Eruvin 90a — the Talmud in English

Only in order

to guard the garden [to guard my garden]

to guard my garden]

was it made: I made the ascent, and thereby he removed himself from using the roofs.

I built the stairway, and by doing so he removed himself from using the roofs.

Rami bar Hama asked, who held like Rav above [89a], that roofs adjoining one another have the status of a karmelit, and it is forbidden to carry on them more than four cubits:

as he held in accordance with Rav’s opinion stated above [page 89a], that roofs adjacent to one another have the status of an enclosed public area, and it is prohibited to carry within them more than four cubits:

Carrying an object

two cubits on a roof and two cubits on a pillar adjoining the roof, which stands in the public domain, when it is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide—

adjacent to the roof, which stands in the public domain and is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide—

what is the ruling, that it should be permitted?

the ruling? Is it permitted?

And we raise an objection to it:

What is he asking?

For the roof is a karmelit, whereas the pillar is a private domain, since it is ten high and four wide; and is

a karmelit and a private domain—

what he is asking—whether it is permitted to take out from one to the other? But surely it is obvious that it is forbidden!

whether it is permitted to transfer an object from one to the other? Surely it is obvious that this is prohibited!

And we say concerning it:

A

and

Rami bar Hama did not properly express his question, but

did not formulate his question properly; rather,

because of his sharpness [out of his sharpness] he hurried with his question, and

because of his quick mind, he hurried in asking the question, and

did not examine it היטב.

well.

Rather, this is what Rami bar Hama was asking: carrying

carrying

two cubits on the roof of a house

of a house

and two cubits on the roof

on the roof

of a portico belonging to another owner, adjoining it [a portico: a passage in front of the house; it is not a place of residence, but is open toward the courtyard, and it has only the wall of the house. It has no walls by means of “the edge of the ceiling descends and closes,” and therefore the roof of the portico has the status of a karmelit]—

belonging to another owner, adjacent to it [a portico is a passageway in front of a house. It is not a place of residence; rather, it is open toward the courtyard and has only the wall of the house. It has no walls formed by extending and lowering the ceiling, and therefore the roof of the portico has the status of an enclosed public area]—

what is the ruling, that carrying should be permitted?

is the ruling? Is it permitted to carry there?

And this is what he was uncertain about:

Do we say: since neither this [roof]

[the roof]

is fit for residence, nor this [the roof of the portico]

[the roof of the portico]

is fit for residence—

they are one domain?

That is to say: since they are equal in their use and their nature, they are one domain, even though there is a change of ownership.

And it is not comparable to roofs [which are forbidden from one to another], for there are distinct dwellings below both of them, and the Rabbis said that just as they are distinct below, so they shall be distinct above [the wording of the Ritva].

Or perhaps, since this

this

that from roof to roof is forbidden is not because of the division of the residents below, but the reason of the Rabbis is because they are particular about a change of ownership,

is not the separation of the residents below, but rather the reason for the Sages’ ruling is that they are particular about a change of ownership,

from a roof to a portico it is likewise forbidden [Rashi and the Ritva].

Rav Bibi bar Abaye asked:

carrying

two cubits

on a roof

that is breached toward another roof,

and two cubits in a ruin [Tosafot in Rashi’s understanding] that is breached toward the public domain, and which likewise has the status of a karmelit [since it is breached toward a place to which it is forbidden]—

what is the ruling, that it should be forbidden as from roof to roof, when the ruin belongs to another owner?

is the ruling? Is it prohibited, as carrying from one roof to another is prohibited, when the ruin belongs to another owner?

Rav Kahana

said, wondering about it:

Rav Kahana:

And is it that

this is not the question of

the question of

Rami bar Hama above?

question above?

For it is the same uncertainty: do we require dwellings, and in a ruin, as in a portico, there are no dwellings; or perhaps a change of ownership is sufficient where it is somewhat fit for residence?!

Rav Bibi bar Abaye

said to Rav Kahana: And what of it that I asked the same question?

Am I one who came after and quarrels [Is it that I heard the question from another and came in order to taunt and quarrel with those questioned]?!

Did I hear the question from someone else and come in order to taunt and quarrel with those being asked]?!

That is to say: Is it your view that I had already heard this question, and asked only in order to taunt?! But surely my question is not similar to Rami bar Hama’s question.

For

a portico is not fit for residence, whereas a ruin is fit for residence

with a small repair.

And since it is fit for residence, its use is not equal to that of the roof, which is not fit for residence; and since there is a change in use and a change of ownership, they are two domains! [the wording of the Ritva].

And this is the meaning: he was not uncertain whether a change of ownership alone is sufficient, as Rami bar Hama was uncertain; rather, he was uncertain only about a change in use together with a change of ownership.

And we raise an objection to it:

But since it is fit for residence—

what is he asking?

For it is not comparable to a roof, and it is forbidden?!

And we answer:

He is saying: “If you should say”!

If you should say that a portico is not fit for residence

and it is permitted,

a ruin is fit for residence

and it is forbidden.

Or perhaps, at present there are no dwellings in the ruin

and it is no better than a portico.

And we conclude concerning all these questions with

We conclude all the questions with

teyku! Above, the Gemara brought a dispute between Rav and Shmuel as to whether it is permitted to carry on the roof itself more than four cubits; and because every roof is breached toward another, it is forbidden to carry from one to another according to the Sages.

According to Rav, we do not say gud asik mechitzot to separate one roof from another, since the walls are not discernible.

And according to Shmuel, even though the walls are not discernible, we say gud asik mechitzot.

And now the Gemara brings that Rav and Shmuel disagree in the reverse manner:

a. They disagree concerning

A. They disagree with regard to equal roofs [where there is not between one roof and another a height difference of ten handbreadths, which forbids carrying from one roof to another, as a decree because of a mound in the public domain, as above, at the beginning of our chapter],

where there is no height difference of ten handbreadths between one roof and another, which would prohibit carrying from one roof to another, as a preventive decree due to a mound in the public domain, as stated above at the beginning of the chapter],

according

according to

Rabbi Meir, who permits carrying from a roof breached toward another roof, since one roof does not forbid carrying on the other—is there another reason for a prohibition against carrying on it, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

who permits carrying from a roof that is open to another roof, since one roof does not prohibit carrying on the other. The question is whether carrying on such roofs is nevertheless prohibited for another reason, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

B.

A

and they likewise disagree with regard to a

single roof, which is not breached toward another roof, and even

which is not open to another roof, even

according to the Sages—whether it is forbidden to carry on it:

as to whether carrying on it is prohibited:

Rav said: It is permitted to carry throughout all of it.

And Shmuel said: One may carry on it only within four cubits.

And it entered our understanding concerning the reason for the prohibition: since the roof is adjacent to the public domain or to other courtyards belonging to different owners, it is as though the roof, which has no walls, is breached toward a domain in which carrying is forbidden.

We further understood their dispute as follows: according to Rav, it is permitted to carry, since we say gud asik concerning the walls of the house, and the roof is consequently surrounded by walls.

And Shmuel holds: since it is the way of roofs that the roof projects and extends beyond the house itself, it follows that the walls are not discernible to one standing on the roof; and with walls that are not discernible, we do not say gud asik mechitzta [Ritva; see also Tosafot, s.v. kashya, and the Maharsha].

And therefore we ask:

There is a difficulty with

the words of

Rav here are difficult, for he says gud asik even with walls that are not discernible,

here, where he says that we apply this principle even when the walls are not noticeable,

contradicting

whereas the words of

Rav above are difficult, since he does not hold that one says gud asik with walls that are not discernible!

above, where he does not hold that we apply this principle to walls that are not noticeable!

And we answer:

There—in

Rav’s words—

the wall is not discernible, but here the matter does not concern walls that are not discernible, as we had understood.

but here the discussion is not about walls that are unnoticeable, contrary to our initial assumption.

But,

here, the wall is discernible, and Rav’s reasoning is entirely well understood.

and Rav’s reasoning is therefore fully understandable.

And now we ask, for according to what we explained—that it concerns discernible walls—

Shmuel’s words

here are difficult

in light of Shmuel’s words above, by means of a kal va-chomer: If above, where the walls were not discernible, Shmuel said gud asik mechitzta, here, where the walls are discernible, is it not all the more so [Ritva]?! And we answer:

position above, by an a-fortiori inference: If above, where the walls were not noticeable, Shmuel said that the walls are considered to rise and surround the roof, then here, where the walls are noticeable, is it not all the more so?! [Ritva] And we answer:

There, it was not more than a beit seah; here, it is more than a beit seah.

That is to say: Now the Gemara retracts from the assumption that Shmuel’s reason is that we do not say gud asik of the walls around the roof, and that the roof is forbidden because of a breach toward the public domain [or because it is a domain without walls—according to the Tosafot of Rabbi Asher].

Rather, we indeed say gud asik around it, and nevertheless it is forbidden.

And it concerns a situation in which each roof by itself does not exceed a beit seah [an area of five thousand cubits, like the courtyard of the Tabernacle], but all the roofs together are more than a beit seah, surrounded not for the purpose of residence [as will be explained below].

And now Shmuel’s words are understandable: he permitted carrying on the roofs according to the Sages, and forbade carrying on the roofs according to Rabbi Meir.

For according to the Sages, who are stringent not to carry from roof to roof, and the strict law would be to forbid every roof since it is breached toward another, we say gud asik mechitzot to separate the roofs from one another; and consequently there is no single domain here larger than a beit seah, and it is permitted to carry on them more than four cubits.

But according to Rabbi Meir, who is lenient to carry from roof to roof, this leniency leads to stringency: as a result, we do not say gud asik mechitzot to separate one roof from another, and it follows that there is here a single domain larger than a beit seah.

And now we explain why we regard them as not surrounded for residence, even though the walls were constructed for the residence below, and concerning them we say gud asik:

And the reason is:

These walls—which we seek to raise onto the roof in order to surround the domain of the roof by the law of gud asik—

which we seek to raise to the roof in order to enclose the roof’s domain by means of the principle that the walls rise and surround it—were made

for

for the residence of

below they were made [they were made], but

[they were made for that purpose], but

for

for the residence of

above,

on the roof,

they were not made.

And it becomes

And it is

like a karpef larger than a beit seah that was not surrounded

by walls

for

for the purpose of

residence.

And every karpef larger than a beit seah that was not surrounded for residence

the Sages treated stringently and gave it the status of an enclosed public area, and

the Sages made stringent concerning it and gave it the status of a karmelit, and one may carry in it only within four cubits [as was explained above, 23a].

[as explained above, on page 23a].

And that which Shmuel forbade with regard to a single roof concerns a large roof which by itself is more than a beit seah.

But Rav holds that the domain of the roofs is considered a domain surrounded for residence, since once the walls were made for the residence below, even though they were not made for the residence above, when we say gud asik concerning them, it is like an enclosure for residence [Rashi, on 90b, s.v. mai].

It was stated: A ship

which is larger than a beit seah:

Rav said: It is permitted to carry throughout all of it,