Eruvin 50a (נ.) — the Talmud in English

Rabba said: What is the reason for Rav’s ruling

that he acquired no Shabbat residence at all beneath the tree, and he is forbidden to walk to the tree even if the entire canopy of the tree was within two thousand cubits of the place where he is standing?

But although he did not specify where the four cubits of his Shabbat residence are, in any event he has not escaped a state of uncertainty. And if the entire tree is within two thousand cubits, why should he not walk beneath the tree?!

Because its place is not demarcated

as he did not define and designate a specific place beneath the tree where he wished to acquire four cubits of Shabbat residence. Therefore, he acquires no Shabbat residence beneath the tree at all, because a person acquires Shabbat residence only when his place is defined and recognizable.

And some say: Rabba said: What is the reason for Rav’s ruling

that he did not acquire Shabbat residence at all beneath the tree? We do not say that he acquired Shabbat residence there, but only that we are uncertain where those four cubits that he acquired are, as Shmuel said?!

Because he holds: Anything

that

cannot

take effect

successively,

as in this case of Shabbat residence: if he had designated and acquired Shabbat residence in the four cubits to the north beneath the tree, he could not have said that he wished to acquire Shabbat residence also in the four cubits to the south, since a person’s place of Shabbat residence is four cubits, and it is impossible to acquire two Shabbat residences—therefore

even

when he includes in his statement the entire area beneath the tree

at once,

intending to acquire Shabbat residence in any four cubits beneath the tree—

it cannot

take effect. Therefore, he acquires no Shabbat residence at all [Ritva; see Rashi’s wording carefully].

And we explain:

What is the difference between them

between these two formulations of Rabba’s opinion?!

There is a difference between them

in a case

where he said

explicitly:

Let me acquire

Shabbat residence

in four cubits from among

within

eight

cubits beneath the tree, but he did not designate which four cubits.

According to the one who says

that the reason for Rav’s ruling is that he does not acquire

because its place is not demarcated, here too its place is not demarcated

and he acquires nothing.

But according to the one who says

that the reason Rav rules that he does not acquire is

because anything

that

cannot

take effect

successively—

even at once it cannot

take effect—this applies only when he included in his statement more than four cubits, which constitute his place of Shabbat residence.

But

this

case, in which he said four cubits from among eight, is

like

having designated and defined

four cubits.

For here he said, “four cubits”

from among eight

he said,

so he has four unspecified cubits within the eight cubits.

The substance of the matter. Rabba said: Anything

whose legal effect

cannot

take effect

successively—

even at once it cannot.

Abaye raised an objection to Rabba: One who designates more than the required amount for tithes

who was separating the first tithe, and instead of separating one-tenth of the produce, he separated, for example, one-fifth of the produce—

his produce

that he came to render fit

is rendered fit.

But

if

his tithes—they are

unfit. For the status of tithe takes effect on only the amount prescribed by the Torah from what he separated, and this amount loses its status as tevel once it becomes tithe. But the excess over the prescribed amount, which did not become tithe, does not lose its status as tevel.

This excess is worse than the rest of the produce, for with regard to the rest of the produce, he intended that the tithe should permit it and remove its status as tevel. But with regard to the excess, he did not intend this, since he sought to confer the status of tithe upon the excess as well.

It follows that of the produce he separated as tithe, part has the status of tithe [in accordance with the amount prescribed by the Torah] and has lost its status as tevel, while another part remains complete tevel.

And since he does not know which produce is tithe and which is tevel, all the tithes he separated are found to be unfit, as they cannot be eaten.

And now this is difficult for Rabba:

Why

does

the tithe take effect at all, rendering his produce fit?

Let us say: Anything that cannot take effect successively—

even at once it cannot,

for if he had separated tithe properly and then returned and separated another tithe from the non-sacred produce, the second separation would not have taken effect. If so, even when he separates at once more than the prescribed amount, the tithe should not need to take effect at all?! And we reject this:

Tithe is different, as it exists in halves,

in each and every grain.

For if he said

and specified verbally that he wished

to be sanctified

with the sanctity of tithe every

half of each grain—

it is sanctified,

the half of each grain.

And since this is so, when he said that tithe should take effect on an amount of grain greater than the amount of tithe that he must separate, we interpret his words as meaning that he did not intend the status of tithe to take effect on all the grain, but only on a portion of each and every grain, so that all the portions together would amount to the tithe that he must separate from all the grain. It follows that this is not a case of one who designates more than the required amount for tithes, since he confers the status of tithe only upon one-tenth, as required, and no more .

And all this is possible only with regard to tithes.

But with regard to Shabbat residence, it is impossible for his Shabbat residence to be divided throughout the entire tree. Rather, he must have four cubits of Shabbat residence in one place. Thus, when he said, “My Shabbat residence is throughout the entire area beneath the tree,” he used language that expanded his place of Shabbat residence beyond what is possible. Therefore, we say: Anything that cannot take effect successively—even at once it cannot, as we said.

And we challenge this:

But what of the animal tithe, which does not exist in halves?

For if he said, “Half of this lamb shall be animal tithe,” it is not sanctified, as the Merciful One said: “Every one that passes under the rod, the tenth, shall be holy”—a complete tenth, and not half [Ritva],

and it does not exist successively

according to the Bach, since when he passes the animals beneath the rod and calls the tenth one “tenth,” and after calling this one “tenth” he calls another animal “tenth,” only the first one becomes sanctified.

And

even so,

Rabba said

If he passed nine animals beneath the rod and

two emerged

together

as the tenth, and he called them

both

“tenth”—

the sanctity of animal tithe takes effect upon one of them, and

the tenth and the eleventh are intermingled with one another.

That is to say: one is sanctified with the full sanctity of animal tithe, while the other has the status of a shelamim offering, as is the law with regard to “the eleventh that he called tenth.” However, we do not know which is the tithe and which is the shelamim .

This law applies wherever the tenth animal emerged first, and he erred and did not call it “tenth,” and afterward the eleventh emerged and he mistakenly called it “tenth.” The latter is sanctified with the sanctity of “shelamim,” and not with the sanctity of “tithe.”

And if you would say that “anything that cannot take effect successively, even at once it cannot,” then since, had he called each one “tenth” after he had already called its fellow “tenth,” the second would not have become sanctified at all—not with the sanctity of tithe and not with the sanctity of shelamim—

even now, when each emerged at once with its fellow and he called both of them “tenth,” neither of the two should become sanctified, neither with the sanctity of tithe nor with the sanctity of shelamim.

And why is one of them sanctified with the sanctity of tithe and the other with the sanctity of shelamim?

And we answer:

Animal tithe is different,

because the Torah introduced a special law concerning it,

that it exists,

in that calling an animal “tithe” confers the sanctity of an offering upon two offerings, even if he designated two offerings as tithe

successively—

although the double designation was

in error.

That is to say, there are two special innovations concerning the animal-tithe offering:

A. Even conferring the status of tithe in error upon an offering that is not the tenth animal sanctifies it with the sanctity of an offering [although with the sanctity of shelamim].

For example, the tenth animal emerged, and he mistakenly called it the ninth, and continued in his error and called the eleventh “tenth”; the eleventh becomes sanctified with the sanctity of a shelamim offering, by virtue of a scriptural decree.

B. It is possible for him to call the animal emerging beneath the rod “eleventh,” and nevertheless it becomes sanctified with the sanctity of tithe, even though he had already called another animal “tenth” before it.

For example, if he first erred and called the ninth “tenth,” and continued in his error and called the tenth “eleventh,” the tenth [which he mistakenly called “eleventh”] becomes sanctified with the sanctity of tithe, despite the fact that he had already designated the ninth as tithe.

Therefore, there is no impediment when two animals emerge together beneath the rod as “tenth,” and he calls both of them “tenth,” to one of them acquiring the status of tithe and the other the status of shelamim.

For here we do not say, “Anything that cannot take effect successively, even at once it cannot,” since we find that designating two animals as tithe successively does sanctify them, by virtue of the special law introduced with regard to animal tithe.

As we learned:

One who was tithing his animals, and while they were emerging beneath the rod, erred and

called the ninth “tenth,” and the tenth

he called

“ninth,” and the eleventh

also called

“tenth”—

all three are sanctified.

However, all three are not sanctified with the sanctity of tithe. Only the animal that emerged tenth beneath the rod has that sanctity, while the ninth and the eleventh are sanctified only with the sanctity of shelamim.

That is to say, despite the fact that he first called the ninth “tenth” and afterward also called the eleventh “tenth,” both become sanctified [although with the sanctity of shelamim], by virtue of the special innovation stated with regard to animal tithe.

We further challenge Rabba, who said, “Anything that cannot take effect successively, even at once it cannot”:

But

what of the forty loaves brought with the

todah offering

whose law is that they become sanctified with the sanctity of the todah loaves when he slaughters the todah offering itself over them,

which does not exist in error,

for if he set aside forty loaves and forgot that he had set them aside, and then set aside another forty loaves, they are not sanctified, since an offering consecrated in error is not consecrated [Rashi].

And it does not exist

either

successively,

for if he set aside forty loaves, slaughtered the offering over them, and then set aside another forty, the latter are not sanctified.

And

even so,

it was stated: With regard to a todah slaughtered over eighty loaves,

that he set aside eighty loaves for the offering instead of forty,

Ḥizkiya said: Forty of the eighty became sanctified upon it

upon the todah, through the slaughter,

out of the eighty.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Forty out of the eighty did not become sanctified upon it.

It is evident from Ḥizkiya’s words [that the halakha is in accordance with him, Rashba] that forty out of the eighty become sanctified, even though todah loaves do not become sanctified successively?!

And we answer:

It was stated concerning it

that beraita over which Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Yoḥanan disagreed:

Rabbi Zeira said [in Masoret HaShas, the text was emended on the basis of Kiddushin to:

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi]:

Everyone agrees that where he said, “Let forty

loaves be sanctified

loaves

out of eighty”—

the forty are sanctified, as he said.

But if he said,

“Let forty

loaves not be sanctified

the loaves

unless

eighty loaves are sanctified”

loaves—

everyone agrees that they are not sanctified

at all, because it is impossible for more than forty loaves to be sanctified for a todah offering.

They disagree

Ḥizkiya and Rabbi Yoḥanan in a case where he set aside eighty loaves

without specification.

One master

Ḥizkiya

held: We interpret the words of the one who set them aside as meaning that only forty loaves would be sanctified, while the additional loaves—

he intends for contingencies.

And he brought them on condition,

intending that the additional forty loaves would become sanctified only if the first forty loaves were lost or became impure. If not, they would not become sanctified; this is equivalent to his saying, “Let forty out of eighty loaves be sanctified.”

meaning that he intended the additional forty loaves to become consecrated only if the first forty were lost or became impure; otherwise, they would not become consecrated. This is equivalent to saying, “Let forty out of eighty become consecrated