture of water that remained was of such a measure that one who touched the water, if he afterward touched another place, would also wet that place with the moisture of the water on his hand.

And the uncertainty is: Since half of the hand is still wet from the first washing, can he go back and wash the second half of the hand, and will the two washings combine, or not?

And we raise an objection:

This too we have learned: “Wet enough to make another wet”

is

a connection

with regard to a mikva.

And if it is a connection, it is proven that they are considered a connection of water. And if so, with regard to washing, it is certainly still considered that the hand has been washed. And if so, why was Ilfa uncertain?

And we resolve it:

Perhaps

that which we learned, that “wet enough to make another wet” is a connection, is specifically

with regard to mikvaot, and it is Rabbi Judah’s view.

And as

we learned: “A mikva containing exactly forty seah”—

forty seah precisely—

“and two descended and immersed in it one after the other,”

and when the first one immerses and emerges, a small amount of water is diminished from the forty seah, because some water remains on his body; therefore, the

first one is pure, and the second one is impure,

because when the second one immersed, the mikva already contained less than forty seah.

Rabbi Judah says: “If the feet of the first one were touching the water”

when the second one immerses,

“the second one too is pure.”

This is because we consider the water on the body of the first one as though it were joined to the water of the mikva, by the principle of “draw down,” which considers the water on the first person who immersed as though it descended from his body and joined the water of the mikva, since the water is joined together by water dampness at the level of “wet enough to make another wet.”

And that which the beraita said, “Wet enough to make another wet, a connection,” was referring to the law of Rabbi Judah, that this connection is effective for the law of “draw down” in mikvaot, to complete the measure of the mikva, but this is not a connection of water everywhere, and according to everyone.

The third matter—combining drawn water to render a pure person impure.

Rabbi Jeremiah said: They said:

A person who was impure and immersed to rid himself of his impurity, and afterward

he

came with his head and most of his body into drawn water. And

likewise

a pure person upon whose head and most of whose body three log of drawn water fell—

is impure.

And the reason for the matter is that in their time they would immerse in foul mikvaot, and after the immersion they would pour clean drawn water over themselves, or they would immerse in clean drawn water. And the people began to err and say that the clean drawn water was what purified them. And the Sages were concerned that they would cease immersing in a valid mikva.

Therefore, they decreed that even a pure person upon whom drawn water fell becomes impure.

However, with regard to immersion in drawn water, they decreed only concerning an impure person who immersed in a mikva: if he were to immerse afterward in drawn water, he would become impure again, by rabbinic decree.

And

Rabbi Jeremiah asked,

if, after his immersion in a mikva, he washes his body,

half of it by entering

into a mikva of drawn water,

and half of it

by falling drawn water,

what is [the law]?

Shall we decree upon him that he return to his impurity, or perhaps the entire decree applied specifically when his entire body entered drawn water, or when he poured drawn water over his entire body?

And the Gemara remained in uncertainty:

Teiku.

The fourth matter—combining water with regard to the purification of one who experienced a seminal emission.

Rabbi Pappa said: They said:

Ezra enacted that one who experienced a seminal emission should not engage in Torah before immersing. But

one who experienced a seminal emission who is ill, upon whom nine kav of water were given,

is

pure,

and does not need to immerse in a mikva by virtue of Ezra’s enactment, since he is ill and suffers from immersion.

Rabbi Pappa asked:

An ill person who wishes to become pure by means of

half of himself through immersion in a mikva, and half of himself through the giving

of nine kav of water upon his body,

what is [the law]?

Can he thereby become pure with regard to Ezra’s enactment, or perhaps his entire body must be through immersion in a mikva, like any person who experienced a seminal emission, or his entire body through the giving of nine kav of water, like the law of an ill person—and not half of his body through immersion in a mikva and half of his body through water being given upon it?

And the Gemara remained in uncertainty:

Teiku.

Introduction to the sugya of two people who brought a get from overseas, whether they must say “Before me it was written and before me it was signed,” or not.

Earlier, on folio 2b, Rava and Rabba disagreed as to why they must say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.” Rava holds that it is because there is concern that the husband will come and challenge the get, saying that it is forged; and since the get was written and signed overseas, and the witnesses live overseas, there are no witnesses here who can validate the signatures of the witnesses to the get. Therefore, the Sages enacted that the agent should say that the witnesses signed in his presence, and that there is no forgery; and the Sages trusted the agent even though he is one witness.

And according to Rabba, the reason they enacted this is because there is concern that the husband will challenge it and say that the get was not written for its sake. Therefore, the agent must testify and say, “Before me the get was written and signed for its sake,” and the Sages enacted to trust him even though he is one witness [and at the conclusion of the sugya, the Gemara holds that Rabba adds a concern to Rava’s words: in addition to the concern of forgery, there is also concern that it was not written for its sake].

And the Gemara there presents a practical difference between Rava and Rabba, in the case of a get that two agents brought from overseas.

According to Rava, they do not need to say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed,” since the agents presumably recognize the signatures of the witnesses to the get, so that if the husband comes and challenges it, saying that the get is forged, witnesses capable of validating the get are present here. Therefore, the entire enactment does not apply here, and it is not necessary to say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.”

But according to Rabba, since there is concern that the husband will say that the get was not written for its sake, it does not help that we have two witnesses here. Therefore, according to Rabba, they must say, “Before me the get was written and signed for its sake.”

And it is explained in the Gemara on folio 5a that after they enacted saying, “Before me it was written and signed,” people learned that they must say “for its sake,” and everyone writes a get for its sake; therefore, even if the husband challenges it and says that the get was not written for its sake, his challenge is not accepted.

If so, ostensibly, according to Rabba there is no concern that it was not written for its sake.

Nevertheless, Rabba holds that even after they learned to write for its sake, one must say, “Before me it was written and signed for its sake,” because the Sages decreed a decree lest the matter return to its state of disorder, and they forget to say “for its sake.”

And according to this, the Gemara says that it is possible to say that even according to Rabba, two agents who brought a get from overseas do not need to testify, “Before me it was written and signed for its sake.”

For since today, after everyone learned to write for its sake, the reason one must say “Before me it was written and signed for its sake” is only because of a decree, in the case of two agents bringing the get, this is an uncommon matter—and concerning an uncommon matter, the Sages did not decree.

And in this the two formulations in the sugya before us disagree.

The first formulation

holds that two people who brought a get from overseas do not need to say, “Before me it was written and signed.” And the reason is either because they held like Rava, and according to Rava it is certainly unnecessary for two agents to say, “Before me it was written and signed,” as was explained; or because they held like Rabba, and after people learned to write for its sake, this is only a decree lest the matter return and be forgotten, and with two agents this is uncommon, so they did not decree.

But the latter formulation holds that even two people who brought a get from overseas must say, “Before me it was written and signed.”

And the reason must be that this formulation holds like Rabba; and even though today, after people learned to write for its sake, this is only a decree,

the latter formulation

holds that they also decreed concerning two agents, lest the matter return to its state of disorder. Therefore, they must say, “Before me it was written and before me it was signed.”

We learned in the Mishna:

“One says, ‘Before me it was written,’ and one says, ‘Before me it was signed’—it is invalid.”

Rabbi Shmuel bar Judah said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: They taught

in the Mishna that it is invalid

only when the get does not emerge from the hands of both of them,

for they are not both agents to bring the get, but one of them is an agent and the other came only to testify. For example, the agent says, “Before me it was written,” and the second witness testifies, “Before me it was signed.” Or conversely, the agent testifies, “Before me it was signed,” and the second witness testifies, “Before me it was written.” In such a case it is invalid, because we have clarification only concerning one of the matters. For we trust only the agent, but we do not trust the second one, because he is merely one witness. It follows that the clarification we have [whether concerning “Before me it was written” or concerning “Before me it was signed”] is only concerning that about which the agent testified, but not concerning the second part. Therefore, it is invalid, because the agent must say both, “Before me it was written” and “Before me it was signed.”

But

if the

get emerges from the hands of both of them,

for both of them were agents, then even if one said, “Before me it was written,” and the other, “Before me it was signed,” the get

is valid.