Eruvin 75b (עה:) — the Talmud in English

It was also taught likewise

in accordance with Rav Yehuda, that “one place” means the outer courtyard:

If they placed their eiruv in the outer courtyard, and one person, whether from the outer courtyard or from the inner courtyard, forgot and did not participate in the eiruv, both courtyards are prohibited,

as we learned in the Mishna.

If they placed their eiruv in the inner courtyard:

and one person from the inner courtyard forgot and did not participate in the eiruv, both courtyards are prohibited,

either because of the right of passage, or because the inner courtyard cannot withdraw from the joint eiruv, as explained.

One person forgot

from the outer courtyard and did not participate in the eiruv; both courtyards are prohibited—this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva,

and the Gemara will explain it below.

But the Sages say: In this case—

where one person from the outer courtyard forgot—

the inner courtyard is permitted,

since it can withdraw from the joint eiruv,

but the outer courtyard is prohibited.

Now we explain the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling:

Rabba bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: What is different according to the Sages, who say that the inner courtyard is permitted because

the inner courtyard

closes its door

before the outer courtyard

and uses it,

meaning that the inner courtyard withdraws from the joint eiruv?

According to Rabbi Akiva as well, let

the inner courtyard

close its door and use it!

That is, what is Rabbi Akiva’s reason for not agreeing with the Sages?!

He said to him,

Abaye to Rabba bar Ḥanan:

The eiruv

of the outer courtyard, which was placed in the inner courtyard,

causes it

to enter the inner courtyard; that is, its eiruv brings the feet of the inhabitants of the outer courtyard into the inner courtyard [Rav Ḥisda], and it is comparable to the right of passage into the inner courtyard, as explained above, on p. 66b.

The Gemara asks: If so,

according to the Sages as well

let us say:

The eiruv causes it

and, since the outer courtyard is prohibited in its own place, it prohibits the inner courtyard, just as does the right of passage [as above, on p. 66b]?!

And we answer: It is because

the inner courtyard says

to the outer courtyard:

To rectify—

so that we could use one another’s courtyard—

I joined you

in one eiruv.

But not to cause harm,

so that you should become prohibited to me because of the joint eiruv between us, which causes you to enter my courtyard! And the Gemara asks:

According to Rabbi Akiva as well, let

the inner courtyard say to the outer courtyard:

To rectify matters I joined you, but not to cause harm?!

And we answer:

The outer courtyard says to it,

the inner courtyard:

We revoke my rights for you,

that is, this is not harm, since the outer courtyard can revoke for the inner courtyard the rights that it has in the inner courtyard by virtue of the eiruv’s right of passage. And since it can revoke them, the inner courtyard is not permitted until the outer courtyard revokes its rights.

And

the reason of

the Sages

who disagree is that they hold:

There is no revocation of rights from a member of one

courtyard

to a member of one

courtyard

to a member of

a

second courtyard; and the inhabitants of the outer courtyard cannot revoke their rights for the inhabitants of the inner courtyard. Since the revocation is ineffective, it would constitute harm, and therefore the inner courtyard is permitted.

—that is the conclusion of the explanation.

The Gemara raises an objection: Above, on p. 66b, the amoraim disagreed about this matter, whether there is revocation of rights from one courtyard to another [and it can also be found in other forms, for example: the inner courtyard may revoke for the outer courtyard the right of passage that it has in the outer courtyard; or there may be two courtyards with an entrance between them that did not establish an eiruv, and one courtyard comes to revoke its rights for the other so that the latter may be permitted to carry from its domain into the other domain; or even if they established an eiruv and one person forgot to participate, and he comes to revoke his rights for the inhabitants of his courtyard and for the inhabitants of the second courtyard that joined it in the eiruv].

And now:

Shall we say that Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan—

who disagreed about this above—

disagree in accordance with the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Akiva?

As Shmuel said

that there is no revocation of rights from one courtyard to another,

he agrees with the Sages.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said

that there is revocation from one courtyard to another,

agrees with Rabbi Akiva?!

And we answer:

Shmuel could say to you: I state my opinion even according to Rabbi Akiva.

For

Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling here only with regard to two courtyards, one within the other, which prohibit one another

because of the eiruv’s right of passage; and likewise with regard to two courtyards with an entrance between them, which established an eiruv with one another and prohibit one another because of the eiruv’s right of passage.

It is not specifically stated by the Gemara that they are one within the other—Rashba; and likewise, with regard to two courtyards, one within the other, where the inner courtyard prohibits the outer courtyard because of the right of passage, since they prohibit one another, they can revoke their rights.

But there,

in Shmuel’s statement, the case concerns two courtyards with an entrance between them, which do not prohibit one another. In that case we say:

Do they prohibit one another,

that the Sages would institute revocation in order to permit them?!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan—

who said above that there is revocation of rights from one courtyard to another, even with regard to two courtyards with an entrance between them that do not prohibit one another, and all the more so here—

said

to you:

I state my opinion even according to the Sages,

and even according to the Sages there is revocation of rights from one courtyard to another.

Here,

where the inner courtyard can say to the outer courtyard, “To rectify matters I joined you, but not to cause harm,” this is not because the outer courtyard is unable to revoke its rights, as we explained above.

Rather,

it is because the inner courtyard says to the outer courtyard: Even though you can revoke for me the rights that you have in my courtyard, it would nevertheless constitute harm. For

while you revoke [

until you revoke ]

for me

you prohibit me!

Therefore, let you and your revocation be disregarded, for I do not want it [Rashi].

But there,

with regard to two courtyards with an entrance between them, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that there is revocation of rights from one courtyard to another—

does one courtyard prohibit

the other

through it

at the entrance between them without an eiruv, such that, if you say that it should revoke its rights, that would constitute harm?!

We learned in the Mishna:

And if they were—

the inner and outer courtyards—

owned by individuals,

they do not need to establish an eiruv.

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi taught: If there were

in the two courtyards together

three

people

(who are prohibited)

(who prohibit)—Rashi and Ritva—the inner courtyard prohibits the outer courtyard because of the inner courtyard’s right of passage.

The reason is as follows: It is not necessary to state this if there were two people in the inner courtyard who did not establish an eiruv, since, because the inner courtyard is prohibited in its own place, it prohibits the outer courtyard. Rather, even if there were two people in the outer courtyard and one in the inner courtyard, the inner courtyard prohibits the outer courtyard until it establishes an eiruv with it, and it is not sufficient for the outer courtyard to establish an eiruv among its own inhabitants. The reason is explained below [explained on the basis of the Ritva].

—this concludes the explanation.

Rav Bibi said to them,

to the members of the academy:

Do not heed

him,

Rav Yosef [do not accept this from him], for this teaching is a beraita in Rabbi’s name.

For I

am the one who

told it to him

Rav Yosef, before he became ill and forgot his learning; I did not tell it to him in Rabbi’s name,

but I told it to him in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava!

And I gave the reason for this ruling:

Since I refer to them as “many” in the outer courtyard,

we issue a decree on account of the case of “many” in the inner courtyard who did not establish an eiruv.

Rav Yosef subsequently remembered that this was indeed the case, and

Rav Yosef said: Master of Abraham! “Many”—

which I heard from Rav Bibi—

was exchanged in my mind for “Rabbi”;

and I mistakenly said that “Rabbi” taught this ruling in a beraita.

And Shmuel

disagreed with the fundamental ruling, and

said: The two courtyards are always permitted

when there are three people, even if there are two in the outer courtyard who established an eiruv and one in the inner courtyard,

until there are two in the inner courtyard

who did not establish an eiruv

and one in the outer courtyard,

for in that case the inner courtyard properly prohibits the outer courtyard because of the right of passage, which is prohibited in its own place.

Rabbi Elazar said:

We have established that a gentile who resides with two Jews in one courtyard prohibits them from carrying there until they rent his rights from him, as we said at the beginning of the chapter [and in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov—the halakha follows him—who requires two Jews with the gentile].

Rabbi Elazar teaches us that even if the

gentile

resided alone in the inner courtyard and had access through the outer courtyard, in which two people resided,

he is like many

who did not establish an eiruv; they prohibit the outer courtyard through the right of passage, and the outer courtyard is not permitted until it rents the gentile’s rights.

This statement of Rabbi Elazar is a fundamental novelty according to Shmuel. According to Rav Bibi, who says that even one Jew in the inner courtyard and two in the outer courtyard cause a prohibition, why was it necessary for Rabbi Elazar to say that a gentile prohibits? Even a Jew prohibits in such a case [Rashi].

Why do we consider the gentile, according to Rabbi Elazar, “like many,” rather than say that he is an individual and will not prohibit, just as one Jew does not prohibit [as Tosafot explained: if he were like an individual and not like many, he would not prohibit, since there is no reason to be more stringent with a gentile than with a Jew]?

It is because we are concerned that someone may not know that the gentile is alone [as Rashi wrote, s.v. “he makes his voice heard”], and they will think that there are many people there; therefore, they prohibit.

The Gemara raises an objection:

What is different

in the case of a

Jew

who is alone in the inner courtyard,

who does not prohibit,

according to Shmuel, because people do not know that there is only one person there, who does not prohibit, and because

the one who knows

that there is no more than one person there

knows,

while the one who does not know

that there is one person there

assumes

that even if there are two, presumably he

established an eiruv

with his fellow, so that it is a permitted right of passage in its own place [explained on the basis of the Meiri; but see carefully the Gaon Yaakov].

With regard to a gentile as well, we could say [that is, let us say]

meaning: let us say]

that the one who knows

that there is only one person there

knows,

while the one

who does not know

that the gentile is alone in his courtyard and thinks that there are many people there

assumes: The gentile rented out [that is, already rented out his rights]; therefore, the outer courtyard is permitted. Why, then, did you say that we are concerned about observers who do not know that he is alone?!

the gentile has already rented out his domain], and therefore the outer courtyard should be permitted. Why, then, did you say that we are concerned about those who see him but do not know that he is alone?!

And we answer: In the case of a gentile, observers do not assume that he rented out his rights when in fact he did not, because they say:

If it were so that he rented them, he would make it known!

If he had rented out his rights, there would have been publicity, for a gentile makes his affairs known and his actions become public knowledge [Meiri; see also the other explanations in Rabbenu Yehonatan]. Therefore, someone who does not know that he lives there alone says that the right of passage does not cause a prohibition [Rashi].

Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: If there are ten houses, one within another,

located in a courtyard together with other residences, and the inner houses have no way of exiting to the courtyard except through the outer houses,

the innermost one contributes its eiruv

in order to permit carrying in the courtyard, together with the other residents of the courtyard,

and that is sufficient.

The other nine houses do not need to contribute their eiruvs. [See illustration.] The reason is that all nine are “gatehouses” serving the innermost house, and we will say below in the Mishna [and above, on p. 72b] that one who resides in a gatehouse does not prohibit the inhabitants of the courtyard, and does not need to participate in the courtyard eiruv.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even the outermost one

contributes to the courtyard eiruv.

The initial understanding was that he was referring to all the outer houses.

The Gemara raises an objection:

The outermost one is a gatehouse;

why should it contribute an eiruv?!

And we explain his statement:

The outermost one serving the innermost one,

that is, the ninth outer house, adjacent to the innermost one.

And we explain the reason:

With regard to what do they disagree?

One—

Shmuel, who exempts them all, even the ninth house, which is a gatehouse serving the innermost house—

holds:

Even

a gatehouse serving a single individual is called a gatehouse,

and consequently they are all gatehouses.

And the other—

Rabbi Yoḥanan, who obligates the ninth house—

holds:

A gatehouse serving a single individual

is not called a gatehouse.

Therefore, the first eight houses are considered gatehouses serving the two innermost houses, while the ninth is not called a gatehouse and must also contribute its eiruv.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha, who said in the name of Rav: If there are two courtyards

containing residences,

and

there are also

three houses between them,

one of the houses being open to one courtyard, one being open to the other courtyard, and the third house being between the two and not open to a courtyard, but open on both sides to the houses that open into the courtyards [and that middle house has another exit to the public domain; whenever one is not required to leave through the houses adjacent to it, they are not considered its “gatehouse,” and they do prohibit—Ran].

If the two courtyards come to establish an eiruv with one another [Ritva, Shulḥan Arukh], it is possible for all three houses to be exempt from contributing to the eiruv and nevertheless be permitted to carry.

For example:

One comes through this one and places his eiruv in that one,

that is, the inhabitants of one courtyard collect their eiruv and place it in the middle house.

And

this one

[the inhabitants of the second courtyard]

comes through this one

[through the second outer house]

and places

his eiruv as well

in that one

[in the middle house]. [See illustration 1.]

Thus, these three houses do not need to contribute anything to the eiruv.