Eruvin 98a — the Talmud in English

Whose [opinion is this]?

The Mishna

is Rabbi Shimon’s.

For he says

in the latter clause:

Anything that is because of shevut does not stand in the way of the sacred writings.

And therefore he permits it when he was reading on top of the roof and the scroll rolled from his hand, to roll it even when the scroll reached the ground in the public domain; and the same is true of one reading on the threshold.

Say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if it is removed from the ground only by the length of a thread—

he rolls it to himself.

Since in such a case it does not at all resemble the falling of the entire scroll from his hand, we do not decree lest he come to roll it. But if it reached the ground, we decree because of the falling of all of it, and it is forbidden to roll it to himself.

And just as Rabbi Yehuda is stringent concerning one reading on the roof, so too he is stringent concerning one reading on the threshold. If so, the first clause of the Mishna must necessarily be, must necessarily be, unlike him.

But in the continuation of the Mishna, in the latter clause, it is stated:

Rabban Shimon says: Even when it is on the ground itself—

he rolls it to himself.

It follows that

the first clause and the latter clause

of the Mishna are the words of

Rabbi Shimon,

whereas

the middle clause is Rabbi Yehuda’s

!?

Rav Yehuda said: Yes!

Indeed,

the first clause and the latter clause are Rabbi Shimon’s,

whereas

the middle clause is Rabbi Yehuda’s.

Rabba said: Here we are dealing with a threshold that is trampled,

which is indeed a private domain, but the public passes over it, and they may step on the scroll if they leave it there for the entire Shabbat. Therefore even Rabbi Yehuda will agree with the first clause, because

because of

preventing

the disgrace of the sacred writings, the Sages permitted

them to roll it and bring it into the private domain, since one end of the scroll remains in his hand. This is so even though there was room to decree because of the falling of all of it.

No esli chelovek chitaet na kryshe, gde ostavlenie knigi v takom vide ne privodit k stol'komu unizheniyu, potomu chto na nee ne nastupyat, Rabbi Yehuda schitaet, chto esli kniga dostigla zemli, svertyvat' ee zapreshcheno iz-za opaseniya, chto eto prividet k padeniyu vsei knigi.

But when he is reading on the roof, where there is not so much disgrace if he leaves it that way, because people will not tread on it, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is forbidden to roll it when it reached the ground, a decree because of the falling of all of it.

Abaye raised an objection to him:

It was taught: If one was reading in a scroll on the threshold and the scroll rolled from his hand into the public domain, if it rolled only

within four cubits

in the public domain,

he rolls it to himself.

But if it reached

beyond four

cubits in the public domain, in which case, if he rolls it to himself, he will have to carry it four cubits in the public domain—

he turns it over onto its writing,

and leaves it there until the end of Shabbat.

And if you say that we are dealing with a trampled threshold—

what difference is there to me whether it is within four cubits or whether it is beyond four cubits?

For even if he carries it four cubits in the public domain, he does not violate a prohibition from the Torah, because one end remains in his hand; there is only a shevut that the Sages decreed lest the entire scroll fall from his hand.

And just as, with regard to bringing it from the public domain into the private domain, we permitted the shevut in order to prevent the disgrace of the sacred writings, so too here we should permit it with regard to carrying four cubits in the public domain!?

Rather, Abaye said: Here,

both in the Mishna and in the beraita,

we are dealing with a threshold

that is

a karmelit.

It is four handbreadths wide and less than ten handbreadths high. Inside it there is a private domain,

and the public domain passes before it

on the outside of the threshold.

Therefore, as long as the scroll fell

within four cubits

in the public domain,

for

even

if it fell

entirely from his hand

and he brought it

and brought it to the threshold,

he will not come to an obligation to bring a sin-offering,

for he brought it from the public domain into a karmelit—

they permitted

it

to him, the Sages,

when one end remains in his hand.

But when the scroll rolled

beyond four cubits, for if

it had fallen entirely from his hand and

he brought it

from there to himself, it would be

a case of coming to an obligation to bring a sin-offering,

because of carrying four cubits in the public domain—

the Sages did not permit him

to roll it and bring it to himself even when one end remains in his hand, a decree because of the case where the entire scroll fell from his hand. [

And all this is according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if it fell from the top of the roof, which is a private domain, he is forbidden to roll it to himself only when it is raised from the ground by the length of a thread. But if it fell to the ground, we decree because of the falling of all of it, since then he comes to an obligation to bring a sin-offering, for he is bringing it from the public domain into the private domain.

But according to Rabbi Shimon, we do not decree at all in a place where there is disgrace to the sacred writings, and it is permitted even when it fell from the roof to the ground of the public domain.

And the first clause of the Mishna concerning the threshold thus comes according to Rabbi Yehuda, and likewise the middle clause, while the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon’s.]]

And we raise a difficulty:

If so, within four cubits too, let us decree lest

the entire scroll fall from his hand and he

bring

it

from the public domain into the private domain.

For although the threshold itself is a karmelit, we should decree lest he bring it inside the threshold, into the house, which is a private domain, and come to an obligation to bring a sin-offering!

And if you would say,

perhaps you will say,

since the threshold interrupts

—the threshold, which is

a karmelit,

between the public domain and the private domain,

we have no concern,

there is no obligation to bring a sin-offering for such bringing.

It is impossible to say so. For

did not Rava say: One who carries an object

in the public domain

from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of four

cubits,

and carries it through above him,

having lifted it from the ground of the public domain and carried it four cubits while holding it above his head, and placed it on the ground of the public domain at the end of four cubits—although above his head is a place of exemption, for the air of the public domain extends only up to a height of ten handbreadths above the ground, nevertheless, since he did not place the object in a place of exemption, but merely carried it through there, carrying it above his body, he

is liable

because of carrying four cubits in the public domain.

Therefore here too, since he did not place it on the threshold—and he did not even stop there, so that we would consider the placing of his body as the placing of the object—but merely carried it through it, he should become liable because of bringing it from the public domain into the private domain!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here—

with a long threshold,

extremely wide, whose width interrupts between the public domain and the private domain, so that even if he wishes to bring the scroll into the private domain,

in the meantime,

while walking across the wide threshold,

he remembers

that the matter is forbidden, and he will stop there, and only afterward will he bring it inside. Thus there is no concern that he will come to an obligation to bring a sin-offering, for he will perform placing in the middle, in a karmelit.

And if you wish, say: Actually, we are dealing with a threshold that is not long.

Nevertheless, there is no concern lest he bring the scroll from the public domain into the private domain without placing it in the middle on the threshold.

Because

ordinary sacred writings—

he examines them, [

and the Gemara assumes that he will examine them when he reaches the threshold,]

and places them,

and performs there an act of placing the scroll in the middle.

And we raise a difficulty:

Let us be concerned lest he examine them

already

in the public domain, and bring them directly

immediately

into the private domain,

for after he finishes examining them in the public domain, he will bring them immediately into the private domain, without placing them in the middle on the threshold?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this—

it is Ben Azzai’s.

For he says: One who walks is considered like one who is standing!

For with every step he is as though his body rests and is uprooted again, and therefore it is impossible to come to an obligation to bring a sin-offering by carrying the scroll during his walking across the threshold, a karmelit.

For when he walks on the threshold, he is as though he rests there. And the placing of his body is considered like the placing of an object, and it follows that placing was performed in the middle, in a karmelit.

And we raise a difficulty:

And

let us be concerned

lest he throw them by throwing

the scroll from the public domain into the private domain through the threshold, in which case he is liable even according to Ben Azzai.

For Rabbi Yohanan said: Ben Azzai agrees concerning one who throws,

an object from the private domain to the public domain through a karmelit, that he is liable, for there was no placing in the karmelit at all!?

And we answer:

Rav Aha bar Ahava said: That is to say: Sacred writings are not thrown!

Therefore there is no concern lest he throw the scroll.

We learned in the Mishna:

If he was reading on top of the roof—

he turns it over onto its writing.

And we inquire about it:

And is it permitted

to turn sacred writings over?

But was it not taught: Those who write scrolls,

Torah scrolls,

tefillin and mezuzot—

they did not permit them to turn over

the

sheet onto its face

when they interrupt their writing, so that dust should not rise onto the letters.

Rather, he spreads a cloth over it.

It follows that turning sacred writings over is a disgrace to them?

And we answer:

There, it is possible

for him to spread a cloth, and therefore they did not permit him to turn it over.

Here, it is not possible.

For the case is where he has no cloth to spread.

And if he does not turn it over—

there is a disgrace to the sacred writings

when he leaves them exposed in this manner,

even more

than when he turns them over.

We learned in the Mishna: When it reached ten handbreadths—

he turns it over onto its writing.

And we inquire about it: Why is he forbidden to roll it to himself,

for it did not

rest

the end of the scroll on the ground in the public domain? If so, there is not even a shevut here, because of a decree in the case where its other end did not remain in his hand. For even then there would be no obligation to bring a sin-offering if he caught it from the air and rolled it and returned it to himself, since he did not uproot it from the ground of the public domain.

And we answer:

Rava said:

What are we dealing with here?

With an inclined wall,

toward the outside, and the scroll rested on that incline; and once it reached the lower ten handbreadths, which are the airspace of the public domain, and rested there, it is considered to have rested in the public domain.

He said

and objected

to him, Abaye,

to Rava:

How did you establish the Mishna—

with an inclined wall!

If so,

say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if it is removed from the ground only by the length of a thread—

he rolls it to himself.

And why does he roll it?

But it rested

on the incline, for there it is a full-fledged public domain?

And we answer:

The Mishna is deficient,

in that it omitted words.

And this is what it teaches

in it:

When is this statement applicable,

that if it reached the lower ten handbreadths of the public domain he is not permitted to roll it—

with an inclined wall,

where placing upon it is considered placing in the public domain, and likewise uprooting from it is considered uprooting from the public domain.