Eruvin 7a — the Talmud in English

6

entire beraita [Rabbi Avraham Mordechai Horowitz, of blessed memory,

is the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, who does not heed a heavenly voice!

As he says [on Bava Metzia 59b]: “It is not in Heaven,” for the Torah was already given to us at Mount Sinai [Tosafot there].

Alternatively,

the halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel, and even one who wishes to act in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, adopting both their leniencies and their stringencies, may not do so, since a heavenly voice has already gone forth that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel. Rather,

this is what

the beraita

is saying: Whenever you find two tannaim, and two

or two

amoraim who disagree with one another

—when you find tannaim or amoraim who disagree with one another

in a manner resembling the dispute

in which

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel

disagreed concerning other matters—one who wishes to act in accordance with the opinion of this one may do so, and one who wishes to act in accordance with the opinion of that one may do so, provided that he

does not act according to the leniency of this master and according to the leniency of that master,

as it is taught in a beraita: One who follows the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the leniencies of Beit Hillel is wicked.

Nor according to the stringency of this master and according to the stringency of that master,

as it is taught in a beraita: Concerning one who follows the stringencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel, the verse says: “The fool walks in darkness.”

Rather: Either according to the leniency of this master—

and according to his stringency, he acts

[he should act according to the leniency and stringency of this one]—

or according to the leniency of that master—

and according to his stringency, he acts!

[As it is taught in a beraita: Either in accordance with Beit Shammai, according to their leniencies and their stringencies, or in accordance with Beit Hillel, according to their leniencies and their stringencies.]

We now return to raise an objection concerning the fact that in Nehardea they ruled that one should follow both the stringencies of Rav and the stringencies of Shmuel, for

in any event, it is difficult

how did they act in this manner, to be stringent according to both opinions? Our present assumption is that although if one wishes to be stringent or lenient according to both opinions in two disputes that are entirely unrelated to one another, he may certainly do so, here, in the case of the crooked alleyway of Nehardea, we are stringent according to the stringency of one in the dispute concerning a crooked alleyway, and according to the stringency of the other in the dispute concerning an alleyway open at both ends; and these disputes are entirely unrelated and interdependent. Nevertheless, since with regard to permitting a crooked alleyway both this master and that master suffice with a form of an entrance, it is impossible to be more stringent than both of them [Tosafot and the Ritva].

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: They acted entirely in accordance with Rav

in Nehardea, and did not impose upon it anything based on Shmuel, for Rav holds that its legal status is that of an alleyway open at both ends. Although according to Rav himself, to permit an alleyway open at both ends, a form of an entrance suffices, as Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the first tanna, who holds this way, this is not so,

as Rav Huna said that Rav said: The halakha is

in accordance with the first tanna, that a form of an entrance suffices,

but this is not the ruling given in practice,

rather, the ruling is in accordance with Ḥananya, who requires a door.

And we ask:

And according to Rav Adda bar Ahava, who said in the name of Rav: The halakha is

in accordance with the first tanna—that a form of an entrance suffices for an alleyway open at both ends—

and this is the ruling given in practice, what can one say,

how did they act in Nehardea in accordance with two stringencies?

He said

and answered:

Rav Shizbi said: When we do not act according to the stringencies of two houses of scholars,

that statement applies

where they contradict

the two stringencies

one another

,

as in the case of a spinal column and a skull

—

!

And is this so?

As we learned:

A bone from a corpse [on which there is no flesh] that is the size of a barley grain transmits impurity through contact and through carrying, but it does not transmit impurity through a tent. However, a complete spinal column of a corpse or a complete skull of a corpse transmits impurity even through a tent.

A spinal column and a skull that are deficient

by an amount such that a person could not live with such a deficiency, had the deficiency occurred during his lifetime, have the status of an ordinary bone, which does not transmit impurity through a tent.

And how much deficiency in a spinal column

renders a person unable to live, and consequently causes it not to transmit impurity through a tent?

Beit Shammai say: Two vertebrae; and Beit Hillel say: One vertebra!

And with regard to the skull,

how much of a deficiency is required for it not to transmit impurity through a tent?

Beit Shammai say:

If an amount is removed from the skull

the size of a drill bit

[it is explained in Bekhorot],

and Beit Hillel say:

If an amount is removed from the skull

such that it could be removed from a living person and he would die

from that, it is considered a deficiency [the measure is explained in Bekhorot].

And Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: And likewise

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel necessarily disagreed

with regard to an animal with a fatal defect,

concerning what degree of deficiency in a spinal column or skull is considered a fatal defect, for if the animal cannot live with it, it is a fatal defect.

And now we answer: They said that one may not act according to the stringencies of Beit Shammai and according to the stringencies of Beit Hillel only in a case such as this dispute concerning a spinal column and a skull. If a person is stringent like Beit Shammai, and is concerned about impurity transmitted through a tent by a spinal column deficient by only one vertebra, because he holds that a living person can survive with a deficiency of one vertebra, while, on the other hand, he acts according to the stringency of Beit Hillel and refrains from eating an animal deficient by one vertebra, since according to Beit Hillel it has a fatal defect, it is in such a case that we say that he is like a fool who walks in darkness. For whichever way one looks: If you hold like Beit Shammai that it is possible to live with a deficiency of one vertebra, then the animal does not have a fatal defect either, since the two matters are interdependent. And this person walks in darkness, adopting two stringencies that contradict one another.

But where they do not contradict one another, we do act accordingly!

For example, in the case of a crooked alleyway. Although, whichever way one looks, a form of an entrance suffices according to both Rav and Shmuel, as explained, nevertheless, it suffices for two different reasons. Rav holds: a. The legal status of a crooked alleyway is that of an alleyway open at both ends; b. An alleyway open at both ends is rectified with a form of an entrance. If a person holds like Rav with regard to his opinion that the legal status of a crooked alleyway is that of an alleyway open at both ends, while, on the other hand, he holds like Shmuel that an alleyway open at both ends requires a door, he is not contradicting himself, since one matter is not dependent upon the other.

And we wonder:

And where they contradict

the two stringencies

one another,

,

we do not act accordingly?! Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection

to this

Rav Mesharsheya:

In the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the Sabbatical cycle, second tithe is observed with regard to them; and in the third and sixth years, poor man’s tithe is observed with regard to them. Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed as to when the year begins anew and the law of the tithe of trees changes. Beit Shammai hold: On the first of Shevat is the New Year for trees. And Beit Hillel say: On the fifteenth of Shevat.

An incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who gathered

fruit from an

etrog tree on the first of Shevat

at the end of the second year entering the third,

and he treated it

stringently

as subject to two tithes

[types of tithe]: One tithe

one

he treated as for the poor

in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai,

who hold that the third year, which is the year of poor man’s tithe, had already begun.

And

one tithe

one

which is second tithe he treated

in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel,

who hold that it was still the second year, the year of second tithe, \-

itself! [This does not mean that he separated twice; rather, he separated second tithe conditionally, redeemed it, and himself ate the money in Jerusalem, while he gave the tithe itself to the poor; Tosafot here. See “Studies”].

And now it is difficult: How did Rabbi Akiva act according to the stringencies of Beit Shammai and according to the stringencies of Beit Hillel? What Rabbi Akiva did involved two stringencies that contradict one another, for if the produce is liable for second tithe, it cannot be liable for poor man’s tithe. And we answer:

Rabbi Akiva was uncertain about the tradition he had received,

[he was uncertain how he had received it],

and did not know whether Beit Hillel had said it applied on the first of Shevat or whether he had said it applied on the fifteenth of Shevat; and he acted stringently here and stringently there,

with the result that he was stringent only in accordance with Beit Hillel, and did not act according to the stringencies of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. [The Ritva explained: Specifically here he is not called “a fool who walks in darkness,” since “there was no one who could clarify the truth for him. But one who adopts the stringency of this master and that master because he does not know the law, although according to the strict law he must act in this manner, is nevertheless still called a fool who walks in darkness, for he should have studied but did not study.” See also what the Ḥazon Ish wrote about this, Yoreh De’ah 150:5.]

Rav Yosef was sitting before Rav Huna, and he was sitting and saying: Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The dispute

that we learned above—how does one establish an eruv for alleyways open at both ends, whether a door or a form of an entrance is required—

concerns

alleyways open

to a sartya

[a thoroughfare intended for the passage of people, which is a public domain]

on this side and a sartya on that side,

on both sides of the alleyway, or alleyways open to a

paltaya

[a thoroughfare intended for marketplaces, which is a public domain]

on this side and a paltaya on that side.

But

if the alleyways were open and led to a

sartya

[a public domain]

on this side and

to a

valley

[a karmelit, which is prohibited by rabbinic law to carry within]

on this side, or

were open to a

valley on this side and a valley on that side,

according to everyone it suffices if one

makes a form of an entrance on this side and a side post and crossbeam on that side!

And we ask: Why did it need to teach us that when there is a valley on this side and a valley on that side, a form of an entrance suffices?

Now, if when there is a sartya

which is a public domain

on this side and a valley on that side,

you say that it suffices if one

makes a form of

an entrance on this side and a side post and crossbeam on that side,

a valley, which is a karmelit,

on this side and a valley on that side—

is it necessary

to say that a form of an entrance suffices?!

And we answer:

This is what

the beraita

is saying: If the alleyway was open to a

alleyway

as

if it were open to a

valley on this side and a valley on that side,

a form of an entrance on this side and a side post and crossbeam on that side suffice for it.

And

Rav Yosef concludes

the preceding statement, which he cited in the name of Rav Yehuda, who cited it in the name of Rav, and he added

in the name of Rav Yehuda,

not in the name of Rav:

If the

этот

alleyway

is open on one side to a public domain,

and ends

without an intervening partition

in a courtyard

[it terminates at its other end in a courtyard, which is a yard behind the houses enclosed by four partitions and is a complete private domain, with no residents], and the wall on the far side of the courtyard is also breached to the public domain—an opening up to ten cubits wide—directly opposite the breach of the alleyway beside the courtyard, this is considered a closed alleyway and

requires nothing

“to rectify that opening [of the alleyway] beside the courtyard” [Rashi], but only the opening of the alleyway to the public domain. [Tosafot wrote: “It is not considered open at both ends, because when one exits the alleyway there is room to turn to either side of the courtyard, and one will not come to permit an alleyway open at both ends.” And their intent is that without this reason, rectification would be required at the breach opening onto the courtyard, because “it appears to be open at both ends.”]

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This

that you said in the name

of Rav Yehuda,

that an alleyway ending in a courtyard requires nothing, Rav Yehuda did not explain to you from whom he learned it,

is the opinion of Shmuel!

That is, he learned it from Shmuel, his teacher!