Eruvin 75b — the Talmud in English

A beraita also teaches this way

in accordance with Rav Yehuda: “one place” means the outer courtyard:

If they placed their merging in the outer courtyard, and one person—whether from the outer courtyard or from the inner courtyard—forgot and did not participate in the merging, both courtyards are prohibited,

as we learned in the Mishna.

If they placed their merging in the inner courtyard:

And one person from the inner courtyard forgot and did not participate in the merging, both courtyards are prohibited,

either because of the right of passage through it, or because the inner courtyard cannot withdraw from the shared merging, as was explained.

One person forgot

from the outer courtyard and did not participate in the merging; both courtyards are prohibited—this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva,

and the Gemara will explain it below.

But the Sages say: In this case

—where one person from the outer courtyard forgot—

the inner courtyard is permitted,

since it can withdraw from the shared merging,

but the outer courtyard is prohibited.

The Gemara now explains the reason for Rabbi Akiva’s ruling:

Rabba bar Ḥanan said to Abaye: What is different according to the Sages, who say that the inner courtyard is permitted because the

inner courtyard

closes its door

in the presence of the outer courtyard

and uses it,

meaning that the inner courtyard withdraws from the shared merging?

According to Rabbi Akiva as well, let

the inner courtyard

close its door and use the courtyard!

In other words: What is Rabbi Akiva’s reason for not agreeing with the Sages?!

He said to him,

Abaye said to Rabba bar Ḥanan:

The merging

of the outer courtyard, which was placed in the inner courtyard,

causes it to enter

the inner courtyard; that is, its merging brings the residents of the outer courtyard into the inner courtyard, and this is considered like their right of passage through the inner courtyard [Rabbi Ḥananel], as all this was explained above, on page 66b.

The Gemara asks: If so,

according to the Sages as well

let us say:

The merging causes it to enter,

and since the outer courtyard is prohibited in its own place, it prohibits the inner courtyard, just as a right of passage prohibits it [as above, on page 66b]?!

The Gemara answers: This is because

the inner courtyard says

to the outer courtyard:

To remedy the situation

—so that one of us could use the other’s courtyard—

I joined you

in one merging.

But not to cause harm,

so that you should prohibit me because of the shared merging between us, which causes you to enter my courtyard! The Gemara asks:

According to Rabbi Akiva as well, let

the inner courtyard say to the outer courtyard:

I joined you to remedy the situation, but not to cause harm?!

The Gemara answers:

The outer courtyard says

to the inner courtyard:

We will nullify my domain for you,

meaning that this is not considered causing harm, since the outer courtyard can nullify the domain it possesses in the inner courtyard by virtue of the merging’s right of passage. Since it can nullify that domain, the inner courtyard is not permitted until the outer courtyard nullifies it.

And

the reason for

the Sages,

who disagree, is that they hold:

There is no nullification of a domain from the resident of one

courtyard

to the resident of

one

courtyard

to the resident of

another

courtyard. The residents of the outer courtyard therefore cannot nullify their domain for the residents of the inner courtyard. Since the nullification is ineffective, it would indeed cause harm; nevertheless, the inner courtyard is permitted.

The Gemara raises an objection to this: Above, on page 66b, the amoraim disagreed about this matter—whether there is nullification of a domain from one courtyard to another [and this can also be found in other cases, such as when the inner courtyard nullifies the right of passage it possesses through the outer courtyard for the outer courtyard; or when there are two courtyards with an entrance between them, they did not merge, and one courtyard comes to nullify its domain for the other, so that the latter may be permitted to carry from its domain into the other’s domain; or even when they did merge, one person forgot to participate, and he comes to nullify his domain for the residents of his courtyard and for the residents of the other courtyard that merged with it].

Now,

shall we say that Shmuel and Rabbi Yoḥanan

—who disagreed about this above—

disagree in accordance with the disagreement between the Sages and Rabbi Akiva?

As Shmuel, who said

that there is no nullification of a domain from one courtyard to another, holds

in accordance with the Sages.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said

that there is nullification from one courtyard to another, holds

in accordance with Rabbi Akiva?!

The Gemara answers:

Shmuel can say to you: I stated my ruling even according to Rabbi Akiva.

Because

Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling here only in the case of two courtyards, one inside the other, which prohibit one another

because of the merging’s right of passage; and likewise in the case of two courtyards with an entrance between them, which merged with one another and prohibit one another because of the merging’s right of passage. [

The Gemara did not state specifically: “one inside the other”—Rashba.] Likewise, in the case of two courtyards, one inside the other, where the inner courtyard prohibits the outer courtyard because of its right of passage, since they prohibit one another, they may nullify their domains.

But there,

in Shmuel’s statement, the case concerns two courtyards with an entrance between them, which do not prohibit one another, since in such a case we say:

Do they prohibit one another

that the Sages would institute nullification in order to permit them?!

And Rabbi Yoḥanan

—who said above that there is nullification of a domain from one courtyard to another, even in the case of two courtyards with an entrance between them, which do not prohibit one another, and certainly in this case—

said

to you:

I stated my ruling even according to the Sages,

and even according to the Sages there is nullification of a domain from one courtyard to another.

Here,

where the inner courtyard can say to the outer courtyard, “I joined you to remedy the situation, but not to cause harm,” this is not because the outer courtyard “cannot” nullify its domain, as we explained above.

Rather,

it is because the inner courtyard says to the outer courtyard: Even though you can nullify your domain that is located with me, it would nevertheless cause harm. For:

While you nullify [

until you nullify]

for me—

you are prohibiting me!

Therefore, remove yourself and remove your nullification, for I do not want it [Rashi].

But there,

in the case of two courtyards with an entrance between them, where Rabbi Yoḥanan said that there is nullification of a domain from one courtyard to another,

does

one

courtyard prohibit

the other through the entrance between them when there is no merging, such that if you say that it should nullify its domain, this would constitute causing harm?!

We learned in the Mishna:

And if they were

—the inner and outer courtyards—

occupied by individuals,

they do not need to establish a merging.

Rav Yosef said: Rabbi taught: If there were

in the two courtyards together

three

people,

(they are prohibited) [

they prohibit

—Rashi and Ritva] the inner courtyard from the outer courtyard because of the inner courtyard’s right of passage.

The reason is as follows: It is unnecessary to state that if there were two people in the inner courtyard who did not participate in the merging, since the inner courtyard is prohibited in its own place, it prohibits the outer courtyard. Rather, even if there were two people in the outer courtyard and one in the inner courtyard, the inner courtyard prohibits the outer courtyard until it establishes a merging with it; it is not sufficient for the outer courtyard to establish a merging among its own residents. The reason will be explained below [explained according to the Ritva].

Rav Beivai said to them

—to the members of the academy—:

Do not accept

it

from Rav Yosef [do not accept this teaching from him], for this teaching is a beraita transmitted in the name of Rabbi.

I

am the one who

told it to him

—to Rav Yosef, before he became ill and forgot his learning—and I did not tell him that it was transmitted in the name of Rabbi;

I told it to him in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava!

And I gave the reason for this ruling:

Since I refer to them as “many” in the outer courtyard,

we issue a decree because of “many” in the inner courtyard who did not establish a merging.

Rav Yosef later remembered that this was what had happened, and

Rav Yosef said: “Master of Abraham! ‘Many’

—which I heard from Rav Beivai—

was exchanged for me with ‘Rabbi,’

and I mistakenly said that “Rabbi” taught this ruling in a beraita.

And Shmuel

disagreed with the basic ruling, and

said: The two courtyards are always permitted

when there are three people, even if there are two people in the outer courtyard who established a merging and one in the inner courtyard,

until there are two people in the inner courtyard

who did not establish a merging

and one in the outer courtyard,

for in that case the inner courtyard properly prohibits the outer courtyard because of the right of passage, which is prohibited in its own place.

Rabbi Elazar said:

We have established that a gentile who lives with two Jews in one courtyard prohibits them until they rent his domain from him, as we said at the beginning of the chapter [and this is in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, whose view is the established halakha, that two Jews are required along with the gentile].

Rabbi Elazar teaches us that even if the

gentile

lived alone in the inner courtyard and passed through the outer courtyard, where two Jews lived,

he is like many

who did not establish a merging: they prohibit the outer courtyard through their right of passage, and the outer courtyard is not permitted until its residents rent the gentile’s domain. [

Rabbi Elazar’s statement contains its essential novelty according to Shmuel. According to Rav Beivai, who says that even one Jew in the inner courtyard and two in the outer courtyard causes a prohibition, why did Rabbi Elazar need to say that a gentile prohibits? A Jew also prohibits in such a case [Rashi].

Why do we consider the gentile, according to Rabbi Elazar, “like many,” rather than say that he is an individual and does not prohibit, just as a Jew does not prohibit [as Tosafot explain: if he were like an individual and not like many, he would not prohibit, since there is no reason to be more stringent with a gentile than with a Jew]?

This is because we are concerned that someone may not know that the gentile is alone [as Rashi writes, s.v. “he makes his voice heard”], and they may think that many people live there; therefore, they prohibit.

The Gemara raises an objection:

What is different

in the case of a

Jew

who is alone in the inner courtyard,

that he does not prohibit,

as Shmuel holds, because people do not know that there is only one person there, who does not prohibit, and because

whoever knows

that there is only one person there

knows,

while whoever does not know

that there is one person there

thinks

that even if there are two, presumably

they established a merging

with one another, and consequently the right of passage is permitted in its own place. [Explained according to the Meiri; see carefully, however, the Gaon Yaakov.]

Regarding a gentile as well, should we say [

meaning: let us say]

that whoever knows

that there is only one person there

knows,

but whoever

does not know

that the gentile is alone in his courtyard and thinks that there are many

thinks: He rented [

the gentile has already rented out his domain], and therefore the outer courtyard should be permitted. Why, then, did you say that we are concerned about those who see him but do not know that he is alone?!

The Gemara answers: In the case of a gentile, those who see him do not assume that he rented out his domain when in fact he did not rent it, because they say:

If he had indeed rented it, he would have made it known!

If he had rented out his domain, there would have been publicity, since a gentile makes his voice heard and his affairs become known [Meiri; see also the explanations of Rabbeinu Yehonatan]. Therefore, the person who does not know that he lives there alone says that the right of passage does not prohibit [Rashi].

Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Ten houses, one inside the other,

located in a courtyard together with other residences, where the inner houses have no way to exit to the courtyard except through the outer houses:

The innermost resident contributes his merging

—in order to permit carrying in the courtyard—with the other residents of the courtyard,

and that is sufficient.

The nine outer residents need not contribute their merging as well. [See illustration.] The reason is that all nine are “gatehouses” serving the innermost house, and we will say below in the Mishna [and above, on page 72b] that one who lives in a gatehouse does not prohibit the residents of the courtyard and does not need to participate in the courtyard’s merging.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even the outermost

resident contributes to the courtyard’s merging.

The initial understanding was that he referred to all the outer residents.

The Gemara asks:

The outermost house is a gatehouse;

why should its resident contribute to the merging?!

The Gemara explains the statement:

The outermost house relative to the innermost one,

meaning the ninth house, which is adjacent to the innermost house.

The Gemara explains the reason:

With regard to what do they disagree?

One master

—Shmuel, who exempts everyone, even the ninth house, which is a gatehouse for the innermost house—

holds

that

even a gatehouse serving one individual is called a gatehouse,

and therefore all of them are gatehouses.

And the other master

—Rabbi Yoḥanan, who obligates the ninth house—

holds

that a gatehouse serving one individual

is not called a gatehouse.

Therefore, the first eight houses are considered gatehouses serving the two inner houses, but the ninth is not considered a gatehouse and must also contribute its merging.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha, who said in the name of Rav: Two courtyards

that contain residences,

and

there are also

three houses between them,

one of the houses opening into one courtyard, one opening into the other courtyard, and a third house between them that does not open into a courtyard but opens on both sides into the houses that open into the courtyards [and that middle house has another exit to the public domain; therefore, since its resident is not required to leave through the adjacent houses, those houses are not considered its “gatehouse,” and they do prohibit—Ran].

If the two courtyards come to establish a merging with one another [Ritva, Shulḥan Arukh], it is possible for all three houses to be exempt from contributing to the merging and nevertheless be permitted to carry.

For example:

One comes through this one and places his merging in this one,

meaning that the residents of one courtyard collect their merging and place it in the middle house.

And

this [

the residents of the second courtyard]

also comes through this one [

through the second outer house]

and places

his merging as well

in this one [

in the middle house]. [See illustration 1.]

Thus, these three houses do not need to contribute to the merging at all.