Eruvin 97b (צז:) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to him

to Rav:

How did you establish the meaning of our Mishna—

as referring to danger from gentiles,

who had decreed against the mitzva of tefillin?

If so,

say the latter clause: Rabbi Shimon says: One gives them to his fellow, and his fellow gives them to his fellow.

But

all the more so, the matter will become public,

for if many people handle them, the matter will reach the authorities more readily than if he brought them in alone, one pair at a time, or remained there until nightfall.

And we answer:

The Mishna is incomplete,

and

this is what it teaches:

When is this statement—

that he covers them and goes away—

said to apply? In a situation of danger from gentiles. But in a situation of danger from bandits, he

carries them less than four cubits at a time,

as it is taught in the beraita. And Rabbi Shimon disagrees with this, as will be explained below.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: One gives them to his fellow,

and his fellow gives them to his fellow, until they reach the outer courtyard.

And we explain:

With regard to what do the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon disagree

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon?

One,

the first tanna,

holds:

To carry them

less than four cubits at a time is preferable.

For if you say that one gives them to his fellow, and his fellow gives them to his fellow—

the matter of Shabbat will become public,

as this entails considerable publicity and may lead to contempt for Shabbat.

And the other,

Rabbi Shimon,

holds: Giving them to his fellow is preferable.

For if you say that he carries them less than four cubits at a time,

there is concern that

sometimes he will not be attentive,

and will not pay close attention,

and he will come to carry them four cubits in the public domain.

We learned in the Mishna:

And likewise his son.

And we inquire:

His son—

what is he doing there,

in the field, such that he must be brought into the city?

And we answer:

The school of Menashe taught:

What are we dealing with here?

With a child whom his mother gave birth to in the field.

And what is the meaning of “even if they are one hundred”

which the Mishna teaches? What is the novelty of this statement?

Although the child’s arm hurts,

as it is difficult for him to be passed from hand to hand,

even so, this is preferable

to carrying him himself less than four cubits at a time.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda says: A person may give a barrel

to his fellow, and his fellow to his fellow, even beyond the teḥum.

And we inquire:

And

is it

that Rabbi Yehuda does not accept that which we learned

in tractate Beitza:

An animal and vessels

are

like the feet of their owners?

One who borrows an animal or vessels from his fellow on a Festival may not take them farther than the end of the teḥum within which their owners are permitted to walk—for example, if the owners placed an eruv teḥumin to the north of the city, in which case they forfeit the two thousand cubits on the southern side. If the borrower did not place an eruv, he may not take them to the south of the city, but only as far as the owners themselves may walk.

And how, then, could Rabbi Yehuda say that the barrel may be carried even beyond the owners’ teḥum?

And we answer:

Reish Lakish said in the name of Levi the Elder: What are we dealing with here? With a case in which they pour

and decant the water

from a barrel

belonging to him

into a barrel

belonging to his fellow. Therefore, his fellow may carry his barrel, together with the first person’s water, until the end of his own teḥum. Likewise, when his fellow gives it to another fellow, he too transfers the water into his fellow’s barrel.

There is no concern regarding the transfer of the water, despite the fact that it remains under the authority of the original owners, because

Rabbi Yehuda

follows

his own reasoning, as he said: Water has no substance!

It does not acquire a place of residence with its original owners so as to be restricted like them; rather, each person may carry it until the end of his own teḥum.

As we learned:

A woman who borrowed from her neighbor on a Festival spices for her pot, or water and salt for her dough, may take the pot and the dough only to a place where both women are permitted to walk, since both of them have a share in the cooked dish or the dough.

Rabbi Yehuda exempts water,

as no place of residence or teḥum of the owners who lent it takes effect upon it—

because it has no substance.

And what is the meaning of “this may not go

farther than the feet of its owners,” which the Sages say to Rabbi Yehuda? The word “this” implies that it refers to the barrel, yet Rabbi Yehuda too agrees that the barrel may go only as far as the owners’ feet, since we established his statement as referring to a case in which he transfers the water from his barrel into his fellow’s barrel.

This is what they are saying:

What is in this

—namely, the water—

may not go farther than the feet of the owners.

For the Sages follow their own reasoning: The water too acquires a place of residence where the owners are located.

And we challenge this:

You may say that you heard Rabbi Yehuda say

that water has no substance only

where it is absorbed in dough.

But

where it is present as it is,

as in our Mishna—

did you hear him say this?

And there is proof of this:

Now, with regard to a pot,

water placed inside the cooked dish, we find that

Rabbi Yehuda said

that the water

is not nullified

—when the water is

present as it is, is it nullified?!

As it is taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Water and salt are nullified

with regard to their boundaries when they are placed

in dough,

because they are not discernible within it. Therefore, one need not take into account the boundary of the owners of the salt and water, but only the boundary of the owners of the dough.

But they are not nullified

when the water is

in a pot—

because of its gravy,

as the gravy of the pot is visible to the eye.

Rather, Rava said: Here we are dealing with a barrel that acquired a place of residence,

an ordinary barrel that follows the feet of its owners,

and with water that did not acquire a place of residence.

The water was drawn from the spring that day, so that each person may carry it according to his own teḥum.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that each person may likewise carry the barrel according to his own teḥum, because

the

barrel

is nullified with regard to the water,

as the barrel is subordinate to the water.

As we learned

in tractate Shabbat:

One who carries

a person

who is alive in a bed

from a private domain to a public domain is exempt for carrying the living person, because we say: “A living person carries himself,” and he is not considered a burden —

he is exempt even for

carrying

the bed, because the bed is subordinate to him.

And likewise,

one who carries food

that is

less than the measure

for which one is liable for carrying [the measure of a dried fig]

in a vessel—

he is exempt even for

carrying

the vessel.

Because the vessel is subordinate to it,

to the food, and he is exempt for carrying the food because it is less than the requisite measure.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that the same applies with regard to acquiring a place of residence: The barrel’s “feet” are nullified with regard to the water’s “feet.”

But the Sages disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and hold that we say that the subordinate object is nullified with regard to the primary object only in the context of carrying, but not with regard to acquiring a place of residence.

Accordingly, the barrel may not be taken beyond the teḥum of its owners.

Rav Yosef raised an objection

from that which is taught:

Rabbi Yehuda says: In a caravan,

a group of people that camped in a place where there was no water —

a person may give

a barrel of water

to his fellow, and his fellow to his fellow,

even beyond the teḥum.

And it is implied:

In a caravan—

yes,

because Rabbi Yehuda permitted this only on account of the emergency.

But

when there is no caravan—

no?!

Rather, Rav Yosef said:

Indeed,

when we also learned our Mishna,

we learned it as referring to a caravan,

for Rabbi Yehuda permitted this only in that circumstance.

Abaye said:

There are two laws stated by Rabbi Yehuda:

a.

In a caravan,

it is permitted

even with a barrel that acquired a place of residence and water that acquired a place of residence,

water that was drawn on the eve of Shabbat. Although they are like the feet of their original owners, nevertheless it is permitted to carry them beyond his teḥum. This is the law of the beraita.

b.

When there is no caravan,

it is permitted only with

a barrel that acquired a place of residence and water that did not acquire a place of residence.

As we said, this is because the barrel is nullified with regard to the water. This is the law stated in our Mishna.

Rav Ashi said: Here we are dealing with a barrel that was ownerless and with water that was ownerless,

and ownerless objects do not acquire a place of residence anywhere. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is permitted to carry both the barrel and the water anywhere.

And who are those who “said to him”

who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda?

It is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri! For he said: Ownerless objects acquire a place of residence

where they are located, and they may not be taken beyond the teḥum where they were on the eve of Shabbat.

And what is the meaning of “this may not go farther than the feet of the owners”,

which the Sages said? After all, ownerless objects have no owners at all.

This is what they are saying:

These may not go farther than objects that have owners,

because they too acquire a place of residence, as though they had owners.

Mishna:

If one was reading a scroll

rolled as a scroll [for all their books were made this way, like our Torah scrolls]

on the threshold,

the threshold in front of the house, and while he was reading it

the scroll rolled from his hand

into the public domain, while one end of it still remained in his hand—

he rolls it back to himself!

He is permitted to roll up the scroll and return it to himself, since the entire scroll did not fall from his hand; rather, one end remained in his hand.

If he was reading at the top of a roof and the scroll rolled from his hand

into the public domain, if

before it reached

the end of the scroll

the lower ten handbreadths,

which are adjacent to the ground and have the status of the public domain—

he rolls it back to himself.

But

once it reached the lower ten handbreadths,

the lower ten handbreadths—

he turns the writing face down,

so that the letters face the wall and the scroll will not lie there in such great disgrace, and he leaves it there until the conclusion of Shabbat.

Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if it is not raised above the ground

and the scroll is no higher than the ground

by only the thickness of a thread—

he rolls it back to himself.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if

the scroll has reached

the ground itself—

he rolls it

back to himself,

for there is no matter

that is prohibited only

by rabbinic decree,

such as here, where the entire scroll did not fall from his hand and bringing it in from the public domain to him entails only a rabbinic prohibition,

that can stand in the way of the honor of sacred writings!

For the rabbinic prohibition is overridden so that the sacred writings will not be degraded. The Gemara will explain all the statements of the Mishna.

Gemara:

And we inquire:

What are the circumstances of this threshold?

If you say that the threshold

is a

private domain,

for example, the threshold is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide,

and it stands,

with

a public domain

in front of it, and although one end of the scroll fell to the ground of the public domain, it is permitted to roll it up and return it to the private domain, since the other end remained in his hand and it is not considered to be resting in the public domain—

And

it follows that

we do not decree lest the entire scroll fall

into the public domain

and he come to bring it

into the private domain, despite the fact that this would entail liability for a sin-offering.