Gittin 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

through that benefit—

through that benefit [which the borrower has]—

that it is changed for him—

that his loan has been changed for him—

from an old loan—

which he now had to repay—

to a

new loan—

whose repayment date has now been postponed for a long period ,

he resolves

in his mind

and binds himself—

himself, at the time of the statement, to the recipient. And he severs himself from the first lender.

Therefore, since the lien was not created at the time of the loan but at the time of the acquisition, a maamad sheloshtan is effective even for those not yet born!

But the Gemara also raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s reasoning: Mar Huna, son of

the son of

Rav Neḥemya, said to Rav Ashi: If so—

according to your words, that the acquisition through maamad sheloshtan results from the borrower’s desire to bind himself to the recipient—what is the law if the recipient is a difficult person who is unwilling to extend the loan period for him,

such as these— \-

those people—

of the household of bar Elishiv—

members of bar Elishiv’s household—

who bind—

who bind a person who owes them money—

and take immediately—

and take their debt at once? With such people, the borrower’s situation is not merely unimproved; it is worse than it was before.

And if you would say—

and if you were to say—

so too—

that this is indeed the law, that the recipient does not acquire it, because a maamad sheloshtan is ineffective for a person to whom the borrower does not wish to bind himself—

if so, you have made your words subject to distinctions—

so that the borrower binds himself to some people but not to others. This cannot be, for the law cannot depend on and vary from one person to another.

Mar Zutra disagrees with Ameimar and Rav Ashi,

and in his view maamad sheloshtan is an acquisition that the Sages enacted without a reason or rationale:

Rather, Mar Zutra said: These three matters—

these three laws—

the Sages made—

the enactments of the Sages—

as halakha—

like a halakha given to Moses at Sinai—

without a reason—

for no reason need be given for it. These laws, too, have no reason or rationale!

The first—

the first law—

is this—

this law of maamad sheloshtan.

And the other—

and the second—

is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who writes all his property to his wife

in a deed using the language of a gift does not cause her to acquire it.

And he made her

the husband

nothing but an administrator—

like a person appointed over property to bring in or take out. There is no reason for this law; it is simply what the Sages enacted. They had the authority to enact it, for the hefker of the court is hefker.

And the other—

the third law:

as Rav Ḥananya said: One who marries off a woman

to his eldest son in a house

set aside for his wedding, in which the father does not live,

the son acquires it

the son acquires that house and requires no other act of acquisition . This, too, is a law without a reason; it is simply what the Sages enacted.

The Gemara continues discussing the law of maamad sheloshtan and relates an incident:

Rav said to Rav Aḥa bar Adla: I have a kav of saffron with you—

a kav of saffron that is in your possession—

give it to so-and-so—

give it to so-and-so.

I am saying this to you in his presence—

I am telling you this in his presence [the recipient was standing there]—

so that I will not retract—

so that I will not retract my promise.

The Gemara is perplexed:

From this—

from this incident it may be understood—

that if he wished, he could retract—

that if [Rav] wished to retract—

he could retract—

he could retract. But Rav himself said that when one transfers an item to another through a maamad sheloshtan, the recipient acquires it, and the giver cannot retract?! And it answers:

This is what he said—

this is what Rav said [this was his intention]:

These words,

once I said them to you in his presence [of the recipient],

cannot be retracted

by me, since he has already acquired the saffron through a maamad sheloshtan.

The Gemara asks:

Did Rav not already state this once—

he already stated this law once—

as Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “I have a maneh in your possession; give it to so-and-so in a maamad sheloshtan”—

he acquires it.

If so, why did he need to repeat that he could not retract?

The Gemara answers:

If you heard only that statement—

if we heard only the first law—

I would have said—

we would have said [thought]—

this applies—

that this law [that he must say it in the recipient’s presence] applies only

to a substantial gift,

such as a maneh, because it is difficult to achieve firm resolve concerning it.

But a small gift—

concerning which it is easy to resolve to give it—

would not require—

would not require him [to say it]

in his presence.

It teaches us—

therefore, through the repetition in the incident, he stated that even a small gift such as saffron is not acquired unless he says it in the recipient’s presence:

And another incident:

Certain gardeners—

those gardeners who sold vegetables—

who made an accounting with one another—

who calculated their accounts among themselves.

There remained—

and there remained—

five istira zuz—

provincial sela’im —

with one of them—

in the possession of one of them.

They said to him—

his fellow gardeners said to him:

Give them to the owner of the land —

give these coins [which had remained with you] to the landowner. And they said this

in the presence of the landowner—

in the landowner’s presence.

And he made an acquisition from him—

and he undertook through an act of acquisition to give the money to the landowner .

In the end—

finally—

he went and made an accounting between himself and himself—

he went and made [another] calculation by himself—

nothing remained with him, not even anything—

and [discovered] that nothing remained with him [beyond what was due to him].

He came before Rav Naḥman—

he came before Rav Naḥman to ask what should properly be done, since he had undertaken to give five sela’im to the landowner, and it had now become clear that nothing remained with him.

Rav Naḥman said to him: What can I do for you—

what can I do for you?

First—

first, you are liable to pay—by force of the law

that Rav Huna said in the name of Rav,

that a maamad sheloshtan effects an acquisition.

And furthermore, they made an acquisition from you—

they performed an acquisition with you through a sudar acquisition [that you undertake to pay him].

Rava does not agree with Rav Naḥman’s words:

Rava said to Rav Naḥman

[his teacher]:

Does this person— \-

this man—

say, “I will not give”—

does he say, “I will not give” [what I am obligated to give]?

He says, “I have nothing with me”—

he says that he has no funds [extra money] in his possession! [And that he owes nothing].

Rav Naḥman accepts his words:

He said to him

Rav Naḥman

if so:

if it is as you say, that he is not retracting his undertaking but that they erred in the accounting, then

the acquisition

this

was made in error

and was performed in error.

And every acquisition made in error can be retracted.

The Gemara now discusses the law of “taking is like acquiring”:

It was stated:

He said to the agent:

“Take this maneh”

for me

to so-and-so to whom I am indebted.

Rav said: The sender is liable

for it

under his responsibility. If the money is forcibly lost while in the agent’s possession, the loss is his. [Nevertheless:]

And if the money is forcibly lost while in the agent’s possession, the loss is his. [In any event:]

And if

the sender

comes to retract the agency and says to the agent, “Return it to me, lest it be forcibly lost from you on the road,”

the agency and says to the agent, “Return it to me, lest it be forcibly lost from you on the way,”

he may not retract.

And Shmuel said: Since the sender is liable

for it

under his responsibility [of the maneh],

of the one hundred dinars,

if he comes to retract—

he may retract.

The Gemara attempts to clarify what the dispute concerns:

Let us say that they disagree about this—

let us say that this is the subject of their dispute:

one Master holds—

that Rav holds:

“Take” is equivalent to “acquire”—

when one says to an agent, “Take,” it is considered as though he had said, “Acquire it on behalf of so-and-so,” and therefore the sender cannot retract, since the creditor has already acquired it.

Nevertheless, he is liable for the money, because the creditor did not instruct him to give it to this person.

And one Master holds—

and Shmuel holds:

“Take” is not equivalent to “acquire”—

one who says “Take” does not intend that the agent acquire it on his behalf. Therefore, if he comes to retract, he may retract.

The Gemara rejects this:

No; everyone—

according to everyone—

holds that “Take” is equivalent to “acquire”

in all other cases. For example, when one instructs an agent, “Take this gift to so-and-so,” where the issue of responsibility is not under consideration [since he owes him nothing], even Shmuel agrees that he cannot retract.

And here—

and here—

they disagree about this—

this is the subject of their dispute.

One Master holds—

Rav holds:

we do not say “since”—

we do not infer from one fact to another.

And one Master holds—

and Shmuel holds:

we do say “since”—since the sender is liable for it, [therefore,] if he comes to retract, he may retract.

since the sender is liable for the money, if he comes to retract, he may retract.

They bring a beraita in support of Rav:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rav’s opinion:

One who says to an agent one of the following expressions:

“Take a maneh to so-and-so to whom I am indebted.”

Or,

“Give a maneh to so-and-so to whom I am indebted.”

Or,

“Take a maneh to so-and-so

on account of

a deposit that he has with me.”

Or,

“Give a maneh to so-and-so, a deposit that he has with me.”

In all these cases, the law is:

the sender is liable

for it

under his responsibility. And if he comes to retract—

he may not retract.

The Gemara asks concerning a deposit:

Why, in the case of a deposit, if he comes to retract may he not retract?

Let him say to him—

let the sender say to the agent:

“It is not the desire

of the depositor

that his deposit should be in the possession of

a

different person, whom he did not appoint to guard it. It follows that your taking possession of it is to his disadvantage, and one may not cause a disadvantage to a person except in his presence. If so, why may he not retract? Here, the depositor derives no benefit.”

who was not appointed to guard it. It follows that your taking possession of it is detrimental to him, and one may not cause a person a loss without his knowledge. If so, why can he not retract? There is no benefit here for the depositor!”

The Gemara answers:

Rabbi Zeira said:

Here we are dealing

with a case where

the sender

has established himself as a denier—

he denies the deposits in his possession and does not return them to their owners. In such a case, it is obvious that it is preferable for the depositor that another person acquire it on his behalf rather than that it remain with the sender, who may deny the deposit. Therefore, it is considered beneficial.

The Gemara relates an incident:

Rav Sheshet had

—he had—

credit from the cloaks in Meḥoza—

credit: he had sold cloaks to people from Meḥoza, and they had not yet paid him. They had undertaken to pay him at a fixed time.

He said to Rav Yosef bar Ḥama: “When you come

when you return from there—

bring them

to me—

bring them to me, for the time of repayment had already arrived .

He went

—Rav Yosef bar Ḥama went and requested the debt from them.

They gave it to him

—they gave it to him.

They said to him: “Let us acquire it from you”

—they asked him to perform an act of acquisition, so that if the money were forcibly lost while in his possession on the road, Rav Sheshet would not return to demand payment from them a second time.

He said to them: “Yes”

—I will do as you say. However,

in the end

—ultimately—

he eluded them

—he slipped away from them and went on his way [without performing the act of acquisition].

When he came before him

—when he came to him—

he said to him

Rav Sheshet:

“You acted well

—you did well—

that you did not make yourself

—that you did not gratuitously make yourself—

‘a slave, the borrower, to the lender’”

—one who is subjugated to another is considered his slave.

Another version

—there is another version of what he said to him:

“You acted well

—you did well [by eluding the performance of an act of acquisition],

for ‘the borrower is a slave to the lender’”

—they are borrowers and slaves to me, to return the debt with their own responsibility.