Eruvin 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Fig -

to teach the measure

of a dried fig

[a dried fig] required

to

be liable for

carrying

food of this measure on

Shabbat

from the private domain to the public domain.

Pomegranate -

to

teach, as we learned: A vessel that has an opening that prevents its use does not contract ritual impurity.

And therefore,

Therefore,

all the vessels of householders

[who do not intend to sell them, but keep them for their own use and are not particularly concerned about their openings],

the measure

of their openings, in order to remove them from the status of being capable of contracting ritual impurity, is an opening that

“

allows

pomegranates to pass through.”

That is, through that opening a pomegranate, or another object equal in size to a pomegranate, can pass. Tosafot.

But the vessels of craftsmen, which are intended for sale, become pure once they develop even a small opening. Since they are intended for sale, once they have developed an opening they are no longer sold.

But with vessels belonging to householders, even if they develop openings, he still uses them, until they develop an opening large enough for a pomegranate to pass through.

A land of olive and oil -

a land whose measures are all olives.

And we wonder about this: Is it possible that

all its measures

are olives?

Could this enter your mind?!

But there are those that we stated

above, whose measures are not an olive?!

And we answer:

Rather, say: a land whose majority of measures are olives.

For example: eating forbidden fat, blood, notar, piggul, an animal carcass, and a non-kosher animal; the measure of the flesh of a corpse for imparting impurity through a tent; and contact with carcasses. The measure for all of these is an olive-bulk.

Honey,

which is date honey, to teach the measure

of a large date

[a date]

for

one who eats on

Yom Kippur,

to become liable for it,

And now we ask: Since the measures can be derived from Scripture, why did you say that they

are “a halakha given to Moses at Sinai”?

But can you understand this?

Is it possible that the

measures

we stated

are explicitly written

in the Torah?

Is it written in the Torah that a bone imparts impurity with a measure the size of a barley grain, or that a house afflicted with leprosy imparts impurity with the measure of eating wheat bread!? [Rashi, Sukkah 6b.]

Rather,

the measures are indeed

halakha

given to Moses at Sinai

[they are].

And

only

the Sages associated them with verses

such as “a land of wheat.”

We further challenge what we said, that the laws of interposition in immersion are a halakha given to Moses at Sinai:

But

interpositions

are by Torah law!

That is, this can be derived from Scripture, and it is not called a halakha given to Moses at Sinai!?

As it is written: “And if a man has a discharge of semen,

and he shall bathe in water all his flesh

and bathe in water all his flesh.”

And we expound this verse as follows:

“In water—his flesh”: This teaches

that there shall not be

at the time of immersion

anything interposing between his flesh and the water.

“In water”,

this teaches that one must immerse

in the waters of a ritual bath,

which are gathered waters, and it is not necessary to use a spring of living water. The proof is that it is not written, “in living water.”

“All his flesh”,

indicates that he must immerse all his flesh at once. This teaches that he must immerse in

water in which his entire body can be immersed

[can enter]

within it.

And how much is that? -

One cubit by one cubit

square,

with a height

[of]

three cubits.

And the Sages calculated

the

waters of a ritual bath

according to this calculation, and determined that they are

forty se'a.

We have therefore learned that the law of interposition is derived by exposition from Scripture, and is not a halakha given to Moses at Sinai?

And we answer:

The halakha given

to Moses at Sinai is necessary -

to determine the measure of

the hair of the person immersing. This teaches that an interposition also invalidates the immersion when it is on the hair.

And in accordance with the statement of Rabba bar Rav Huna,

who said that an interposition invalidates the immersion when it is on the hair.

As Rabba bar Rav Huna said:

One strand

[of hair]

alone,

that is

tied

to itself,

constitutes an interposition.

For the knot tightens the hair firmly, and the water cannot enter there.

But

three

hairs tied together

do not constitute an interposition,

because such a knot is not tight, and the water enters into the knot; therefore there is no interposition.

But regarding

two

hairs tied together,

I do not know

whether the knot is tight and constitutes an interposition, or not!

We have therefore learned that an interposition invalidates the immersion even when it is on the hair.

We challenge this: But an interposition on

his hair too

is

by Torah law!

For from that same verse from which we learn that there must not be an interposition on his flesh, we can learn that there must also not be an interposition on his hair.

For

this

it is taught: “And he shall bathe

[in water]

all his flesh.”

From the word “all” we learn that he must bathe in water also

the accessory

[attached]

to his flesh—and that is the hair!

And if so, his hair is automatically included even with regard to interposition.

And we answer:

When the halakha came

with regard to his hair, it did not teach the basic law of interposition on the hair, but rather the details of the laws of interposition on the hair:

for the majority

of the hair,

for the minority, for one who is particular and for one who is not particular, and in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzhak.

As Rabbi Yitzhak said: By Torah law

[that is, by the Oral Law], from the halakha given to Moses at Sinai:

a. An interposition found on

the majority

of the hair,

and he is particular

[distressed]

about it, constitutes an interposition.

b.

But if he is not particular about it, it

does not constitute an interposition.

c.

And

the Sages

decreed that an interposition on the majority that he is not particular about

should constitute an interposition, as a

decree because of the majority about which he is particular

[which constitutes an interposition by Torah law], since it resembles Torah law in one respect: the interposition is on the majority.

d.

And

they also decreed

that an interposition on a minority about which he is particular is prohibited because of the majority about which he is particular,

since it resembles Torah law with regard to being particular.

And we challenge this:

Should they not also decree concerning a minority about which he is not particular,

as a

decree because of a minority about which he is particular,

since the two are alike in that both involve a minority?!

Alternatively,

should they not decree concerning a minority about which he is not particular

because of a majority about which he is not particular,

since they are alike in that he is not particular?

And we answer:

That itself—

a minority about which he is particular, or alternatively a majority about which he is not particular—does not constitute an interposition except by virtue of a

decree.

And

should

we arise and issue a decree to prevent violation of another decree?! We further challenge what we said, that partitions are a halakha given to Moses at Sinai:

But

But

partitions

are by Torah law!

As the Master said: The Ark,

which was in the Holy of Holies, was

nine

handbreadths high. As it is written: “And a cubit [of six handbreadths] and its height.”

And the cover,

its thickness being

one handbreadth—

[as we derive it in Sukkah 5b]—

here are ten.

And it is written: “And there I will meet with you and speak with you from above the cover,” indicating that the Divine Presence descended to a height above ten.

And since we maintain that the Divine Presence never descended below ten handbreadths from the ground, as it is written: “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth He has given to human beings,” and not to the Divine Presence, as it were; whereas here we see that the Divine Presence descended to a height above ten handbreadths,

we must conclude that at a height of ten, “a domain is interrupted”: from a height of ten, this is no longer “the domain of the earth,” but another domain.

And from here we learn that whenever one constructs a partition ten high, that is sufficient to divide off an independent domain. For it divides the entire domain, and it is unnecessary to learn this from a halakha given to Moses at Sinai?!

And we answer:

It is necessary

as a halakha given to Moses at Sinai

only according to Rabbi Yehuda.

As he says: The building cubit

that was used in the Tabernacle, for example, to measure the cubits of the boards and curtains,

was a cubit of six

handbreadths.

But

the cubit of

the

vessels

that were in the Tabernacle

was a cubit of five

handbreadths.

It follows that the Ark was seven and a half handbreadths high, and together with the cover, which was one handbreadth, we have only eight and a half handbreadths. We could not know from here that the measure of a partition is ten handbreadths, and therefore the halakha given to Moses at Sinai was necessary.

We challenge this:

And according to Rabbi Meir, who says: All the cubits

that were in the Tabernacle

were of

a

medium

cubit, which is a cubit of six handbreadths.

According to him, the Ark together with the cover was ten handbreadths. If so,

what can be said?

That is, why do I need the halakha given to Moses at Sinai?

And we answer:

According to Rabbi Meir, when the halakha came:

at Sinai was given, it was needed:

a.

For “draw”,

as we say, “draw up the partitions” [extend and raise the partition standing below toward above], and “draw down the partitions” [extend and lower the partition standing above at a height toward below].

b.

And for “lavud”,

for example, when one makes a partition from reeds and there are not three handbreadths between one reed and the next, we regard the partition as a complete partition, as though the intervening spaces were added to the reeds, making them adjacent to one another [the term “lavud” is like “branch” or “extension,” something short to which an addition has been made and by which it has been lengthened].

c.

And for “a crooked wall”,

when invalid roofing is located in the roof of a sukka, adjacent to the wall of the sukka, up to four cubits from the wall [but not including four cubits], we regard it as though it were part of the wall. The walls of the sukka are consequently considered adjacent to the valid roofing placed in the middle of the sukka [as above, 3b].

They raised a dilemma:

If it was high,

the empty space of the alleyway between the floor of the alleyway and the crossbeam above it, more than

twenty cubits,

so that the crossbeam is invalid,

and he came to reduce it

by raising the floor of the alleyway beneath the crossbeam—

how much

does he

reduce?

And it initially entered our minds that the dilemma concerned the measure by which one must reduce the height of the empty space in the alleyway.

Therefore we wonder: What is the dilemma—

how much does he reduce?!

It is obvious that he reduces

as much as is necessary for him

to reduce so that the empty space of the alleyway will not be higher than twenty cubits! What sort of question is this?!

And we explain:

Rather,

this is what they raised as a dilemma:

its width,

that of the lower platform that he raises in order to reduce the empty space—

how much

must it be?

Rav Yosef said: It is sufficient to raise a platform

of a width of

one handbreadth

opposite the width of the crossbeam [which is one handbreadth] above it [see illustration 1].

Abaye said: One must raise a platform

of a width of

four

handbreadths within the alleyway, the measure of a significant area [see illustration 2].

The Gemara analyzes the matter of the dispute between Rav Yosef and Abaye:

Shall we say that they disagree about this: The one who says

[Rav Yosef] that one handbreadth

is

under the crossbeam,

holds: It is permitted to use

[to carry]

under the crossbeam.

Since the measure of the height of up to twenty cubits is necessary for recognition [as stated above, 3a], here too there is recognition for a person standing on that handbreadth beneath the crossbeam, because the crossbeam is discernible to him in that place, as there is no empty space there greater than twenty cubits.