Eruvin 90a (צ.) — the Talmud in English

Only in order

to guard the garden

[to guard my garden]

was it made

I constructed the ascent, and thereby removed himself from using the roofs.

Rami bar Hama raised a dilemma,

as he held in accordance with Rav above [folio 89a], that adjacent roofs have the status of a karmelit, and it is prohibited to carry on them more than four cubits:

The carrying of an object

two cubits on a roof and two cubits on a pillar

adjacent to the roof, which stands in the public domain, when it is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide—

what

is the ruling? Is it permitted?

And we are astonished at this:

What is his dilemma?

The roof is a karmelit, whereas the pillar has the status of a private domain, since it is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. Is it possible that

a karmelit and a private domain—

this is his dilemma—

whether it is permitted to carry from one to the other? Surely it is obvious that this is prohibited!

And we say concerning this:

And

even

Rami bar Hama

did not formulate his question properly; rather,

because of his sharpness [in his acuity,] he hurried in asking his question, and

he

did not examine it

properly.

Rather, this is what Rami bar Hama was asking: Carrying

two cubits

on the roof

of a house

and two cubits

on the roof of

a portico

belonging to another owner, adjacent to it [a portico: a passageway in front of the house, which is not a place of residence but is open toward the courtyard and has only the wall of the house. It does not have walls formed by the principle of the ceiling extending downward and sealing the area; therefore, the roof of the portico is a karmelit]—

what

is the ruling? Is it permitted to carry between them?

And this is his uncertainty:

Shall we say that, since neither this

[the roof]

is fit for residence, nor this

[the roof of the portico]

is fit for residence—

they constitute a single domain.

That is: Since they are equal in their use and function, they constitute a single domain, despite the difference in ownership.

And this is not analogous to the roofs [which are prohibited from one to the other], for there the residences beneath the two roofs are separate, and the Sages said that just as they are separate below, so they are separate above [the wording of the Ritva].

Or perhaps, since

what

is prohibited from one roof to another

is not due to the separation of the residents below; rather, the reason for the Sages’ ruling is that they are particular about a change of ownership,

from a roof to a portico it is likewise prohibited [Rashi and Ritva].

Rav Beיבי bar Abaye raised a dilemma:

Carrying

two cubits

on a roof

that is open to another roof,

and two cubits in a ruin [Tosafot in its understanding of Rashi] that is open to the public domain, and which likewise has the status of a karmelit [since it is open to a place into which it is prohibited for it to open]—

what

is the ruling? Is it prohibited, as carrying from one roof to another is prohibited, when the ruin belongs to another owner?

Rav

said, expressing astonishment at it,

Kahana:

And is this

not the same as

the dilemma

of Rami bar Hama

above?

For this is the same uncertainty: Do we require residences, and in a ruin, as in a portico, there are no residences? Or perhaps a change of ownership suffices where the area is somewhat fit for residence?!

Rav Beיבי bar Abaye said

to Rav Kahana: What difference does it make that I asked the same question?

And is it because I came afterward that I should quarrel

[Did I hear the question from someone else and come merely to taunt and quarrel with those who were asked]?!

That is: Do you think that I had already heard this question and asked it only in order to taunt them?! My question is not the same as Rami bar Hama’s question.

For

a portico is not fit for residence, whereas a ruin is fit for residence

with minor repairs.

And since it is fit for residence, its use is not the same as that of a roof, which is not fit for residence. Since there is both a difference in use and a difference in ownership, they are two domains! [The wording of the Ritva].

That is, he did not raise the uncertainty whether a change in ownership alone suffices, as Rami bar Hama did; his uncertainty concerned only a difference in use together with a difference in ownership.

And we are astonished at this:

But since it is fit for residence—

what is his dilemma?

It is not comparable to a roof, and therefore it is prohibited?!

And we answer:

He said this by way of “if you should say”!

If you should say that a portico is not fit for residence

and carrying is permitted,

but a ruin is fit for residence

and carrying is prohibited.

Or perhaps, at present there are no residences in the ruin

and it is no better than a portico.

And we conclude concerning all the dilemmas with

teiku!

Earlier, the Gemara cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel as to whether it is permitted to carry more than four cubits on the roof itself. Since each roof is open to the adjacent roof, according to the Sages it is prohibited to carry from one to the other.

According to Rav, we do not apply gud asik mechitzot to separate one roof from another, since the walls are not discernible.

According to Shmuel, although the walls are not discernible, we do apply gud asik mechitzot.

Now the Gemara presents a case in which Rav and Shmuel disagree in the reverse manner:

a. They disagree concerning

equal roofs [where there is no height difference of ten handbreadths between one roof and another, which would prohibit carrying from one roof to another, as a safeguard against a mound in the public domain, as stated above at the beginning of our chapter],

where there is no height difference of ten handbreadths between one roof and another, which would prohibit carrying from one roof to another, as a preventive decree due to a mound in the public domain, as stated above at the beginning of the chapter],

according

to

Rabbi Meir,

who permits carrying from a roof that is open to another roof, as one roof does not prohibit carrying on the other—whether carrying there is nevertheless prohibited for another reason, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

b.

And

they likewise disagree concerning

a solitary roof,

which is not open to another roof, and even

according to the Sages,

whether carrying on it is prohibited:

Rav said: It is permitted to carry throughout its entire area.

And Shmuel said: One may carry on it only within four cubits.

And it was initially understood that the reason for the prohibition is that, since the roof is adjacent to the public domain or to other courtyards belonging to other owners, it is as though the roof is open—having no walls—to a domain into which it is prohibited to carry.

It was further initially understood that the basis of their dispute is that according to Rav it is permitted to carry, since we apply gud asik mechitzot to the walls of the house, and the roof is thereby enclosed by walls.

But Shmuel holds that, since roofs ordinarily project and extend beyond the house itself, the walls are not discernible to one standing on the roof; and with regard to walls that are not discernible, we do not apply gud asik mechitzot [Ritva; see also Tosafot, s.v. kashya, and the Maharsha].

Therefore we ask:

The statement of

Rav

here

is difficult in light of the statement of

Rav

above, where he said that we apply gud asik even when the walls are not discernible!

Rav

above, where he does not hold that we apply this principle to walls that are not noticeable!

And we answer:

There,

in Rav’s statement,

the wall is not discernible,

but here the discussion is not about walls that are not discernible, as was initially understood.

But

here, the wall is discernible,

and Rav’s reasoning is therefore readily understood.

Now we ask: According to what we have explained—that the discussion concerns discernible walls—

Shmuel’s statement

here

is difficult in light of Shmuel’s statement

above, by means of a kal va-chomer: If above, where the walls are not discernible, Shmuel said that we apply gud asik mechitzot, then here, where the walls are discernible, all the more so [Ritva]?! And we answer:

There, it was no larger than two se’a; here, it is larger than two se’a.

That is: The Gemara now retracts its assumption that Shmuel’s reason is that we do not apply gud asik mechitzot around the roof, and that the roof is prohibited because it is open to the public domain [or because it is a domain without walls, according to Tosafot of the Rosh].

Rather, we do properly apply gud asik around it, and nevertheless carrying is prohibited.

The discussion concerns a situation in which each roof individually is no larger than two se’a [an area of five thousand cubits, corresponding to the courtyard of the Tabernacle], but all the roofs together are larger than two se’a and are enclosed without the purpose of residence [as explained below].

Shmuel’s statement is now understood: He permitted carrying on the roofs according to the Sages, but prohibited carrying on the roofs according to Rabbi Meir.

For according to the Sages, who are stringent and prohibit carrying from one roof to another, and according to the strict law each roof should be prohibited since it is open to the adjacent roof, we apply gud asik mechitzot to separate the roofs. Consequently, there is no single domain here larger than two se’a, and it is permitted to carry on them more than four cubits.

But according to Rabbi Meir, who is lenient and permits carrying from one roof to another, this leniency leads to stringency: Since the roofs may be joined for carrying, we do not apply gud asik mechitzot to separate one roof from another, and it follows that there is a single domain here larger than two se’a.

The Gemara now explains why we consider them not to be enclosed for residence, even though the walls were constructed for the sake of the residence below, and we apply gud asik with regard to them:

The reason is:

These walls

which we seek to raise onto the roof in order to enclose the roof’s domain through the principle of gud asik

for the

residence

below were made [they were constructed], but

[they were made for that purpose], but

for the

residence

above,

on the roof,

they were not made.

And it would thereby be

for it

like a courtyard larger than two se’a that was not enclosed

by walls

for the

sake of

residence.

And every courtyard larger than two se’a that was not enclosed for residence

the Sages treated stringently and gave it the status of a karmelit, and

one may carry in it only within four cubits [as explained above, on folio 23a].

[as explained above, on page 23a].

And Shmuel’s prohibition in the case of a solitary roof concerns a large roof that by itself is larger than two se’a.

But Rav holds that the roof domain is considered a domain enclosed for residence. Since the walls were constructed for the sake of the residence below, even though they were not constructed for the sake of the residence above, when we apply gud asik to them, this is considered an enclosure for residence [Rashi, on 90b, s.v. mai].

It was stated: A ship

that is larger than two se’a:

Rav said: It is permitted to carry throughout its entire area,