Eruvin 6b (ו:) — the Talmud in English

One who had two houses on opposite sides of the public domain,

one directly opposite the other, and wished to carry from one house to the other through the public domain.

Since there are two partitions, formed by the walls of the houses, on the two sides of the public domain [and according to Rabbi Yehuda, a place that has partitions on two opposite sides becomes a private domain by Torah law,

therefore, a minor enactment is sufficient for him: that he

make a side-post here

at the corner of the house on one side,

and a side-post here

at the other corner of the house!

Or a crossbeam here

across the width of the public domain on one side of the houses,

and a crossbeam here

on the other side of the houses,

and he may conduct business

carry

in the middle,

from house to house.

The Sages said to him

to Rabbi Yehuda:

One may not enclose the public domain in this manner!

This proves that according to the Sages, one may not carry in the public domain by closing it off with a side-post and a crossbeam. And how could you have said that it is effective?!

And if you would say

that only

in this manner,

with two side-posts or two crossbeams,

may the public domain not be enclosed,

the public domain;

but with a door [according to older editions]

on one side, and a side-post or crossbeam on the other side, as Beit Hillel say,

it may be enclosed.

It is impossible to answer in this manner. For:

But Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Jerusalem,

whose public domain ran in a straight line from gate to gate and was open through its entire length, and in which six hundred thousand people passed, and whose width was sixteen cubits,

had its doors

in the wall, on both sides of the public domain,

closed at night—

one would be liable for carrying in it on account of the public domain.

And we may infer from here:

a. One door is insufficient [even if it is locked] on one side.

b. Doors that are not locked are ineffective in a public domain.

And there is an additional proof:

And Ulla said

also:

These gates

the gates

of Meḥoza—

whose gates were aligned one opposite the other, and the public domain ran from gate to gate—

if their doors

of the gates, on both sides,

were not locked

at night,

one would be liable for carrying in them on account of the public domain!

And one may infer from here: with doors that are not locked, or with one door, even if it is locked, it is insufficient!

And now this is difficult: How could you have said that a tzurat ha-petah, or one door that is not locked on one side, together with a side-post and crossbeam on the other side, is effective?! [This is explained according to Tosafot’s understanding of Rashi, combined with the rulings of the RiD].

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said:

The beraita that says, “How does one enclose a way through the public domain?” is not discussing the public domain itself.

Rather, it is discussing alleys that lead between two public domains.

And

this is what it is saying

in the beraita:

How does one enclose

the

“open alleys”

to the public domain—

he makes a tzurat ha-petah here and a side-post or crossbeam here.

And it was with regard to those open alleys that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed, according to Ḥananya; but the tanna was not discussing a public domain at all!

It was stated:

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the first tanna,

who holds that one may permit carrying in an alley open to the public domain at both ends by means of a tzurat ha-petah here and a side-post or crossbeam here! [See illustration 1]

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Ḥananya,

in accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, that one requires a door here and a side-post or crossbeam here!

A question was raised before them: According to Ḥananya, in accordance with Beit Hillel,

who requires a door on one side:

Does one

need to lock

that door when entering and leaving, as Beit Shammai require with regard to two doors?

Or does one not need to lock it?

And we resolve it:

Come and hear: Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One does not need to lock it.

And Rav Mattana likewise said that Shmuel said: One does not need to lock it.

Some say:

Rav Mattana did not state this teaching in the name of Shmuel.

Rather, this is what he

said: “It happened to me personally, and

then

Shmuel said to me: One does not need to lock it.”

And they likewise

asked him

also

of Rav Anan:

Does one

need,

according to Beit Hillel,

to lock

that one door?

Or does one not need to lock it?

He said to them: Come and see

and see

these gates

the gates at the entrances of the open alleys

of Nehardea.

Their doors were buried up to their middles in earth,

as their doors were buried in earth up to halfway, and they could not be locked.

And

nevertheless

he entered and left,

he would enter and leave,

Mar Shmuel

there,

and he said nothing to them,

indicating that the alley was not properly established.

Evidently, even doors that cannot be locked are acceptable!

Rav Kahana said:

There is no proof from here that one does not need to lock the door. For

those

gates of Nehardea

were partially closed; they were neither completely open nor completely closed. And in such a case, doors are effective.

they were neither completely open nor completely closed. And in such a case doors are effective.

But if they are completely open and cannot be locked—they are not effective!

When Rav Naḥman came

to Nehardea and saw the doors buried in earth,

he said: “Clear away their earth” [

clear the earth away from the gates]!

And we consider the matter:

Shall we say that Rav Naḥman holds that one needs to lock the door,

and for this reason he said that the earth should be cleared away from the doors, so that they could be locked?

And we reject this:

No,

Rav Naḥman did not say that the earth should be cleared away in order to lock the doors literally.

Rather, it was so that they would be “fit” to be locked. And

since

they are fit to be locked,

that is acceptable,

even though they are not actually locked

in practice.

There was a certain crooked alley—

this crooked alley was not like the crooked alley discussed above. Rather, it had two bends, so that it was shaped like the letter ḥet, and both of its entrances opened onto the same public domain—

that was in Nehardea.

They imposed upon it the stringency of Rav,

they imposed upon the alley also Rav’s stringency,

and

also

Shmuel’s stringency,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And they required of it:

a.

Doors

at both of its bends.

b. A side-post or crossbeam at both of its entrances that opened onto the public domain. [See illustration 1]

And we explain it:

Rav’s stringency: This is

what

Rav said

above with regard to a crooked alley: that it is not considered a “closed alley,” but

its legal status is that of a

“

open

alley,” and it cannot be permitted by placing only a side-post or crossbeam at the entrance adjacent to the public domain; rather, it also requires the enactment for an open alley [as will be explained] at its bend.

And this alley, which has two bends, requires an enactment at both of its bends, in accordance with the law of a double open alley!

And

nevertheless, if they had followed Rav throughout his entire ruling, they would not have needed to place doors here, because

Rav himself said:

himself:

The halakha is in accordance with the first tanna,

who holds that an open alley is permitted by a tzurat ha-petah here and a side-post and crossbeam here.

Accordingly, here too, tzurat ha-petah constructions at both bends would have been sufficient, and doors would not have been necessary!

Rather, they were stringent with regard to it also

in accordance with Shmuel, who said that the halakha is in accordance with Ḥananya,

in accordance with Beit Hillel, who hold that an open alley requires a door here and a side-post and crossbeam here.

And if we had followed Shmuel throughout his entire ruling, we would not have needed to place doors at its bends. For

Shmuel said: The legal status

of a crooked alley is

that of a

“

closed

alley,” and we do not need to place anything at its bends; rather, only side-posts are required at its two entrances that open onto the public domain.

[According to the יש מפרשים above, who explain that “its legal status is that of a closed alley” to mean that the bends have the legal status of a closed area, doors are likewise not required here at its bends; rather, it is sufficient to place a side-post or crossbeam there].

Rather, this is why they required doors of it: because they were stringent with regard to it also

in accordance with Rav, who said:

A crooked alley

has the legal status of a

“

open

alley,” and one must place at its bends whatever must be placed in an open alley.

And since according to Shmuel, in an ordinary open alley one must place a door, here too one must place a door.

And this is what we say: They imposed upon it Rav’s stringency and Shmuel’s stringency—it has the status of an open alley in accordance with Rav, and requires doors in accordance with Shmuel.

And we raise an objection:

Do we act in accordance with two stringencies?!

For whether according to Rav or according to Shmuel, tzurat ha-petah constructions at the two bends of such a crooked alley should have been sufficient!

For according to Rav, who says that its legal status is that of an open alley, he holds that an open alley is permitted by means of a tzurat ha-petah! And according to Shmuel, who holds that an open alley is permitted by means of a door, he holds that its legal status is that of a closed alley, and we do not require anything at its bend.

[According to the יש מפרשים, a side-post or crossbeam is sufficient, and certainly a tzurat ha-petah is sufficient].

And in a case like this, do we act in accordance with two stringencies?! [Tosafot]

But was it not taught

that we do not act in such a case in accordance with two stringencies:

As it was taught:

The halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel

wherever they disagree with Beit Shammai. However:

One who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai—

may do so [and below the Gemara challenges this, as it contradicts the latter clause with the former].

[and below the Gemara challenges this, since it contradicts the first clause].

And one who wishes to act

in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel—

may do so!

But a person who, in a case where two interrelated disputes exist, follows both

the leniencies of Beit Shammai, and

also

the leniencies of Beit Hillel—

that person is

wicked!

And if he follows both

the stringencies of Beit Shammai and

also

the stringencies of Beit Hillel,

in a case where the two disputes are interrelated—

of him the verse says: “The fool walks in darkness”!

For he does not know upon whom to rely, whether upon Beit Shammai or upon Beit Hillel [Rashi, on Rosh Hashana 15a].

Rather,

this is what he should do: If

he

follows

Beit Shammai—

he should act

according to their leniencies and their stringencies. If

he

follows

Beit Hillel—

he should act

according to their leniencies and their stringencies!

We first explain the beraita, and afterward return to the incident in Nehardea.

And we raise a difficulty:

This very matter

of the beraita

is difficult

internally:

For at first

you said: “The halakha is always in accordance with Beit Hillel.”

This implies that one is obligated to act in accordance with Beit Hillel.

And

if

later,

afterward,

you said: “One who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai”—

may do so?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

Here,

in the latter clause, where we say that one who wishes to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai may do so—

before

the

heavenly voice

emerged and said: “The halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel everywhere” [as stated below, on 13b]. At that time, anyone who wished to act in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai could act according to their leniencies and stringencies.

Here,

in the first clause, where we say that the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel—

after

the

heavenly voice emerged!

And if you wish, say: Both this and that

the first and latter clauses are discussing

after

the

heavenly voice emerged.