Eruvin 81b — the Talmud in English

And the Sages concede

that:

with

one who gave money to

all other people

[as the Gemara explains, that he gave it to the homeowner and not to a shopkeeper or a baker], and said to him, “Acquire the eruv for me” —

that his money acquired it for him.

For if the homeowner acquired for him a share in the eruv through others, among the other members of the courtyard, he acquired the eruv.

For it is not the way of a homeowner to sell from his own [food], and the giver did not intend to purchase from him, with his money, food that would be his share in the eruv. Rather, he gave him the money with the understanding that he would purchase on his behalf. And it is as though he said to him, “Make an eruv for me,” for in this way it is as though he appointed him an agent to make an eruv on his behalf [and when he explicitly appoints him an agent, it is effective even with a shopkeeper, as we said].

And therefore, even if the homeowner took from his own loaf and acquired it for him together with all the members of the courtyard, it is also effective.

And the reason that with a shopkeeper and a baker he did not acquire the eruv is

that one makes an eruv for a person only with his knowledge,

and one who gives money to a shopkeeper did not appoint him an agent, but intended to purchase from him with his money, and money does not effect acquisition.

Rabbi Yehuda said: When are these words applicable

— that one makes an eruv for a person only with his knowledge?

With regard to eruvin of boundaries,

because it is a disadvantage for him, since he loses the city’s boundary in the other direction, and perhaps it is not pleasing to him.

But with regard to eruvin of courtyards —

one may make an eruv with his knowledge or without his knowledge. Since one may confer a benefit upon a person in his absence,

but one may not cause a disadvantage to a person in his absence.

And we raise a difficulty:

What is the reason of Rabbi Eliezer,

who said that he acquired it with the money that he gave to the shopkeeper in order to purchase the eruv?

But he did not pull

the loaf from him, and money does not effect acquisition of movable property!

He said,

explaining,

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha: Rabbi Eliezer treated it like the four periods

[times]

in the year,

during which the Sages said that money effects acquisition. And as will be explained below in the Gemara, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan.

As we learned: During these four periods,

which are: the eve of the first Festival day of Passover, the eve of the Festival day of Shavuot, the eve of Rosh Hashanah, and the eve of the last Festival day of Sukkot, and likewise on the eve of Yom Kippur in the Galilee [where they would increase the meal, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yose the Galilean, that Scripture regards one who eats on the ninth as though he fasted on the ninth and the tenth, Meiri, Hullin 83a] —

the slaughterer is compelled to slaughter

[he is compelled to slaughter and sell the meat]

against his will.

And

even if

the slaughterer had

an ox worth one thousand dinars, while the purchaser had

only

one dinar

in it, for the purchaser had given one dinar for it beforehand in order to acquire only one dinar’s worth of the meat —

they compel him to slaughter,

and to give the purchaser his share, worth one dinar, of the meat, since he acquired his share of the meat.

Therefore,

since the purchaser acquired with his money his share of the ox’s meat —

if the ox died

before they slaughtered it, it is

dead for the purchaser,

who lost his share, as it explains and proceeds.

And we examine this: How did you say that

the ox died

for

the purchaser?

But

the purchaser did not pull

it, and money does not effect acquisition!

Rav Huna said:

Here it is speaking

when the purchaser pulled

the ox in order to acquire his share.

And we examine this statement of Rav Huna:

If so, say the latter clause

of the Mishna:

But

during the rest of the days of the year it is not so,

for they do not compel the slaughterer to slaughter and sell if he has no additional purchasers.

Therefore, if it died — it

died for the seller,

and he returns his money to the purchaser.

But this is difficult for Rav Huna:

Why

did the ox die for the seller?

But

he pulled

it

and acquired his share in the ox, and the ox belonging to him died [in his share]!?

He said, explaining, Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak,

regarding this statement of Rav Huna [Tosafot]:

Actually, it is when he did not pull.

And what is difficult for you: Why did it die for the purchaser?

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he acquired it for him

the seller for the purchaser

through another

[and this is the “pulling” that Rav Huna stated, Tosafot]. He handed him the ox and said to him: Acquire for the purchaser [who had not yet given money] one dinar’s worth of this ox!

And the purchaser did not appoint that other person as his agent; therefore, the law differs between the four periods and the rest of the days of the year:

During these four periods, since it is a benefit for him

to the purchaser to spend money and purchase meat, since everyone’s practice is this —

one may confer the benefit upon him in his absence

[without his knowledge]. Therefore, if the ox died, it died for the purchaser.

But

during the rest of the days of the year, since it is a disadvantage for him

to the purchaser to incur expenses —

one may cause a disadvantage to him only in his presence,

and the purchaser did not acquire it at the time that the slaughterer “acquired” it for him through the pulling of another person on his behalf.

And Rav Ila said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan

another explanation of that same Mishna:

During these four periods, the Sages established their words according to Torah law,

that money effects acquisition!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan follows his own reasoning,

as Rabbi Yoḥanan said

in general:

By Torah law, money effects acquisition.

And why did the Sages say

that money does not effect acquisition, but only

pulling effects acquisition? —

So that he might not say to him,

the seller, after receiving the money from the purchaser:

“Your wheat has burned in the upper room!”

Since if the wheat burned, it burned for the purchaser, for he acquired it with his money, then if a fire breaks out in the upper room where the wheat is, the seller will not trouble himself to save it.

“Therefore the Rabbis placed it in the seller’s domain, so that he would devote himself to it and trouble himself to save it” [Rashi].

But with pulling, he acquires, because ordinarily one who pulls brings it into his home [Rashi, Hullin 83a], and since by Torah law money effects acquisition, they established their words according to Torah law during these four periods.

And it is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view that Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabbah bar Avuha above: that even with regard to an eruv, the Sages established their words according to Torah law, so that money effects acquisition even when he did not pull.

We learned in the Mishna:

And they concede with regard to all other people

that his money acquired it for him.

And we explain:

Who are “all other people”?

He said,

explaining,

Rav: A homeowner

[who is neither a shopkeeper nor a baker] to whom he gave money, as was explained in the Mishna.

And likewise Shmuel said: A homeowner.

For Shmuel said: They taught

in the Mishna that his money did not acquire it for him

only

when he gives a coin to

a baker. But

one who gives a coin to

a homeowner —

acquires.

And

he further

said, Shmuel: They taught

in the Mishna that one who purchases from the baker did not acquire it

only

when he gives

a coin,

since money does not effect acquisition.

But

if he purchased from him through a “kinyan sudar,” which is performed with

a utensil — he

acquires.

And

he further

said, Shmuel: They taught only when he said to him

[to the shopkeeper]

“Acquire it for me.”

But if he said, “Make an eruv for me” — he

made him an agent

the shopkeeper,

and he acquires,

as was explained in the Mishna.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said: When are these words applicable

— that one makes an eruv for a person only with his knowledge? With eruvin of boundaries. But with eruvin of courtyards, one may make an eruv with his knowledge or without his knowledge:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

And furthermore,

not only here,

but

in

every place where Rabbi Yehuda taught

the halakha

in

the laws of

eruvin — he

the halakha is in accordance with him.

Rav Ḥana the Babylonian said to Rav Yehuda:

Did

Shmuel say

that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda

even

with regard to a

passageway

(whose crossbeam or side-posts were removed)

that was removed

from it on Shabbat

its crossbeam or its side-post,

Rashi below, and the Gemara below], for Rabbi Yehuda says in the chapter “All Roofs” that we say, “Since it was permitted on Shabbat, it was permitted,” and it is permitted to carry in the passageway on that Shabbat, even after its permitting device was removed?

He said to him,

Rav Yehuda:

With regard to eruvin,

where the laws of acquiring an eruv are under discussion [Rashi],

I told you

that Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

but not with regard to partitions,

in whose matters the halakha is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda.

He said,

wondering,

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, to Rav Ashi,

about Shmuel’s statement:

Since Shmuel said

“the halakha”

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

by implication

Shmuel holds

that they disagree

with him, the Sages.

But

indeed

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Every place where Rabbi Yehuda said

the expression

“When”

[for example, the matter that we will cite below, on page 82a],

and “When

are these words applicable” [as in this Mishna]

in our Mishna

[and not in baraitot, Tosafot] —

it is only to explain the words of the Sages

who preceded him in the Mishna, and Rabbi Yehuda did not come to disagree with them!

And how did Shmuel say, “The halakha” in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda?!

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav Aḥa, son of Rava:

And

when

they do not disagree

in the Mishna, the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda?!

But we learned

[in the Mishna above, on page 80b]: If

residents were added

to the residents

of it

[to the members of a passageway who made a partnership for several Shabbatot] after some time — he

adds,

if he wishes, from his own [food],

and acquires

the partnership that he added for those residents,

and he must inform

them.

Evidently, knowledge is required, and this is not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda. Evidently, they disagree!

And we answer: This is not difficult for Rav Aḥa, son of Rava.

There,

in that Mishna, it may be explained that it is speaking

of a courtyard situated between two passageways,

where the residents can participate both with this passageway and with that passageway. And since we do not know with which one it is preferable to him, his knowledge is required. But ordinarily, even the Sages concede that knowledge is not required.

And we still raise a difficulty against Rav Aḥa, son of Rava:

But Rav Shizvi said in the name of Rav Ḥisda

[above, concerning that same Mishna]:

This indicates that his colleagues disagree with Rabbi Yehuda.

And he did not find it satisfactory to explain that it is speaking of a courtyard situated between two passageways. Evidently, the Sages disagree with him?!

Rather,

this is how we reject Rav Aḥa, son of Rava’s difficulty against Shmuel, from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: