Eruvin 4b — the Talmud in English

Fig -

to teach the measure

of a dried fig

[a dried fig] in order

to

be liable for

the carrying out

of foodstuffs in such a measure on

Shabbat

from a private domain to a public domain.

Pomegranate -

to

as we learned:

A vessel in which there is an opening that prevents its use does not receive impurity.

And therefore,

all the vessels of householders

[who are not destined to be sold, but are intended for use by their owners, and are not so particular about their openings],

their measure

of their openings, in order to remove them from receiving impurity, is an opening that

“as

large as one that lets out

pomegranates.”

That is to say, from that opening a pomegranate, or another thing equal to the size of a pomegranate, can emerge. Tosafot.

But the vessels of craftsmen, which are intended for sale, once they have been pierced with a small opening they become pure. Since they are intended to be sold, once they have been pierced, they are not sold.

But with the vessels of householders, even if they have been pierced, he still uses them, until they are pierced with an opening as large as one that lets out a pomegranate.

A land of olive and oil -

a land whose majority of measures are olives.

And we raise an objection to it: Is it so that

all its measures

are olives?

Could it enter your mind?!

But there are those that we stated

above, whose measure is not an olive?!

And we answer:

Rather, say: a land whose majority of measures are olives.

For example: eating forbidden fat, blood, notar, pigul, an animal carcass and an impure animal, the flesh of a dead person to impart impurity in a tent, and contact with carcasses. For all of these, their measure is an olive.

Honey,

which is date honey, to teach the measure

of a large date

[a date]

for

one who eats on

Yom Kippur,

to become liable for it,

And now we ask: Since from the verse it is possible to learn measures, why did you say that “they are a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai”?

And we answer:

But can you understand it?

For are the

measures

that we stated

written

explicitly in the Torah?

Is it written in the Torah that a bone imparts impurity with a measure of a barley-corn, and that a house afflicted with a plague imparts impurity with the measure of eating wheat bread!? [Rashi, Sukkah page 6.]

Rather,

the measures are forever

a halakha

given to Moshe at Sinai,

they are.

And

only

the Sages supported them with verses

of “a land of wheat.”

We further ask concerning that which we said, that the laws of interposition in immersion are a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai:

But

interpositions -

are of Torah status!

That is to say, this can be learned from the verse, and they are not called a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai!?

As it is written: “And a man, when there issues from him a discharge of seed,

and he shall bathe in water

all his flesh.”

And we expound this verse as follows:

“In water—his flesh”: It teaches

that there shall not be

at the time of immersion

a thing interposing between his flesh and the water.

“In water”,

it teaches that one must immerse

in the waters of a ritual bath,

which are gathered waters, and there is no need for a spring of living water. And the proof is that it is not written, “in living water.”

“All his flesh”,

implies that one must immerse all his flesh at once. It teaches that he must immerse in

water in which his entire body rises

[enters]

within it.

And how much is that? -

one cubit by one cubit

in a square,

in height

[in altitude]

three cubits.

And the Sages measured

for

the waters of a ritual bath

according to this calculation, that they are

forty seah.

We have therefore learned that the law of interposition is learned by exposition from the verse, and is not a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai?

And we answer:

When the halakha was necessary

given to Moshe at Sinai -

for its hair,

of the person immersing. It teaches that an interposition also invalidates with hair.

And in accordance with Rabbah bar Rav Huna,

who said that an interposition invalidates with hair.

For Rabbah bar Rav Huna said:

One strand

[a hair]

alone,

that is

tied

to itself,

interposes.

For the knot tightens the hair well, and the water does not enter there.

But

three

hairs tied together

do not interpose,

because such a knot is not tight, and the water enters into the knot, and there is no interposition.

But

two

hairs tied together -

I do not know

whether the knot is tight and interposes, or not!

We have therefore learned that interposition invalidates even with hair.

And we object to this: But interposition with

his hair also

is

of Torah status!

For from that same verse from which we learn that there shall not be an interposition with his flesh, we can learn that there shall also not be an interposition with his hair.

For

it

was taught: “And he shall bathe

[in water]

all his flesh.” We learn from the word “all” that he shall bathe in water also

the secondary part

[attached]

to his flesh, and that is hair!

to his flesh—and this is his hair!

And if so, his hair is thereby included even with regard to interposition.

And we answer:

When the halakha came

for his hair, it did not come to teach the fundamental law of interposition with hair, but to teach the details of the laws of interposition with hair:

for the majority

of the hair,

and for the minority, and for one who is particular and one who is not particular, and in accordance with Rabbi Yitzhak.

For Rabbi Yitzhak said: By Torah law

[which is oral], from a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai:

a. An interposition found in

the majority

of the hair,

and he is particular

[is distressed]

about it, interposes.

b.

But if he is not particular about it -

it does not interpose.

c.

And they decreed

the Sages

that a majority about which he is not particular

should interpose, as a decree

on account of a majority about which he is particular

[which interposes by Torah law], since it is partially equal to the Torah law, in that the interposition is on the majority.

d.

And

they also decreed

concerning a minority about which he is particular, on account of a majority about which he is particular,

since it is equal to the Torah law with regard to particularity.

And we object:

Let them also decree concerning a minority about which he is not particular,

as a decree

on account of a minority about which he is particular,

since it is equal to it in this, for both are minorities?!

Alternatively,

let them decree concerning a minority about which he is not particular

on account of a majority about which he is not particular,

since it is equal to it in this, that he is not particular?

And we answer:

That itself -

a minority about which he is particular, alternatively a majority about which he is not particular - does not interpose except because of a

decree.

And

when

shall we arise and make a decree for the sake of a decree?! We further ask concerning that which we said, that partitions are a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai:

But

the

partitions -

are of Torah status!

For the Master said: The Ark

that was in the Holy of Holies, its height was

nine

handbreadths. As it is written: “And one cubit [of six] and half its height.”

And the cover

its thickness was

one handbreadth -

[as we derive it in Sukkah, page 5].

Here there are ten.

And it is written: “And I shall meet with you there and speak with you from above the cover,” thus the Divine Presence descended to above a height of ten.

And since it is established for us that the Divine Presence never descended below, to the earth, as it is written: “The heavens are heavens of the Lord, but the earth He gave to human beings,” and not to the Divine Presence, as it were. Yet here we see that the Divine Presence descended to above ten handbreadths.

Necessarily, at a height of ten, “a domain is interrupted,” for from a height of ten this is no longer “the domain of the earth,” but another domain.

And from here we learn that whenever one makes a partition ten high, this is sufficient to divide a domain into an independent domain. For it divided the entire domain, and it is not necessary to learn it from a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai?!

And we answer:

It is not necessary

for a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai

except according to Rabbi Judah.

For he said: A building cubit

that was in the Tabernacle, such as for measuring the cubits of the boards and curtains,

was a cubit of six

handbreadths.

But

the cubit of

the

vessels

that were in the Tabernacle

was a cubit of five

handbreadths.

And it follows that the height of the Ark was seven and a half handbreadths, and with the cover, which was one handbreadth, we have only eight and a half handbreadths; and we would not know from here that the measure of a partition is ten handbreadths, and therefore a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai was necessary.

And we object:

And according to Rabbi Meir, who said: All the cubits

that were in the Tabernacle

were in a

cubit

of medium size,

which is a cubit of six handbreadths.

And according to him, the Ark together with the cover was ten handbreadths. If so,

what can be said?

That is, why do I need a halakha given to Moshe at Sinai?

And we answer:

For Rabbi Meir, when the halakha came:

at Sinai was given, it was needed:

a.

For “draw”,

as we say, “draw and raise the partition” [draw and raise the partition standing below, toward above], and “draw and lower the partition” [draw and lower the partition standing above at a height, toward below].

b.

And for “lavud”,

such as when he made a partition from reeds and there are not three handbreadths between one reed and the next: we regard the partition as a complete partition, as though what is between them were added to the reeds, and they became close to one another [and the expression “lavud” is like “branch,” a short thing to which they added and lengthened it].

c.

And for “a bent wall”,

when invalid roofing found in the roof of the sukka, adjacent to the wall of the sukka, extends up to four cubits from the wall [but not including four cubits], we regard it as though it were part of the wall, and the walls of the sukka are found to be adjacent to the valid roofing that he placed in the middle of the sukka [as above, page 3b].

They raised a dilemma before them:

If it was high

the empty space of the alleyway between the floor of the alleyway and the beam above it by more than

twenty cubits,

so that the beam is invalid,

and he came to reduce it

the empty space by raising the floor of the alleyway beneath the beam -

how much

does he

reduce?

And it entered our minds that the dilemma concerned the measure that one must reduce from the height of the empty space of the alleyway.

And therefore we wonder: What is the dilemma,

how much does he reduce?!

For it is obvious that he should reduce

as much as he needs

to reduce so that the empty space of the alleyway will not be higher than twenty! And what question is this?!

And we explain:

Rather,

this is what they raised as a dilemma:

its width,

of the lower platform that he raises in order to reduce the empty space, -

how much

is it?

Rav Yosef said:

It is sufficient that he raise a platform with a width of

one handbreadth

opposite the width of the beam [which is one handbreadth] above it [see illustration 1].

Abaye said:

He must raise a platform with a width of

four

handbreadths inside the alleyway, the measure of an important place [see illustration 2].

And the Gemara analyzes in what Rav Yosef and Abaye disagree:

Shall we say that they disagree about this: That the one who says

[Rav Yosef] that one handbreadth

is sufficient

beneath the beam,

holds: It is permitted to use

[to carry]

beneath the beam.

And since the measure of the height of up to twenty cubits is because of recognition [as we said above, 3a], here too there is recognition for a person standing on that handbreadth beneath the beam, because in that place the beam is recognizable to him, since there is no empty space there greater than twenty cubits.