Gittin 12a — the Talmud in English

But the Gemara rejects this:

Ameimar said, and some say —

perhaps you might say that this is what

Rav Pappa said: ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact position on the page")

Perhaps it is not so!

Perhaps they did not disagree for this reason; rather, they have other rationales?!

R. Eliezer stated this only there —

R. Eliezer said his statement there [in the Mishna],

but

because of

the principle of migo —

that since

if he wanted —

if the wealthy person wished —

he could renounce ownership of his property —

he would renounce ownership of all his property —

and become poor and thereby be eligible for it —

and since he would be poor, he would be entitled to take pe'a for himself.

And since he is entitled to acquire it for himself, he is entitled to acquire it for his fellow —

since he can acquire it for himself [that is, he has the capacity to acquire it], he can also acquire it for his fellow.

But here —

here, where the one taking possession is not permitted to take it for himself, since he owes him nothing —

R. Eliezer would not

say this.

And the Sages stated this only there —

the Sages said there [in the Mishna] that he cannot acquire it on behalf of another poor person

but

because

it is written —

as it is written in the verse:

“You shall not gather”

and from the juxtaposition of the verse with its continuation,

“For the poor

and the stranger you shall leave them,” we derive:

“You shall not gather it for him”

you

for the poor person! But here —

here, where he is not warned against taking possession on behalf of others —

the Sages did not

say this. Therefore, it is possible that even where he causes a loss to others, he may take possession on behalf of his fellow.

And the Gemara asks:

And R. Eliezer, this —

verse —

“You shall not gather,”

which the Sages expound—

what does he do with it —

what does he do with it [that is, how does he expound it]? According to his view, this law is learned from reasoning, and therefore the exposition is superfluous.

And it answers:

He needs it —

he requires it [for another law]:

“to warn a poor person concerning his own” —

a poor person who is legally eligible to take pe'a, [who does not have two hundred zuz], and who has a small field: the verse warned him to leave pe'a in it for the benefit of other poor people.

The Gemara now discusses another matter from the Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna:

“If he wishes not to provide sustenance for his slave, etc.”

The Gemara infers: From the fact that the master is permitted not to provide sustenance for his slave,

you can learn from this

that

the master can —

the master —

say to

:

“Work for me”

work

“and I will not provide you with sustenance,”

but instead go around from door to door to obtain your food! Is that truly so?

And the Gemara rejects this:

What are we dealing with here —

what is the case here?

That he said to him —

the master said to the slave:

“Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance.”

The wages from the slave’s labor shall serve for his sustenance.

But the Gemara raises a difficulty:

By the same token —

one could likewise say

with regard to a woman, that he said to her

the husband said to her:

“Go out”

and take

the proceeds of your labor

for yourself, and let that be

for your sustenance —

in place of the sustenance that I am obligated to provide you. But

why, with regard to a woman —

why —

do we not

say this?

And it answers:

A woman [is speaking of one] who is not sufficient —

she does not earn enough through her labor to support herself, and the husband must add to it from his own resources.

But if so, the Gemara asks:

A slave too is one who is not sufficient —

there is likewise no certainty that what he earns through his labor will suffice to feed him. If so, the difficulty remains: Why, with regard to a slave, can the master say to him, “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance,” with no distinction between a slave whose earnings suffice for his needs and one whose earnings do not suffice?

The Gemara answers: There is a difference between a woman and a slave.

A slave whose bread is not worth his keep —

a slave who is not worth the bread he eats —

what need do his master and mistress have of him —

what need do his master and mistress have of him? Therefore, the master is not obligated to add anything for him; rather, he must go around from door to door on his own. A woman, however, is bound by the terms he stipulated with her in her ketuba: even if her earnings are insufficient, he must provide her sustenance from his property.

The Gemara attempts to prove this from a beraita:

Come and hear: A slave who

unintentionally killed someone

and was exiled to the cities of refuge: his master is not obligated to provide him with sustenance. Moreover, the proceeds of his labor

belong

to his master. Learn from this —

it can be proved from here:

that the master can say to the slave: “Work for me and I will not provide you with sustenance.”

And it rejects this as before:

What are we dealing with here? That he said to him

the master said to the slave:

“Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance.”

The Gemara asks:

If so —

if that is so —

the proceeds of his labor —

the wages from his labor —

why —

why do they belong

to his master?

After all, the slave needs them for his sustenance!

The Gemara answers:

For the surplus.

Although the master said to him, “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance,” this applies only to the money [that he earned] required for his sustenance. But if his wages exceed what he needs for his sustenance, the surplus belongs to his master.

The Gemara asks: If the beraita is referring to

the surplus,

then this is

obvious —

it is self-evident that this money goes to his master. Why does the beraita need to state it? And the Gemara answers:

Lest you say —

you might have said [on the basis of reasoning]:

Since when he does not have

when the slave has no surplus money [because he earned only enough for his sustenance] —

he does not give it to him —

the master gives the slave nothing [since he said to him, “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance”]. If so,

when he does have it as well —

when he has a surplus because he earned more that day than he needs —

he should not take it from him —

the master should not take it from him, lest there be a day when he finds no means of earning a livelihood.

It teaches us —

therefore, the beraita comes to teach us that this is not so: when he has a surplus, it belongs to his master!

The Gemara asks:

And what is the difference —

what difference is there between a slave who was exiled

to the cities of refuge

and an ordinary slave with regard to the surplus? Clearly, the tanna could have taught us this even without mentioning the cities of refuge!

The Gemara answers:

It might have entered your mind to say —

with regard to this slave, it might have occurred to us to say that since the Torah states [concerning one who killed unintentionally] [Deuteronomy, chapter 4], “He shall flee to one of these cities

and live,”

perhaps its intention was to command:

Provide him with an enhanced livelihood —

provide him with an extra measure of life and sustenance. Although with regard to an ordinary slave the surplus belongs to the master, in the case of one exiled to a city of refuge, the surplus would belong to him.

It teaches us —

therefore, the tanna teaches us that even in a city of refuge, the surplus belongs to the master!

The Gemara returns and asks:

But from the fact that the latter clause teaches —

from what we learned at the end of the beraita:

“But with regard to a woman who was exiled to the cities of refuge, her husband is obligated to provide her sustenance.” From this

it may be inferred that the case is one in which

he did not say to her

the husband did not say to her: “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance.”

And the proof is as follows:

If

we were to say

—

why

be obligated

to provide her sustenance? Rather, it certainly refers to the latter clause in a case where he did not say it to her.

And from the latter clause

from the fact that the latter clause refers to a case

where he did not say it to her, the first clause likewise

the first clause as well [with regard to the slave] refers to a case

where he did not say it to him —

he did not say to him, “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor,” and nevertheless the master takes the proceeds of his labor and does not provide him with sustenance. The proof therefore returns that the master can say to his slave: “Work for me and I will not provide you with sustenance.”

The Gemara rejects this:

Actually

we will establish the first clause as referring to a case

where he said to him —

where the master said to him, “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor, etc.,” and no proof can be drawn as you reasoned.

And with regard to the woman,

the case likewise involves a husband who said to her, “Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance,” but it is a case

where she is insufficient —

her labor is insufficient for her support.

But the Gemara asks:

But from the fact that the latter clause teaches —

from what we learned in the latter clause of the latter clause:

“And if he said to her”

the husband said to her:

“Go out and use the proceeds of your labor”

“for your sustenance” —

then this is

permitted. From this

it may be inferred

that the first clause

the first clause of the latter section refers to a case

where he did not say it to her?!

And this is not in accordance with the answer you gave!

The Gemara answers:

This is what he is saying —

this is what the tanna said [this is his intention in the final clause of the latter section]:

“And if she is sufficient

to support herself through her wages and does not need her husband’s money

, and he said to her”

the husband said to her in this case:

“Go out and use the proceeds of your labor for your sustenance” —

then this is

permitted,

and he is not prevented from doing so.

But the Gemara asks: If

she is sufficient

to support herself,

what does it come to teach us —

what novel point did the tanna come to teach us? It is obvious?!

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say —

you might have said that from the verse

“All the honor of the king’s daughter is inward”

it follows that the husband is forbidden [for reasons of modesty] to compel her to go about in the marketplaces to earn her livelihood, since she is not one of the local residents [in the city of refuge], and they will not bring work to her home. After all, all Jews are royal princes.

It teaches us —

therefore, the tanna teaches us that when she is sufficient, he is permitted to do so!

The Gemara analyzes this:

Shall we say that this is a dispute between tannaim —

shall we say that tannaim disagreed concerning this matter, whether the master can say to his slave: “Work for me and I will not provide you with sustenance”?

As we learned:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: A slave may say to his master during years of famine: “Either provide me with sustenance”

according to my needs,

“or emancipate me,”

so that I can support myself.

And the Sages say: The choice is in the hands of his master!

Is it not with regard to this that they disagree —

is this not the issue over which they disagree:

One master holds

that the Sages hold:

he can

the master can say to the slave, “Work for me,” etc. Therefore, they said: “The choice is in the hands of his master.”

And the other master holds

that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds:

he cannot?!

The Gemara rejects this:

Can you really understand it that way —

can you really establish this beraita as referring to a case in which he said to him, “Work for me and I will not provide you with sustenance”?

This wording, “Either provide me with sustenance or emancipate me”

if so, this wording used by Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is imprecise, since the slave does not actually want to leave his master’s service; he merely wants to receive from his master enough sustenance for his needs. Therefore,

“Either provide me with sustenance or give me the proceeds of my labor for my support” would have been required

he should have said this?!

Furthermore,

according to your reasoning, there is another difficulty:

what is the difference

why did the tanna choose to situate their dispute

during years of famine?

Even in an ordinary year, if the master says to him, “Work for me and I will not provide you with sustenance,” it is considered a year of famine for him?!

The Gemara explains:

Rather, what are we dealing with here —

what is the case here?

That he said to him

the master said to him:

—

his labor is insufficient to support him. Therefore, in such a case,

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds

that the slave can say to the master:

“Either provide me with sustenance, or emancipate me, so that

so that

people will see me —

people will see me in my distress when I am a free man —

and take pity on me”

and give me sustenance, since people do not take pity on slaves.

And the Sages hold —

the reasoning of the Sages is that even if his master does not emancipate him, people will take pity on him. For

one who takes pity on free people

a person who takes pity on free people

also takes pity on a slave —

he also takes pity on a slave, since he too is obligated in mitzvot, like a woman.

And the Gemara attempts to prove this from Rav’s words:

ta shma: For Rav said: One who consecrates

the labor

of his slave

to Heaven,

that slave borrows

from others

and eats

[and afterward]

and does -

and works -

and repays

his loan. And from Rav’s saying “borrows and eats,” it follows that the slave is not permitted to be sustained from the product of his hands, because they are consecrated.

Learn from this,

from the fact that the master can consecrate the labor of his slave, it follows that likewise

the master can say to the slave: “Work with me and I will not sustain you.”

For if you say that he cannot, why does the slave need to borrow and eat? Since the consecration does not take effect [because a person cannot consecrate something that is not his], he can eat from the money of his labor.

The Gemara rejects this:

Here, with what are we dealing: with the master providing him

the slave

with maintenance.

And therefore Rav said that he can consecrate the product of his hands. [And there is no proof from here concerning “Work with me and I will not sustain you”]".

And the Gemara asks:

If so -

if that is so -

for what purpose