Gittin 12b — the Talmud in English

For what purpose

does he borrow

from others

and eat,

for he receives sustenance from his master?

And the Gemara answers:

For the surplus,

since he desired more ample sustenance, which is not the way of his master to feed him—he borrows from others.

And the Gemara asks again [by way of discussion]:

And let consecration say to him —

that consecration should say to him [as it were, should claim against him]: Behold,

until now

—until this time—

it was sufficient for you

—the sustenance of the master—

without

your needing

the surplus. And now

also—[if so,] even now [when your master has consecrated the product of your hands]

—

let it be sufficient for you

—let it suffice for you—

without the surplus [and the product of your hands will belong to consecration!]

[and your labor should belong to the consecrated property]!

And the Gemara answers:

Consecration itself

—itself—

is pleased

—it is pleased that the slave eat abundantly—

so that his slave will grow stronger

—so that the slave will recover physically and grow stronger.

And the Gemara raises an objection against Rav’s ruling:

What Rav said:

He works and repays

his debt—is difficult, for

each one at a time

—each first peruta that he earns—

becomes consecrated to him

—it is consecrated by virtue of the master’s consecration.

And the Gemara answers: This concerns a case in which, when he earns

less than less than the value of a peruta,

he repays the lender before it combines to the measure of a peruta, because consecration does not take effect upon less than the value of a peruta.

And now the Gemara establishes the rejection of the proof from Rav’s words:

Here too, it is reasonable

—it is likewise reasonable that Rav spoke of a case in which the master provides him with sustenance, for

Rav said another ruling: One who consecrates the hands of his slave, that slave works and eats, for if the slave does not work

for himself

who will work him

—who will work him and provide him with sustenance? And in this ruling it is explained that the master’s consecration does not take effect, in contradiction to his earlier words.

And necessarily, in order to resolve the contradiction, one must say:

If you grant

—if you say so, your words will be comfortable and understood, namely:

this

—the first ruling of Rav—concerns

providing

the master’s sustenance to the slave, and only for this reason the consecration takes effect, for

he cannot

the master say to the slave: “Work for me, and I will not sustain you.”

But this

—the second ruling of Rav—concerns a case in which he is

not providing

him with sustenance, and therefore his consecration does not take effect. And the two rulings are reconciled

well

—properly.

But if you say

—if you say—

this

—the first ruling—concerns

a case in which he is not providing

him with sustenance, and nevertheless the consecration takes effect, because

he can

the master say to the slave: “Work for me, and I will not sustain you,” then the wording of the second ruling is perplexing:

“For if the slave does not work, who will work him?”

For everyone

who wishes may work him

—whoever wishes [to assist him] may work him and provide him with sustenance.

And by force of the necessity to establish that the case concerns one who provides him with sustenance, the proof from Rav’s words is nullified: that the master can say to his slave, “Work for me, and I will not sustain you.”

An attempt to prove this from the words of Rabbi Yohanan, who disagrees with Rav:

Come and hear: For Rabbi Yohanan said: One who cuts off the hand of another’s slave gives his lost-work compensation

[the payment for the days of illness during which he was prevented from working ]

and his medical expenses

[the cost of medical treatment]

to his master. And that slave is sustained from charity.

And from the fact that his lost-work compensation goes to the master while he himself is sustained from charity,

learn from it

—it can be learned from this—

that the master can say to the slave, “Work for me, and I will not sustain you!”

And the Gemara rejects this:

With what are we dealing here? With one who provides him

—the master provides the slave—

with sustenance.

But the Gemara asks:

If so

—if so—

why

—why [must he be]—

sustained from charity?

And the Gemara answers:

For the surplus.

He needs, because of his illness, to add to his sustenance.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

If so

—if so, why did Rabbi Yohanan say

“is sustained”

—which implies that he receives from charity only the principal sustenance, merely enough for his life? Yet

“is supported” should have been said by him

—he should have used the language of support and said: “He is supported from charity,” whose meaning includes all his needs?!

Rather, is it not so

—it is proven from here that Rabbi Yohanan did not speak of one who provides him with sustenance. And from the fact that nevertheless his medical expenses go to his master,

learn from it,

—it can be learned from this—

that the master can

say to his slave: “Work for me, and I will not sustain you.”

Learn from it—and there is no refutation of this proof.

there is no refutation of this proof.

Now the Gemara discusses Rabbi Yohanan’s actual statement:

The master said:

There is a matter to discuss in Rabbi Yohanan’s words, who said:

“He gives his lost-work compensation and his medical expenses to his master.”

His lost-work compensation

is obvious

that it belongs to his master—but to whom else? For since the product of his hands belongs to his master, certainly the lost-work compensation belongs to him! And if you answer that he came to teach the earlier ruling, that the master can say to the slave, “Work for me, and I will not sustain you,” and here too he does not sustain him, then it would have been sufficient for him to say: “That slave is sustained from charity,” and there would have been no need to add that his lost-work compensation goes to his master.

And the Gemara answers:

His medical expenses were necessary for him

—with regard to the cost of his medical treatment, he needed to teach a novelty: that the master receives them, even though this is not profit that comes from the product of his hands. And along with his medical expenses, the tanna also stated the ruling concerning his lost-work compensation.

And the Gemara asks: Are not the cost of

his medical expenses his

—they belong to the slave—

for he needs —

for he needs—

to be healed through them,

to recover by means of them?!

And the Gemara answers:

It is necessary

—this ruling is necessary only in a case

where they assessed him

—the court assessed the length of time required for a physician’s treatment—

for five days

—and he must give the physician the wage for five days—

but they gave him a harsh medicine

—and they prepared a strong medicine for him—

and he recovered in three days

—and he was healed within three days.

You might have said

—we might have thought to say—

the pain is his

—this pain that was added to him because of the harsh medicine belongs to him [and not to the master]. If so, he should receive the wage of the two days in exchange for the pain that he suffered—

it teaches us

—therefore Rabbi Yohanan came to teach us that this is not so. Rather, every profit or improvement that comes to the slave is acquired by the master, like profits that come to him from his ox and his donkey, since it is his property.

And now the Gemara returns to discuss the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna, whether it is a benefit for a slave to leave his master’s control to freedom, or a detriment.

And the Gemara cites a beraita:

It was taught: Rabbi Elazar said

[one of the sages who disagreed with Rabbi Meir]:

We said to Meir:

“Is it not a benefit for a slave to leave his master’s control to freedom?”

He said to us: “It is a detriment to him,”

and the proof is:

“If he was a slave

of a

priest,

then the moment he releases him

he disqualifies him from

eating

teruma.”

We said to him: “But is it not so

that in any event he can prevent him [even without releasing him], for

what

is the law

if he wishes

the master

not to sustain him and not to support him—

he is

permitted!

It follows that he does not cause him any loss by releasing him.”

He said to us: “And what if a priest’s slave fled

—from his master’s house—

and a priest’s wife rebelled against her husband

and fled from his house—

do they not eat

—they—

teruma

in the houses of others? If so, it is proven that even when his master prevents him from eating teruma, he can still eat it in the houses of others, since he is a priest’s slave. But in contrast:

“And this one

who was released

does not eat

anywhere. If so, it is a detriment to him!”

The Sages said to him:

“But

with regard to

a woman

who receives a bill of divorce from her husband, we agree

that it is a detriment to her, for it disqualifies her

by this

from teruma,

[since she is no longer the wife of a priest], and likewise

she loses

by this

her sustenance,

which he had been obligated to provide for her until now. [Whereas with a slave, the master is permitted not to sustain him].”

And the Gemara asks:

What did they say to him

—what did the Sages ask him [Rabbi Meir]—

and what did he answer them

—and what answer did he give them? For concerning their question about sustenance, that the master is permitted not to sustain him and not to support him, he answered nothing. His words contain an answer only to their question about teruma.

And the Gemara explains Rabbi Meir’s answer:

This is what he said to them

—this is how he answered them:

“You have answered me concerning sustenance,

that the master does not cause him a loss through the release, for in any event, [even while he is still a slave], he is permitted not to sustain him from his own property. But

what will you answer me concerning teruma

—for as long as the master has not released him, he can eat teruma belonging to others by virtue of his being a priest’s slave? And if so, only the release causes him to lose teruma, and it is a detriment to the slave. And an agent cannot acquire for him something that is a detriment.”

Continuation of Rabbi Meir’s words:

And if you say—

and if you return and argue against me: surely the agent’s acceptance is not a liability, since

if he wishes—

if he wished [the master to free him], he is not obligated to do this specifically through the agent. Rather,

he throws him a get—

he would throw the get toward him in the public domain [even if not into his hand, but] into the four cubits in which he is standing—

and disqualifies him—

[and thus he will free him] and disqualify him from then on from eating teruma.

I too will answer you:

he leaves him—

immediately the slave will leave him and flee. And he will not place himself in a place where the master can disqualify him by throwing a get.

and goes off into the world—

and he will go to other places, and there he will eat teruma, since: