Gittin 12b (יב:) — the Talmud in English

For what purpose

does he borrow

from others

and eat,

when he receives his sustenance from his master?

The Gemara answers:

For additional provision,

since he wanted more generous sustenance, which it is not his master’s practice to provide him with; he therefore borrows from others.

The Gemara asks again [in the course of its give-and-take]:

And let the consecrated property say to him —

that is, let the consecrated property say to him [as it were, in a claim against him]: Indeed,

until now

—until this point—

it was sufficient for you

—your master’s sustenance—

without

your needing

additional provision. And now

as well—

[if so,] now too [when your master has consecrated the proceeds of your labor]

let it be sufficient for you

—let it suffice for you—

without additional provision

[and let the proceeds of your labor belong to the consecrated property]!

The Gemara answers:

The consecrated property itself

—itself—

finds it beneficial

—it is beneficial to it—for the slave to eat generously,

so that his slave will improve

—so that the slave will recover physically and become stronger.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rav’s ruling:

What Rav said:

He works and repays

his debt—is difficult, for

each one as it comes

—each first peruta that he earns—

becomes consecrated to him

—it is consecrated by virtue of the master’s consecration.

The Gemara answers: The case is one in which, when he earns

less than a peruta at a time,

he repays the lender before the earnings combine to reach the amount of a peruta, since consecration does not take effect on an amount worth less than a peruta.

The Gemara now substantiates its rejection of the proof from Rav’s words:

Here too, it is logically evident

—it is likewise evident that Rav was speaking of a case in which the master provides him with sustenance—for

Rav said another law: One who consecrates the hands of his slave—the slave works and eats, for if the slave did not work

for himself

who would work him

—who would work him and provide him with sustenance? This ruling clearly indicates that the master’s consecration does not take effect, contrary to his earlier statements.

Necessarily, in order to resolve the contradiction, one must say:

If you say

—if you say this, your statements will be coherent and understandable, namely:

this

—Rav’s first ruling—is speaking

of a case where the master provides

the slave with sustenance, and the consecration takes effect only for this reason, since

he cannot

the master say to the slave: “Work for me, and I will not provide you with sustenance.”

But this

—Rav’s second ruling—is speaking

of a case where he does not provide

him with sustenance, and therefore the consecration does not take effect. The two rulings are thus reconciled

well

—completely.

But if you say

—if you say that

this

—the first ruling—is speaking

of a case where he does not provide

him with sustenance, and nevertheless the consecration takes effect because

he can

the master say to the slave: “Work for me, and I will not provide you with sustenance,” then the wording of the second ruling is puzzling:

“For if the slave did not work, who would work him?”

After all, anyone

who wishes may work him

—whoever wishes [to assist him] can work him and provide him with sustenance.

Since it is necessary to establish the case as one in which the master provides him with sustenance, the proof from Rav’s words is rejected: the master can say to his slave, “Work for me, and I will not provide you with sustenance.”

An attempt to prove the contrary from the words of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who disagrees with Rav:

Come and hear: For Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who cuts off the hand of another’s slave gives his loss of work the wages for the days of illness during which he was unable to work ]

[the wages for the days of work he missed]

and his medical expenses

[the cost of medical treatment]

to his master. And that slave is sustained from charity.

And from the fact that the compensation for his loss of work goes to the master, while he himself is sustained from charity,

infer from it

—it may be learned from this—

that the master can say to the slave, “Work for me, and I will not provide you with sustenance”!

The Gemara rejects this:

What are we dealing with here? With a case where he provides him

—the master provides the slave—

with sustenance.

The Gemara nevertheless asks:

If so

—if so—

why

—why [must he be]—

sustained from charity?

The Gemara answers:

For additional provision.

Because on account of his illness he needs to add to his sustenance.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so

—if so, why did Rabbi Yoḥanan say

“is sustained”

—which implies that he receives from charity only his basic sustenance, merely what is necessary for his life? After all,

“is supported” would have been required

—he should have used the expression “is supported,” and said: “He is supported from charity,” whose meaning includes all his needs?!

Rather, is it not

—is it not proven from here that Rabbi Yoḥanan was not speaking of a case where the master provides him with sustenance? And from the fact that nevertheless the payment for his medical expenses goes to his master,

infer from it,

it may be learned from this

that he can

the master say to his slave: “Work for me, and I will not provide you with sustenance.”

Infer from it

—and there is no refutation of this proof.

The Gemara now discusses Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement itself:

The Master said:

There is reason to discuss Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement, in which he said:

He gives his loss of work and his medical expenses to his master.

His loss of work

is obvious

that it belongs to his master—if not to him, to whom would it belong? Since the proceeds of his labor belong to his master, certainly the compensation for his loss of work belongs to him! And if you answer that Rabbi Yoḥanan came to teach us the preceding ruling, that the master can say to the slave, “Work for me, and I will not provide you with sustenance,” and here too he does not provide him with sustenance, then it would have sufficed to say: “That slave is sustained from charity,” and there would be no need to add that his loss of work goes to his master.

The Gemara answers:

His medical expenses were necessary to state

—a novel ruling was necessary concerning payment of his medical expenses: that the master receives them, even though this is not profit derived from the proceeds of his labor. And incidentally to his medical expenses, the tanna also stated the law concerning his loss of work.

The Gemara asks: Is the payment for

his medical expenses not his

—does it not belong to the slave—

since he needs —

[for he] needs—

to be healed through it,

to be cured with that money?!

The Gemara answers:

It is necessary

—this ruling is necessary only in a case

where they assessed him

—the court assessed the length of time required for medical treatment—

for five days

—and he must pay the physician’s fee for five days—

but they administered a potent medicine to him

—and they gave him a strong medicine—

and he recovered in three days

—and he was cured within three days.

Lest you say

—we might have thought—

the pain is his

—this additional pain caused to him by the potent medicine belongs to him [and not to the master]. If so, he should receive the payment for the two days in exchange for the pain he suffered—

it comes to teach us

—Rabbi Yoḥanan therefore comes to teach us that this is not so. Rather, any profit or benefit that comes to the slave is acquired by the master, like profits that come to him from his ox or donkey, since the slave too is his property.

The Gemara now returns to discuss the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Meir in the Mishna: whether it is beneficial for a slave to leave his master’s control and become free, or detrimental.

The Gemara cites a beraita:

It was taught: Rabbi Elazar said

[one of the Sages who disagreed with Rabbi Meir]:

We said to Meir:

Is it not beneficial for a slave to leave his master’s control and become free?

He said to us: It is detrimental to him,

and the proof is:

If he were a slave

of a

koen,

then the moment his master frees him, he

disqualifies him from

eating

teruma.

We said to him: But indeed

he can prevent him from eating it even without freeing him, for

what

is the law

if he wishes

the master

not to provide him with sustenance and not to support him—

he is

permitted

to do so! It follows that he does not cause him any loss by freeing him.

He said to us: And what if a koen’s slave fled

—from his master’s house—

and a koen’s wife rebelled against her husband

and fled from his house—

do they not eat

—they do eat—

teruma

in the homes of others. It follows that even when his master prevents him from eating teruma, he can still eat it elsewhere, since he remains a koen’s slave. But in contrast,

this one

who was freed

does not eat

anywhere. If so, it is detrimental to him!

The Sages said to him:

But

with regard to a

woman

who receives a bill of divorce from her husband, we agree

that it is detrimental to her, since it disqualifies her

thereby

from teruma,

[as she is no longer a koen’s wife], and likewise

she loses

thereby

her sustenance,

which he had been obligated to provide for her until then. [Whereas with regard to a slave, the master is permitted not to provide him with sustenance].

The Gemara asks:

What did they say to him

—what did the Sages ask [Rabbi Meir]—

and what did he answer them

—and what answer did he give them? For he did not answer their question concerning sustenance, that the master is permitted not to provide him with sustenance and support. His words respond only to their question concerning teruma.

The Gemara explains Rabbi Meir’s answer:

This is what he said to them

—this is what he answered them:

You have answered me concerning sustenance,

that the master does not cause him a loss by freeing him, since in any event, [even while he is still a slave,] the master is permitted not to provide him with sustenance from his own resources. But

what will you answer me concerning teruma

—as long as his master has not freed him, he can eat teruma belonging to others by virtue of his status as a koen’s slave. If so, it is only the freeing that causes him to lose teruma, and it is therefore detrimental to the slave. And an agent cannot acquire for someone something that is detrimental to him.

Continuation of Rabbi Meir’s words:

And if you say:

And if you return and argue against me: Surely the agent’s acceptance is not a liability, since

if he wanted—

if the master wanted to free him, he need not do so specifically through the agent. Rather,

he throws him a get—

he throws the get toward him in the public domain [even if not into his hand, but] within four cubits in which he is standing—

and disqualifies him—

and thereby frees him and disqualifies him from that point onward from eating teruma.

Rashi explains it this way. But seemingly there is a difficulty: The acquisition of four cubits is effective only by rabbinic enactment, so how can it be effective to remove his prohibition from the Torah and permit him to a free Jewish woman? In his responsa, Hatam Sofer (Yoreh De'ah, siman 314) wrote that Rashi’s position in Gittin below (64b, s.v. Zokheh) is indeed that a rabbinic acquisition is effective with regard to a matter governed by the Torah, unlike the position of Tosafot there, who disagree. And in Eshel Avraham it was written to resolve this according to Tosafot Rid in Bava Metzia (10b), that with regard to a get, the acquisition of four cubits is effective by Torah law; see there. Accordingly, it may be said that even with regard to a deed of emancipation it is effective by Torah law, because the laws of a deed of emancipation are derived by means of a gzera shava from the get of a woman. I too will answer you:

he abandons him—

the slave will immediately leave him and flee. He will not place himself in a location where the master could disqualify him by throwing a get.

and go off into the world—

he will go to other places, and there he will eat teruma, since: