Eruvin 30a — the Talmud in English

And infer from it:

but

“garments of the wealthy”—

for the poor, no!

That is to say: when the cloth belongs to the poor, we do not say that it does not contract impurity unless it is also fit for the wealthy. Rather, since it is fit for its poor owners, behold, even for the wealthy, for whom it is not fit, it is impure.

And here too, with regard to roasted meat, we should not say in accordance with Rav Yosef’s words that since for the Persians it is not a relish, even with regard to us it is not a relish, and one requires from the meat itself the measure of two meals for the eruv!

And since this is so, it is difficult: why did you follow the Persians?!

And if you would say,

in every case of this kind, in which the measure of one is not like the measure of the other, we always follow the stringent side, and therefore:

here,

with regard to the garments of the poor, we follow

the stringent side,

and we say: since for them it has the measure for contracting impurity, it is impure, even though for the wealthy it does not have the measure.

And

here too—

with regard to the eruv—we need to follow

the stringent side,

and say the opposite: even though with regard to us it is a relish—and it is sufficient to have the measure that is enough to relish bread of two meals—nevertheless, since with regard to the Persians it is not a relish, one may establish an eruv with it only with the measure fit for the Persians, that is, food of two meals from the meat itself.

This cannot be said:

For

it was taught

with regard to an eruv that in a case of this kind we always follow the lenient side, for it was taught:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: One may establish an eruv for a sick person and for an elderly person—

who eat little, and the measure of food for two of their meals is smaller than that of an average person—with two meals

according to his food,

and not according to that of an average person, since this is the lenient side.

And

one may establish an eruv

for a glutton—

who eats more than an average person—

with an average meal of every person,

since this is the lenient side!

And here too you should need to follow the lenient side. And since for us roasted meat is a relish, the measure of relish should suffice?!

And we conclude:

It is difficult!

And we are astonished:

And did Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar say this,

that for a glutton one does not measure according to himself, but he is drawn after every person?!

And the Gemara brings proof from the laws of impurity that according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar the measure is established according to the person himself and not according to others.

With regard to a house in which there is a corpse, the Sages decreed concerning all its openings that they render impure the person and the vessels found within the space of the opening, if through these openings there is a possibility of taking the corpse out of the house.

But if among the openings there is a “designated opening,” through which specifically they are accustomed to take the corpse out of the house, then only this opening renders impure those found within its space, and not the other openings, since they are not intended for taking out the corpse [as a result of the existence of the designated opening].

One of the matters defining an opening as a “designated opening” for taking out the corpse is when this opening has a measure of four handbreadths by four handbreadths, whereas the other openings do not have such a measure [according to the Ritva here].

This measure of four handbreadths by four handbreadths was established because it is the measure of an opening through which it is possible to transfer a corpse of ordinary size .

And it was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: When Og, king of Bashan, died,

the measure of

his opening

in order to define it as an opening designated for taking out the corpse in relation to the other openings [smaller than this opening]—

its full size,

that of Og, king of Bashan!

That is to say: the measure through which it is fit to take him out!

And the law of this opening is like the law of an opening of four handbreadths with regard to other corpses [Ritva].

And now it is difficult: what is different, with regard to an eruv, that you said that even a glutton has the measure of every person, whereas with regard to the corpse of Og, king of Bashan, we do not say that the measure of his opening should be like the opening of every person, four handbreadths, but rather according to his own measure [Ritva]?!

And Abaye ,

There,

with regard to Og, king of Bashan,

what should he do?

Should he

be reduced to pieces [and

take him out]?!

And are we to hollow out the corpse—to cut it into pieces—in order to take him out?

That is to say: it is not comparable, because there, since the corpse renders impure only through the opening “fit for it,” a corpse the size of Og cannot be taken out through an opening of four handbreadths. Ritva.

They raised a question before them:

Do

the Sages disagree—

with regard to Og, king of Bashan—

with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, or do they not

disagree?

Come and hear: For Rabba bar bar Hana said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan:

Even

Og, king of Bashan—

his opening is four!

It is therefore apparent that the Sages disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

And we reject this:

There,

in Rabbi Yohanan’s statement, it is speaking

where there are many small openings—

less than four—

and there is one

opening

that is four

handbreadths, and it is clear that one must break through one of the openings and enlarge it in order to take the corpse through it [which is larger than the width of the openings].

And therefore, in such a case, we say:

Certainly, when he enlarges it,

when he enlarges one of the openings,

through that

opening of four handbreadths

he enlarges it,

and therefore this opening is considered like one designated for taking the corpse through it.

And in a case of this kind even Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar concedes that this opening saves all of them, even with regard to Og, king of Bashan.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that the opening of Og must be his full size in order to designate it for taking out the corpse only with regard to a case in which there is an opening through which he is fit to exit as he is, while the other openings are four handbreadths but are not his full size: this opening is impure and the others are pure .

Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: One may establish an eruv with raw meat [that is salted but not cooked. See what the early authorities wrote above].

Rav Shimi bar Hiyya said: One may establish an eruv with live eggs

that were not cooked, for sometimes one dines on them under pressing circumstances [Ritva].

And how many

eggs does one give for the eruv?

Rav Nahman bar Yitzhak said: One, Sinai [

Rav Yosef, who was expert in Mishnayot and beraitot, and they were arranged in his mouth as though he had received them from Mount Sinai from Moses our teacher, Rabbenu Yehonatan]

said: Two!

We learned in the Mishna:

One who vows from food—

is permitted water

and salt.

And we infer:

Water and salt are what are not called “food”

to be included within the scope of his vow.

But all other things

are

called “food.”

Let us say that this is a refutation of Rav and Shmuel.

Of Rav and Shmuel, who both said: One recites “Who creates varieties of nourishment” only over the five species

of grain

alone.

And their reasoning is: because only the five species of grain are called “food.” But from our Mishna it is proven that everything is called “food” .

And we are astonished at the difficulty:

А их основание таково: только пять видов зерна называются «пищей». Между тем из нашей Мишны следует, что все называется «пищей».

And

if

we did not refute them

—Rav and Shmuel—

one time

already [and have we not already raised a difficulty against them once, from another source?] in Berakhot 37, from a beraita?!

And we explain: even so,

let us say that they are also refuted by this [is there also a refutation from the Mishna]?

And we answer:

Rav Huna said:

There is no basis for refuting Rav and Shmuel from the Mishna. For the Mishna is not speaking of one who says: “Food—is forbidden to me.” Rather, it is

when he says

“Everything that nourishes

—is forbidden

to me.”

And therefore, only

water and salt do not nourish [satiate].

But all things—

even those that are not among the five species of grain—

do nourish.

Nevertheless, this is not sufficient for them to be called “food” and for one to recite over them “Who creates varieties of nourishment,” since they do not sustain the heart of a person. Therefore, one recites “Who creates varieties of nourishment” only over the five species of grain.

And we are astonished concerning what we said, that all things nourish:

But Rabba bar bar Hana said: When we would go after Rabbi Yohanan to eat the fruits of Gennesaret [when we would go after Rabbi Yohanan to eat the fruits of Gennesaret, which is the land of the Sea of Galilee, whose fruits are sweet],

when we were one hundred [when we were a group of one hundred men],

we would take ten for each and every one [we would take ten fruits for each person].

And

when we were ten [and when we were a group of ten],

we would take one hundred for each and every one.

And each hundred of them [and each hundred of the fruits]

could not be held by a basket of three seahs [a basket of three seahs was needed in order to hold them].

And he would eat them—

Rabbi Yohanan—

all of them.

And

even so

he said

Rabbi Yohanan:

An oath that I have not tasted “nourishment” [he would swear after his eating that he had not eaten to satiety]!

Behold, we see that fruits do not satiate, and how did you say that all things nourish?!

And we answer:

Say: this is what Rabbi Yohanan would swear: “An oath that I have not tasted

food [I have still not sustained my heart]!”

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

One who swears:

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf”—

one may establish an eruv for him with it.

Since he prohibited himself only from eating, and not from benefit. And the eruv with this loaf is not forbidden to him by virtue of his oath .

[после еды он клялся, что не насытился].

But one who vows:

“This loaf is forbidden to me,”

and also prohibits himself from benefiting from the loaf—

one may not establish an eruv for him with it,

since even the benefit of the eruv has been prohibited to him .

[то есть я еще не насытил сердце].

The beraita raises an objection

from what we learned in a beraita:

One who vows from a loaf—

one may establish an eruv for him with it.

And the Gemara infers:

Is it not in a case where

he said, “This loaf is forbidden

to me,” and nevertheless one may establish an eruv for him with it.

It is therefore apparent that a person does not prohibit, without specification, except the primary benefit of the thing; and when he vows from a loaf, he vows with regard to eating, and not with regard to an eruv?!

And we answer:

No, this is how he vowed. Rather, here it is speaking

when he said: “An oath that I shall not eat

this loaf.”

He prohibited only its eating.

This too is logically evident,

that the matter is speaking of an oath that he shall not eat it.

From what it teaches at the end:

When

can he establish an eruv with the forbidden loaf?

When he said, “An oath that I shall not taste it.”

Because he did not prohibit the benefit.

And we are still astonished:

But

if he

said, “This loaf is

to me,”

what

is your view—does it mean that

here too one may not establish an eruv for him with it?

If so,

it is difficult:

instead of teaching

at the end: The one who says

“This loaf is consecrated”—

one may not establish an eruv for him with it, because one does not establish an eruv with consecrated property,

since it is not fit for human eating,

let him distinguish and teach it concerning itself—with regard to an ordinary loaf that he did not consecrate, but prohibited to himself by an oath or a vow.

And let him say:

“In what case are these words said,”

that it is possible to establish an eruv with a loaf that he prohibited, in a case where

he said, “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf.”

But

if he

said, “This loaf is

to me”—

one may not establish an eruv for him with it.

And from the fact that the tanna did not distinguish in this way, it is proven that even if he said, “This loaf is to me,” he may establish an eruv with it.

He said: Rav Huna answered you:

But what

did you wish to say, that

wherever he says, “This loaf is

to me,”

one may establish an eruv

for him with it?!

According to this,

the beginning is difficult,

for it teaches there: “When may one establish an eruv? When he said, ‘An oath that I shall not taste it,’” thus it is apparent that if he said, “This loaf is to me,”

—

one may not establish an eruv with it?!

Rather, necessarily, it is impossible to learn from the wording of the beraita what the law is when one says, “This loaf is to me.”

And we reject this: The beginning is not difficult. Rather,

something is missing

from the wording of the beraita,

and this is what it teaches

in it:

One who vows from a loaf—

one may establish an eruv for him with it. And even

if he

said

simply, “This loaf is

to me”—

it is treated as though he said, “An oath that I shall not taste it.”

For here too, he prohibited himself only through eating [the early authorities].

And we return to the difficulty:

in any event, it is difficult for Rav Huna,

the difficulty that we raised: Why does it teach at the end that with a consecrated loaf it is forbidden? Even when he says, “This loaf is to me,” it is forbidden?!

And we answer: Indeed, it is so: from this beraita it is proven that it is not in accordance with Rav Huna.

And he—

Rav Huna—

spoke in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

who disagrees with this beraita.

For it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf”—

one may establish an eruv for him with it.

“This loaf

is forbidden

to me”—

one may not establish an eruv for him with it.

And this is in accordance with Rav Huna!

And now we are astonished concerning Rabbi Eliezer:

And did Rabbi Eliezer say this?!

And it was taught: This is the principle:

When

a person prohibits himself through food,

that is, when he swears that he will not eat [for an oath is a prohibition applying to the person, as it is stated in Nedarim 2b]—

one may establish an eruv for him with it .

тем не менее это представляет трудность для Рав Уны: почему в конце барайты сказано, что в случае посвященного каравая запрещено устраивать эрув? Ведь даже если человек сказал: «Этот каравай запрещен мне», — это запрещено?!

But

food that is prohibited to a person [that is, a vow, which is a prohibition applying to the object, as it is stated in Nedarim 2b], and for example he said, “This loaf is to me”—

one may not establish an eruv for him with it.

Rabbi Eliezer says: One who says

“This loaf is to me”—

one may establish an eruv for him with it.

But one who says

“This loaf is consecrated”—

one may not establish an eruv for him with it.

For one does not establish an eruv for him

with a person

with consecrated property.

And now Rabbi Eliezer contradicts Rabbi Eliezer.

For above it teaches in the beraita that according to Rabbi Eliezer, one who says, “This loaf is forbidden to me,” may not establish an eruv for him with it.

Whereas here it teaches that according to Rabbi Eliezer, one who says, “This loaf is to me,” may establish an eruv for him with it?!

And we answer:

They are two tannaim,

and

they disagree

according to Rabbi Eliezer

about what his position is.

We learned in the Mishna:

One may establish an eruv for a nazirite with wine,

and for an Israelite with teruma.

And we say:

The Mishna—

is not in accordance with the School of Shammai.

For it was taught: The School of Shammai says: One may not establish an eruv for a nazirite with wine or for an Israelite with teruma.

The School of Hillel says: One may establish an eruv for a nazirite with wine and for an Israelite with teruma.

может устроить для себя на нем эрув.

Но тот, кто сказал

«Этот каравай — посвящение»,

не может устроить для себя на нем эрув.

Поскольку нельзя устраивать для человека

на

посвященном.

И теперь возникает противоречие между одним высказыванием рабби Элиэзера и другим.

Выше в барайте учено, что, согласно рабби Элиэзеру, если человек говорит: «Этот каравай запрещен мне», — нельзя устроить для него на нем эрув.

А здесь учено, что, согласно рабби Элиэзеру, если человек говорит: «Этот каравай запрещен мне», — можно устроить для него на нем эрув?!

И отвечаем:

это два танная,

которые

и

разошлись во мнениях

относительно мнения рабби Элиэзера,

то есть каково его мнение.

Мы учили в Мишне:

для назира устраивают эрув на вине,

а для исраэль — на труме.

И говорим:

Мишна

не соответствует мнению Бейт Шаммай.

Ибо учено: Бейт Шаммай говорят: нельзя устраивать для назира эрув на вине и для исраэль — на труме.

Бейт Гиллель говорят: можно устраивать для назира эрув на вине и для исраэль — на труме.