Gittin 11a — the Talmud in English

Among gentiles, owners of

distinctive names

who signed. And since it is not common for Jews to be called by such names, there is therefore no concern that people will come to rely upon them. For everyone knows that they are gentiles.

And the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances—

which names are considered distinctive names?

Rav Pappa said:

The names of gentile judges,

such as: Hurmiz, Avudina, bar Shivtai, bar Kidrei, Bati, and Nakim Una.

But the Gemara is precise:

It follows from your words:

But

if the signatories are owners of

names that are not distinctive, what—

what is the law?

No,

we do not validate them even when there are witnesses to the delivery, because of the concern that people will come to rely upon them!

Accordingly, one must raise a difficulty against the wording of the Mishna:

If so—

if that is so—

when it teaches the latter clause—

what the Mishna taught at its end:

“They were mentioned

bills of divorce and documents of emancipation for disqualification

only when they were made by laymen.”

And it follows that those made before all the courts are valid. This is difficult: for according to your answer, “with distinctive names,” even among those made before courts there is a distinction to be made. If so,

let it distinguish—

let the tanna distinguish—

and teach—

and state—

it—

in the law of the courts itself [where a bill of divorce was signed in their presence], and let it say as follows:

When are these words applicable—

that these bills may be validated on the strength of the witnesses to the delivery? Only when the signatories are called

by distinctive names of gentiles. But

if the signatories are owners of

names that are not distinctive—

—

no!

And the Gemara answers:

This too is what he said—

this is also what the tanna intended to say. Namely:

When are these words applicable, with regard to ministers? With distinctive names. But with names that are not distinctive—

it is made—

they are considered—

as though they were made—

like other sale documents that were made—

by laymen,

without the courts—and they are invalid. And the reason is: because these people are not particular about their good name and are not careful to refrain from signing falsely.

Alternatively, if you wish,

and if you wish [another answer], say:

The latter clause—

the conclusion of the Mishna, “they were mentioned, and so forth,” does not refer at all to women’s bills of divorce, but

we come—

it comes to refer—

to monetary documents.

And it is not a continuation of Rabbi Shimon’s words, as we had thought earlier. Rather, it is the conclusion of the words of the first Rabbis in the Mishna, who validate all documents issued in the courts of gentiles, such as sale documents

and this is what it says—

and this is what the Mishna says:

They were mentioned

in the beit-midrash

as monetary documents that are invalid—

which are invalid—only

when they were made by a

gentile

layman,

who is not particular about his good name and does not care about signing falsely.

And the Gemara brings a beraita found in the Tosefta of this tractate [chapter 1, halakha 9], in which the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Akiva is explained, as Rabbi Shimon told the Sages who were in Sidon. And the position of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel regarding women’s bills of divorce and documents of emancipation is also brought.

It was taught: Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yosei said:

Rabbi Shimon said this to the Sages in Sidon: Rabbi Akiva and the Sages did not disagree concerning all documents issued in the courts of gentiles.

[And both agree]

that even though their signatories are gentiles,

they are valid, even women’s bills of divorce and documents of emancipation.

In what, then, did they disagree?

They disagreed only when they were made by laymen. For Rabbi Akiva validates,

even other documents.

And the Sages disqualify

other documents,

except for women’s bills of divorce and documents of emancipation—

which are valid.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: These too

[women’s bills of divorce] are not

valid

except

in a place where Jews do not sign

on documents—for the gentiles do not allow them to sign. Consequently, everyone knows that the signatories are gentiles and will not come to rely upon them.

But in a place where Jews sign

on documents—if so, even with distinctive names of gentiles—

no,

we do not validate these bills. For if we validate them, people will come to validate them also with names that are not distinctive.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

A place where Jews do not sign should also be subject to a decree—

let us also decree—

lest—

on account of—

a place where Jews sign,

and disqualify there the bills signed by gentiles. In the same way that we decreed concerning distinctive names [where there is no concern], on account of names that are not distinctive?

And the Gemara answers:

There is a distinction between confusion of names and confusion of places.

Name with name—

a distinctive name with a name that is not distinctive—

is confused—

people are accustomed to confuse and err between them. But

place with place—

place with place [places where Jews are allowed to sign with places where they are not allowed

is not confused—

people will not come to err and confuse them! Therefore, there is no need to decree concerning a place where Jews do not sign. And bills signed there by gentiles and delivered in the presence of Jewish witnesses are valid.

And the Gemara relates:

Ravina thought to validate—

to validate—documents that were made

in the assembly of the Arameans—

a place where the distinguished men of the gentiles would gather temporarily to judge and adjudicate, not by order of the king—on the basis of the words of our Mishna.

Rafram said to him:

But

we learned, “courts”—

we learned in our Mishna, and specifically when it was made before gentile judges established by order of the king, who do not lie because of fear of the king—it is valid. And the Gemara continues regarding a document written in the language of the gentiles but delivered before Jewish witnesses:

Rava said: This Persian document—

a promissory document that they wrote in the Persian language and Persians [gentiles], laymen, signed on it—

that he delivered it to him—

that he delivered it to him [to the creditor]—

in the presence of witnesses—

in the presence of witnesses—

Israelites.

If he does not repay his debt, the law is:

we collect through it—

we collect on its basis

from

the borrower’s property,

unencumbered —

[which is] unencumbered property that is not pledged to anyone.

And the Gemara asks:

But—

and yet—

they do not know—

they [the witnesses of delivery] do not know—

to read—

to read Persian. And if so, they do not know what is written in the document, and how will they be able to testify in the future concerning this loan?

And the Gemara answers:

When they know—

it is speaking of a case in which the witnesses know how to read Persian.

And it asks again:

But I require—

and yet we require that there be—

writing

on parchment processed with gall water

that cannot be forged. But there is not—

and there is not, for the Persians’ parchments are not processed with gall. And because of this, it is possible to erase the sums written in them while leaving the signatures, and afterward to write again, falsely, a large sum.

And the Gemara answers: Here it is speaking

of parchment processed with gall—

of parchments that were processed, and they cannot be forged.

And another question:

But I require—

and yet we require—that we fulfill the halakha:

he must repeat

and write

the substance of the document in the last line

of the document, in order to prevent one who wishes to forge from adding there whatever he wishes,

but there is not—

and in Persian documents they do not do this.

And the Gemara answers: Here it is speaking

of one who repeats—

of a case in which he repeated and wrote the substance of the document in the last line.

But a difficulty can nevertheless be raised:

If so—

if so, that all the conditions that validate the document have been fulfilled, let them collect by means of it

from encumbered property—

from property subject to a lien—

also—

also?! And why did Rava say that they collect with it only from unconstrained assets?

And the Gemara answers: This document

has no public voice—

it has no public knowledge among people. For in an ordinary document, the Jews who signed it are the ones who disseminate and publicize the matter of the loan and the land that became subject to a lien on account of it. But with this document, which was signed by gentiles, the purchaser [who comes to buy land from the borrower] is prevented from knowing about the lien. Therefore they do not collect from him the land that he bought, but collect only from unconstrained land, which remains in the possession of the borrower himself.

And the Gemara continues concerning the names of gentiles:

He asked him—

he asked him—

Resh Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan: