Gittin 15b — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rava said:

The novelty in the law of the Mishna, "Before me half of it was signed," is that

even

if

he,

the agent,

and

another

witness

join and

testify [

together, as though they were two witnesses from the marketplace]

concerning the signature of the second —

nevertheless

the get is invalid

!

What is the reason? —

A decree, because it may lead to confusion with the validation of ordinary documents.

And this is because, since in a similar case concerning the validation of ordinary documents it is invalid, as the reason will be explained below, if we validate such a validation in a get, there is concern that they will confuse the matters and say that such validation is also valid in ordinary validation of documents.

And this case is when, in validating a monetary document, one of the witnesses comes and says, "This is my handwriting." And concerning his own handwriting he is trustworthy to testify as two witnesses, and thereby the signature of the first witness is validated. Whereas concerning the signature of the second witness, another witness from the marketplace comes and joins the first witness who came before us, and together they testify concerning the signature of the second.

And validation of a monetary document in such a manner is invalid, because

"less than a quarter of the money comes out,"

since "all the money less a quarter" [that is, three quarters of the money recorded in the document] comes out from the borrower to the lender

through the mouth of one witness,

according to the statement of one witness, who testifies exclusively concerning his own signature and also testifies concerning the additional signature, together with one witness.

And this is not according to law, because the Torah says, "Through the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established." And it implies that one half of the money concerning which the two witnesses testify shall be established through this witness, and the other half of the money shall be established through the second witness.

Whereas here, three quarters of the money comes out through one witness, because the witness who testified concerning his own signature thereby established half of the validation, and in addition he participated in validating the signature of the second, and took half a share in validating the second signature. Thus he established three quarters of the validation, while the other established only one quarter of the validation. And it follows that three quarters of the money come out through one witness, and one quarter through the second witness.

And therefore Rava also invalidated the case where the agent of the get testified about one signature, and concerning the second he joined with another to validate it. For here too, it resembles a case where three quarters of the validation is done through one—the agent—and one quarter through the witness; and therefore here too it is invalid, by decree because of the validation of documents.

Rav Ashi challenges him: Is there such a thing,

is such a matter possible,

that if he himself completed the entire statement, it is valid,

for if he testified, "Before me all of it was signed," it would be valid. Whereas

now, when there is one together with him,

when another witness joined him concerning the signature of the second witness—could this detract, and make it

invalid!?

Rather, Rav Ashi said,

the novelty in the law of the Mishna, "Before me half of it was signed; it is invalid," is that

even if he says

the agent concerning one signature, "Before me it was signed," and concerning the second signature he says:

I am the second witness,

and this is my signature, nevertheless it is

invalid.

What is the reason? —

Either it is all through validation of the get,

by witnesses, like all validation of documents.

Or it is all through the enactment of the Sages,

through an agent who says, "Before me it was signed"!

And Rava and Rav Ashi raise a further difficulty against Rav Ḥisda from our Mishna:

We learned: "Before me all of it was written, and before me half of it was signed; it is invalid."

And one should infer:

The other "half,"

the second half of the signing of the get, that is, the second signature, concerning which he did not testify that it was signed in his presence,

what are the circumstances,

how is it being discussed? —

If you say that there is no one testifying about it at all —

that there is no testimony whatsoever concerning the signature of the second witness—then it is obvious that the get is invalid!

For

now,

at present, when we learned in the Mishna, "

One says, 'Before me it was written,' and one says, 'Before me it was signed': this one testifies about all the writing, and this one testifies about all the signing" —

and together we have testimony concerning "before me it was written" and "before me it was signed," nevertheless

it is invalid.

Half

—when we have testimony concerning only half of the signatures, since the only testimony we have is, "Before me half of it was signed" —

is it necessary to say so!?

Is it necessary to say that it is invalid!?

Rather,

necessarily, there is also some testimony concerning validation of the signature of the second witness, and necessarily our Mishna comes to teach:

Either as Rava —

that concerning the signature of the second witness, the agent and another person join to testify concerning his signature. And this is what our Mishna comes to teach us: that despite this, the get is invalid.

Or as Rav Ashi,

that concerning the signature of the second witness, the agent testifies and says, "I am the second witness"; and this is what our Mishna comes to teach us: that it is invalid.

And

necessarily, this novelty of the Mishna comes

to exclude Rav Ḥisda!

For if the tanna held like him, he should have taught us the novelty of Rav Ḥisda, which is a greater novelty. And if the tanna did not teach it to us, even though the entire purpose of the tanna in the Mishna is to teach a novel matter, this is proof that the tanna of the Mishna is not in agreement with Rav Ḥisda!

And one cannot say, on the contrary, perhaps indeed the purpose of the tanna in the Mishna is to teach us the novelty of Rav Ḥisda, and "Before me half of it was signed" means that concerning validation of the signature of the second witness there are two witnesses—for this is impossible.

For a novelty as great as that which Rav Ḥisda innovated, the Mishna should have explicitly stated that this is what it means. But the cases of Rava and Rav Ashi are not such great novelties. Therefore it is possible to say that the Mishna intends to state concerning them that it is invalid [for otherwise this would be a superfluous Mishna], and the Mishna comes to teach us that it is invalid only in these cases, but not in the case of Rav Ḥisda.

Rav Ḥisda could say to you: And according to your reasoning —

that in every passage of the Mishna there is a novelty, and therefore you argue against me that if the tanna agreed with me, he should have taught my novelty—then, according to your words, what is written in the Mishna, "

Before me it was written, but not before me it was signed" —

why do I need it?

After all, this is a superfluous Mishna, because later the Mishna says, "Before me all of it was written and before me half of it was signed; it is invalid." And if "Before me half of it was signed" is invalid, all the more so if he did not say "Before me it was signed" at all, it is invalid; so what novelty did the Mishna teach us with these words?!

Rather,

necessarily, one must say that our Mishna follows the method of

"This one—and even that one—it teaches."

At first the Mishna states the simple novelty, and afterward the more novel novelty. And even though after the greater novelty there is no longer any need to state the simple novelty, nevertheless it is the way of the tanna to teach from the simple case to the novel case.

If so,

here too,

what you asked—what is the novelty in "Before me half of it was signed," if it comes to exclude me!?—I can answer and say that indeed there is no novelty in these words of the Mishna, and when the Mishna says, "Before me half of it was signed," its intention is that concerning the signature of the second witness there is no testimony whatsoever. And since the tanna did not come to teach a novel matter, he does not need to mention my novelties. And you have no proof that he does not agree with me from the fact that he refrained from mentioning my novelties.

And although it is seemingly a superfluous Mishna, as Rava and Rav Ashi raised as a difficulty, this is not difficult, because, as stated, according to your own words too, it is the way of the tanna to teach in the manner of

"This one—and even that one—it teaches,"

from the simple case to the novel case. Therefore it may be said that here too the tanna followed this method, and there was no need for him to introduce a novel matter here.

And I did not intend to say that my innovation is an interpretation of the Mishna; rather, I said this on my own: that even if there are two witnesses concerning the signature of the second witness, the bill of divorce is invalid.

And since the Gemara dealt with the matter of “either all of it in verification of the bill of divorce, or all of it in the ordinance of the Sages,” it brings and explains additional matters of “either this or that.”

The first matter is the definition of a private domain, with regard to the labor of carrying out from one domain to another on Shabbat.

It is forbidden to carry out an object on Shabbat from a private domain to a public domain, and likewise in the opposite direction. "

“A private domain” is a place enclosed by partitions ten handbreadths high, or a pit whose depth is ten handbreadths, since in its depth there are partitions of ten handbreadths from the bottom of the pit.

But if there was a pit five handbreadths deep, and one added around it a fence of five handbreadths, the Sages disagreed about this matter, whether these two types of partitions combine to create a private domain.

Rav Hisda said: “A gidud,”

a pit in depth

five

handbreadths,

and a partition five,

that they enclosed with a fence around the pit, five handbreadths high,

do not combine

the five handbreadths of the depth of the pit with the five handbreadths of the fence around the pit, to consider the pit a private domain enclosed by partitions ten handbreadths high.

Until there is

the enclosure of the partitions around the private domain,

either all of it in a partition

ten handbreadths high.

or all of it in a gidud,

a pit ten handbreadths deep, and not half a fence and half the depth of a pit.

Marimar expounded,

and disagreed with Rav Hisda:

a gidud of five and a partition of five combine.

And the halakha—

they combine.

The second matter—the combining in the washing of hands:

Ilfa raised a question: Hands—

are they pure by halves, or are they not pure by halves?

And the Gemara explains concerning what Ilfa was uncertain:

What are the circumstances?

What is being discussed?

For Ilfa was not uncertain about a case in which there was one washing from a vessel containing half a revi'it of water, for it is obvious that it is ineffective.

If you say

that Ilfa was uncertain about a case such as

that they washed—

they washed

two

people,

from a revi'it,

from a vessel holding a full revi'it of a log of water; and this is what Ilfa meant by saying “by halves”: two people washed from a vessel that was full of a revi'it of a log of water, and it follows that each one washed his hands from half of the water that was in the vessel. And since initially there was in the vessel water measuring a revi'it, Ilfa was uncertain whether the washing from this vessel would be effective for the two people.

This is not possible!

For

did we not learn: From

a full vessel

a revi'it

of water,

one washes hands for

one

person, and even for two

people!

And if so, it is not possible that Ilfa was uncertain about this; rather, certainly it is possible to wash the hands of two people with one revi'it of water.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Ilfa’s uncertainty is in a case

in which he washes each of his hands separately,

in which the person did not wash both his hands at once, but washed one hand and dried it, and then washed his second hand; and Ilfa was uncertain whether washing the hands is effective even one after the other, or whether a person must wash both his hands at once, without drying them in between.

This too is not possible as the matter about which Ilfa was uncertain.

For

did we not learn: One who washes his hand—

one by washing

from a vessel,

and one by rinsing in a river,

his hands are pure.

And it stands to reason that if washing his hands one after the other is ineffective, the two types of washing—washing and immersion—will also not be effective, even if they are performed at once.

And since we explicitly learned that the immersion of one hand and the washing of the other hand are effective, it is proven that it is effective to wash one hand after the other.

Rather,

perhaps you will say

that he washes half by half

of it.

Ilfa was uncertain whether, if he washed half a hand and dried it, and then washed another half of the hand, this is a complete washing.

But the school of Rabbi Yannai said: Hands are not pure by halves!

And if so, there is no possibility of purifying half a hand, and again it is difficult: what was Ilfa asking?

And we answer: In fact, the uncertainty is in a case where he washed half a hand and afterward another half. And if he first dried the half of the hand, there is no doubt that the two washings do not combine into one valid washing.

And it is necessary only where there is liquid sufficient to make wet.

Water-moisture still remained on the half of the hand that he washed, and then he returned and washed another half of the hand; and about this Ilfa was uncertain.

And we object:

And when there is

on the first hand

liquid sufficient to make wet, what of it!?

For certainly this small amount of moisture that remained is considered nothing.