Eruvin 98a (צח.) — the Talmud in English

Whose opinion is this?

The Mishna

is that of Rabbi Shimon,

as he says

in the latter clause:

Any matter prohibited by rabbinic decree does not stand in the way of the sacred writings.

Therefore, he permits him, when he was reading on the roof and the scroll rolled from his hand, to roll it up even when the scroll reached the ground in the public domain; and the same applies when one is reading on the threshold.

Come and hear the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if it is elevated from the ground only by the thickness of a thread—

he rolls it up to himself.

Since in such a case this is not at all similar to the entire scroll falling from his hand, we do not issue a decree lest he come to roll it up. But if it reached the ground, we issue a decree due to its similarity to the entire scroll falling, and it is prohibited to roll it up.

Just as Rabbi Yehuda is stringent when one is reading on the roof, so too is he stringent when one is reading on the threshold. If so, the first clause of the Mishna must necessarily be contrary to his opinion.

But in the continuation of the Mishna, in the latter clause, it states:

Rabban Shimon says: Even when it is on the ground itself—

he rolls it up to himself.

It follows that

the first and latter clauses

of the Mishna are the words of

Rabbi Shimon,

whereas

the middle clause is Rabbi Yehuda’s

opinion!?

Rav Yehuda said: Yes!

Indeed,

the first and latter clauses are Rabbi Shimon’s,

whereas

the middle clause is Rabbi Yehuda’s.

Rabba said: Here we are dealing with a threshold that is trampled upon,

which is indeed a private domain, but the public passes over it, and they might step on the scroll if it were left there for the entire Shabbat. Therefore, even Rabbi Yehuda would agree with the first clause, because

on account of

preventing

the disgrace of the sacred writings, the Sages permitted

him to roll it up and bring it into the private domain, since one end of the scroll remains in his hand. This is so even though there would have been room to issue a decree due to the possibility of the entire scroll falling.

No esli chelovek chitaet na kryshe, gde ostavlenie knigi v takom vide ne privodit k stol'komu unizheniyu, potomu chto na nee ne nastupyat, Rabbi Yehuda schitaet, chto esli kniga dostigla zemli, svertyvat' ee zapreshcheno iz-za opaseniya, chto eto prividet k padeniyu vsei knigi.

But when one is reading on the roof, where there is not so much disgrace if he leaves it as it is, since people will not trample on it, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is prohibited to roll it up when it has reached the ground, as a decree due to the possibility of the entire scroll falling.

Abaye raised an objection to him:

It was taught in a baraita: If one was reading from a scroll on the threshold and the scroll rolled from his hand into the public domain, if it rolled only

within four cubits

in the public domain,

he rolls it up to himself.

But if it reached

beyond four

cubits in the public domain, in which case he would have to carry it four cubits in the public domain if he rolled it toward himself—

he turns it over onto the writing,

and leaves it there until the conclusion of Shabbat.

And if you say that we are dealing with a trampled threshold—

what difference is there whether it is within four cubits or beyond four cubits?

For even if he carries it four cubits in the public domain, he does not violate a Torah prohibition, because one end remains in his hand, and this involves only a rabbinic prohibition, which the Sages decreed lest the entire scroll fall from his hand.

Just as with regard to bringing an object from the public domain into the private domain, we permitted a rabbinic prohibition in order to prevent the disgrace of the sacred writings, so too here we should permit it with regard to carrying four cubits in the public domain!?

Rather, Abaye said: Here,

both in the Mishna and in the baraita,

we are dealing with a threshold

that is

a karmelit.

It is four handbreadths wide and less than ten handbreadths high. Inside it is a private domain,

and the public domain passes in front of it

on the outside of the threshold.

Therefore, as long as the scroll fell

within four cubits

in the public domain,

even if

the entire scroll

falls

from his hand and he

brings it

to the threshold,

he will not come to a liability to bring a sin-offering,

since he has brought it from the public domain into a karmelit—

the Sages permitted

him,

the Sages,

provided that one end remains in his hand.

But when the scroll rolled

beyond four cubits, for if

the entire scroll

had fallen

from his hand and he

brought it

from there to himself, he would

come to a liability to bring a sin-offering,

because of carrying four cubits in the public domain —the Sages did not permit him to roll it up and bring it to himself even when one end remained in his hand, as a decree due to the possibility that the entire scroll might fall from his hand.

All this is according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that if it fell from the roof, which is a private domain, he may roll it up to himself only when it is elevated from the ground by the thickness of a thread. But if it fell all the way to the ground, we issue a decree due to the possibility of the entire scroll falling, because in that case he would come to a liability to bring a sin-offering, since he would be bringing it from the public domain into the private domain.

But according to Rabbi Shimon, we do not issue a decree at all in a place where doing so would cause disgrace to the sacred writings, and it is permitted even when it fell from the roof all the way to the ground in the public domain.

The first clause of the Mishna concerning the threshold would therefore be according to Rabbi Yehuda, as would the middle clause, while the latter clause is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion.]

And we raise an objection:

If so, within four cubits too, let us issue a decree lest

the entire scroll fall from his hand and he

bring

it

from the public domain into the private domain.

Although the threshold itself is a karmelit, we should issue a decree lest he bring it inside beyond the threshold, into the house, which is a private domain, and come to a liability to bring a sin-offering!

And if you would say,

perhaps you might say:

Since the threshold interrupts,

the threshold, which is

a karmelit,

between the public domain and the private domain,

we have no concern,

there is no liability to bring a sin-offering for such an act of bringing.

This cannot be said. For

Rava did not say: One who carries an object

in the public domain

from the beginning of four

cubits

to the end of four

cubits,

and carries it through above him,

meaning that he lifted it from the ground of the public domain and carried it four cubits while holding it above his head, and placed it on the ground of the public domain at the end of four cubits. Although the area above his head is a place exempt from liability, since the air of the public domain extends only to a height of ten handbreadths above the ground, nevertheless, since he did not place the object in a place exempt from liability, but merely carried it through that area, carrying it above his body, he

is liable

for carrying four cubits in the public domain.

Therefore, here too, since he did not place it on the threshold—and did not even stop there in a manner that would cause the placing of his body to be considered the placing of the object—but merely carried it through the threshold, he should become liable for bringing it from the public domain into the private domain!?

And we answer:

What are we dealing with here—

with a long threshold,

whose width is considerable, and its breadth interrupts between the public domain and the private domain, so that even if he wishes to bring the scroll into the private domain,

in the meantime,

while walking across the wide threshold,

he remembers

that the act is prohibited and stops there, and only afterward brings it inside. Thus, there is no concern that he will come to a liability to bring a sin-offering, since he will perform the placing in the middle, in a karmelit.

And if you wish, say instead: Actually, we are dealing with a threshold that is not long.

Nevertheless, there is no concern lest he bring the scroll from the public domain into the private domain without placing it in the interim on the threshold.

Because

ordinary sacred writings—

he studies them attentively

[and the Gemara assumes that he will study them when he reaches the threshold],

and places them down,

performing an act of placing the scroll in the middle.

And we raise an objection:

Let us be concerned lest he study them

already

in the public domain and bring them in directly

immediately

into the private domain,

for after he finishes studying them in the public domain, he will bring them immediately into the private domain, without placing them in the interim on the threshold?

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this?—

It is that of Ben Azzai,

who says: One who walks is considered like one who is standing!

At every step he takes, it is as though his body comes to rest and is then uprooted again; therefore, it is impossible for him to come to a liability to bring a sin-offering by carrying the scroll in the course of walking across a threshold that is a karmelit.

For when he walks on the threshold, it is as though he has come to rest there. The placing of his body is considered like the placing of an object, and it follows that a placing has taken place in the middle, in a karmelit.

And we raise an objection:

And

let us be concerned

lest he throw them by throwing

the scroll from the public domain into the private domain by way of the threshold, in which case even Ben Azzai would hold him liable.

For Rabbi Yohanan said: Ben Azzai concedes with regard to one who throws

an object from the private domain into the public domain by way of a karmelit that he is liable, since there was no placing at all in the karmelit!?

And we answer:

Rav Aha bar Ahava said: That is to say: One may not throw sacred writings!

Therefore, there is no concern lest he throw the scroll.

We learned in the Mishna:

If one was reading on the roof—

he turns it over onto the writing.

And we inquire:

Is it permitted

to turn over sacred writings?

But was it not taught: Those who write scrolls,

Torah scrolls,

tefillin and mezuzot—

they did not permit them to turn over

the

parchment onto its face

when they interrupt their writing, so that dust will not settle on the letters.

Rather, one spreads a cloth over it.

It follows that turning over sacred writings is disgraceful to them?

And we answer:

There, it is possible

for him to spread a cloth, and therefore they did not permit him to turn it over.

Here, it is not possible,

since the case is one in which he has no cloth to spread.

And if he does not turn it over—

there is the disgrace of the sacred writings

when he leaves them exposed in this manner,

all the more so

than if he turns them over.

We learned in the Mishna: When it reaches ten handbreadths—

he turns it over onto the writing.

And we inquire: Why is he prohibited from rolling it up to himself?

But it has not

come to rest

with the end of the scroll on the ground in the public domain. If so, this does not even involve the rabbinic prohibition of a decree due to the possibility that the other end would not remain in his hand. For even in that case there would be no liability to bring a sin-offering if he caught it from the air, rolled it up, and returned it to himself, since he would not be uprooting it from the ground of the public domain.

And we answer:

Rava said:

What are we dealing with here?

With a wall sloping

outward, and the scroll has come to rest on that slope. Once it reaches the lower ten handbreadths, which constitute the airspace of the public domain, and comes to rest there, it is considered to have come to rest in the public domain.

He said

he challenged

him, Abaye,

to Rava:

How have you established the Mishna—

as referring to a sloping wall!

If so,

say the latter clause: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if it is elevated from the ground only by the thickness of a thread—

he rolls it up to himself.

And why does he roll it up?

But it has come to rest

on the slope, which there is a full-fledged public domain?

And we answer:

The Mishna is incomplete,

and

this is what it teaches

in it:

When is this statement applicable,

that if it reaches the lower ten handbreadths of the public domain he may not roll it up—

when it is a sloping wall,

on which placing is considered placing in the public domain; and uprooting it from there is likewise considered uprooting it from the public domain.