Gittin 13b — the Talmud in English

And he answers:

Rav Pappa holds that

Rav Pappa holds:

when \-

when

Rav said

the law of the presence of the three of them,

it makes no difference—

he did not distinguish between

a loan,

where the money was given to the borrower to spend and is not present.

Nor does it make a difference in a deposit—

where the money is gathered and lying there, and is indeed present. In every case, the recipient acquires it. Therefore, if the Mishna had been speaking of the presence of the three of them, there would have been no need at all to establish it in a case where the money was gathered.

The Gemara asks regarding the other side:

Rav Zevid, what is the reason—

what is the reason—

that he did not say in accordance with Rav Pappa.

After all, Rav Pappa’s reasoning is convincing?! The answer:

The Mishna cannot be established as referring to a dangerously ill person—

according to Rav Zevid, our Mishna cannot be established as referring to a dangerously ill person.

And if you ask:

From where—

what is the necessity for this:

The answer:

From what it teaches—

from what we learned in our Mishna:

One who says, “Give this bill of divorce to my wife, and this deed of emancipation to my slave,” and dies, they may not give them after his death.

It may be inferred:

The reason—

the reason that they may not give them—

is that he died—

because he died, and there is no bill of divorce after death.

This—

this implies—

during his lifetime—

if he were still alive—

they give

to the woman or to the slave, without asking him again.

The reason is that he said, “Give”—

and even during his lifetime, it is only because he said, “Give”—

this—

but if—

he did not say, “Give,”

but only, “Write,” then even if he had not died—

they do not give,

because he did not say explicitly: “Give.” This is the law regarding a healthy person. [And in contrast:]

And a dangerously ill person—

the law is not so, but

even though he did not say, “Give” [and only said, “Write”]—

but only said, “Write it”—

they give.

And this is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri in the Mishna [below, page 65b],

as we learned: At first—

initially—

they would say

the Sages:

One who is being led out in chains—

whom the kingdom takes out in chains to kill, and he is in mortal danger—

and says, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,”

so that she will not require levirate marriage. Even though he did not say, “and give it”—

these [those who hear him]

who heard him

shall write and give.

For he certainly intended that they give it to her, but because he was frantic over his life, he did not complete his statement.

They returned

the Sages and added

to say: [not only this, but]

not only this, but

even one who sets sail

on a ship to the sea,

and one who goes out in a caravan

to the desert—both are places of danger—and says, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife”: these shall write and give.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri

adds further

and says: Even one who is dangerously ill

because of illness [a dangerously ill person] who said, “Write”—the law is likewise.

If so, from the words of Rabbi Shimon Shezuri we see that, in the case of a dangerously ill person, acquisition takes effect even without his saying, “Give”!

Rav Ashi challenges Rabbi Zeira’s necessity:

Rav Ashi raised an objection to him: And who can say to us—

and who will tell us [prove to us]—

that the Mishna—

that our Mishna—is according to the method of

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri? Perhaps it is according to the Sages—

perhaps it was taught according to the method of the Sages, and one who is dangerously ill [a dangerously ill person] does not have the same law as one being led out in chains. And if he did not say, “Give,” they do not give.

Now the Gemara attempts to understand the reason for the acquisition through the presence of the three of them:

The substance itself—

the substance of the law:

Rav Huna said that Rav said:

If one person said to another:

“I have one hundred dinars with you,”

do not return it to me, but

“Give it to so-and-so,”

who is standing here with us. If this statement was made

in the presence of the three of them—

he acquires

the one hundred dinars. And he does not require another act of acquisition or witnesses.

The Gemara says:

Rava said: Rav’s statement stands to reason—

Rav’s law stands to reason—specifically

with regard to a deposit,

which is found and remains with the depositary.

But with regard to a loan,

which was given for expenditure—

no,

the law of the presence of the three of them is not effective.

But the Gemara wonders:

And by the Almighty—

this is an expression of an oath. How can Rava state a reasoning of his own, distinguishing between a deposit and a loan, when

Rav said

his law explicitly

even with regard to a loan.

And there is additional support:

It was also stated—

and it was likewise said in the beit-midrash:

Shmuel said in the name of Levi—

in his name:

“I have a loan with you; give it to so-and-so”—

in the presence of the three of them—

he acquires.

If so, it is proven that the law of the presence of the three of them applies also to a loan.

The Gemara asks:

And what is the reason—

what is [in truth] the reason that a loan can also be acquired through the presence of the three of them, when the money is not found with him, so that he could acquire it?!

See there where he elaborates. And he answers:

Ameimar said: It is made—

the matter is considered—

as though he said to him

the borrower to the lender at the time the money was given:

“I have bound myself to you”—

I hereby bind myself to you from now—

“to you and to everyone who comes through your power”—

to you and to everyone who will come by your authority. Therefore, when the lender said to him [later], “Give it to so-and-so” [in the presence of the three of them], it becomes clear that the borrower bound himself to this person already from the time the money was given.

Rav Ashi raises a difficulty against Ameimar:

But if so,

according to your words, that everything depends on the borrower’s obligation from the first moment, what is the law if

the lender transferred

the loan

to those yet to be born—

to people who were born after the loan—

who were not—

who did not exist—

at the time the money was given.

If so, the borrower did not bind himself to them.

Is it indeed so—

is this really the law—

that they did not acquire—

that they do not acquire? [For:]

For even according to Rabbi Meir, who said: A person can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world,

such as the fruit of a palm tree that has not yet grown, or when he says, “I hereby transfer to you whatever I shall bring up in my net”—

these words—

that is, specifically—

apply to a person—

to a person—

who exists in the world. But

to bind oneself

to a person—

to a person—

who does not exist in the world, no

is effective, even according to Rabbi Meir.

And according to your words, that the transfer depends on the borrower’s obligation from the first moment, it is clear that the presence of the three of them will not be effective for a person born after the loan [as we proved]. And this is surely not correct, since we have found no such distinction in the law of the presence of the three of them!

Rav Ashi states another reason for the law of the presence of the three of them: