Gittin 14a — the Talmud in English

Rather, Rav Ashi said: ![](pamud.bmp "

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through that benefit —

through that benefit [which the borrower has] —

that it is changed for him —

that the loan has changed for him —

between an old loan —

which he now had to repay,

to a

new loan —

whose repayment time has now been postponed for a long period ,

he completes

in his mind

and subjugates himself —

himself, at the time of the statement, to the recipient. And he detaches himself from the first lender.

And therefore, since the lien did not come into being at the time of the loan, but rather at the time of the acquisition, the presence of all three is effective even for those not yet born!

But the Gemara also raises an objection to Rav Ashi’s reason: Mar Huna, son of

the son of

Rav Nehemiah, said to Rav Ashi: Rather, from now on —

according to your words, that the acquisition through the presence of all three derives from the lien by which the borrower wishes to subjugate himself to the recipient — what is the law if the recipient is a harsh person who is not prepared to extend the time of the loan for him,

such as these \-

those people —

of the house of Bar Elishiv —

from among the members of Bar Elishiv’s household,

who bind —

who bind one who owes them money —

and take immediately —

and take their debt at once? Surely with such people the borrower’s situation was not improved, but rather was even worsened from what it had been.

And if you would say —

and if you would say —

so too —

this is indeed the law: that he does not acquire, because the presence of all three is not effective for a person to whom the borrower does not wish to subjugate himself?

If so, you have rendered your words subject to measures —

that the borrower subjugates himself to certain people but not to others. Yet it is impossible that the law should depend upon and change from one person to another.

Mar Zutra disputes Amemar and Rav Ashi,

and in his view the presence of all three is an acquisition which the Sages enacted without reason or rationale:

Rather, Mar Zutra said: These three matters —

these three laws —

the Sages made them —

the Sages’ enactments —

as a law —

like a law given to Moses at Sinai —

without a reason —

that no reason need be given for it. And in these laws too there is no reason or rationale!

One —

the first law —

this —

this law of the presence of all three.

And the other —

and the other [the second] —

that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: One who writes all his property to his wife

in a document, in the language of a gift, does not acquire it.

And he did not make her

the husband

anything but a trustee —

like a person appointed over property to bring in or take out. And there is no reason for this law, except that this is what the Sages enacted. And they have the power to enact this, for the renunciation of the court is renunciation.

And the other —

and the other [the third law]:

that Rav Ḥananya said: One who marries off a woman —

to his eldest son in a house

designated for his wedding, in which the father does not live —

he acquires it

the son acquires that house and does not require another acquisition . And this too is a law without a reason, except that this is what the Sages enacted.

The Gemara continues with the law of the presence of all three and brings an incident:

Rav said to Rav Aḥa bar Adla: I have a kav of saffron in your possession —

a kav of saffron that I have in your possession —

give it to so-and-so —

give it to so-and-so.

I am telling you in his presence —

I am telling you this in his presence [the recipient was standing there] —

that I will not retract —

that I will not retract from my promise.

And the Gemara is astonished:

It follows —

from this incident it can be understood —

that if he wished, he could retract —

that if [Rav] wished to retract —

he could retract —

he was able to retract. But Rav himself said that one who transfers to another through the presence of all three acquires, and the giver cannot retract?! And it resolves:

This is what he said —

this is what Rav said [this was his intention]:

These matters

since I said them to you in his presence [of the recipient],

are not subject to retraction

on my part, because he has already acquired the saffron through the presence of all three.

The Gemara asks:

Rav already said this once —

he already stated this law once —

for Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: “A maneh that I have in your possession, give it to so-and-so in the presence of all three,”

he acquires.

And if so, why must he repeat once more and say that he cannot retract?

The Gemara answers:

If from that —

if we heard only the first law —

I would have said —

we would have said [thought] —

these words —

that this law [that he must say it in the recipient’s presence] applies only

to a substantial gift

such as a maneh, because it is difficult to complete one’s resolve concerning it.

But a small gift —

concerning which it is easy to complete one’s resolve to give it —

would not require —

would not require [him to say it]

in his presence.

It teaches us —

therefore, in the incident he repeated his words and said that even a small gift, like saffron, is not acquired unless he said it in his presence:

And another incident:

Certain gardeners —

those owners of gardens who sold vegetables —

who made an accounting with one another —

who made an accounting among themselves. —

There remained —

and there remained —

five istrai of zuz —

provincial selaim —

with one of them —

with one of them.

They said to him —

his fellow gardeners said to him:

Give them to the owner of the land —

give this money [which remained with you] to the owner of the land. And they said this to him

in the presence of the owner of the land —

in the presence of the owner of the land.

And he acquired from him —

and he undertook through an acquisition to give the money to the owner of the land .

In the end —

in the end —

he went and made an accounting between himself and himself —

he went and made [another] accounting between himself and himself —

nothing remained with him — [

and he discovered] that nothing remained with him [beyond what was due to him].

He came before Rav Naḥman —

he came before Rav Naḥman to ask according to the law what he should do, since he had undertaken to give five selaim to the owner of the land. And now it had become clear that nothing remained with him.

Rav Naḥman said to him: What can I do for you —

what can I do for you?

One —

first, you are liable to pay — by force of the law

that Rav Huna said in the name of Rav,

that the presence of all three acquires.

And furthermore, they acquired from you —

after all, they made an acquisition from you through a cloth acquisition [that you undertake to pay him].

Rava does not agree with Rav Naḥman’s words:

Rava said to Rav Naḥman

his [teacher]:

Is it so that this person — \-

and is this person —

saying, “I will not give” —

is he saying, “I will not give” [what I am obligated to give]?

He is saying, “I have nothing with me” —

that he has no [extra] money in his possession, he is saying! [And I owe nothing.]

Rav Naḥman accepts his words:

He said to him

Rav Naḥman:

If so

it is as you say, that he is not retracting from his undertaking, but that they erred in the accounting, then

the acquisition

this

is an erroneous one

was made in error.

And every erroneous acquisition can be retracted.

The Gemara now discusses the law of “going is equivalent to acquiring”:

It was stated:

he said to the agent:

“Take this maneh”

on my behalf

to so-and-so, to whom I am indebted.

Rav said: The sender is liable

for it

under his responsibility.

And if the money is forcibly lost from the agent’s possession, the loss is his. [In any event:]

And if

the sender

comes to retract

from the agency and say to the agent, “Return it to me, lest it be forcibly lost from you on the way,”

he may not retract.

And Shmuel said: Since the sender is liable

for the money

under his responsibility

[of the maneh],

if he comes to retract—

he may retract.

The Gemara seeks to clarify what they disagreed about:

Shall we say that they disagree about this—

let us say that they disagree over this:

that one master holds—

that Rav holds—

“take” is considered like “acquire”—

that when one says to an agent, “Take,” it is considered as though he said, “Acquire it for so-and-so,” and therefore the sender cannot retract, since the creditor has already acquired it.

Nevertheless, he is liable for the money, because the creditor did not instruct him to deliver it to this person.

And one master holds—

and Shmuel holds:

“take” is not considered like “acquire”—

one who says “take” does not intend that he acquire it for him. Therefore, if he comes to retract, he may retract.

The Gemara rejects this:

No! Everyone

—according to everyone—

holds that “take” is considered like “acquire”

in all other cases. For example, when he instructs the agent, “Take this gift to so-and-so,” where the question of responsibility is not at issue [since he owes him nothing], even Shmuel agrees that he cannot retract.

And here—

and here—

in this matter they disagree—

over this they disagree.

One master holds—

Rav holds:

we do not say migo—

we do not say “since.”

And one master holds—

and Shmuel holds:

we do say migo—

since the sender is liable under his responsibility, [therefore,] if he comes to retract, he may retract.

And they bring a beraita in accordance with Rav’s words:

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with Rav’s view:

one who says to an agent one of these expressions:

“Take a maneh to so-and-so, to whom I am indebted.”

Or,

“Give a maneh to so-and-so, to whom I am indebted.”

Or,

“Take a maneh to so-and-so”

for

a deposit that he has with me.

Or,

“Give a maneh to so-and-so, a deposit that he has with me.”

In all of them the law is:

the sender is liable

for it

under his responsibility. And if he comes to retract—

he may not retract.

The Gemara asks concerning a deposit:

Why, in the case of a deposit, if he comes to retract may he not retract?

Let him say to him—

let the sender say to the agent:

“It is not the will

of the depositor

that his deposit be in the possession of

another

person

whom he did not appoint to guard it. It follows that your taking possession of it is detrimental to him. And one may not cause a detriment to a person except in his presence. If so, why may he not retract? For there is no benefit here for the depositor!”

And it answers:

Rabbi Zeira said:

Here we are speaking

where

the sender

has been established as a denier—

he denies the deposits in his possession and does not return them to their owners. In such a case, it is obvious that it is preferable for the depositor that another person acquire it for him rather than that it remain in the sender’s possession, who may deny the deposit. Therefore, it is considered beneficial!

And the Gemara brings an incident:

Rav Sheshet had—

he had—

a credit in Mahuza for cloaks—

credit from having sold cloaks to people of Mahuza who had not yet paid him, and they had undertaken to pay him at a fixed time.

He said to Rav Yosef bar Hama: When you come

when you come from there—

bring them

to me—

bring them to me, for the time of repayment had already arrived .

He went

Rav Yosef bar Hama went and requested the debt from them.

They gave it to him—

they gave it to him.

They said to him: Let us acquire from you—

they asked him to perform an act of acquisition, so that if the money were forcibly lost while in his possession on the way, Rav Sheshet would not return to demand it from them a second time.

He said to them: Yes—

I will do as you say. However,

in the end—

ultimately—

he slipped away from them—

he slipped away from them and went on his way [without performing the act of acquisition].

When he came to him—

when he came to him—

he said to him

Rav Sheshet said to him:

You acted well—

you did well—

that you did not make yourself—

that you did not make yourself for nothing—

“a debtor’s slave to a creditor’s man”

for one who is subjugated to another is considered his slave.

Another version—

there is another version of what he said to him:

You acted well—

you did well [by slipping away from performing an act of acquisition],

for “a debtor’s slave to a creditor’s man”—

they are borrowers and slaves to me, to return the debt under their responsibility.